Riverdale Mills Corporation

Read the official release (oshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Riverdale Mills manufactures coated wire mesh on a long production line at its Massachusetts facility. After an employee suffered a severe arm injury while adjusting moving mesh, OSHA issued safety and health citations involving lockout/tagout, machine guarding, chemical training, and access to safety data sheets. The judge affirmed a serious violation for failing to conduct an annual inspection of an authorized employee's lockout/tagout proficiency, but vacated five other lockout/tagout items and an alternative machine-guarding item because OSHA did not establish the cited requirements applied to the specific production tasks. The judge also affirmed a serious hazard-communication training violation and an other-than-serious violation for failing to make safety data sheets readily available to OSHA. Penalties of $8,525 were assessed for each affirmed serious item, for a total of $17,050.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.147(c)(6)(i), 1910.147(c)(7)(i)(A), 1910.147(d)(2), 1910.147(d)(3), 1910.147(d)(4)(i), 1910.147(c)(4)(i), 1910.212(a)(1), 1910.1200(h)(1), 1910.1200(g)(11)
• Outcome: Three items were affirmed and six were vacated, with total assessed penalties of $17,050.
• Key point: Lockout/tagout requirements must apply to the specific servicing activity, while annual proficiency inspections and hazard-communication duties remain independently enforceable.

Full text (OSHRC public release)


Document

United States of America

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1924 Building - Room 2R90, 100 Alabama Street, S.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104

Secretary of Labor,

Complainant

v.

OSHRC Docket No.:
19-1566 & 19-2011

Riverdale Mills Corporation,

Respondent.

Appearances:

Scott Miller , Esq.
and Joseph R. Landry, Esq.

U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor,
Boston, MA

For Complainant

Travis W. Vance ,
Esq.
and Davis I. Klass, Esq.

Fisher & Phillips, LLC

For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Sharon D. Calhoun

DECISION AND ORDER

Riverdale Mills Corporation
(Riverdale)
manufactures coated wire mesh products at its facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts.
On April 3, 2019, a Riverdale employee suffered
a severe injury
to his right arm as he attempted to adjust a length of mesh as it
moved through rotating rollers on the Coating Line.
The Northbridge Police Department notified
t he Occupational Safety and Health Administration
of the incident.
An
OSHA
Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO)
opened
a
safety inspection
at
Riverdale’s facility later that day.
On June 27, 2019,
an
OSHA Industrial Hygienist
(IH)
opened a health inspection of the
facility .

On September 26, 2019, the Secretary issued a
Citation and Notification of Penalty to Riverdale
(the Safety Citation ) ,
alleging violations of eight safety standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (Act). On December 13, 2019, the Secretary
issued
a second
Citation
(the Health Citation)
to Riverdale, alleging
violations of
four
health standards of the Act.
After Riverdale contested the Citations, the Commission docketed the Safety and Health Citations as Nos. 19-1566 and 19-2011, respectively.
The Safety and Health cases were consolidated
for hearing and disposition
on February 4, 2020 .

The
Secretary withdrew
Items 7 and 8 of the Safety Citation
prior to hearing .
The r emaining
Safety items
at issue
allege serious violations of
29 C.F.R. § 1910.147 ,
titled
The
control of hazardous energy (lockout /tagout) ,
known as the LOTO standard.
Item 2
alleg es
a
violation
of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147 (c) (6)( i ) ; Item 3, alleg es
a violation of 29 C .F.R. § 1910.147(c)(7)( i )(A ) ;
and
Items
5a, 5b, 5c, and
5e
allege
violations of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.147(d)(2),
(3), (4)( i ), and
(c)(4)( i ) . 1
In the alternative to
I nstance (a) of Item 5e,
Item 6
alleges
a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1) , a machine guarding standard
(Tr.
7-8) .
The
penalties proposed by the Secretary for the remaining Safety items
total $32, 393.

The Secretary also withdrew
Items 1 and 2 of Citation No. 1 of the Health Citation
prior to hearing. Remaining from the Health Citation
are Item 3
of Citation No. 1 , alleging a serious violation of 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200(h)(1), for failing to provide
an
employee with
information and training on hazardous chemicals; and Item
1 of Citation No. 2, alleging an other-than-serious violation of
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(11), for failing to make
safety data sheet s
readily a vailable to
OSHA.
The Secretary proposes a penalty of $ 8,525 for Item
3
of Health Citation No. 1
and no penalty for Item 1 of Health Citation No.
2.

The Court held a hearing in this matter
from June 14 to
June 17 and
from
August 16 to
19, 2021, in Boston, Massachusetts. 2
The parties have filed post-hearing briefs.
For the reasons discussed below, t he Court
makes the following determinations:

Under the Safety Citation, Item
2 of Citation No.1
is
AFFIRMED
and a penalty of
$8,525 is assessed. Items
3, 5a, 5b, 5c , 5e, and 6 are
VACATED.

Under the Health Citation, Item 3 of Citation No. 1
and Item 1 of Citation No. 2 are
AFFIRMED.
A penalty of $8,525 is assessed for Item 3 of Citation No. 1. No penalty is assessed for
Item 1 of Citation No. 2.

JURISDICTION AND COVERAGE

Riverdale
timely contested the Citation s . The parties agree the Commission has jurisdiction over this action and
Riverdale
is a covered employer under the Act (Tr.
38 ). Based on the agreement and the record evidence, the Court finds the Commission has jurisdiction over this proceeding under § 10(c) of the Act, and
Riverdale
is a covered employer under § 3(5) of the Act.

BACKGROUND

Riverdale
manufactures coated wire mesh products at its facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts.
The coating process
occurs on the
coating line . The coating line
is more than 200 feet long and
comprises
a series of
integrated
machines and equipment through which
the
mesh
passes ,
in conveyor-belt fashion ,
as
it is coated, cured, and cooled .
The coating line processes rolls
of mesh
with different gauges and widths of mesh openings, and it applies
assorted colors
of PVC coating, according to the specifications of the order
being run
(Tr.
78- 79).

Operation of the Coating Line

A splice
operator work s
at the
beginning
of the coating line and two spindle operators work at its end .
The lead coating line operator works at various stations along the coating line
and instructs the other operators
(Tr.
79 -80,
174 , 449 ). To begin the process, a large roll of mesh is placed in the cradle at the first station of the coating line.
The s plice operator attach es
the next roll of mesh to the end of the one being
processed, if
that particular order requires it (Tr. 79-83).
The s plice operator use s
a
rack
to
connect
the separate lengths of mesh as they move through the coating line (Tr. 82-83). 3

The r ear drive rollers and the main drive rollers propel the mesh through the coating line. The rear drive rollers are located about 25 feet from the start of the coating line. The main drive
rollers are located approximately 150 feet
downstream
from the rear drive rollers
(Tr. 84) . Between the two sets of rollers, the mesh moves through a series of rinse and wash tanks to remove dirt and debris. From there, the mesh moves through a
wrapper , designed to “vibrate the mesh to get any excess water off before going into the primer tank.” (Tr. 85)
T he mesh moves to the primer tank. The primer facilitates the PVC coating
to
adhere to the mesh. The coating line then moves the mesh to the preheat oven, which “heat[s] up the water so the PVC compound can . . . adhere to [it].” (Tr. 85-86) From there, the mesh goes through the fluidized PVC vat
(the fluid bed) , where “the PVC is put into a fluid state where it cascades around like a waterfall, travel s
through it, and picks up the PVC powder.” (Tr. 86) The mesh then moves to the post-cure oven, which melts the PVC, and then to the cooling chamber. After the cooling chamber, the mesh goes through the main drive rollers, which pull the mesh and maintain tension with the rear drive rollers, to keep the mesh suspended.
Finally , the mesh travels to the spindle collection area, where it is rolled up to be cut into smaller rolls (Tr. 87).

On one side of the coati ng line
i s a brick wall
and
on
the other
side
is an
aisle. A catwalk rises above the area of the main drive rollers, guarded by a yellow metal railing system ( Exh . C-4; Tr. 90-91, 96 , 112-13 ). 4
Next to the main drive rollers is the collection area for the spindle (Tr. 106).
There are
three
different spindles at the end of the coating line ( Exh . C4, p. 5a; Tr. 109-10 , 1015 ).
The spindle
in use
collects the coated mesh wire as it emerges from the main drive rollers. When the mesh is collected to its specified length, the spindle operators tie it off or staple it
( depending on its gauge ) ,
and
cut, remove, and place
it
on pallets ( Exh . C-4, p. 5; Tr.
8 7-88,
111-12).
As
the finished mesh roll is being removed from the spindle, the next order of mesh moves through the coating line. It folds over on itself and gathers on the floor in the collecting area ( Exh . C-40; Tr. 112).

Recurring Problems on the Coating Line

Production problems ar i se almost every shift on the coating line , including
“[t] ension , temperatures, how the wire is welded. Not enough powder in the
bed [ ,] . . .
[s] plice
breaks; missed splices; not getting rolls off the spindle fast enough; too much collection;
shutdowns ;
startups .”
(Tr. 134)
A splice break (“when the two rolls that are attached down at splice come apart
. . .
where they are attached” (Tr. 135))
causes
problems up and down the line: “Lines have got to stop. Mesh is just sitting in hot ovens, sitting in the powder. It could cause heavy coating and lead to a lot of issues.” (Tr. 135-36)
The coating line
also
could be shut down due to “equipment failure or mesh that can get jammed up in the drive or too much collection in the collection area, and they can’t pick it up because of the weight.” (Tr. 136)
These issues could affect the
quality of the
mesh, resulting in a non-conforming product
(NCP) ,
which
is
unusable
(Tr. 135).

The April 3, 2 019, Accident

The accident that triggered OSH A’s
Safety
inspection in this case occurred
the morning of April 3, 201 9,
during Riverdale’s third shift . 5
JR
( the lead coating
line
operator )
was working at the fluid bed . The
spindle operators were
AT (the injured employee)
and NM .
Production lead AM
and
supervisor
Brian Johnson were onsite
(Tr. 176).

Spindle
o perators A T
and NM were collecting mesh on the spindle when they noticed the mesh was out of alignment.
It
had strayed too far from its intended track to collect on the spindle.
The
spindle
operators used the intercom to call
JR
for help
(Tr.
340,
436,
696 ,
1463 -65 , 1482-83) .

J R arrived and
went up on the
catwalk above the main drive .
He
sat on the catwalk
facing
the spindle
area ,
extended
his leg through
a
gap in the rail s , and pressed his foot on the edge of the moving mesh, about 1½ feet from the nearest rotating roller (Tr. 340-43, 353-58) .
He
was able to move the track of the mesh using this method (Tr. 342) .
JR left the catwalk
and went to the fluid bed station to adjust the
mesh’s alignment using
positioning poles
(Tr. 406-07) .

After JR
went to the fluid bed station,
AT
left the
spindle station and
went to
a
yellow
gate on the wall side of the main drive
area . 6
A sign
was posted on the gate stating,

DANGER

DO NOT ENTER THE AREA

WHILE MACHINE IS RUNN ING

( Exh . R-20; Tr. 473- 74 , 621 )

AT opened the gate and
entered the area
immediately
next to the main drive rollers. He
attempted to adjust the mesh ’s alignment
near
the
main drive
rollers
by grabbing
the mesh with
his right hand
(Tr.
469 -70 ,
472,
1463) .
As
A T did so, his
right
arm was pulled into the rollers,
breaking
bones and
degloving the skin from his hand to his bicep
(Tr. 700) .

