Gander & White Shipping, Inc.

Plain-English summary

OSHA inspected Gander & White Shipping after an employee was injured in a fall from a scissor lift at its Miami warehouse. The inspection found that employees operated powered industrial trucks without completing the required training and evaluation. The operations manager admitted the employees were untrained at the time, and records showed they received certifications only after the accident and inspection. The judge imputed the warehouse foreman's knowledge of a subordinate employee's untrained forklift operation to the company. The serious citation was affirmed and a $4,681 penalty was assessed.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(l)(1)(i)
• Outcome: Citation 1, Item 1 was affirmed, and a penalty of $4,681 was assessed.
• Key point: A supervisor's knowledge that a subordinate operates a powered industrial truck without required training can establish employer knowledge.

Full text (OSHRC public release)


Document

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v.

OSHRC Docket No.
22-0494

GANDER AND WHITE SHIPPING , INC . ,

Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

Attorneys and Law firms

C. Renita Hollins , Trial Attorney ,
Office of the Solicitor ,
Atlanta, GA ,
for Complainant.

Sean Maguire ,
Non- Attorney
Representative ,
Long Island City, NY ,
for Respondent.

JUDGE : John B. Gatto, United States Administrative Law Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

A n employee of
Respondent
Gander
a nd White Shipping, Inc.
( Gander )
was
injured in an accident
o n
January 18, 2021 ,
in M iami, Florida
(worksite) , which resulted in
the initiation of an
investigation by
C ompliance
S afety and
H ealth
O fficer
Anthony Campos 1
with
the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) .
After Campos
conducted
the
inspection
the
Complainant
Secretary
of Labor
(Secretary) 2
subsequently
issued
Gander
two
c itation s
with
proposed
penalt ies
totaling $ 4 , 681 .00 .
Gander ’s late notice of contest
(NOC)
contested the penalties only . 3
Since no penalty was involved
i n Citation 2,
Gander
did not contest Citation 2,
Item 1.
Therefore, i n accordance with §10(a) of the Act, Citation 2, Items 1 is “deemed a final order of the Commission and not subject to review by any court or agency.”

The Secretary subsequently filed a formal complaint 4
with the Commission seeking an Order affirming the Citation.
The reafter, the
Court
granted
Gander ’s unopposed request to convert the case to simplified
proceedings, where
pleadings are not required,
and t he admission of evidence is
generally
not controlled by the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 5
The
c ou rt
hel d a
bench
trial
on
February 8, 2023 .
Based upon the record, the court concludes it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in this case.
For the reasons indicated
infra , the Court
AFFIRMS
Citation 1, Item 1 and assesses a penalty of $ 4 , 681 .

II.
BACKGROUND

OSHA received
an anonymous complaint
on January 21, 2021 , which alleged a n employee was elevated on a scissor lift checking a box that was on a shelf and fell out of the lift approximately 9
feet
to the ground fracturing the elbow on his left arm.
(Ex. C-2.)
Campos
opened an inspection
on January 25, 2021 .
(Compl. Ex. A.)

Through his investigation, Campos
learned
that
the
accident occurred on January 18, 2021.
(Ex. C-2.)
During the course of his investigation,
Campos
determined
that
Gander ’s
employees were operating forklifts in the warehouse
without
hav ing
the required training and certification. (Tr.
30 ;
see also
Ex. C-2. ) According to the
Campos ,
f orklifts are
p owered
i ndustrial
t rucks. (Tr. 19 ).
Eugene Layton,
Gander ’s Operations Manager, admits
it operates
a scissor lift and a battery powered forklift
at the worksite, which were power industrial equipment. (Tr. 61). Layton also admitted
its employees were no t
trained at the time of the accident and testified that since the accident,
Gander
has now trained its employees. (Tr.
62 ).
Admitted into the record were certifications showing
Gander s employees were certified in Powered Industrial Trucks
after
the date of the accident and
after
the initial inspection. (Ex. R-1 through Ex. R-41.)

