American Civil Constructors LLC, dba American Civil Constructors Mountain West

Plain-English summary

American Civil Constructors installed water pipe at a construction project in Aurora, Colorado. An excavator operator used a bucket to deliver a pipe plug to an employee in a trench, and the approximately 2,500-pound bucket detached and struck the employee, who died from his injuries. OSHA cited the company under the General Duty Clause for exposing employees to an improperly connected excavator bucket. The judge found that the company and its industry recognized the hazard, a rule barring workers from approaching suspended machine components was feasible, and the foreman's knowledge was attributable to the company because he knew the operator was inexperienced and had previously failed to test bucket connections. The serious citation and its $11,747 penalty were affirmed.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
• Outcome: The serious General Duty Clause citation was affirmed with an $11,747 penalty.
• Key point: A supervisor's knowledge of an operator's inexperience and prior missed connection tests can support constructive knowledge of an excavator-bucket hazard.

Full text (OSHRC public release)


Document

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

S ECRETARY OF LABOR ,

Complainan t,

v.

AMERICAN CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS, L L C,
d / b / a
AMERICAN CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS
MOUNTAIN WEST ,

Respondent.

DOCKET NO.
   22-0300

Appearances:

Bryan Kaufman , Esq. , U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor,
Denver, CO,

For Complainant

Travis Vance , Esq.,
Nicholas Hulse , Esq.,
Kristin White , Esq.,
Fischer & Phillips, LLP ,

For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge
Brian A. Duncan

DECISION AND ORDER

Procedural History

On
August 23, 2021,
an excavator bucket detached
from a John Deere 350G excavator
and struck
one of Respondent
American Civil Constructors, LCC ’s
(ACC)
employees, who was killed.
The next day,
the OSHA
Assistant Area Director
(AAD)
for the Denver office and a
Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO)
conducted an inspection of the
jobsite
located at
64th
Avenue
and Denali
Street
( 64th and Denali project) .
On
February 14, 2022 ,
Complainant issued a
Citation and Notification of Penalty , alleging that
ACC
had committed a serious violation of 2 9
U.S.C. §   654(a)(1), also referred to as the general duty clause, with a proposed penalty of
$11,747 .
ACC
timely filed a notice of contest , which brought the matter before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission pursuant to
s ection 10(c) of the OSH Act.

A trial was held
on May 22-23 and June
29, 2023.
The following individuals testified: (1)   George
Trehal , Foreman; (2) Joshua
Shorley ,
Safety Director for ACC; (3)
Sean Fabela,
Construction Superintendent ;
(4) Lisa Bennett,
OSHA
AAD
for the Denver Office;
(5)
CSHO
Bradley Mercil ; and (6)
David Danaher, Expert Witness for ACC.
B oth parties
timely
submitted post-trial briefs
for
consideration.

Jurisdiction
& Stipulations

The parties
stipulated
that
the Commission has j urisdiction
over this proceeding
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act
and
that,
at all times
relevant to this proceeding,
ACC
was an employer engaged in a business and industry affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of
s ections   3(3) and 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § §
652( 3 )
& (5) .
( Tr.
26 ).
See
Slingluff v. OSHRC , 425 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2005).

Factual
Background

1. The Accident

ACC was hired to install new roadways and underground utilities at a worksite known as the 64th and Denali project.
(Tr. 250).
Sean Fabela was the
p roject ’s
s uperintendent who supervised all of ACC’s crews at the worksite. (Tr.
405,
407). George
Trehal
was the foreman of
the crew
working at the accident location
that
was
responsible for installing freshwater pi pe . (Tr. 5 4-55 ).
At all relevant times,
Foreman
Trehal’s
crew consisted of
[redacted]
( mainline hoe operator ),
[redacted]
( head pipelayer ) ,
Cade Pi h l
( laborer ), and
Samuael
“ Sosa ”
Samano-Ortega
( laborer ) . (Tr.
89).

On August 23, 2021 —the date of the accident—the
crew was preparing to
connect
a water pipe section
t o a fire hydrant , and
Foreman
Trehal
directed
[redacted]
and
[redacted]
to
“clean the hole”
before the installation . (Tr. 58).
“Cleaning the hole” meant using the excavator to
widen
and deepen the trench.
(Tr.
149 ).
[redacted]
was in
the
trench and
yelled out
for someone to pass him the pipe plug, which
weighed
five
pounds . (Tr.
149;
194 ).
Foreman
Trehal
heard
[redacted]
call for the pipe plug. (Tr.
150 ).
[redacted]
intended to install the pipe plug on the bell of the pipe to protect it from dirt .
(Tr.
58,
194).
While
[redacted]
was in the trench
awaiting the pipe plug ,
Foreman
Trehal
walked
about 50 to 100 feet away, on the other side of the excavator,
to perform another job task.
(Tr.
150,
189- 90).
There was no bucket attached to the excavator when
Foreman
Trehal
walked
around to the other side of the excavator , so
Foreman
Trehal
understood
[redacted]
would need to connect
a
bucket before cleaning the hole . (Tr.
150 , 169 , 190 ).
The record establishes that for this type of work, excavator operators change buckets and attachments
frequently,
sometimes 50 times
per day . (Tr.
199).
[redacted]
connected
the bucket and
used
it
to
deliver the pipe plug to
[redacted]
in side
the trench. (Tr.
306-07 ; Ex.
C-20 at 13 ).
W hen
[redacted]
approached the excavator bucket
to
reach in and
retrieve the pipe plug ,
the bucket
suddenly
detached
from the coupler
and struck
[redacted]
in his torso and shoulder . (Tr.
602-03 ; Ex. J-7 ).
It is unclear whether the bucket was suspended in the air
at that moment
or resting on the
curved surface
of the
horizontal
pipe. (Ex. C- 10; Ex. C -17 at 2).
The bucket
was 54 inches wide and
weighed
approximately
2,500
pounds. 1
(Tr.
475 ; Ex. C-19 at 3 ; Ex. R-10 ).
[redacted]
died
as a result of
his injuries.
( Tr. 26;
Ex. J-7).
He was underneath the detached bucket
when first responders arrived at the scene.
(Tr. 589).