JR
heard AT screaming . He ran to the main drive area and
pushed the emergency stop
button to deenergize the
machiner y.
AT was unable to
remov e his arm from the drive rollers .
Production lead
AM called 911 , and
E MTs and members of the Northbridge Police Department responded to the call.
Eventually
a Riverdale employee
used a forklift to raise one of the drive rollers
s o emergency personnel could
extricate AT’s arm
from the machinery.
They
transport ed
him to
a hospital ( Exh . C-4, p. 1a ; Tr. 88 , 701 ). 7
Two
CSHO s
arrived later that day to open
an
investigation
after the Northbridge Police Department notified OSHA of the incident (Tr.
885-86).

On June 27, 2019, IH Ann Hart
arrived at Riverdale’s facility to conduct a Health
inspection. She met with Riverdale management personnel, including owner James Knott, corporate counsel Cyril Means, and plant safety manager David Stevens . IH Hart conducted a walkaround inspection with Knott and Means. She interviewed a
machine operator and obtained a signed employee statement from him ( Exh . C-27 ; Tr. 1080-82).

Subsequently, the Secretary issue d
the Safety and Health Citations that gave rise to this proceeding.

THE CITATIONS

The Secretary’s Burden of Proof

In order to establish a violation of an occupational safety or health standard, the Secretary has the burden of proving: (a) the applicability of the cited standard, (b) the employer's noncompliance with the standard's terms, (c) employee access to the violative conditions, and (d) the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the violation (i.e., the employer either knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of the violative conditions).

Atlantic Battery Co., Inc ., No. 90-1747, 1994 WL 682922, at *6 (OSHRC Dec. 5, 1994).

The employer or the Secretary may appeal a final decision
and
order to the federal court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or where the employer has its principal office, and the employer also may appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 660(a) and (b). Here, the violation occurred in
Northbridge ,
Massachusetts , in the
First
Circuit.
Riverdale’s
principal place of business is
also in Massachusetts .
W here it is highly probable that a
case will be appealed to a particular circuit,
t he Commission has
generally applied the precedent of that circuit in deciding the case , e ven though it may differ from the Commission’s precedent.
Kerns Bros. Tree Serv .,
No. 96- 1719,
2000 WL 294514 , at *4
( OSHRC March 16 ,
2000). Here, the parties do not contend, and the Court has not found, relevant
First Circuit
precedent that differs from the Commission’s precedent. The Court therefore applies Commission precedent in this case .

THE
SAFETY
CITATION
(No. 19-1566)

Item 2: Alleged Serious Violation of
§ 1910.147(c)(6)( i )

The Alleged Violation Description

Item 2 alleges:

29 CFR 1910. 147(c)(6)( i ): The employer did not conduct a periodic inspection of the energy control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and the requirement
of this standard of this standard were being followed:

(a) Site: In Building 1, at the Coating Line, at the Big
Spindle

. . .
: On 4/26/2019
the employer had not conducted a periodic inspection of Energy Control Procedure RMC-022 for the Big Spindle since 4/26 /2016.

The Cited Standard   

Section 1910.147(c) (1) requires employers to establish an energy control program
that includes periodic inspections
to ensure employees
are trained to
lock out machines or equip ment before performing servicing or
maintenance
on them . 8
The cited standard, § 1 910.147(c)(6)( i ) ,
provides ,

The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and the requirements of this standard are being followed.

ANALYSIS

(1) The Applicability of the Cited Standard

The cited standard is found in
Subpart J ( General Environmental
Controls )) of the
Part 1910
general industry
standards.
Section 1910.147
addresses
“t he control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout) , ”
known as LOTO.
T he
Scope
section of the LOTO standard states it “covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the
unexpected energization
or
start up
of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy, could harm employees. This standard establishes minimum performance requirements for the control of such hazardous energy.” § 1910.147(a)(1)( i ) (emphasis in original). The LOTO standard “applies to the control of energy during servicing and/or maintenance of machines and equipment” but not to normal production operations. § 1910.147(a)(2)(1).

Here,
the Secretary cited Riverdale for failing
to conduct
periodic
inspections
of authorized employees
for
the
energy control
procedure
relating
the application of LOTO
to
a spindle
when performing maintenance
o n it .
Riverdale admits the cited standard applies
to the violative activity alleged in Item 2 of the Safety Citation
( Exh . C-103, p. 8, ¶
14). The Court determines § 1 910.147(c)(6)( i )
applies to the cited activity.

(2)
C ompliance with the Standard’s Terms

Sections 1910. 147(c)(6)( i )( A) through (D)
set out the specific requirements
for
period ic
inspection s :

(A) The periodic inspection shall be performed by an authorized employee other than the ones(s) utilizing the energy control procedure being inspected.

(B) The periodic inspection shall be conducted to correct any deviations or inadequacies identified.

(C) Where lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control procedure being inspected.

(D) Where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized and affected employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the elements set forth in paragraph (c)(7)(ii) of this section.

R iverdale has
a written LOTO procedure
that requires its facility manager to “conduct an annual review of the written energy control procedures with maintenance supervision to ensure that the procedure
and the requirements of the Program are being followed.”
(R-57, p.13, ¶
7.0)
Riverdale’s written procedure tracks OSHA’s requirements for
a compliant energy control procedure:

7.1 Each AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE shall undergo
at the minimum an
annual
inspection
of the ir
understanding
of
LOCKOUT/TAGOUT procedures by undergoing
a LOCKOUT/TAGOUT
Practical Demonstration
conducted by the Facilities Manager to identify any deviations or inadequacies.

. . .

7. 3 A
   Lockout Tagout Practical Demonstration Checklist (Appendix B)
   will be used to record the results of each inspection and filed on the Riverdale Mills fileserver[.]

( Exh .
R - 57, p. 13 )
(emphasis in original)
Under the LOTO standard, an
authorized employee
is “[a]
person who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. ” § 1910.1457(b).

Page 16 of
Riverdale’s written LOTO procedure
( Exh . R- 57 )
is a checklist form
listing
a number of
ta sks on which the
authorized
employee is to be tested for lockout and tagout procedures .
The words
Pass
and
Fail
are next to each task
so the person
conduct ing the
inspection can circle the appropriate
word . The checklist states
twice ( for both the lockout and the tagout sections ) that “Failure in any category above must be marked as an Overall Fail and training must be retaken prior to retest.” ( Id .)

Riverdale maintains a
Lockout Tagout Log
that records the dates
LOTO
is applied and removed from a
piece of equipment and the nam es of the
authorized
employees
performing the LOTO procedure
( Exh . C - 16 ).
On April 26, 2019,
Riverdale employees
TB and EM
were members of the main tenance department.
TB was
the
maintenance supervisor and EM was a maintenance mechanic (Tr. 829, 841).
That day,
TB and EM applied
and then
removed
LOTO to
and from
a piece of equipment listed as a
“ C-Spindle . ”
( Exh , C-20, p. 4)
TB testified “C-spindle” refers to a coating line spindle . He
stated he
and EM were performing maintenance on
a spindle
that day , and they were authorized employees
(Tr. 839-4 2). 9

TB testified he had worked for Riverdale
from
the late 1990s to approximately 2005
and then
left for other employment . He
returned to Riverdale and worked from approximately 2016 to December of 2019. He held the position of maintenance supervisor the last 14 months of his employment with Riverdale (Tr. 828-29). During the time
TB
worked
both
as a maintenance
mechanic
and as a maintenance supervisor,
Riverdale personnel never performed a periodic inspection of his proficiency in LOTO procedures (Tr. 843 , 864 ). 10

As part of
its inspection, OSHA requested
from Riverdale
copies of completed periodic inspections
for “each piece of equipment comprising the Coating Line ” between April 26, 2016 ,
and April 26, 2019 (the date
TB and EM applied LOTO to one of the coating line’s spindles) ( Exh .
C-14, p. 2).
Riverdale
did not produce any completed
periodic inspection records
that
meet the requirements of
1910.147(c)(6)( i )(A) through (D) ,
including its own
Practical Demonstration Checklist
for that
time period
( Tr. 937-38 , 940- 41 , 949- 51).

Riverdale
makes several arguments in opposition to the Secretary’s case, none of
them
meritorious.
First ,
Riverdale argues the alleged violation description for Item 2 misidentifies
the “C-spindle” t o which TB and EM applied LOTO
as “the Big Spindle.” Riverdale
contends there are three spindles on the coating line
and “no evidence was presented regarding which of the three, if any, was the ‘big spindle ’ identified in the citation.” (Riverdale’s
Brief , p. 5)
T he evidence establishe s
TB
and EM
applied
LOTO to
a spindle on the coating line on April 19, 2019 .
TB stated he had not been the subject of a
periodic inspection
for LOTO proficiency
for
any
energy control procedures . When asked why not, TB responded
the previous “supervisors that were there were not there long enough.”
(Tr. 843)

Periodic inspections are required for
each
authorized employee .
§§ 1910.147(c)(6)( i )(C) and (D).
TB, an authorized employee, testified
Riverdale had never ,
in the cumulative nine years he worked at the facility,
performed a periodic inspection with him, either as a mechanic or a supervisor.
Therefore, when TB applied LOTO to a spindle on the coating line on April
26, 2019, Riverdale
was in noncompliance with the cited standard.

Riverdale also
contend s that TB, “as the employee conducting periodic inspections, was not required to inspect himself.” (Riverdale’s
Brief,
p. 8)
This argument is nonsensical.
No one has suggested
an authorized employee should conduct a periodic inspection on himself.
Any authorized employee
may conduct a periodic inspection for the authorized employee
applying the LOTO.
The LOTO standard specifically states
that t he periodic inspection
“ shall be performed by
an authorized employee
other than the ones(s) utilizing the energy control procedure being inspected. ” § 1910.147 (c) ( 6)( i )(a)
(emphasis added) .
Riverdale’s
own
written LOTO procedure states t hat periodic inspections
shall be “ conducted by the Facilities Manager to identify any deviations or inadequacies. ” ( Exh .
R-57, p. 13, ¶ 7.1)
It was incumbent on Riverdale to
ensure an authorized employee conducted a periodic inspection
with
TB
in order to
comply with the cited standard.

Finally, Riverdale argues
its failure to produce
periodic inspection
certification s, either by its
Practical Demonstration Checklist
forms or
by
other documentation ,
cannot be used as evidence it failed to comply with
§ 1910.147(c)(6)( i )
because
the cited
subsection
does not require certification .
Certification is required by § 1910.147(c)(6)(ii)
( the next subsection after
the
cited
subsection) , which provides:

The employer shall certify that the periodic inspections have been performed. The certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the energy control procedure was being utilized, the date of the inspection, the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the inspection.

Riverdale misconstrues the significance of
its failure to produce
certification s
of periodic inspections.
The Secretary
alleges Riverdale failed to co nduct periodic inspections of authorized employees
in the use of LOTO procedures.
In support of this allegation, the Secretary adduced evidence that on April 26, 2019,
Riverdale’s
maintenance
supervisor
and a maintenance mechanic
applied LOTO to a spindle
on the coating line .
Riverdale failed to provide
periodic inspection
certifications
for either of the two employees
i n response to a request from the Secretary
for such documentation
for “each piece of equipment comprising the Coating Line” between April 26, 2016, and April 26, 2019 . ”
( Exh . C-14,
p. 2)
At the hearing, the maintenance supervisor testified
he had worked at Riverdale for a total
of
nine years
and had never
been subject to a periodic inspection.
With this, the Secretary has m ade a prima facie case
establish ing
Riverdale failed to comply with § 1910.147(c)(6)( i ).