I II . ANALYSIS

The fundamental objective of the Act is to prevent occupational deaths and serious injuries.
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall , 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980). The Act “establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed ‘to assure so far as possible safe and healthful working conditions’ for ‘every working man and woman in the Nation.’”
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n (CF&I Steel Corp.),
499 U.S. 144, 147 (1991) ( quoting
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)). “The Act charges the Secretary with responsibility for setting and enforcing workplace health and safety standards.”
Id . To achieve this purpose, the Act imposes two duties on an employer, a general duty to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), and a specific duty to “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.” Id. § 654(a)(2). Thus, each employee must “comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this Act which are applicable to his own actions and conduct.” Id. § 654(b).

Pursuant to that authority, the standards at issue in this case were promulgated.
See
29 U.S.C. § 665. Meanwhile, the Commission is assigned to carry out adjudicatory functions under the Act and serves “as a neutral arbiter and determine whether the Secretary's citations should be enforced over employee or union objections.”
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union,
474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985) (per curiam). Thus, Congress vested the Commission with the “adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review context.”
CF&I Steel Corp ., 499 U.S. at 151.

Under the law of the Eleventh Circuit where this case arose, 6
“ the Secretary will make out a
prima facie
case for the violation of an OSHA standard by showing (1) that the regulation applied; (2) that it was violated; (3) that an employee was exposed to the hazard that was created; and importantly, (4) that the employer ‘knowingly disregarded’ the Act's requirements.”
Quinlan v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor , 812 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
ComTran Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 722 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013)). “If the Secretary establishes a
prima facie
case with respect to all four elements, the employer may then come forward and assert the affirmative defense of unpreventable or unforeseeable employee misconduct.”
Id.
(citing
id.
at 1308).

Citation 1,
Item 1

The cited standard mandates that the employer “shall ensure that each powered industrial truck operator is competent to operate a powered industrial truck safely, as demonstrated by the successful completion of the training and evaluation specified in this paragraph (l).” 29 CFR §1910.178(l)(1)(i).
Citation 1, Item 1 asserts
Gander
violated
§ 1910.178(l)(1)(i) when it “did not ensure that each powered industrial truck operator is competent to operate a powered industrial truck safely, as demonstrated by the successful completion of the training and evaluation specified in this paragraph (l)[.]”
(Compl. Ex. A.)
More specifically, the Secretary asserts that on or about January 21, 2021,
Gander
“did not ensure that employees while operating powered industrial truck to transport merchandise were trained and evaluated, thereby exposing employees to falls, crushed-by and struck-by hazards.” ( Id. )

(1) Cited Standard Applied

The powered industrial truck standard found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178 “contains safety requirements relating to fire protection, design, maintenance and use of
fork trucks , tractors, platform lift trucks, motorized hand trucks, and other specialized industrial trucks powered by electric motors or internal combustion engines.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(a)(1).
Gander ’s Operations Manager admits
it operates
a scissor lift and a battery powered forklift
at the worksite.
Thus, the cited standard applied.

(2) Cited Standard
was
Violated

Gander ’s Operations Manager admits its employees were not trained at the time of the accident. Therefore,
Gander
violated 29 CFR §1910.178(l)(1)(i) .

(3) Whether Employees were Exposed to Hazard

E mployees working inside
the
warehouse were exposed to struck by
hazards from untrained forklift operators .
Therefore,
t he Secretary has satisfied the third element as it relates to
Citation 1,
Item 1.

(4) Whether
Gander
“Knowingly Disregarded” the Act's Requirements

The Act imposes liability on the employer for a serious violation only if the employer knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the presence of the violation.
Fla. Lemark Corp. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Lab. , 634 F. App'x 681, 687 (11th Cir. 2015). “When a corporate employer entrusts to a supervisory employee its duty to assure employee compliance with safety standards, it is reasonable to charge the employer with the supervisor's knowledge actual or constructive of noncomplying conduct of a subordinate.”
ComTran Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 722 F.3d 1304, 13 1 7 (11th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). “It is reasonable to do this because a corporate employer can, of course, only act through its agents . . . and the supervisor acts as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the absent employer. That makes his knowledge the employer's knowledge.”
Id.