[redacted]
appears to have been
the only witness to the accident
but
was
not
called by either party to
testify at trial .
(Tr.
678).
Mr. Pihl and Mr.
Samano-Ortega
were cutting a pipe near the
edge of the
trench but did not
actually
see the
bucket
detach and fall on
[redacted] . (Tr.
148; Ex.
C-11; Ex.
C-17 ).
As stated previously,
Foreman
Trehal
was
completing another job task
on the other side of the excavator when the accident occurred , and he could not see the trench from his position
approximately
50 to 100 feet away .
(Tr. 219).

Shortly thereafter , t he police
arrived at the scene
and
investigated
the accident .
(Tr.
3 18 -19 ) . The next day,
AAD
Bennet t
and
CSHO
Miguel
Demelli
conducted
an inspection of the worksite. 2
(Tr.
53 0-31 ).
They took videos and photos
and
completed
interviews with various ACC employees.
(Tr. 532).
They
later
returned to
the
work site
when the excavator was moved
to be
placed
in storage . (Tr.
5 32 ,
699 ).
In October 2021 , the
investigation
was reassigned to CSHO Mercil, who handled the
matter
until the Citation in this case was issued.
(Tr.
633 ; 6 39- 40 ).

David
Danaher , a forensic engineer
with a background in mechanical engineering ,
was retained
by ACC
to
determine whether
the excavator and coupler
were
operat ing
properly at the time of the accident .
(Tr.
698,
720 ; Ex. R-8 ).
The
hydraulic
coupler
used to quickly connect and disconnect various excavator attachments , like buckets,
works as follows .
The excavator has two pins, a front pin and a back pin. ( Ex. C-4 at ACC000153 ;
Ex.
R-18 ).
The operator
first
attaches
the front hook
of the excavator
on the
front pin of the bucket. ( Tr.
461; Ex. C -4 at
ACC 000153 ;
Ex.
R-18 ).
The operator then rotates
the bucket to the full curl position
and pushes a switch to
th e
lock position.
(Ex. C-4 at
ACC000153 ; Ex. R-18 ).
This activates the hydraulic locking mechanism and locks the back pin of the bucket. ( Tr.
517-18 ; Ex. C-4 at 113).
If
one of
the
pins
is
not properly
engaged, the bucket will swing
and give the operator a visual
cue that the bucket is
not properly
attached . (Tr.
462 ; Ex. R-18 ) .

In addition
to visual verification , e xcavator operators
also
perform a
“ ground test ”
after
connecting
a new attachment
to ensure
it
is secure.
(Tr.
213-14 ; Ex. R-18 at 2).
When conducting a ground test, the operator curls the bucket and hits the bucket on the ground . (Tr. 201). This confirms there is no movement and
that
the front and back pins
have locked. (Tr.
198).
Ground tests take approximately 10 to 15 seconds to complete. (Tr. 201).

In April 2022, 3
Mr. Danaher tested the excavator and coupler. (Tr. 7 0 0). He concluded both were operating properly at the time of the accident and
the hydraulic
coupler
was
functional.
(Tr. 72 0-2 1).
In other words,
if
the operator
had
ensured
the
coupler
was properly
attached to
both pins of the bucket,
verified by a ground test,
the bucket
could not
have
unexpectedly detach ed .
(Tr. 721).
OSHA did
not test the excavator
or
coupl er . (Tr.
625 ).

Complainant
ultimately determined that
ACC
violated
s ection 5(a)(1) of the
OSH
Act when
it exposed employees to struck-by and crushing hazards from the unexpected release
of
a 54-inch excavation bucket from
a quick coupler device. (Citation, Ex.
J-1 at 6).

2. ACC’s Safety Program

ACC had a
written
Safety Management Program in place at the time of the accident. (Tr.
131 ; J-5). It required its employees to undergo
various types of
safety training, site supervisors to conduct safety meetings, and foremen to conduct
weekly
“toolbox
talks ” ( Ex. J-5; Tr. 339 ; Ex. R-1 ; Ex. R-4 ). Site supervisors also completed
daily
job
safety
analyses (JSAs), which identified
specific
work
hazards
present
on
a
specific day based on the tasks to be completed and
other
factors , like weather or traffic. (Tr.
339 ,
343 ; Ex. R-2 ).
In addition, each worksite—including the
64th and Denali worksite—had a site - specific safety plan prepared ,
which was intended to reiterate important
portions
of ACC’s
safety program and set forth
an
emergency action plan. (Tr. 344; Ex. J-4).