Riverdale could rebut the Secretary’s case with evidence it
had, in fact, conducted periodic inspections of authorized
employees. One way to do so would be to adduce certifications of the
periodic inspections. Since
both
§ 1910.147(c)( 6)(ii)
and Riverdale’s written LOTO program require
these certifications to be
maintained,
it is reasonable to
infer
that Riverdale would have produced
the certifications if they existed.

In
Well Solutions, Inc., Rig No. 30 , No. 91-340, 1995 WL 242595 (OSHRC April 19, 1995) ,
the Secretary alleged
the respondent (WS)
failed to provide
required
first aid training
to an employee or employees
where no medical facility was near the worksite.
OSHA
conducted a fatality investigation of WS after a n explosion killed two men in
four-man
crew . T he two surviving employees testified they had not received training in first aid. It was their opinion that one of the two deceased employees (who was their cousin) also had not received first aid training .
There was no specific evidence regarding whether the other deceased employee had been trained in first aid. WS argued the Secretary should have made a greater effort to determine whether the deceased employees had received first aid training. The Commission rejected this argument.

[W]e conclude that the Secretary has introduced sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie
showing of a violation. WS presented no evidence to rebut the Secretary's case, even though it would have possession of any first aid training records. While the Secretary's evidence is not overwhelming, it is sufficient in the absence of rebuttal, and therefore we conclude that the Secretary has proven a violation of section 1910.151(b).

Id . at *4.

Here,
Riverdale was
required
to maintain periodic inspection certifications
for
each
authorized employee. If Riverdale
had
conducted the required periodic inspection s , it
is expected
Riverdale
would
have possession of the certifications . Because Riverdale did not
produce
the certifications ,
the Court
finds
the Secretary’s case
(specifically TB’s undisputed testimony that Riverdale had
never
conducted a periodic inspection
with
him during his employment) is
unrebutted.

The Secretary has established
Riverdale violated § 1 910.147(c)(6)( i ) .

(3) Employee Access to the Violative Condition

It is undisputed TB and EM applied LOTO to a spindle on the coating line on April
26, 2019. TB testified that, according to
Riverdale’s energy control
procedures for
the coating line spindle,
the
spindle
presents electric and pneumatic hazards, including “the quick disconnect for the couplings for the compressed air, which may contain debris, which could be released [at] 110 psi.” (Tr. 842)

Without conducting the required periodic inspections, the employer cannot ensure
its authorized employees understand
and
will
implement the appropriate LOTO procedures for
the relevant equipment and machinery.
In the preamble to
the LOTO standard, OSHA states
the cited standard “ will assure that employees follow and maintain proficiency in the energy control
procedure, and that the inspector will be better able to determine whether changes are needed. ”
Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout),
54 FR 36644-01 , 36673
(September 1, 19 8 9) .

The Secretary has
established
employee access to the violative condition.

(4) Employer Knowledge

TB
was Riverdale’s maintenance supervisor
on April 26, 2019. He
knew
Riverdale had never conducted a periodic inspection
of his LOTO proficiency.
The Tenth Circuit
has held
that employer knowledge of the violative condition “will almost invariably be present where the alleged violative condition is inadequate training of employees.”
Compass Env't, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n , 663 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011). 11
The Court finds employer knowledge is likewise present where the violative condition
concerns
the employer’s
failure to
conduct periodic inspections of authorized employees.
TB’s
knowledge that Riverdale had never conducted a periodic inspection
with him
under
§ 1910.147(c)(6)(i)
when he was a maintenance mechanic
and that he, as
maintenance
supervisor, had never conducted such inspections on
other employees, is imputed to Riverdale. 12

The Secretary has established Riverdale had actual knowledge
of the violative condition.
The Court finds the Secretary has established all elements of his burden of proof.
Therefore, Item 2 is
AFFIRMED.

Characterization of the Violation

The Secretary characterized the violation of § 1910.147(c)(6)(i)
as serious. A serious violation is established when there is “a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result [from a violative condition] . . . unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). Here,
an
authorized
employee was
exposed to the
electrical and pneumatic
hazards presented
in the application of LOTO to a spindle on the coating line
without
undergoing a period inspection to confirm his proficiency.
The violation is properly characterized as serious.

Item s
3 , 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5e : Alleged Serious Violation of § §
1910.147 (c)(7)( i )(A) ,

(d)( 2), (d)(2), ( d)(4)( i ), and
( c ) (4)( i )

Alleged Violation Descriptions

The alleged violation descriptions (AVDs)
for
Item 3, 5a, 5b,
5c, and 5e
of
the Safety Citation
each cite
two
incidents
that occurred on April 3, 2019 , when
the lead coating line operator and a spindle operator
attempted to
adjust
a n order of
mesh a fter it
bec a me misaligned
as it moved through the coating line.
I tem s
3,
5a, 5b,
and 5e each cite two instances .
Instance (a)
cites
the
lead
coat ing line
operator ’s
attempt to realign the
mesh b y
extending his leg through the rails of the catwalk and placing his foot
on the
mesh
as it moved through the coating line .
Instance (b)
cite s
the
spindle operator’s attempt to realign
the mesh by
opening the gate to the main drive area , entering it,
and reaching
near
the main drive rollers to adjust the mesh with his
right hand.
Item 5c
combines
both
of the incidents
in Instance (a) (“employees at the catwalk and
Main Drive engaged in activities requiring the use of” LOTO).

Riverdale does not dispute the
lead
coating line
operator
and the spindle operator
engaged in the cited
conduct . It contends, however,
that the LOTO standard
( sub sections of whi ch the Secretary
alleges Riverdale violated
for
each of the five items )
does not apply to the cited activity.
Because the five items
cite
the same
employee conduct and related
subsections of the LOTO standard, t he Court
groups
the five items for the purpose of discussing
the
applicabil ity
of the
standard .

For reference,
the AVDs and
the
cited standard subsections and
of the five items are as follows:

Item 3

The
AVD

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(7)( i )(A): Authorized employee(s) did not receive training in the recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and the methods and means necessary for energy isolation and control.

(a) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, on the catwalk above the Main Drive component
. . . :
On 4/3/2019 affected employees performed the duties of authorized employees including when those employees performed tasks from the catwalk that required them to remove or bypass guards in order to adjust moving wire mesh material while the Coating Line was
operati ng.

(b) Site: In Building 1, at the Coating Line, at the Main Drive on the
wa ll
side
. . . :
On 4/3/2019 affected employees performed the duties of authorized employees when those employees performed tasks that required they remove or bypass guards in order to adjust moving wire mesh material.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910.147(c)(7)( i )(A) provides:

Each authorized employee shall receive training in the recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and the methods and means necessary for energy isolation and control.

Item
5a

The AVD

29 CFR 1910.147(d)(2): The machine or equipment was not turned off or shut down using the procedures established for the machine or equipment:

( a) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, on the catwalk above the Main Drive component
. . . :
On 4/3/2019
On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) actions were not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none of the prescribed steps were performed . On 4/3/2019 a
Coating Line Operator did not turn off or shut down the Main Drive using the procedures established for the machines or equipment prior to starting work covered by this subpart.

(b) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, at the Main Drive on the
wall
side
. . . :
On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) actions were not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none of the prescribed steps were performed .
On 4/3/2019 a Coating Line Operator did not turn off or shut down the Main Drive using the procedures established for the machines or equipment prior to starting work covered by this subpart.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910.147(d)(2) provides:

The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An orderly shutdown must be utilized to avoid any additional or increased hazard(s) to employees
as a result of
the equipment stoppage.

Item 5 b

The AVD

29 CFR 1910.147(d)(3) : All energy isolating devices that were needed to control the energy to the machine or equipment were not physically located and operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy source(s):

(a) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, on the catwalk above the Main Drive component
. . . :
On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) actions were not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none of the prescribed steps were performed .
On 4/3/2019 the energy isolating device that w[as] needed to control the energy to the Main Drive was not moved into the off position to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy source(s) prior to starting work covered by this subpart.

(b) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, at the Main Drive on the aisle side
. . . :
On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) actions were not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none of the prescribed steps were performed .
On 4/3/2019 the energy isolating device that w[as] needed to control the energy to the Main Drive was not moved into the off position to isolate
the machine or equipment from the energy source(s) prior to starting work covered by this subpart.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910.147(d)(3) provides:

All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy source(s).

Item 5c

The AVD

29 CFR 1910. 147(d)(4)( i ): Lockout or tagout devices were not affixed to each energy isolating device by authorized
employees.

(a) Site: A t the Coating Line
. . .
On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control (lockout or tagout) actions
were
not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none of the prescribed steps were performed.
On 4/3/2019
employees at the catwalk and Main Drive
were engaged in activities requiring the use of Lockout/Tago ut procedures and Lockout/Tagout devices were not affixed
to energy isolating devices by employees prior to commencing with work.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910.147(d)(4)( i ) provides:

Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy isolating device by authorized employees.

Item 5e

29 CFR 1910.147 (c) (4)( i ): Procedures were not developed,
documented
and utilized for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees were engaged in activities covered by this section:

(a) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, on the catwalk above the Main Drive component . . .: On 4/3/2019 a Coating Line Operator working from the catwalk did not utilize
Lockout/Tagout
p rocedure s
for the control of potentially hazardous energy prior to commencing with activities covered by this subpart. This included using his foot on the moving wire mesh
in order to
straighten it.

(b) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line, at the Main Drive on the
wall
side . . .: On 4/3/2019 a Coating Line Operator did not utilize
Lockout/Tagout procedures
for the control of potentially hazardous energy prior to commencing with activities covered by this subpart. This included accessing the main drive area while the wire mesh was moving
in order to
straighten it.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910.147 (c) (4)( i ) provides:

Procedures shall be developed,
documented
and utilized for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees are engaged in the activities covered by this section.

ANALYSIS

Applicability of the LOTO Standard

The LOTO
standard
applies to "the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the
unexpected energization
or
start up
of the machines or equipment, or
release of stored energy, could harm employees."
§ 1910.147 (a)(1)( i ) (emphasis in the original).
Section 1910.147(b) defines
servicing
and/or maintenance
(referred to
herein
as
“servicing work ” )
as

Workplace activities such as constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, modifying, and maintaining and/or servicing machines or equipment. These activities include lubrication, cleaning or unjamming of machines or equipment and
making adjustments
or tool changes, where the employee may be exposed to the  unexpected
energization
or startup of the equipment or release of hazardous energy. 

Here,
it
is undisputed
JR, the l ead
coating line operator , and AT, the spindle operator (and injured employee)
were
not exposed to the unexpected energization ,
start up , or release of stored energy
of the coating line
machinery
b ecause
it
was operating
when they attempted to realign the mesh.

The Secretary argues
the employees were engaged in
servicing work
when they attempted to realign the mesh .
Although the LOTO standard generally does not apply during normal production operations , it may apply to
servicing work
performed
during production
if it
occurs
under either of two
specific
conditions . Section 1910.147(a)(ii) provides:

Normal production operations are not covered by this standard [.]
. . .
Servicing and/or maintenance which takes place during normal production operations is covered by this standard only if:

(A)
An employee is required to remove or bypass a guard or other safety device; or

( B )
An employee is required to place any part of his or her body into an area on a machine or piece of equipment where work is
actually performed
upon the material being processed (point of operation) or where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle. 

Riverdale counters that, in attempting to realign the mesh as it proceeded along the coating line, JR and AT were not engaged in any of the activities defined as servicing work by § 1910.147(b):
constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, modifying,
lubricating,
cleaning
or unjamming machines
or
making adjustments or tool changes . Any adjustments they attempted were on the mesh, not the coating line machinery.

In support of his argument, the Secretary cites the
preamble to the LOTO standard.