“The Secretary may prove that an employer had knowledge of a violation in one of two ways—(1) by imputing the actual or constructive knowledge of a supervisor or (2) by demonstrating constructive knowledge based on the employer's failure to implement an adequate safety program.”
Samsson Constr., Incorp. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Lab. , 723 F. App'x 695, 697 (11th Cir. 2018) ( citing
ComTran Grp., Inc. , 722 F.3d at 1311).
Here,
Joel Hernandez, the warehouse
foreman admitted to
Campos
that he and another employee
operated
the forklifts
even though
they have never been trained.

However,
“the Secretary does not carry [his] burden and establish a prima facie case with respect to employer knowledge merely by demonstrating that a supervisor engaged in misconduct.”
ComTran Grp., Inc. , 722 F.3d at 1316. “A supervisor's ‘rogue conduct’ cannot be imputed to the employer in that situation.”
Id. “Rather, ‘employer knowledge must be established, not vicariously through the violator's knowledge, but by either the employer's actual knowledge, or by its constructive knowledge based on the fact that the employer could, under the circumstances of the case, foresee the unsafe conduct of the supervisor, [that is, with evidence of lax safety standards].”
Id.
(citation omitted). “Without such evidence, a supervisor's misconduct may be viewed as an isolated incident of unforeseeable or idiosyncratic behavior . . . which is insufficient, by itself, to impose liability under the Act.”
Id.
(citations omitted).

Here,
Hernandez
admitted both he and
a
subordinate
employee operated the forklifts even though they have never been trained.
Therefore, “the situation with respect to the non-supervisory subordinate employee in this case is analogous to the ordinary situation in which imputation is clearly established.”
Quinlan , 812 F.3d at 841.
Hernandez’s
actual knowledge of
a subordinate
employee’s
hazardous conduct
is imputed to
Gander. 7
Therefore,
t he Secretary has satisfied the
fourth
element as it relates to
Citation 1,
Item 1.

I V.
PENALTY

Under the Act, the Secretary has the authority to propose a penalty according to Section 17 of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(a), 666. Ultimately, it is the province of the Commission to “assess all civil penalties provided in [Section 17]”, which it
determines
de novo . 29 U.S.C. § 666(j);
see also Valdak Corp. , 17 BNA OSHC 1135 (No. 93-0239, 1995). In determining an appropriate penalty, the Court is required to consider “the employer’s size, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and any prior history of violations.”
Briones Util. Co. , 26 BNA OSHC 1218, 1222 (No. 10-1372, 2016) ( citing
29 U.S.C. § 666(j). These factors are not necessarily accorded equal weight.
J.A. Jones Constr. , 15 BNA OSHC 2201, 2216 (No. 87-2059, 1993) (citation omitted). Gravity
is the primary focus of any penalty analysis,
which
takes into consideration: (1) how many employees were exposed and for how long; (2) whether
Gander
took precautions against injury; (3) the probability an accident will occur; and (4) the likelihood an injury will occur.
See, e.g., Capform, Inc. , 19 BNA OSHC 1374, 1378 (No. 99-0322, 2001),
aff’d , 34 F. Appx. 152 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).

The Secretary
proposed a penalty of
$4,681.00
for Citation 1, Item 1. Th e
Secretary
determined
the violation was of
medium
severity
because an
employee being
struck by a forklift could suffer a fracture ,
and
lessor
probability b ased on the l imit ed time of employee exposure to the hazard .
( See
Ex. C- 3 ;
see also
Ex. C-12 ) (where Carlos Sosa stated,
“ I
used the forklift sometimes 2 to 3 times a week to 2 to 3 times a month”).
The
c ourt agree with th e Secretary’s
determination. The
Secretary
proposed a 6 0% reduction in the penalty amount because
Gander
ha d
15
employee s .
Based upon
Carlos Sosa’s statement, the
c ourt finds the actual number of employees was 20 ( “about 15 people in the warehouse
and 5 in the office” ).
(Ex. C-12.)
The
c ourt
nonetheless
agrees that
a 60 % reduction for size is appropriate.
The Secretary did not provide an i ncrease or a reduction based upon
Gander ’s history since OSHA had not
inspected
Gander
in the
previous 5 years. The
c ourt
agrees
with that determination. The Secretary also did not provide a reduction based
upon good faith.
Since
Gander
had no program in place to
ensure that each powered industrial truck operator
wa s competent to operate a powered industrial truck safely
prior to the accident,
t he
c ourt
also
agree with that determination.
Th us,
considering
Gander ’s
size, the gravity of the violation, the
lack of
good faith, and
its
history ,
the
c ourt concludes the appropriate
penalty is $ 4,681 .
Accordingly,

V. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
Citation 1,
Item 1 is
AFFIRMED
and
a civil
penalty of $4,681 is
ASSESSED .

SO ORDERED .

/s/____

JOHN B. GATTO, Judge

Dated: March 10, 2023

Atlanta, GA

"

1
“Compliance Safety and Health Officer” means “a person authorized by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, to conduct inspections.” 29 C.F.R. § 1903.22(d).

2
The Secretary of Labor has assigned responsibility for enforcement of the Act to OSHA and has delegated his authority under the Act to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, who heads OSHA.
See
Order 8-2020, Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, 85 Fed. Reg. 58393 (Sept. 18, 2020 ), superseding
Order No. 1-2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012).
The terms “Secretary” and “OSHA” are used interchangeably herein. For simplicity, the court also refers to actions taken by the Assistant Secretary and the Area Directors as actions taken by the Secretary.

3
The late NOC stated, “ We respectfully request that the fine be waived as we regularly conduct safety training for each
new hire and periodically thereafter when circumstances permit. ”
Early decisions of the Commission held that when an employer contested the penalties, the citations were automatically in
contest.
See Swan Lake Moulding Co. , 1 BNA OSHC 1419, 1421 (No. 1305, 1973).
This position was reversed by the Commission in
Florida East Coast Properties, Inc.
when the Commission held that
“even though a respondent properly contests the amount of a penalty proposed by the Secretary, the Commission does not thereby acquire jurisdiction to review the violation.”
Fla. E. Coast Properties, Inc. , 1 BNA OSHC 1532 ( No.
2354,
1974) .

4
Commission Rule 30(d) provides that “[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion. A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.” 29 C.F.R §2200.30(d). Attached to the complaint and also adopted by reference were the citations, which were “a part thereof for all purposes.”

5
The Secretary stipulated the
Federal Rules of Evidence
will apply to him.
( See
29 C.F.R §2200.209(c)).

6
The employer or the Secretary may appeal a final decision and order to the federal court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or where the employer has its principal office, and the employer also may appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 660(a) and (b). The Commission has held that
“[w] here it is highly probable ”
that a case
“would
be appealed to a particular circuit,
the Commission has
generally applied the precedent of that circuit in deciding the case — even though it may differ from the Commission’s precedent. ”
Kerns Bros. Tree Serv .,
18 BNA OSHC 2064, 2068
( No. 96-1719 , 2000).
The Eleventh Circuit has jurisdiction over the site of the alleged violations and
Respondent’s
principal place of business ,
both of which are in
Miami,
Florida .
The
c ourt appl ies
its
precedent
here.

7
The Secretary classified the violation as “serious,” which is true if “an employer knew about and failed to prevent ‘a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists’ in the workplace.”
Fluor Daniel v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n , 295 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002) ( quoting
29 U.S.C. § 666(k)). As the Commission has noted, “[t]his does not mean that the occurrence of an accident must be a substantially probable result of the violative condition but, rather, that a serious injury is the likely result if an accident does occur.”
Mosser Constr., Inc. , 23 BNA OSHC 1044, 1046 (No. 08-0631, 2010) ( quoting Oberdorfer Indus. Inc. , 20 BNA OSHC 1321 (No. 97-0469, 2003) (consolidated) (citation omitted)). Based upon the record, the
c ourt concludes the Secretary properly classified the violation as a serious one.