In addition to
its
Safety Management Program , ACC
submits that it
had
a number of
work
rules it communicated to its employees.
For example, employees were
generally
told to st ay out of the
“ line of fire ”
and
were
prohibited from entering
the
swing zone
of heavy machinery . (Tr.
211 , 235 , 280 ).
If a work task required an employee to be within the swing zone ,
ACC
required the employee
to make eye contact with the machine operator before entering the swing zone and maintain eye contact while in the swing zone. (Tr. 279 ,
350 ,
419 -20 ).
T his practice ensured the machine operator’s awareness of the employee’s presence in the swing zone. (Tr.
420 ).

ACC also had
a
work
rule
against
standing under suspended loads. (Tr.
191 ,
204 , 212 ,
330 ).
Management understood the rule to include
excavator buckets. (Tr. 33 0 ).
The record did not establish that employees also understood this rule to include excavator buckets. OSHA
did
not consider
the term
suspended load to include excavator buckets. (Tr. 634). In its section on excavation and training, the
Safety Management Program
prohibited employees from standing “underneath loads handled by lifting or digging equipment.” ( Ex.
J-5 at 130).

In addition, ACC had a work rule that required excavator operators to conduct a
“ ground test ” (explained earlier)
to ensure an attachment was properly
connected and locked. (Tr.
198). This practice was in line with
other construction companies, as well as
the manufacturer’s instructions for
operating
the
   quick connect
coupler. ( Tr.
214;
Ex.
R-18).

In addition to written policies and
work rules , ACC’s safety program
also
included routine inspections and audits of worksites. (Tr. 241).
As ACC’s Safety Director, Mr.
Shorley
conducted these inspections and attended toolbox talks,
conducted
trainings, and advised employees on safety
hazards. (Tr. 241 , 246 ). Formal inspections were documented.
(Tr. 242 ).
Mr.
Shorley
conducted several safety inspections at the 64th and Denali Project, and any corrective actions were completed under his supervision. (Tr.
248-49,
381 ;
Ex. R-3 ).
As site superintendent, Mr. Fabela
inspected the
64th and Denali worksite
daily
for safety and quality control. (Tr. 409).

Foreman
Trehal
completed daily JSAs with his crew, alerting them to
safety
issues ranging from proper trench sloping to staying out of the line of fire. (Tr. 235 -36 ; Ex. C-7). The JSA for
the
day
of the accident identifie d
hazards
such as
“ human equipment interface ”
and blind spots. (Ex. C-7 at 4 8) . Corrective measures included communications with operators, avoiding standing in the line of fire, watching the swing radius of equipment, and maintaining eye contact with operators. (Ex. C-7 at 4 8 ).
T he JSA
dated a few days before the accident
included a warning
against standing
under a suspended load , referring to
rigging . (Ex. C-7 at 43).

3. ACC’s Disciplinary Policy

ACC had a progressive disciplinary action policy
in effect at the time of the accident . (Ex. J-5
at 43-44 ;
Tr. 283).
The policy required a n employee’s supervisor
to
give the employee a verbal warning at the first violation, a written warning at the second violation, and discharge at the third violation. (Ex. J-5 at 43 -44 ). Although the immediate supervisor was responsible for initiating discipline, the division general superintendent had to be advised prior to all disciplinary actions. (Ex. J-5 at 43). The policy required all warnings and proposed solutions to be documented and placed in the personnel file of the employee. ( Ex.
J-5 at 43;
Ex. J-6;
Tr. 284-85).

A handful of
documented
disciplinary actions were entered into the record. ( Ex.
J-6).
The
discipline
ranged from a verbal warning for improper lane usage to termination for
working under the influence of alcohol. ( Ex.
J-6 at 1, 3).
None of the
disciplinary actions involved an employee being in the line of fire ,
failing to perform a ground test ,
or working
near or
underneath the bucket
of an excavator. None of the disciplinary actions involved
[redacted]
or
[redacted] .
Foreman
Trehal , the
supervisor
present at the accident site,
admitted
during the trial
that he did not follow the progressive disciplinary policy set forth in ACC’s Safety Management Program. (Tr. 132 -33 ).
He never documented violations and was unaware of the requirement to do so. (Tr. 132). Instead, i f he saw a safety violation, he would yell at the employee to correct the behavior. (Tr.
130, 136,
140,
199 ).
On other jobs p rior to the a ccident ,
h e recalled
yell ing
at
[redacted]
for being in the swing zone of heavy machinery without the operator seeing him. (Tr. 130 -31 ).
Foreman
Trehal
also
recalled yelling
at
[redacted]
(the excavator operator)
on two
previous
occasions for operating
a
tailhoe
excavator
with an improperly attached bucket
after
[redacted]
failed to conduct a ground test to ensure the bucket was
fully engaged . (Tr. 11 6-1 7 ,
19 6-9 7).
Foreman
Trehal
never documented
the se
safety
violations
or administered any
formal
discipline
for the violations
to
[redacted]
or
[redacted] . (Tr. 11 7-1 8).