[U] sing
[a]
. . . .
table saw, it may be necessary for the employee to remove a piece of wood which has become jammed against the blade of the saw. In doing so, the employee might need to bypass or remove the guard on the saw and reach into the point of operation. Although this action takes place “during” normal production operations, it is not actually production, but is
servicing of the equipment to perform its production function . When such servicing may expose the employee to the unexpected activation of the machinery or equipment, or to the release of stored energy, this Final Rule will apply. If the servicing is performed in a way which prevents such exposure, such as
by the use of
special tools and/or alternative procedures which keep the employee's body out of the areas of potential contact with machine components or which otherwise maintain effective guarding, this standard will not apply.
Thus, lockout or tagout is not required by this standard if the employer can demonstrate that the alternative means enables the servicing employee to clean or unjam or otherwise service
the machine without being exposed to unexpected energization or activation of the equipment or release of stored energy.

Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 54 FR 36644-01 , 366 46-47
(Sept. 1, 19 8 9)
(emphasis added) .

The example in the preamble to the LOTO standard is
distinguishable from the situation at issue.
In the example,
a piece of wood “has become jammed against the blade of the saw.”
Jamming
affe cts the operation of
a
machine ,
and
the LOTO standard identifies
unjamming
a s
a form of servicing work .
Here, the coating line
machinery
was operating in the manner intended —it
was
the mesh that went off track .
JR and AT were not attempting to
adjust or
service
“ the
equipment to perform its production function” ;
they were
adjusting the mesh,
i.e.
the product being manufactured. 13
The Court finds JR and AT were not engaged in servicing work when they engaged in
the cited conduct.

A ssuming JR and AT were engaged in servicing work
during normal production operations, the Secretary must establish
Riverdale
either
required
JR to extend his leg through the rails of the catwalk
or
required
AT to open the gate to the main drive area
(“An employee is required to remove or bypass a guard [.]” § 1910.147( a)(2)(ii)(A)) ;
or
Riverdale required JR to
place his foot on top of the mesh to adjust it
or
required
AT to
reach towards the main drive rollers to grab the mesh to adjust it (“An employee is required to place any part of his or her body into an area on a machine or piece of equipment where work is actually performed upon the material being
processed (point of operation) or where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle.”
§ 1910.147(a)(2)(ii)(B)).

In support of his argument
that Riverdale required
JR and AT to bypass guards and insert
parts of their bod ies in machinery
or associated danger zones , the Secretary cites
Burkes Mechanical , Inc.,
No. 04-475, 2007 WL 2046814
(OSHRC July 12, 2007) . In that case , employees
of Burkes Mechanical, Inc. (BMI)
were required to
continually
clean debris underneath a moving conveyor
(but not to clean the
conveyor itself).
BMI
contended
the LOTO standard did not apply to the employees’ work because the
employees
were aware the
conveyor was in operation while they were working near it.
The Commission disagreed , finding
the cleaning work
created “an associated danger zone
. . . during a machine operating cycle.”
§ 1910.147(a)(2)(ii)(B). The Commission held,

The preamble
[of the LOTO standard]
discusses hazards—quite
similar to
those presented in this case—that pertain to servicing or maintaining a machine during normal production operations:

Performance of maintenance or servicing activities on a machine or equipment that is in operation has the potential of exposing employees not only to contact with moving machinery components at the point of operation, but also to contact with other moving components, such as power transmission apparatus,
and also
increases the risk of injury due to the position the employee must assume and the need to remove, bypass or disable guards and other safety devices. In many cases, these activities expose the employee to the hazard of being pulled into the operating equipment when parts of the employee's body, clothing or the material or tools used for cleaning or servicing become entrapped or entangled in the machine or equipment mechanism.

. . .

See   Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 54 Fed. Reg. at 36,647 . Here, an increased risk of injury existed for those BMI laborers cleaning in Areas B and C who had to assume cramped, awkward positions while shoveling the debris in close contact with the operating equipment and were, thus, exposed to the hazard
of being pulled into the operating equipment.

Id.
at *5 .

Riverdale argues
that, unlike BMI ,
it did not require
its employees
to
work in
an associated danger zone when attempting to realign the mesh as it
moved through the coating line. Instead, Riverdale
provided five different authorized methods to adjust the mesh that did not expose employees to points of operation or danger zones of the coating line.
Several Riverdale employees, including JR and AT, testified
regarding their training
in methods for
realigning the mesh
w hen it w ent off
track
and what Riverdale
required them to do .

Witness Testimony

AM,
Production Lead

AM
worked for Riverdale for approximately
six years.
He
worked as
the lead coating line operator and later became a production lead , the position he held the night of AT’s accident
(Tr. 519).
AM was working th at
night, but he did not see the accident
occur
(Tr.603 ,
635 ).
AM was no longer working for Riverdale at the time of the hearing (Tr.
518) .

AM trained JR
to take over the position of lead coating line operator
(Tr. 524-25) .
AM
described
how training was accomplished. “I learned from the guy before me. I picked up on
little tricks he had, and it goes down the chain that way. You learn from the guy before you.” (Tr.
564)

AM testified
it was the lead coating line operator’s responsibility
(and not the
responsibility of the
spindle operators)
to realign mesh that had gone off track
on the coating line (Tr. 565 ).
The mesh could
only be realigned while the coating line was operating (Tr.
613).
He trained JR to keep the mesh straight as it moves through the coating line by using
“poles” to guide it.

We have poles that we put up at the fluid beds . . . [W]e use guides at splice. Sometimes you’ve got to use them in other s pots of the line to try and keep the mesh from walking .
. . .
There’s a setup at the fluid bed where you can lock the poles in place so the mesh can’t push them.

(Tr. 580-81)
Another set of
poles
was
near the catwalk that employees could use to move the mesh
(Tr. 612).
Near the splice end of the coating line ,
there were guards that could be used to a djust the track of the mesh (Tr. 613).

C oating line employees could also use camber rollers to realign
mesh
using controls on an operator panel (Tr. 6 11) . “There are rollers underneath the catwalk after the cooling chamber that you can use to help prevent leans or help guide the
mesh where you want it to go.” (Tr. 602)
In addition to the poles
at the fluid bed ,
the poles at the catwalk,
the camber rollers, and the guards
near the splice end , coating line operators could adjust the
mesh by
offsetting the next splice d
section
so the mesh lines up correctly (Tr. 613).

AM stated he
sometimes
used his foot to move the mesh rather than the other available
methods because “it fixes the problem quicker.” (Tr. 664)
He
testified that moving the mesh with his foot is something JR “picked up from me, and I’ve seen him do it.” (Tr. 590)
AM conceded he had shown JR how
he would sit on the catwalk platform and extend his leg through the rails
to place his foot on the mesh to move it (Tr. 581).
“If the mesh is walked too much
to one side, then you’ve got to push it another way, the opposite way, that ’s where I use the trick
[counsel is] referring to with the foot.” (Tr. 582)
AM described his technique:

Me personally, and the way people have
seen me do it, I sit on the catwalk because even
with my leg fully extended out, I can't reach the
drive.
And you would just push it as it goes,
take your foot off, push it a little, go with it and
it will move whichever side you're trying to push it
towards.

(Tr. 582)   

A M
conceded that
even though he was supposed to notify supervisor Brian Johnson
if
the mesh became misaligned on the coating line
and required correcting , he
did not do so (Tr. 607).
He also admitted he knew his method of aligning the mesh
with his foot as he sat on the catwalk was contrary to Riverdale’s
safety rules.

Q. : Did you recognize that when you put your
foot through the catwalk to adjust the mesh while
the mesh was moving that it was against Riverdale
Mills's
safety protocols at the time?

A M: Yes.

Q. : And you knew it was against their safety
protocols because you were putting a part of your
b ody past the yellow marking when the line was
moving, correct?

AM: Correct.

Q. : And you also knew it was against protocol
because doing so was not how you were trained,
correct?

AM: Correct.

Q. : You were not trained to put your foot
through the catwalk to move the mesh, correct?

A M:
Correct.

Q. : And no one showed you to move the mesh with
your foot, correct?

AM: Correct.

Q. : You were instructed on other ways to adjust
the mesh, correct?

A M: Using poles.

Q. : You came up with adjusting the wire mesh
with your foot on your o w n, right?

A M:
Yep.

. . .

Q.: And you never trained [JR] to use his foot past the catwalk, right?

AM: I didn’t tell him to do it, but I will own up and say he probably picked it up from me. He probably [saw] me do it and picked it up on his own, but it’s not how I instructed him to do it.

(Tr. 615-1 7 )

AM
was not aware of anyone
aside from himself and JR who
us ed
this method to align the mesh
(Tr. 617). H e did not use the method in the presence of
supervisor
Brian Johnson
because he “didn’t
want to get in trouble or written up.”
(Tr.
618).

Regarding the yellow gate that
led to the main drive area, AM stated he had never seen the gate opened
or any coating line operators in the main drive area (Tr. 621-22).
He testified there was no reason for a spindle
operator to enter the main drive area
(Tr. 637- 38).
When asked his
opinion of AT as an employee, AM responded he “lacks common sense .” (Tr. 668-89)

JR, Lead Coating Line Operator

JR worked for Riverdale from August 2018 to March 2021. 14
He was the lead coating
line
operator
on the third shift . He was working
in that position
the night of the accident.
(Tr. 75-77). JR received training for his position as lead coating operator from production lead A M
in October 2018, through observation and on-the-job training (Tr. 131).
He observed AM adjust the mesh with his foot from the catwalk (Tr. 380).

Like AM, he acknowledged he knew he was supposed to inform
supervisor Brian Johnson
if the mesh on the coating line needed to be corrected , but he did not do so (Tr. 403-04).
He also conceded
Riverdale had provided several methods for adjusting the mesh , and it was unnecessary to use his foot to realign
it (Tr. 408 -14 ).
Like AM, he adjusted the mesh with his foot because
“[ i ]t was easier to me.” (Tr.
500)

J R was aware Riverdale ’s safety rules
did not permit employees to
use their feet to adjust the mesh from the catwalk.

Q. : And you understood that using your foot was
against Riverdale
Mills's
safety rules, correct?

JR: Correct.

Q. : And it was not standard operating procedure;
is that right?

JR: No.

Q. : And it wasn't something that
[AM]
told you to do, correct?

JR: Correct.

Q. : You never moved the mesh with your foot in
front of Brian Johnson, correct?

JR: Not that I am aware of.

Q. : Y ou were not trained to put your boot or
your foot through the catwalk to adjust the wire
mesh, correct?

JR: Correct.

(Tr. 4 27-28)

JR testified that both he and AM understood
adjusting the mesh with their feet was not an authorized method for realigning the mesh.

Q.:
Did
[AM]
ever tell you not to
[use your foot to adjust the
mesh] ?

JR: Kind of.

Q. : What do you mean?

JR: He said I am not telling you to do this.
He said you
shouldn't
but it works for me.

(Tr.
382)

Regarding AT ’s accident, JR testified there was no reason for AT to open the gate and enter the main drive area
(Tr. 471).
JR had never seen anyone attempt to adjust the mesh from the main drive area while the coating line was operating . He was surprised to see AT had attempted it
(Tr. 472).

AT, Spindle Operator

AT began working for Riverdale in December of 201 8
(Tr.
675). He worked
as a spindle operator until the night of his accident on April 3, 2019
(Tr. 677) .
He
often worked with spindle operator s
NM
and MC
(Tr. 689-90 , 717 ).
AT
returned to
Riverdale and performed light work
in October of 2019 (Tr. 729) . At
the time of the hearing, he was unemployed (Tr. 674).

AT testified that part of his job was to
adjust the mesh if it was misaligned.
H e adjusted the mesh in the main drive area from the aisle side “a couple of times a week
. . . [b]y
reaching in and pulling it over towards me or by pushing it away from me . ” (Tr.
699)
He stated he had observed “multiple people do it”
including AM ,
JR , and MC
(Tr. 699)
AT stated the gate to the main drive area was always open (Tr. 73 2 -3 4 , 743 ).
“All of the time , 90 percent of the time it was open. I physically did not touch it .” (Tr. 742-43)

When AT returned to Riverdale after his accident , he received a
write-up as a disciplinary action
and was retrained in safety procedures
(Tr. 730) .
AT was upset by the write-up. “I believe I should have been coached, not disciplined.” (Tr. 731)

ER, Spindle Operator

ER worked as a spindle operator on the coating line
for one month (March 5 to April 5, 2019) until he was fired for
drinking
alcohol
on the job
(Tr.
799,
815-1 6 , 818-21 ).
He primarily worked
the second shift on the coating line (Tr. 801).
ER testified the yellow gate
used to access the main drive area “was always open for at least the whole month I was working there.” ( Tr. 801)

On cross -examination,
ER
state d
he contacted OSHA in
April
of 2019
after he was fired
because he was mad at Riverdale
(Tr. 821). He
to ld the CSHO he spoke with that he had
quit working at Riverdale
(rather than being fired) . ER
admitted
at the hearing
that statement was “not true.” (Tr.
813)
He disputed the CSHO’s notes
showing he had told her he worked the third shift with
AT
and he left Riverdale due to an arm injury (Tr.
813-15).

NM, Spindle Operator

NM
be gan working at Riverdale in November 2018.
On April 3, 2018,
h e
w as a third-shift spindle operator
working with AT .
NM
was
still employed
with
Riverdale at the time of the
hearing (Tr. 1452 -53).

NM testified
he never observed
the yellow gate used to access the main drive area
open while the coating line was operating (Tr. 1461).
He had never observed
coating line operators work in the main drive area
with the gate open (Tr. 1462).

NM described AT’s actions the night of his accident : “He bypassed a door, stuck his arm in and then it got stuck and trapped in which he broke his arm in two places.” (Tr.
1461)
“[AT] ran around me, went to the main drive. Thought he could help and then he stuck his arm in there, which he got caught and hurt himself.” (Tr. 1463)
NM
testified
that as he
attempted to move the
mesh f rom the spindle area, AT

walked
behind me, got into like the main drive area. Thought he could
help [JR] by moving it. I don’t know what he was thinking . Stuck his arm inside the yellow caution pinch-point area. Tried to grab it. And literally, glove got stuck and got his arm sucked in.
That’s not like
a way how we move the mesh at all. We don’t stick our hands in there.

(Tr.
1465)

NM had never seen
AT
or
any other Riverdale employee enter the main drive area while the coating line was operating
(Tr. 1467).

Brian Johnson,
Third - Shift Supervisor

Brian Johnson
began working for Riverdale in October of 201 8 as a shift supervisor
(Tr. 1132).
He was working for Riverdale at the time of the hearing.
On April 3, 2019, Johnson
was
the supervisor for Riverdale’s third shift (Tr.
1323).

Johnson
testified
the yellow gate used to access the main drive area was always closed.
H e had
seen
only
maintenance department employees enter the main drive area , and
that was
when
the coating line was not operating and LOTO had been applied to the main drive
(Tr. 1375).
Coating line operators, including spindle operators,
were not supposed to open the gate (Tr. 1377).

Johnson described his reaction to
AT’s accident.

I was shocked that anybody
would go through that safety area and open the gate.
Regardless of what the situation was
with the material. Don't -- doesn't matter. That is
the most unsafe area on the entire -- on the entire
line.
But to pull the pin out and to put your
hand into it, it's better than an 80-percent chance
you're going to get severely hurt in that machine.
And I was shocked that somebody would
actually do
it. It's just not something I've ever
seen done before.

(Tr. 1377-78)

Johnson was also dismayed to learn of JR’s
technique of using his foot to straighten the mesh from the catwalk.

I have never seen, as of even today,
somebody trying that maneuver. It has never happened on my third shift to my knowledge.
It has now been brought to my attention
several months back that it was done under my watch.
And that's --
that's
totally wrong to do something
like that.

(Tr. 1378)

Credibility Determination
Regarding the
Gate and Main Drive Area

The testimony of AM, JR, N M, and Brian Johnson is at odds with that of AT and ER. The first four employees
testified the yellow gate used to access the main drive area
was always kept shut ,
only maintenance department employees entered the area, and
they entered
only when the coating line was
not operating and
LOTO had been applied to
the main drive. AT and ER , on the other hand,
testified
the
gate was usually open and coating line operators frequently entered the area to realign the
mesh
by grabbing it with their hands.

The Court finds the testimony of AM, JR, NM, and Johnson to
be
more credible than that of
AT and ER.
AT and ER appeared defensive and forgetful
of inconvenient details
as they testified.
They
admitted
t he y
w ere
angry at Riverdale (AT for being written up and ER for being fired) . ER admitted he lied to the CSHO who interviewed
him
about the circumstances
of his termination.
In contrast, the testimony of the other four employees was internally consistent and consistent with each other . Their responses to questions were straightforward , with no signs of evasiveness or hesitation.

Of
particular note
is the testimony of AM and JR . Neither of these
witnesses
was working for Riverdale at the time of the hearing. They
had no
motivation
to provide testimony favorable to Riverdale in the interest of job security . Both employees openly conceded they had
attempted to realign the mesh with their feet from the catwalk, despite knowing
it was a safety infraction that could get them in trouble if
they were
caught .
AM
testified regarding whether he applied LOTO procedures when he stopped the coating line to fix splice breaks.
“As far as I’m concerned, we
were supposed to, but like I said, you ’re not being watched all the time.
So
me feeling comfortable, I didn’t follow protocol all the time . I didn’t
lock
it out all the time. I’m supposed to but I didn’t.” (Tr.
554)
It is unlikely
a witness would
testify so candidly about
his
own misbehavior
yet provide cover for
his
former employer by
giving false testimony
about the gate and main drive area. 15

The Court concludes it is more likely than not that the gate to the main drive area was not left open ,
and coating line operators did not enter the area and
attempt to realign the mesh with their hands.

No
Requirement to Bypass Guard or
Place
Body Part in Point of Operation

Even if the
testimony of AT and
J R were deemed credible, it would not establish
the
LOTO standard applies to the cited
activities .
It is undisputed the coating line was
engaged in its normal production operation on April 3, 201 9.
Section s
1910.147(a)( 2)(ii)(A) and (B)
provide the LOTO standard applies to servicing work during normal production operations
“ only if ” employees are
“ required
to remove or bypass a guard” or they
are “ required
to place any ” body part in the “ point of operation ”
or
“ where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle. ” ( emphasis
added)

The
Application
section of the LOTO standar d explicitly provides the standard applies only if the employer
requires
employees to take one of the two listed actions. Nowhere in the record
is there evidence Riverdale
required
an employee to bypass the gate to the main drive area or to
place
his foot on the moving mesh from the catwalk.
Neither of
thes e actions w as
permitted b y Riverdale’s safety program , much less required . The two employees who used their feet to move the mesh
while sitting on
the catwalk knew to hide their actions from supervisor Johnson —otherwise they would be written up.
AT’s action
of
bypass ing
the gate to the main drive area
and grab bing
the
mesh with his hand
shocked his supervisor and
coworkers —they had never seen anyone do that and could not comprehend why anyone would. 16

Riverdale provided five methods for
realigning mesh that
had
gone off track on the coating line. None of them required employees to bypass guards or place body parts in the point of
operation.
Because the Secretary cannot establish
Riverdale required employees to take
either of these actions, he has failed to establish the five cited
subsections of the LOTO
standard apply to the cited conditions.

Items
3,
5a, 5b, 5c, and 5e are
VACATED . 17

Alternative Item 6: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1926. 212(a)(1)

The Secretary alleged, in the alternative to
Instance (a) of
Item 5e , a serious
violation of § 1926.212(a)(1) .
Item
6 addresses only the action of JR using his foot to adjust the mesh
while sitting on
the catwalk on April 3, 2019. The
actions
of AT
in the main drive area are not at issue.
The
AVD of Item 2 states:

29 CFR 1910.212(a)(1):
One or more methods of machine guarding was not provided to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as
those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips and sparks:

(a) Site: Building 1, at the Coating Line , on the catwalk above the Main Drive component
. . . :

On 4/3/2 019 a machine guard was not provided to protect a Coating Line Operator from moving parts of the Main Drive in that the operator placed a foot thro ugh the railing on the catwalk and on to the moving wire mesh in order to straighten it.

The Cited Standard

Section 19 10.212(a)(1) provides:

One or more methods of machine guarding shall be provided to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips and sparks. Examples of guarding methods are-barrier guards, two-hand tripping devices, electronic safety devices, etc.

ANALYSIS

(1) Applicability of the Cited Standard

Section 1910.212(a)(1) is found in Subpart O ( Machine and Machine Guarding ) of the general industry standards. Section 1910.212 is titled
General requirements for all machines . The
main drive
rollers
at issue
are part of
a machine.
The cited standard applies.

(2) Compli ance with the Terms of
the Standard

Section 1910.212(a)(1) is a performance standard.
Performance standards “require an employer to identify the hazards peculiar to its own workplace and determine the steps necessary
to abate them.”
Thomas Indus. Coatings, Inc. ,
No. 97-1073, 2007 WL 4138237, at *4 (OSHRC Nov. 1, 2007).
It is undisputed
AM and JR were able to reach
the moving mesh with their feet if they sat on the catwalk and
extended
their legs between the rails.
Thus
the
main drive area was not guarded
in the sense that employees could , with effort, make contact with the mesh
near the main drive rollers.
The issue is whether the Secretary establish ed guarding was required.

To prove
access
to a hazard for the element of noncompliance, the Secretary must show that it is reasonably predictable by operational necessity or otherwise that employees
could
have been in the zone of danger of the
main drive rollers.

To make this determination, we consider whether, given “the manner in which the machine functions and how it is operated by the employees,” they are exposed to a hazard.
Rockwell Int'l Corp ., 9 BNA OSHC 1092, 1097-98 (No. 12470, 1980). In other words, for the Secretary to establish the exposure to a hazard required for noncompliance, he “must show that it is reasonably predictable either by operational necessity or otherwise (including inadvertence), that employees have been, are, or will be in the zone of danger.”
Aerospace Testing Alliance , No. 16- 1167, at 4 (OSHRC 2020) (quoting
Fabricated Metal Prods ., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1073-74 (No. 93-1853, 1997) (emphasis added)). Therefore, the occurrence of the operator's injury here does not, by itself, establish that [the company] failed to comply with § 1910.212(a)(1). Indeed, noncompliance in this case hinges on whether the operator's actions were reasonably predictable given the machine's normal operation.

Wayne Farms ,
No. 17-1174,
2020 WL 5815506 at *3
(OSHRC Sept. 22, 2020).

The actions of JR were not reasonably predictable given the coating line’s normal operation. Riverdale provided five authorized methods for realigning the mesh, including using two sets of poles, cambers, guides, and offsetting splices. Extending a foot between rail s
while sitting on
the catwalk is a shortcut AM came up with
and JR observed . This rogue method was not operationally necessary or the result of employee inadvertence. It was an intentional, idiosyncratic act contrary to Riverdale’s safety rules.