Discussion

Citation 1, Item 1

Complainant alleged a serious violation of the Act in Citation
1,
Item 1 as follows:

OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees
in that employee(s) were exposed to a struck-by hazards:

(a) American Civil Constructors LLC located at 23614 E. 64th Avenue: On August 23,
2021
and at times prior,
employees were exposed to struck-by and crushing hazards from the unexpected release of a Paladin 54 inch
excavator bucket from a Paladin JRB
PowerLatch
EX Coupler. An employee was fatally injured when he was
struck by an excavator bucket that became detached from a quick coupler device.

Among other methods, feasible and acceptable abatement methods to correct this hazard include ensuring that
employees do not stand under suspended machine components such as the boom, arm, or bucket, such as stated in
the NIOSH document,
“ Preventing Injuries When Working with Hydraulic Excavators and Backhoe Loaders ”
and
as the employer implemented in its revised policy following the accident .

( Citation and Notification of Penalty at 6 ) .

“To prove a violation of the general duty clause, the Secretary must establish that: (1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard; (2) the employer or its industry recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm; and (4) a feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.”  UHS o f
Westwood Pembroke, Inc. , No. 17-0737, 2022 WL 774272, at 2 (OSHRC, Mar. 3, 2022 ),
aff’d , No.
22-1845, 2023 WL 3243988, at 1 (3d Cir. May 4, 2023) .
The Secretary must also establish that “the employer knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the hazardous condition.”  Id.

Complainant alleges ACC violated the general duty clause
because ACC
failed to implement work rules
or provide
proper supervision to avoid a known
and foreseeable
hazard : employees working under
improperly connected
excavator buckets.
ACC
argues in response that
it had work rules in place that prohibited employees from standing under suspended excavator
attachments
and implemented a progressive disciplinary policy to enforce its safety rules.
ACC contends the accident was
the result of unpreventable employee misconduct because the
decision to
use an excavator bucket to
deliver a
five -pound pipe plug to an employee in a trench, who then approached
the
suspended bucket , was unforeseeable .

The
C onditions
C reated a
H azard for
E mployees

As the first element in establishing a
s ection
5(a)(1) violation, a “hazard” is defined in terms of conditions or practices deemed unsafe over which an employer
can reasonably be expected to exercise control.
Morrison-Knudson Co./Yonkers Contracting Co., A Joint Venture,
No. 88- 572,
1993 WL 127946, at *19
(OSHRC ,
Apr. 20,
1993).
The hazard
advanced by Complainant
in this case is the unexpected detachment of an excavator bucket from the quick
coupling device.
The Court notes that w hether
an
excavator bucket
presents a hazard
to employees
depends on whether anyone is within
striking
distance
of the bucket should it detach .
See
Baroid
Div. of NL
Indust ., Inc. , 660 F.2d 439, 444 (10th Cir. 1981) ( noting a
hazard is a “condition that creates or contributes to an increased risk that an event causing death or serious bodily harm to employees will occur.”).
There is no hazard if an operator was , for example,
prairie digging,
which is the pr actice
of
operating
an excavator
in an open area without utilities or traffic
during training , with no employees in the vicinity . (Tr. 465) .

Here, Complainant has established a hazard.
If a
detached bucket
strik es
a
nearby
worker , it
could and did
result in death or serious bodily harm.
In addition, an employer
can reasonably control the hazard by
implement ing
w ork rules
to
mitigate the unexpected detachment itself by requiring operators to
conduct
a ground test
each time an excavator attachment is changed out
an d
prohibit employees from standing under
or approaching
suspended buckets .
In fact, ACC maintains these work rules were in place at the time the accident occurred.
Thus, the hazard
wa s within the employer’s
reasonable
control
to prevent.

In addition,
the Court
notes that
the unexpected detachment of an excavator bucket
has caused
fatalities
in other cases before this Commission.
See, e.g.
Reynolds, Inc ., No.
05-0023,
2006 WL 1302527, at 1
(OSHRC ALJ , Mar. 20, 2006);
Performance Site M gmt . ,
No.
01-0956,
2002 WL 1869651, at 3
(OSHRCALJ, Aug. 8, 2002) .
This hazard is not one that
is the result of
“ a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances . ”
See
Nat’l
Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC , 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Respondent and Its Industry Recognized the Hazard

A hazard is recognized when either the cited employer or its industry recognizes the risk of harm from the cited conditions.
Arcadian Corp. ,
No. 93-0628, 2004 WL 2218388, at 14
(OSHRC, Sept. 30, 2004) .
P recautions taken by an employer can establish hazard recognition in conjunction with other evidence , such as
management’s
understanding
of the hazard .
Beverly
Enterprs . , Inc .,
No.
91-3144,
2000 WL 34012177, at 28
( OSHRC, Oct. 27, 2000)
(consolidated)
(finding persuasive
evidence that the
employer’s managers specifically
knew about and warned
personnel of the lifting hazard at issue) .
Probative evidence of industry recognition includes, among other things, voluntary industry standards published
by
organizations like A NSI
and NIOSH.
See, e.g.,
The
Duriron
Co., Inc .,
No. 77-2847,
1983 WL 23869, at *5
n.2 (OSHRC, Apr.   27, 1983)
(relying on NIOSH standards for corroboration of industry recognition of a hazard ).