Furthermore, the Secretary has not established JR had access to the zone of danger when
he
extended
his
leg through the rail s
of the catwalk.
Looking at the photograph admitted as Exhibit C-100a, JR marked the area where he placed his foot to adjust the mesh. He also marked the roller nearest to the catwalk. He described the area where he placed his foot as “[j] ust
in front of the catwalk along the edge of the mesh.” (Tr. 346) JR estimated the roller closest to the edge of the catwalk was “[m] aybe
two feet” from the catwalk and the mesh was “[m] aybe
half a foot” below the catwalk as it moved along the coating line (Tr. 353). He placed his foot “four to six inches”
from the edge of the catwalk when he straightened the mesh (Tr. 353).
The Secretary does not dispute JR’s estimates
or
offer
alternative
estimates. The Court credits JR’s testimony regarding his estimates of the relevant distances.

T he Commission has noted, “there is no hard and fast rule for determining exposure in a machine guarding case—rather, exposure must be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on ‘the manner in which the machine functions and the way it is operated.”
Dover High Performance
Plastics, Inc ., No. 14-1268, 2020 WL 5880242, at *3, n. 5 (OSHRC Sept. 25, 2020) .
JR testified
he sat on the catwalk and extended his leg through
the rail s
(Tr. 341 -42 ) .
As he did so, his arm was “wrapped around the railing ,” indicating his torso was
next to
the railing support s (Tr. 350).
JR was able to place his foot
“[f] our
to six inches maybe ” from the edge of the catwalk
onto the mesh , meaning his foot was approximately
eighteen inches from the closest roller
(Tr. 353 ).
AM, whose technique JR copied,
testified
h e could not reach the
main
drive rollers from the catwalk.
“[E] ven
with my leg fully extended out, I can't reach the
drive . ” ( Tr. 582)

The Court finds the Secretary failed to establish
Riverdale
violated the terms of
§ 1910.212(a)(1)
T he Secretary di d not prove
JR
w as
exposed to the rotating parts of the main drive
rollers
by operational necessity
or by access to the zone of danger.

Item 6 is
VACATED .

THE
HEALTH
CITATION
(No. 19-2011)

Item 3 of Citation No.
1: Alleged Serious Violation of §
1910.1200(h)(1)

Item 3
of Citation No. 1
provides:

29 CFR 1910.1200(h)(1):
Employees were not provided effective information and training on hazardous chemicals in their work area at the time of their initial assignment and whenever a new hazard that the employees
had not been previously trained about was introduced into their work area:

On or about 6/13/19 to 6/27/19 hazardous chemicals were used in the coating line work area , such as “soap,” fluid bed chemicals, washer chemicals, and cooling chemicals , where an employee worked without first receiving effective information and training on such chemicals at the time of the initial assignment and/or whenever a new hazard was introduced into the work area.

The Cited Standard

Section 1910 .1200
addresses
hazard communication
regarding
toxic and
hazardous substances.
It requires
that the
“ transmittal of information is to be accomplished by means of comprehensive hazard communication programs, which are to include container labeling and other forms of warning, safety data sheets and employee training. ”
§ 1910.1200(a)(1).

The cited standard, §
1910.1200(h)(1) ,
stat es:

Employers shall provide employees with effective information and training on hazardous chemicals in their work area at the time of their initial assignment, and whenever a new chemical hazard the employees have not previously been trained about is introduced into their work area. Information and training may be designed to cover categories of hazards (e.g., flammability, carcinogenicity) or specific chemicals. Chemical-specific information must always be available through labels and safety data sheets.

(1)
Applicability of the Cited Standard

The cited standard is found in Subpart Z ( Toxic and Hazardous Substances ) .
Section

1910.12 00( b), the
Scope
section of the standard ,
provides
in relevant part :

(1)
This section requires chemical manufacturers or importers to classify the hazards of chemicals which they produce or import, and all employers to provide information to their employees about the hazardous chemicals to which they are exposed, by means of a hazard communication program, labels and other forms of warning, safety data sheets, and information and training .
. . .
(Employers who do not produce or import chemicals need only focus on those parts of this rule that deal with establishing a workplace program and communicating information to their workers.)

(2)
This section applies to any chemical which is known to be present in the workplace in such a manner that employees may be exposed under normal conditions of use or in a foreseeable emergency .

It is undisputed
Riverdale employees worked with hazardous chemicals, including
those listed in the AVD s of the items at issue under the Health Citation. 18
Section 1910. 1200(h)(1) applies to the cited chemicals.

(2)
C ompliance with the
Terms of the
Standard

IH Hart opened a health inspection
at Riverdale’s facility on
June 27, 2019.
During her inspection, she
interviewed a machine operator
who
had worked
at
Riverdale for two months at th at
time.
IH Hart conducted the interview
in the presence of
Cyril Means,
Riverdale’s
corporate counsel . She
transcribed the machine worker’s answers to her questions and then gave him the
statement to read over and sign
( Exh . C-27 ; Tr. 1080-82).
The
information
communicated in the
machine operator’s interview statement
is the basis for the
violation alleged in Item 3
(Tr.
15 70) .

The m achine operator
told IH Hart
he uses chemicals in his work,
including one the employees call
soap ,
which is what the employees call sodium hydroxide (Tr. 10 78). IH Hart testified its “corrosive. It can damage skin, eyes, any part of the body, really.”
(Tr. 1078)

The machine operator told IH Hart ,

If I get soap on me, it’s going to eat my skin . I don’t know what’s in the soap that does that . Gets active with the sweat on me. I have a safety data sheet. I
don’t get training yet.
About chemicals yet .
Primer doesn’t
do anything. Only the soap hurts me .
. . .
When I first started, 2
[hours]
training about forklifts, PPE,
video. Nothing in video about chemicals . Soap literally will eat your flesh . Mostly maintenance adds soap. We
have to
check it, and if it needs more, I add it. I wear gloves . Lead operators add it. During the day
. . . we
have to
add it. Make sure I’m not sweating and wear gloves. I wear a dust mask for it also . If it gets on skin, wash it off.

( Exh . C - 27)

The
primer
to which the machine operator refer s
contains hazardous Chemical 6 ( Exh . C- 37
(Under Seal) ).
IH Hart asked to see the
safety data sheet
to which the machine operator referred .
When he produced it, she discovered it was not a safety data sheet but a recipe for one of the products Riverdale uses at it s
facility ( Exh . C -28
(Under Seal) ;
Tr. 1082-83
(Under Seal) ).

Riverdale argues the machine operator’s statement is hearsay and should not
weigh in
the Court’s
consideration
of this item.
Riverdale is incorrect.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(d) ,

A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay:

. . .

(2) The statement is offered against an opposing party and:

. . .

(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed [.]

The machine operator
was an employee at the time he made the statement to IH Hart ,
and his statement concerns his working conditions, a matter within the scope of his relationship with
Riverdale.
See, Regina Constr. Co.,
No. 87-1309 , 1991 WL 104227, at *3 (OSHRC
May 15, 1991). The machine operator’s statement is not hearsay ,
and
the Court gives it considerable weight.

The Court also rejects
Riverdale’s claim that the machine operator ’s statement unfairly prejudices Riverdale under
Fed. R. Evid. 403 ( “T he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” ) . 19
Riverdale’s legal
counsel
has
robustly
defend ed Riverdale’s
interests
throughout
this proceeding.
Riverdale’s corporate counsel was present at the machine operator’s interview.
At no time has
Riverdale’s counsel suggest ed
the
IH ’s transcription of
the machine operator’s responses is
inaccurate
or her conduct of the interview
lacked transparency.

Next , Riverdale argues that even if the machine operator’s statement is true , it shows
Riverdale trained him in compliance with the cited standard.
“ Specifically, in his statement,
[ the machine operator]
admitted that he knew the industry term for the chemical (“soap”), what PPE to wear while using the soap (“I wear gloves”) and knew what to do if he had a dermal exposure (“If it gets on skin, wash it off”). ” (Riverdale’s
Brief , p.
25) None of this co unteracts the machine operator’s statement that he had not yet received training in the use of chemicals .
The machine operator stated he routinely worked with soap.
Knowing
what the other employees call sodium hydroxide and
that it will burn
his
skin does not establish Riverdale trained
him in compliance with the standard.

Dav id
Stevens ,
Riverdale’s
plant safety manager ,
testified he provides
hazard communication training to employees.

[W] e
make
sure that they know
exactly where the Safety Data Sheets are. We let
them know -- there's a film that we watch before a
video. We go back, we review the --
the
key points
of the film. We have a five-page training document
that we go through with them.
So
we make sure that they get all of
that information. And then I make sure that they
nod their head north and south to me that they
understand, and then they acknowledge that they've got it.

(Tr. 1531-32)

Stevens
testified
the machine operator received
safety training on
a number of
topics on May 16, 2019, the day after he was hired
( Exh . R-106 ; Tr. 1531).
Exhibit
R-106 is a form titled
Safety Training Checklist and Documentation
and lists twenty-one
topics, such as crane training, forklift training, machine controls, etc. The only
topic related to the item at issue is
“Right to Know/Hazard Communication - ( Location of safety data sheets and other reference material). ”
IH Hart requested
hazard communication training documents at the
opening conference (( Exh . C-26 ; Tr.
1056-58) .
By the time of the
closing conference in September 2019, Riverdale had not provided the training documents to her (Tr.
1088-89).

The machine operator
told IH Hart that he received no
training
with regard to
chemicals.
In contrast, he speci fically mentioned he had received training in “steel toes
. . . forklifts,
[and] PPE.” He also pointed out the safety video he watch ed
did not address hazardous chemicals: “Nothing in video about chemicals.”
( Exh . C-27) 20
The Court credits the machine operator’s statement that Riverdale did not provide hazard communication safety training to him.

T he Secretary has established Riverdale did not provide the machine operator with “ effective information and training on hazardous chemicals in
[his]
work area at the time of
[his]
initial assignment ,” as required by § 1910.1200(h)(1).
The Court finds
Riverdale failed to comply with the requirements of § 1910.1200(h)(1)
with regard to
the machine operator.

(3) Employee Access to
the Hazardous Condition

The machine operator worked with soap and primer, both of which contain hazardous chemicals
( Exh . C -27) .
The Secretary has established he had access to the
hazardous
chemicals.

(4) Employer Knowledge

As previously noted, when an employee
has not received required safety training,
the employer
necessarily has knowledge
of the failing.
Riverdale’s
employee handbook includes a section on hazard communication training. It states :

EMPLOYEE INFORMATION & TRAINING- 1910.1200(h) All employees deemed to have been or to be placed in contact with hazardous material will be so informed and
will be trained in safety procedures on a one-on - one basis by the Supervisor.
New and transferred employees will be trained by the Supervisor of that area as part of the training/orientation process. Use of the appropriate MSDS will be part of this training.

( Exh . C-9, p. 56, ¶ C )
(emphasis added)

Riverdale has a hazard communication program
that
details
the
elements to be covered when training new employees :

Prior to starting work each new employee of Riverdale Mills Corporation will attend a health and safety orientation and will receive information and training on the following:

• an
  overview of the requirements contained in the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 1910.1200;

*
any
operations in their work area where hazardous chemicals are present;

*
location
and availability of our written hazard program;

*
physical
and health hazards of the chemicals in their work area;

*
m ethods
and observation techniques used to determine the presence or release of toxic and hazardous substances in the work area;

*
m easures
employees can take to protect themselves from hazards in their workplace, including specific procedures the employer has
implemented
to prevent exposure to hazardous chemicals such as appropriate work practices, emergency procedures, and personal protective equipment;

*
explanation
of the labeling system and what the label information means; and

*
explanation of
M [ safety data sheets]
and how employees can use this information to protect themselves.

( Exh . R-8 0, p. 2, ¶ 3)

It is clear from the machine operator’s interview statement that he did not attend
the specialized training in hazard communication outlined in Riverdale’s program.
Riverdale’s policy, as stated in t he employee
handbook ,
is
that
newly-hired
employees be trained
one-on-one
by their
supervisors
for hazard communication safety . The machine
operator’s supervisor necessarily knows he did not tr ain the machine operator in hazardous communication safety.
His
knowledge is imputed to Riverdale.

The Court finds Riverdale
knew it had not adequately trained the machine operator
on hazardous chemicals
in his work area.

The Court finds the Secretary has established all elements of his burden of proof. Therefore, Item 3 is
AFFIRMED.

Characterization of the Violation

The Secretary characteri zed the violation cited in Item 3 as serious.
IH Hart’s description of the hazards
presented by working with sodium hydroxide
is
sufficient
to show “ an accident is possible and there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the accident . ”

Item 3 is properly characterized as serious.

Item 1 of Citation No. 2 : Alleged Other-than-Serious Violation of § 1910.1200(g)(11)

Item 1 of Citation No. 2 provides:

29 CFR 1910. 1200(g)(11): Safety data sheets were not made readily available, upon request, to designated representatives , the Assistant Secretary, and the Director, in accordance with the requirements of 29 CFR 1910. 1020(e):

. . . On or about 6/27/19, and again on 8/26/19, the employer did not make readily available, upon request, to the Assistant Secretary, and the Director , the safety data sheets for the hazardous materials used on the galvanizing and coating lines, such as, but not limited to, Chemical 4, Chemical 5, and Chemical 6 identified on the chemical key which is provided separately to the employer simultaneously with this citation.

The Cited Standard

Section
1910.1200(g)(11) provides:

Safety data sheets shall also be made readily available, upon request, to designated representatives, the Assistant Secretary, and the Director, in accordance with the requirements of § 1910.1020(e).

(1)
Applicability of the Cited Standard

Riverdale used hazardous chemicals in its facility
for which safety data sheets are required
( Exhs . C-25
& R-52
(Under Seal);
Tr.
1 064
& 1066
(Under Seal) ; Tr . 1065 , 1121-22 ) .
Section 1910. 1200(g)(1) applies to the cited condition.

(2)
C ompliance with the Terms of the Standard

The cited standard requires the employer to make safety data sheets readily available, upon request, to OSHA in accordance with the requirements of § 1910.1020(e). Section 1910.1020(e) provides:

Whenever an employee or designated representative requests access to a record, the employer shall assure that access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and manner. If the employer cannot reasonably provide access to the record within fifteen (15) working days, the employer shall within the fifteen (15) working days apprise the employee or designated representative requesting the record of the reason for the delay and the earliest date when the record can be made available.

On June 27, 2019, IH Hart
held an opening conference attended by Riverdale owner James Knott, corporate counsel Cyril Means, and plant safety manager David
Stevens .
She conducted a walkaround inspection with James Knott
and Cyril Means
which took
them along the coating line and the galvanizing line. She discussed the chemicals used by operators on the
two
line s
with Knott
(Tr.
1063-64, 1066 (Under Seal)).
She
requested all safety data sheets for Riverdale’s coating and galvanizing lines that Riverdale had not previously provided . It was her impression
Knott and Means understood she was talking about safety data sheets for chemicals used on the
two lines
( Exh . C-26; Tr.
1057-60, 1125). She
gave her business card
to the
men.
Her card listed her contact information, including her name, office address, email address, fax number, and telephone number (Tr. 1058-59).

Riverdale had not provided any of the documents she requested by the day of the closing conference,
i n September 2019
(Tr. 1088).
O n September 24, 2019
( after the closing conference ),
IH Hart’s assistant area director received an email from one of Riverdale’s attorneys with safety data sheets attached
for some of the chemicals, including Chemicals
4, 5, and 6
( Exh . C-31 (Under Seal); Tr. 1089-90).
Still missing were requested safety data sheets for
Chemicals 2 and 3 (Tr. 1094 (Under Seal)). OSHA had not received those safety data sheets as of December 13, 2019, when the Secretary issued the Health Citation to Riverdale (Tr. 1094 (Under Seal)).

Riverdale contends it understood IH Hart’s request for safety data sheets during the opening conference to pertain only to chemicals that presented air-contaminant hazards.

[I] t is important to note that OSHA opened the inspection
as a result of
a complaint about air-contaminant hazards,
and therefore Hart’s request for
[safety data sheets]
on the first day of the inspection can only be underst oo d as
requesting
[safety data sheets]
applicable to possible air contaminants. The Secretary, however, has not claimed
that the
[safety data sheets]
which were subsequently provided in September 2019 (and which are the basis for
this citation item) relate specifically to potential air contaminants; rather, they relate to chemicals
used on the coating line. Accordingly, as of June 27, 2021,
[Riverdale]
had already fully complied with
OSHA’s requests for
[safety data sheets]
related to potential air contaminants. If OSHA sought other
[safety data sheets]
than
those related to air contaminants, it was the agency’s burden, not RMC’s, to clearly articulate
which
[safety data sheets]
were sought.

( Riverdale ’s
Brief , pp. 27-28)

Riverdale’ s argument would be more persuasive if one of the men attending the opening conference
or walkaround inspection had
testified
to this effect
at the hearing .
Of the
three men, only Stevens
was called as a witness by Riverdale, and he was not questioned
regarding his understanding of IH Hart’s document request.
IH Hart t ook the stand on the fifth day of the eight-day hearing.
Means
attended
the
entirety of the
hearing and
was present in the courtroom
that day (Tr. 1036).
If he disagreed with IH Hart’s
testimony, he could
have
inform ed
Riverdale’s counsel , who
could have called
Means or Knott to
the stand to
rebut IH Hart’s testimony.
Riverdale did not do so.

Th e
situation
here
is analogous to
the situation
in
Capeway
Roofing Sys., Inc.,
No. 00-1968,
2003 WL 22020485 (OSHRC
Aug. 26, 2003). In that case,
a
CSHO named Holiday testified
that on the day of the inspection,
a foreman named Araujo
told him his employees had been working
on a roof without fall protection
the previous day.
Capeway
argued
the ALJ
erred
in
credit ing
CSHO Holiday’s testimony
over
conflicting testimony
that a second foreman had
stated
the employees had not been working on the roof that day.
The Commission disagreed.

[Foreman]
Araujo was in the courtroom, yet he was not called to testify. If he had not made the admission to which CO Holiday testified, we would expect that he would have taken the witness stand to deny or explain it. The fact that he did not lends weight to Holiday's testimony, because  Capeway  had the opportunity to rebut it but did not .  . . .
It is well established that when one party has it peculiarly within its power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the situation and fails to do so, it gives rise to the presumption that the testimony would be unfavorable to that party .  . . .
The Commission has also noted that when one party has evidence but does not present it, it is reasonable to draw a negative or adverse inference against that party,  i.e. , that the evidence would not help that party's case. 

Id.
at
*12 (citations omitted) .

If
Means
or Knott
agreed
with Riverdale
that
it could “only be
understood” that IH Hart
was requesting safety data sheets relating to
air contaminants
the day of her opening conference , the Court would expect that
one of the men
would have taken the witness stand to
dispute
her testimony
that she
requested safety data sheets for the coating and galvanizing line chemicals . The fact that neither of them
testified
lends weight to IH Hart’s testimony, because Riverdale had the opportunity to rebut it but did not.
The Court credits IH Hart’s testimony that she requested safety data sheets for the chemicals used on the coating line and galvanizing line. 21

Finally, Riverdale argues
§§ 1910.1200(g)(11) and 1910.10 20(e)
do not require the employer to give, send, or otherwise produce
the requested safety data sheets to OSHA—the employer is required only to
“make readily available” the safety data sheets.

[Riverdale]
was not required to provide copies of these documents; it only had to make them
“ readily available” for inspection.
Id.
§ 1910.1200(g)(11). And they were readily available for Hart
to inspect in person when she visited
[Riverdale ’s ]
worksite. Hart chose not to inspect them then. Thus,
[Riverdale]
did not withhold
[safety
data sheets]
documents at this or any other time.

(Riverdale’s
Brief , p. 29)

Under Riverdale’s interpretation of
“made readily available,”
an employer
is required to do nothing to comply with § 1910.1 200(g)(11) except
maintain safety data sheets somewhere in its facility.
An employer need not even respond to a request for
documents, unless the IH a sks to
see
them in person at the facility.
Riverdale’s novel argument
ignores the plain language of § 1910.1020(e), which is incorporated
by reference
in the cited standard. Section 1910. 1020(e) requires the employer, upon request by
an
OSHA representative , to “ assure that access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and manner , ”
and
provides fifteen days for the employer to provide access.
Section 1910.1020(e)
places an affirmative obligation on the employer to
take action
in response to the request
for access to record s.
Assure
is defined as “ tell
someone something positively or confidently to dispel any doubts they may have
. . . make (someone) sure of something
. . . make (something) certain to happen . ”
Assure ,
The New Oxford American Dictionary ( 2d ed. 2005).
The employer cannot sit back and ignore
the request for documents until the OSHA representative asks to view them in person.
Under the standard, the employer is required to
either send the
OSHA representative copies of the requested documents (surely the easi est method of compliance) or
initiate
arrangements as to
the “time, place, and manner” for the OSHA representative to access the records. Regardless, the
onus
is on the employer to affirmatively respond to the Secretary.

The Secretary has established Riverdale
failed to comply with the terms of § 1910.1200(g)(11).

(3) Employee Access
to the Violative Conditions

Employee access to a hazard is not an element of the Secretary’s burden of proof for a recordkeeping violation. “[T]he Secretary need not prove harm to any particular employee resulting from a violative record, to establish a violation.”
Gen. Dynamics Corp ., 15 BNA OSHC 2122, 2132 n. 17 (No. 87-1195, 1993).

(4) Employer Knowledge

IH Hart requested the safety data sheets for
chemicals used by employees on the
coating line and galvanizing line
in the presence of Riverdale owner James Knott
and
Riverdale corporate counsel Cyril Means.
N either
of them assured
that access to the safety data records was made readily available to
IH Hart.
Their knowledge of the request for safety data sheets and their failure to respond
in accordance with the requirements of § 1910.1020(e) is imputed to Riverdale. The Secretary has established Riverdale had actual knowledge of the violation.

The Court finds the Secretary has established all elements of his burden of proof. Therefore, Item 1 is
AFFIRMED.

Characterization of the Violation

The Secretary characterized the violation of § 19 10 . 1200(g )( ( 11)
as other-than-serious. “[A] nonserious violation is one in which there is a direct and immediate relationship between the violative condition and occupational safety and health but not of such relationship that a resultant injury or illness is death or serious physical harm.”
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co.,
1 BNA OSHC 1219, 23 1222 (No. 1, 1973).

The violation is
properly characterized as
other-than-serious.

PENALTY DETERMINATION

“In assessing penalties, section 17(j) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(j), requires the Commission to give due consideration to the gravity of the violation and the employer's size, history of violation, and good faith.”
Burkes Mech., Inc .,
200 7 WL
2046814, at9.
“Gravity is a principal factor in the penalty determination and is based on the number of employees exposed, duration of exposure, likelihood of injury, and precautions taken against injury.”
Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc .,
No. 00-1052 ,
2005 WL
696568, at
3 (OSHRC Feb. 25, 2005)
(citation omitted). "Gravity, unlike good faith, compliance history and size, is relevant only to the violation being considered in a case and therefore is usually of greater significance. The other factors are concerned with the employer generally and are considered as modifying factors.''
Natkin
& Co. Mech. Contractors ,
No. 401, 1973 WL
4007, at * 2, n. 3 (OSHRC April
27, 1973).