Complainant presented evidence o f employer and industry recognition of th e cited hazard . 4
Foreman
Trehal , Mr.
Shorley , and Mr.
Fabela
all testified that
an improperly attached bucket could cause serious injury
and
there existed
work rules
against standing under suspended loads
to avoid
th at
hazard .
(Tr.
108,
252 , 330 ,
42 3-24 ) .
Foreman
Trehal
had
on several
previous
occasions
seen
improperly attached buckets, and in some instances, he observed
an improperly attached
bucket fall off.
(Tr. 100-01 ). In addition,
Foreman
Trehal
observed — on
multiple
occasions — an improperly attached bucket while
[redacted]
was operating an excavator. (Tr. 116-17).
In addition, ACC’s work rule requiring excavator operators to conduct ground tests after
connecting
an attachment demonstrates
employer
recognition of the hazard.
The knowledge of ACC’s management supports a finding that the hazard was recognized by ACC.
See
Mo. Basin Well Svc., Inc ., No. 13-1817, 2018 WL 1309482 (OSHRC, Mar. 1, 2018)
( finding supervisor’s recognition of the hazard was imputable to his employer).

Additionally, the Court finds
the
industry recognized the hazard at issue.
Complainant introduced into evidence a NIOSH publication titled “Preventing Injuries when Working with Hydraulic Excavators and Backhoe Loaders.” (Ex. C-1).
The publication identifies the two most common causes of injury associated with excavators or backhoe loads,
one of them being a worker struck by excavator buckets that unexpectedly detach.
(Ex. C-1,
Description of Exposure ).
In addition, the excavator’s operating manual itself
warned “Never lift, move, or swing a load or attachment over anyone.”
(Ex. C-5 at 9).
And,
t he excavator had a sticker clearly warning
that workers could be exposed to a crush hazard
if a bucket is improperly attached and drops unexpectedly.
(Ex. C-4 at
ACC 0000 96 ; Tr. 423 ).
Complainant presented sufficient evidence that
ACC
and
the
industry recognized
the cited
hazard
of an improperly connected bucket becoming detached from an excavator coupler .

The
Hazard Caused
Serious Injury
and
Death

Complainant must show
that
ACC’s
employees were “exposed to a hazard likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”
Peacock Eng’g, Inc. ,
No. 11-2780, 2017 WL 3864205 (OSHRC, Apr. 27, 2017).
ACC argues
Complainant
did not
show the hazard
wa s
likely to cause serious injury or death
because there
we re no work tasks that require d
an employee to be under a suspended excavator bucket such that an injury might occur. However, the
appropriate standard for assessing this element is “not the likelihood of an accident or injury, but whether, if an accident occur s , the results are likely to cause death or serious harm.”
Waldon
Health Care Ctr. , No.
89-3097, 1993 WL 119662, at *11 (OSHRC, Apr. 2, 1993) .
On this point , the Court need not speculate.
An employee was killed when a
2,500-pound
excavator bucket unexpectedly detached and struck him.
Complainant established this element.

Complainant Established Feasible Means to Abate the Hazard

To
prove
this element,
Complainant must “specify the proposed abatement measures and demonstrate both that the measures are capable of being put into effect and that they would be effective in materially reducing the incidence of the hazard. ”
Arcadian Corp. ,
No. 93-0628, 2004 WL 2218388, at 13 (OSHRC, Sept. 30, 2004) ( internal citation and quotation omitted ).
Where an employer has taken steps to abate the recognized hazard, Complainant must show those measures
we re inadequate.
Ala .
Power Co. ,
No. 84-357, 1987 WL 89119, at * 4, (OSHRC, Apr. 17, 1987)
(citing
Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Grp., Inc. ,
No. 78-5159, 1986 WL 53476, at 2 (OSHRC, May 7, 1986) ).

Complainant
submitted sufficient evidence to support
a
feasible means of abatement includ ing
implementing and enforcing a policy prohibiting employees from standing under suspended machine components , “such as
the boom, arm, or bucket . ”
See
A.H. Sturgill Roofing, Inc .,
No.
13-0224 , 2019 WL 1099857, at 9
(OSHRC, Feb. 28, 2019) ( implementing any one of
alternative means
would constitute abatement of the alleged violation ).
Foreman
Trehal , Mr.
Shorley , and Mr. Fabela testified that no work task required an employee to
be
under a suspended bucket , which
weighs in favor of the feasibility of Complainant’s proposed rule . (Tr. 191, 203, 212, 455, 330, 358).
The operator’s manual itself
warns “Never lift, move, or swing a load or attachment over anyone”
(Ex. C-5 at 9), which also weighs in favor of finding feasible the proposed rule.
In
addition,
t he NIOSH publication
directly addresses the circumstances present here and recommends
a work rule of : “Do not allow workers to stand under suspended loads or suspended machine components, such as the boom, arm, or bucket.” (Ex. C-1 at 3).
See
M o.
Basin Well Serv . , Inc .,
No.
20-0562,
2018 WL 1309482, at 6
(OSHRC, July 12, 2022)
( industry standard
offered by Secretary
should address
the same circumstances at issue
in the case ).