Riverdale employed
135
to 150
employees (Tr. 984 , 1100-0 1 ).
IH
Hart testified, “History is based on previous serious citations from OSHA
in the last five years, which I didn’t find.” (Tr. 1101)
The Court does not credit Riverdale with good faith.
The record reveals
Riverdale was lax in the areas of safety training, recordkeeping, and supervisory oversight.

The gravity of Item
2 of the Safety Citation is
high. TB, the cited employee, had worked at Riverdale as an authorized employee for a total of nine years.
Yet Riverdale had never conducted a periodic inspection with him, even though
§ 1910. 147 (c)(6)( i ) requires the employer to conduct periodic inspections annually . Any deficiencies in TB’s understanding and implementation of
LOTO procedure went unnoticed for almost a decade. The Court assesses a penalty of
$8 ,525 for Item 2 of the Safety Citation.

The gravity of
Item 3 of
Citation No. 1 of the Health Citation is also high.
The machine operator was working with hazardous chemicals, including sodiu m hydroxide,
which
are corrosive
and highly dangerous.
Riverdale’s failure to adequately train the machine operator under §
1910.1200(h)(1)
imperiled his safety
and health . The Court assesses a penalty of
$8,525 for Item 3 of Citation No. 1 of the Health Citation.

The gravity of Item
1 of Citation No. 2 of the Health Citation is moderate.
The Court assesses no penalty
for Item 1.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing decision, it is hereby
ORDERED:

1. Item 2 of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(c) (6)( i ), is
   AFFIRMED , and a penalty of $8,525 is
   assessed ;

2.
Item
3
of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(c)( 7 )( i ) (A) , is
VACATED , and
no
penalty is
assessed;

3. Item
   5a
   of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147( d )( 2 ), is
   VACATED , and no penalty is
   assessed;

4. Item 5b of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(d)(3), is
   VACATED , and no penalty is
   assessed;

5. Item 5 c
   of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147(d)( 4 ) ( i ) , is
   VACATED , and no penalty is
   assessed;

6. Item 5 e
   of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.147( c )( 4 ) ( i ) , is
   VACATED , and no penalty is
   assessed;

7. Item 6 of the Safety Citation, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.212(a)(1), is
   VACATED , and no penalty is
   assessed;

8. Item 3 of Citation No. 1 of the Health Citation , alleging a serious violation of § 1910.1200(h)(1)
   is
   AFFIRMED ,
   and a penalty of $8,525 is assessed; and

9. Item 1 of Citation No. 2 of the Health Citation, alleging a n other-than- serious violation of § 1910.1200( g )(1 1 ) ,
   is
   AFFIRMED,
   and
   no
   penalty is assessed .

SO
ORDERED.

/s/ _________

Sharon D. Calhoun

Dated: July 1 8 ,
2022                Administrative Law Judge, OSHRC

Atlanta, GA

"

1
In the complaint
for the Safety Citation , t he Secretary amended
the designation of Item 1
to
Item 5e
and grouped it with Items
5a through
5d
(the Secretary
later
withdrew Item 5d). The Secretary
withdrew Item 4
but incorporated
this
language from
its alleged violation description
into Items
5a through 5c: “ On 4/3/2019 the application of energy control
( lockout or tagout) actions
were
not done in the sequence prescribed by the standard in that none
of the prescribed steps were performed.” (Complaint,
¶
V.A & V.B;
Exh . A)
The Secretary
subsequently moved for leave to amend
Items 3, 5c and 5e
of the Safety
Citation. Judge Gatto, to whom this case was originally assigned,
granted in
part
and denied in part the Secretary’s motion
in an order issued August 24, 2020.
The
quoted text of the
alleged violation descriptions
for the
cited items in this decision reflect the
amendments
made in the Secretary’s complaint and Judge
Gatto’s
order .

2 After the Secretary rested,
Riverdale
moved for
a judgment on partial findings under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue. The court may, however, decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence.”)
Riverdale argued the motion separately for the Health
Citation (Tr.
1246- 58 , 1262- 66 ) and the Safety Citation
(Tr.
1277- 98 , 1313-17 ) .
The Secretary responded
by
arguing he had met his
prima facie
case on each of the remaining citation items and asking the Court to deny
Riverdale’s motion
(Tr.
1258- 61,
1266- 67,
1298- 1313 , 1318- 19 ) .
The Court
deferred ruling on the motion
(Tr. 1321).
The Court
now
denies
Riverdale’s motion .

3 A
former
coating line operator described a rack as “generally 12-and-a-half gauge or 10-and-a-half gauge mesh that would be cut into about maybe two-feet lengths with needles bent over like a staple that would be placed underneath the two adjoining pieces that banged over like you’re stapling.” (Tr. 83)

4
Page 42 of Exhibit C-39 is a photograph showing the catwalk above the main drive rollers. Yellow metal caging can be seen attached to the railing system. At the time of the accident on April 3, 2019, the railing system was in place, but there was space between its vertical supports and between the top rail and the catwalk surface, through which employees could extend their arms and legs. After the accident, Riverdale installed the caging (also referred to as “security fencing”) to the railing system , which
prevents employees from extending their arms and legs through the railing (Tr. 92, 95, 103).

5
The third shift runs f rom 9:30 p.m. to 7:15 a.m.
on
Sundays and Mondays ,
and from 11:00 p.m. to 7:15 a.m.
on
the
other days
of the week
(Tr. 76-77).

6
There are gates on both the wall side and the aisle side
of the coating line (Tr. 543).

7
AT
remained hospitalized for a week. He
subsequentl y u nderwent five surgical procedures
for
steel plate insertion, debridement, and skin grafts (Tr.701).

8
Section 1910.147(c)(1)
provides :

The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy control procedures, employee training and periodic inspections to ensure that before any employee performs any servicing or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected energizing, startup or release of stored energy could occur and cause injury, the machine or equipment shall be isolated from the energy source and rendered inoperative.

9
Riverdale argues
the Secretary “ presented no evidence regarding when
[TB]
became an authorized employee .” (Riverdale’s
Brief ,
p.
8)
Riverdale’s
argument
is disingenuous .
The record establishes
that one of the main functions of the
maintenance department
is
to apply LOTO to machinery and equipment
when performing servicing work.
TB is Riverdale’s maintenance supervisor . H e testified he and EM were authorized employees (Tr.
842).
TB
testified employees in the maintenance department
performed “[s] ervice
on equipment, machines building facilities , preventive maintenance.” (Tr. 832)
Both as a maintenance mechanic and a maintenance supervisor, TB
performed maintenance on the coating line
using the LOTO “program that applied to the maintenance department .” (Tr. 834)
He testified
the maintenance
department used
Riverdale’s
Lockout Tagout Log
to record
“the individual locking out, the time, date, and piece of equipment.”
(Tr. 835)
TB stated Riverdale management informed him he
“was in charge” of the LOTO program (Tr. 850).
When he hired EM, he trained him as an authorized employee
(Tr. 864).
The Court finds TB and EM were authorized employees
in that
they
“ lock [ed]
out or tag [ ged ]
out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment.” § 1910.1457(b).

10
Riverdale’s failure to conduct a periodic inspection for
TB is established by his testimony. The Secretary also contends
Riverdale did not conduct a periodic inspection for
EM .
The Secretary
was unable, however, to establish
how long EM had been working for Riverdale at the time he and TB applied LOTO to the spindle . TB stated he hired EM and
he “wanted to say” EM had worked at Riverdale
for more than a year by April 26, 2019, but he was not “sure about that.” (Tr. 858)
Because the record does not establish EM had worked for Riverdale for at least a year ,
t he
Secretary
cannot establish
Riverdale failed to conduct an annual
periodic
inspection with him.

11
Although
th e cited
case is
not precedential
in this proceeding, the Court finds its reasoning
persuasive .

12
TB testified he began conducting periodic inspections of maintenance department employees after
OSHA’s
S afety inspection occurred (Tr.
843- 50) .

13
Furthermore, Riverdale provided alternative means to enable coating line operators to realign the mesh
without exposing themselves to hazardous conditions. The alternative
means for realignment of the mesh are discussed in
the section addressing witness testimony .

14
JR left Riverdale’s employment shortly after the April 3, 2019, accident. He returned to work at Riverdale in July 2020 and left again in March 2021. At the time of the hearing, JR was no longer at Riverdale (Tr. 74-76).

15
The Court notes that instances of
potential
safety infractions
by Riverdale employees
at various stations of the coating line
came
to light
during the hearing.
The only instances at issue , however, in Items
3,
5a, 5b, 5c, 5e, and 6 are the
actions of JR and AT on April 3, 2019 , at the catwalk and the main drive area.

16
The cause of the accident is not
at issue. “The Commission has long held that
‘ [d] etermining
whether the standard was violated is not dependent on the cause of the accident.’
Am. Wrecking Corp ., 19 BNA OSHC 1703, 1707 n.4 (No. 96-1330, 2001) (consolidated),
aff'd in relevant part , 351 F.3d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2003).”
Ceco
Concrete,
No. 17-0843, 2021 WL 2311867, at *5, n.4 (OSHRC Feb. 26, 2021).

17
The parties raised other issues
on the
merits of Items 3, 5a, 5c, and 5e,
including whether JR was a supervisor
( for the purpose of imputing employer knowledge ) , whether the coating line operators were authorized employees , and
how LOTO was applied in
areas of the coating line other than the catwalk and the main drive area . Because the Court finds
the LOTO standard is not applicable to the cited
conditions in the five items,
those issues are moot.

18
Riverdale
considers some of the chemicals
and recipes
it uses
at its facility to be
proprietary information . The
Court
consented to the parties’ agreement to
place certain testimony and exhibits
under seal
and to
use
a
Chemical Key
( Exh . C-3 4
(Under Seal) )
to
refer to certain chemicals at issue . IH Hart
explained the purpose of the Chemical Key : Riverdale “wanted to keep their chemicals confidential .
So
the area director made a list of them and numbered them so that the numbers could be used instead of the name [s].” (Tr. 1099)
See
C ommission Rule 52(e)(7)
( “In connection with any discovery procedures and where a showing of good cause has been made, the Commission or Judge may make any order including ... [t]hat a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.” ).

19
The Advisory Committee Notes for Fed. R. Evid. 403 states, “’ Unfair prejudice ’
within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”

20
Riverdale did not produce the safety video
or the
purporte d five-page
training
document
during discovery or
at the hearing (Tr. 486-87, 493-94).
The Court infers
the
missing
training materials do not address the
hazard communication training required by § 1910.1200(h)(1) .
See N. Landing Line Constr. Co .,
No. 96- 0721, 2001 WL 826759, at * 9 (OSHRC July 20, 2001)
(“[D] eficiencies
in [the employer’s] response should be taken as establishing that there was no such evidence, not that the Secretary failed to carry her burden.”) ( citing
Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor , 594 F.2d 396, 403 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1979).

21
Riverdale also faults IH Hart because she emailed a second request for the safety data sheets
on
August
26, 2019 ,
but
used the email address for
the senior
James Knott
instead of
his son, the James Knott she met with the day of the opening conference.
The elder James Knott had
died the previous year and
Riverdale was unaware of the email request (Tr.
1111).
This failed request is immaterial
to this proceeding
because IH Hart made the request that
triggered the requirements of
§§ 1910.1200(g)(11) and 1910.1020 (e) on June
27, 2019, at the opening conference.