A lthough ACC
believes the
bucket was resting on the bell of the pipe, it does not argue
in its post-trial brief that
this meant the bucket was not
at least partially
suspended
as opposed to fully and
firmly
resting on the ground .
Therefore,
the Court
find s
the
preponderance of the evidence establishes
the bucket
was
suspended , i.e. ,
not resting on the ground,
at
the time of the accident. And, a lthough
ACC
argues
it had a rule against standing under suspended loads,
it
was
not clear that employees understood that
a
bucket
attached to a mainline hoe
should be treated as
a suspended load .
The Court finds that
Complainant established a feasible means to abate the identified hazard.

Respondent’s Employees Were
Exposed
to
a
Hazard

“Implicit in the above elements
[of
proof for general duty clause violations]
is the necessity for establishing employee exposure to the cited hazardous condition.”
Peacock Engineering, Inc ., 2017 WL 3864205, at * 5 (OSHRC, Apr.   27, 2017)
(citation omitted).
“ The Secretary establishes exposure either by showing actual exposure or that access to the hazard was reasonably predictable.”
Id.
(citation omitted) .
ACC
argues there was no employee exposure because no work tasks required an employee to be under a suspended excavator bucket.
However,
this ignores the fact that
[redacted]
was
in the trench
completing a
task
specifically assigned by Foreman
Trehal
when
[redacted]
used the bucket to deliver a pipe plug
to
[redacted] .
[redacted]
was clearly exposed to the hazard,
as the detached bucket fell on him.
Complainant established
employee
exposure to
the cited
hazard.

Respondent Had Knowledge of the Violation

“[I] n addition to establishing the four elements of a general duty clause violation, the Secretary must prove that the employer knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the hazardous condition. ”
Peacock Eng ’g ,
2017 WL 3864205, at 2 .
The key
factor
here
is whether
ACC
was aware of the conditions constituting a violation, not whether it understood the conditions violated the
OSH
Act.
Phoenix Roofing, Inc. ,
No. 90-2148, 1995 WL 82313, at * 3 (OSHRC, Feb. 24, 1995).
Complainant can
prove
employer
knowledge through the actual or constructive
knowledge
of its supervisory employees.
Dover Elevator Co. ,
No. 91-862, 1993 WL 275823, at 7 (OSHRC, July 16, 1993) . If a supervisor is, or should be, aware of
a hazardous condition , it is reasonable to charge the employer with that knowledge.
See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. OSHRC , 623 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1980).
T he Secretary may
also
prove constructive knowledge by showing that the employer failed to establish an adequate program to promote compliance with
relevant
safety standards .
PSP
Monotech
Industries ,
No.
06-1201 ,
2007 WL 5432286, at *3
(OSHRC, Aug. 14, 2008).

1. Supervisor Knowledge
   is
   Imputed to ACC

Here,
Foreman
Trehal
knew or could have known of the violative condition and the circumstances giving rise to it.
He
was
only
50 to 100 feet away , just on the other side of the excavator,
when the accident occurred. He
testified
at trial
that
he
could observe
an improperly attached bucket from
a distance of 50
feet.
(Tr. 119).
Therefore, if
in the moments before the accident
Foreman
Trehal
was 50 feet away from the trench, he could have seen
that
the bucket was improperly attached , and that
[redacted]
was retrieving the pipe plug from it .
And, even if
Foreman
Trehal
was 100 feet away and could not have observed the bucket from that distance, his presence at the worksite favors
a finding of constructive knowledge .
See
PAR Elec. Contractors Inc .,
No. 99-1520, 2004 WL 334488, at * 3 (OSHRC, Feb. 19, 2004)
(foreman ’ s presence at worksite establishes that violation could have been found with reasonable diligence)​ .
In addition, Foreman
Trehal , only moments before the accident, gave
[redacted]
instructions to get ready to dig the trench (which required
the bucket to be attached) and for
[redacted]
to
enter the trench, get the
pipe plug, and
install
it.

ACC management
also
knew
[redacted]
was an inexperienced
mainli n e hoe operator.
The bulk of his experience was operating
the
tailhoe . 5
(Tr. 108-09). However, ACC’s management
elevated
him to the mainline hoe
only
two weeks before the accident . (Tr. 116, 198).
Foreman
Trehal
watched
[redacted]
more carefully after he was assigned to the mainline hoe because he had
concerns
about
[redacted] ’s level of experience ,
and
Foreman
Trehal
knew
that
significantly more work activities , with workers nearby on the ground,
took place around a mainline hoe versus a
tailhoe . (Tr.
110,
201) .
Foreman
Trehal
also
specifically
knew
[redacted]
had
on multiple occasions
in the past failed to conduct a ground test after attaching a bucket.
(Tr. 116-117).

On the day of the accident,
Foreman
Trehal
specifically assigned
[redacted]
and
[redacted]
to take the necessary next
steps to
“clean the hole,” and he knew that
task
required the use of the mainline hoe.
Foreman
Trehal
knew
[redacted]
was in the trench ,
and he heard
[redacted]
ask for someone to give him the pipe plug .
Foreman
Trehal
also knew an excavator bucket would have to be attached because
it was unattached
at the time he walked
around to the
other side of the excavator .
And,
he
knew excavator buckets could unexpectedly detach if improperly attached
and not ground tested
by the operator.
Thus, i t was foreseeable
to
Foreman
Trehal
that
[redacted] —through inexperience or otherwise— may
improperly attach the bucket and
fail to conduct a ground test
before
moving
the bucket within
proximity
of a crew member.
And
Foreman
Trehal
could have known about the improperly attached bucket had he stayed
near the trench and supervised the junior members of his team
carry out its work
and his instructions .
The Court finds that the
preponderance of the evidence in the record supports imputing Foreman
Trehal’s
knowledge to ACC.

2. ACC Failed to Establish an Adequate Program to Promote Compliance with Safety Standards

The reasonableness of imputing knowledge
to an employer is also influenced by the adequacy of any employer’s safety program. 6
“ In determining whether a safety program is adequate, the Commission considers whether the employer has established work
rules designed to prevent the hazards from occurring, has adequately communicated the work
rules to the employees, has taken steps to discover noncompliance with the rules, and has effectively enforced the
rules in the event of noncompliance.”
PSP
Monotech
Indus . , 2007 WL 5432286, at *3 (citation omitted).
Here,
ACC had in place various work rules designed to avoid hazards associated with suspended loads
– though it was not clear that employees were trained to include excavator buckets in that category .
Excavator operators were required to conduct ground tests to ensure a bucket was properly attached. Workers were required to maintain eye contact with excavator operators when entering the swing radius
of an excavator .

The record establishes that work
rules
requiring excavator operators to perform ground tests, that employees do not work underneath suspended loads, and that employees stay out of the swing radius of heavy machinery existed and
were communicated to employees.
The Court declines to find that ACC had a rule that suspended loads included bucket excavators.

The JSA from the date of the accident documented a warning against lingering in the blind spots
of heavy machinery, and the JSA dated a few days before the accident documented a warning against standing under a suspended load. In addition,
Foreman
Trehal
and Mr. Fa b ela trained excavator operators to conduct ground tests after attaching a bucket
to ensure it did not unexpectedly detach . However,
the record
is unclear whether ACC’s supervisors communicated to workers that the prohibition against standing under suspended loads applied to excavator buckets. Mr.
Shorley
admitted that while he
personally
believed buckets constitute d
suspended loads, OSHA
might not.
(Tr.
358 ).
Indeed, Ms. Bennett testified that a n excavator
bucket is not considered a
suspended
load in the construction industry
as the attached bucket is part of the machinery , and the NIOSH publication
introduced by Complainant
indicates a suspended load is different from a suspended machine component, such as the boom, arm, or bucket.
(Tr.
634; Ex.
C-1 ).

Next,
the Court evaluates whether ACC took steps to discover noncompliance with
t he rules.
Mr.
Shorley
regularly inspected worksites, including the 64th and Denali project worksite , and
any safety issues were
immediately
corrected . Mr. Fabela
daily
visited each
of ACC’s work
crew s
at the worksite.
(Tr. 408) .
During those visits, he inspected
the
quality
of work
and
ensured proper
safety
precautions were being taken . (Tr. 409).
Foreman
Trehal
routinely
noted
to his crew any
rules violations
he observed, such as when a crew member was
in the
swing zone
or using
a
cell phone .
ACC
took steps to discover
certain
rules violations.

However,
Complainant
proved
ACC failed to
effectively enforce its
rules when violations were detected.
Foreman
Trehal
observed
[redacted]
failing to conduct a ground test
more than once
but did not formally
or progressively
discipline him. Instead, he only yelled at
[redacted]
and did not document the
events
in
[redacted] ’ s
employment file.
Foreman
Trehal
admitted he only issued
verbal reprimands, and he was entirely unaware of ACC’s policy requiring documentation of all disciplinary actions, including verbal warnings. Mr.
Shorley
also admitted that although ACC had a progressive disciplinary policy, discipline could be left to the discretion of management , and not every
mistake would result in the employee being written up . (Tr.
341 ).

Failure to progressively discipline
[redacted]
for repeated failures to perform ground tests after attaching an excavator bucket , and failure to clearly communicate to employees that elevated excavator buckets should be avoided as suspended loads,
may have directly contributed to this hazard ous
condition and accident.

Respondent Failed to Prove the Affirmative Defense of
Unpreventable Employee Misconduct

ACC maintains th e
cited violation was
unforeseeable and
the result
of
unpreventable
employee misconduct.
To establish the defense ,
ACC
must
prove : (1) it ha d
established work rules designed to prevent the violation; (2) it ha d
adequately communicated those rules to its employees; (3) it ha d
taken steps to discover violations of the rules; and (4) it
effectively enforce d
the rules when violations
we re detected.
Am. Eng’g & Dev. Corp. ,
No. 10-0359, 2012 WL 3875599, at 3 (OSHRC, Aug. 27, 2012) .
In other words, it is incumbent upon
ACC
to “demonstrate that the actions of the employee were a departure from a uniformly and effectively communicated and enforced
workrule
[sic].”
Archer-W .
Contractors Ltd. ,
No. 87-1067, 1991 WL 81020, at 5 (OSHRC, Apr. 30, 1991) .

As discussed previously,
ACC’s safety program was inadequate because
ACC
did not
adequately
communicate to its employees that the prohibition against standing under suspended loads
should
also
appl y
to excavator buckets. In addition, ACC ’s supervisory employees did not follow the progressive disciplinary policy
when
[redacted] ’s repeated failure to perform ground tests on newly attached excavator bucket s w as
discovered.
Under these circumstances, ACC
did
not meet its burden of establishing
the
violati ve condition
was the result of unpreventable misconduct.
See Danis Shook Joint Venture XXV ,
No. 98-1192, 2001 WL 881247, at *6 (OSHRC, Aug 2, 2001)
(finding that employer ’ s affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct failed “for largely the same reasons upon which [the Commission] base[d] [its] finding of constructive knowledge of the violation at issue”) .
ACC’s affirmative defense fails.

Conclusion

Complainant established by a preponderance of the evidence
that on August 23, 2021, at the 64 th
and Denali Project in Aurora, Colorado, there was
a condition or activity in the workplace
which
presented a hazard
to an employee; that Respondent
and
its industry recognized the hazard;
that
the hazard was likely to cause , and did cause,
the
death
of an employee ;
that
a feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard ; and that Respondent
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence ,
could have known of the hazardous condition. Respondent failed to establish that the violati ve condition
resulted from unpreventable employee misconduct.
Accordingly,
Citation 1, Item 1
will
be

AFFIRMED .

Penalty

In calculating appropriate penalties for affirmed violations,
s ection 17(j) of the
OSH
Act requires the Commission give due consideration to four criteria:
(1) the size of the employer’s business, (2)   the gravity of the violation, (3) the good faith of the employer, and (4) the employer’s prior history of violations. Gravity is the primary consideration and is determined by the number of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the precautions taken against injury, and the likelihood of an actual injury.
J.A. Jones Const .
Co. ,
No. 87-2059, 1993 WL 61950 (OSHRC. Feb. 19, 1993) . It is well established that the Commission and its judges conduct
de novo
penalty determinations and have full discretion to assess penalties based on the facts of each case and the
applicable statutory criteria.
Valdak
Corp .,
No. 93-0239, 1995 WL 139505 (OSHRC, Mar. 29, 1995);
Allied Structural Steel , No. 1681, 1975 WL 4613 (OSHRC, Jan. 7, 1975).

Complainant
proposed
a penalty of
$11,747 .
Complainant first assessed the maximum penalty allowed by Congress
then reduced
the penalty by 10% based on ACC’s
small
size
and another 10% based on ACC’s
lack of violation
history . (Tr. 585).
Complainant determined the severity was high because the injury
that could occur would be permanently disabling or
result in
death. (Tr. 583).
The probability of injury was assessed as greater because the accident occurred ,
and death resulted. (Tr.
584).
B ased on the totality of circumstances discussed above, the Court
agrees with Complainant’s application of penalty factors and will assess
a penalty of
$11,747
for Citation 1, Item 1 .

O RDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclus i ons of Law, it is
ORDERED

t hat
Citat ion 1, Item
1
is
AFFIRME D
as a SERIOUS violation of the Act , and a penalty of $ 11,747
is ASSESSED.

/s/ Brian A. Duncan

Judge Brian A. Duncan

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Date:
February 6, 2024

Denver, Colorado

"

1
Witnesses at trial testified that the bucket weighed anywhere between 2,500 and 6,000 pounds , and the coroner’s report listed the bucket as weighing 6,800 pounds .
(Tr. 475,
577-78; Ex. J-7 at 2 ).
For the purposes of this decision, the Court concludes
an approximate weight of
2,500 pounds.

2
Although ACC notified OSHA of the accident on the date it occurred, OSHA arrived at the worksite after it had
closed for
the day. (Tr.
531 ).

3
It is unclear why there was an eight-month delay to conduct post-accident test ing
of the equipment involve d .

4
In its post-trial brief, ACC
argues
there is no evidence that the release of an excavator bucket from a fully engaged coupler is recognized by ACC or the industry. However, that mischaracterizes the hazard identified by Complainant, which is the unexpected release of an
improperly
attached excavator bucket.

5
Tailhoe
excavator
operators are responsible for performing “backhoe operation s ,” such as
digging the initial trench
at the beginning of the project and later back filling the trench with dirt
after the job is complete . (Tr. 410).
Mainline hoe operators
perform tasks like
“ cleaning the hole, ”
which requires operation of the machine around people on foot. (Tr. 411).
Operating a mainline hoe
involves hazards like swing radius, blind spots, and controlled access. ( Tr.
411-12).
For this reason, mainline hoe operators
typically
have more experience than tailhoe operators.
(Tr. 411).

6
The factors to consider in assessing the adequacy of an employer’s safety program are similar to the elements of proof for the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct.
See
PSP Monotech Indus . , 2007 WL 5432286, at * 4
n.4 (“ [W] e note that the Secretary ’ s
burden of proving constructive knowledge and
[the employer’s]
burden of showing unpreventable employee
misconduct rest upon an overlapping issue-whether
[the employer]
had an adequate safety program. ” ).