OSHRC ALJ decision Docket 14-0465 Decided November 20, 2014 Mixed result Judge Heather A. Joys

DeMouy General Contracting, Inc.

Scaffold fall-protection item affirmed against owner and employee

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This order from 2014 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ezel answers your situation under the current OSHA standards and Commission precedent, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 2014
The OSHA standards may have been amended, penalty amounts have been adjusted, and later Commission or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current compliance advice. Verify the current standard before relying on any specific rule, threshold, or penalty mentioned here.
Final order, not Commission precedent
This decision by an OSHRC Administrative Law Judge became a final order of the Commission because no Commissioner directed review (29 U.S.C. § 661(j)). It binds the parties but is not binding precedent in other cases. The full text below is from the official OSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official OSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (oshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

The owner of DeMouy General Contracting and an employee worked about 20 feet above ground on a pump-jack scaffold without effective fall protection. The judge held that the owner was an employee under the OSH Act while performing construction work for the corporation, despite his belief that owners were exempt. The owner knew of his own exposure and should have noticed the nearby employee was not tied off; the company also lacked adequate written rules, training, monitoring, and enforcement. The serious fall-protection item was affirmed with a reduced $2,100 penalty, while the Secretary withdrew the separate scaffold-bracing item.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.452(j)(1).
  • Outcome: Serious scaffold fall-protection item affirmed for $2,100; scaffold-bracing item vacated as withdrawn.
  • Key point: A corporate owner performing the company's construction work can be an employee protected by OSHA, and the owner's mistaken belief that fall protection is optional does not defeat employer knowledge.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

                       United States of America
      OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
                         1924 Building – Room 2R90, 100 Alabama Street SW
                                    Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104

Secretary of Labor,
Complainant,

           v.                                                    OSHRC Docket No. 14-0465

DeMouy General Contracting, Inc.,
Respondent.

Appearances:

   Jean C. Abreu, Esquire, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Atlanta, Georgia
            For the Secretary

   Clifford C. Brady, Esquire, Brady, Radcliff & Brown, LLP, Mobile, Alabama
            For the Respondent

BEFORE: Administrative Law Judge Heather A. Joys

                                   DECISION AND ORDER

   This proceeding is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

pursuant to § 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651- 678
(2014) (the Act). DeMouy General Contracting, Inc., (hereinafter Respondent) is a construction
company located in Mobile, Alabama. On December 12, 2013, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Compliance Officer (CSHO) Steven Yeend conducted an inspection of
Respondent at a jobsite located at 1916 Airport Boulevard in Mobile, Alabama, where
Respondent was performing construction work on a commercial building. Based upon CSHO
Yeend’s inspection, the Secretary of Labor on March 6, 2014, issued a Citation and Notification
of Penalty with two items to Respondent alleging serious violations of 29 C. F. R. §§
1926.451(g)(1) and 1926.452(j)(1), for failing to provide fall protection for employees working
on scaffolds and failing to properly brace the scaffold on which employees were working. The
Secretary proposed a total penalty of $4,800.00 for the Citation. Respondent timely contested
the Citation and proposed penalty. Prior to the hearing on this matter, the Secretary vacated Item
2 of the Citation alleging a violation of § 1926.452(j)(1) with a proposed penalty of $2,000.00.
Therefore, the only violation at issue is the alleged violation of § 1926.451(g)(1) and the
proposed penalty of $2,800.00.
A hearing was held in this matter on September 25, 2014, in Mobile, Alabama. The
proceedings were conducted pursuant to the Commission’s Simplified Proceedings. 29 CFR §§
2200.200-211. At the close of testimony, the parties gave oral closing arguments.
For the reasons that follow, Item 1 of Citation 1 is affirmed, and a penalty in the amount
of $2,100.00 is assessed, as set forth herein.

                                        Jurisdiction
   At the hearing, the parties stipulated that jurisdiction of this action is conferred upon the

Commission pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act (Tr. 8). Respondent also admits that at all
times relevant to this action, it was an employer engaged in a business affecting interstate
commerce within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (Tr. 8).

                                        Background
   Respondent is an Alabama corporation engaged in commercial and residential

construction activities (Tr. 8). The company is owned and operated by Robert “Bobby” DeMouy
who, along with his wife, own 100% of the business (Tr. 8, 31). Mr. DeMouy has been in the
construction business for over 30 years (Tr. 31-32). The company operates as both a prime
contractor and as a subcontractor with other, larger, construction companies. Due to the area in
which Respondent performs work, Mr. DeMouy has considerable experience with working at
heights in excess of 10 feet (Tr. 44, 49-50).
On December 12, 2013, while in route to his office after an “OSHA physical,” Assistant
Area Director (AAD) Jeff Stawowy observed four individuals installing fascia on a commercial
building exposed to what he believed to be fall hazards at a construction site on Airport
Boulevard in Mobile, Alabama (Tr. 15). He observed two of those individuals working on a
pump jack scaffold who did not appear to be protected from falling (Tr. 20-24). With his cell
phone, he took one photograph while stopped at a red light and then pulled his vehicle into a
nearby parking lot and took another photograph of the employees working on the scaffold (Tr.
15, 25; Exhs. C-1A, 1B and 2). AAD Stawowy then called his office and asked that an
inspection be opened and a CSHO be assigned to conduct it (Tr. 15).
CSHO Yeend was assigned to perform the inspection. He arrived at the worksite mid-
afternoon, as the workers were wrapping up for the day and preparing to leave (Tr. 66). CSHO
Yeend spoke with Mr. DeMouy and showed him the photographs taken by AAD Stawowy (Tr.
67). At that time, Mr. DeMouy identified himself as owner of Respondent and also as one of the
individuals in the photograph (Tr. 67-68). Mr. DeMouy identified the second individual in the
photograph was Phillip Wells, a long-time employee of Respondent (Tr. 33-34). Mr. DeMouy
informed CSHO Yeend that Respondent owned the scaffolds (Tr. 69). Mr. DeMouy also
explained Respondent provided its employees working on the scaffold with a personal fall arrest
system which included a harness worn by the employees attached to an “OSHA approved” rope
(Tr. 35-37, 69).
As can be seen in the photographs taken by AAD Stawowy, which are in the record at
Exhibits C-1A, 1B and 2, Mr. Wells was wearing a harness as part of a personal fall arrest
system. Mr. DeMouy, on the other hand, had no such equipment (Tr. 34). When CSHO Yeend
inquired about this, Mr. DeMouy stated he believed he, as the business owner, was not required
to use fall protection (Tr. 59; Exh. C- 7). Mr. DeMouy admitted in his testimony he told CSHO
Yeend, “I could jump off the roof, who cares.” (Tr. 59).
Mr. DeMouy later informed CSHO Yeend he was the competent person on site with
regard to scaffold safety (Tr. 44, 90). Mr. DeMouy conceded he had no formal, classroom
training on scaffold safety, but testified he had extensive experience and training from his many
years in the construction business and working with other, large, commercial contractors that
provided instruction and whose safety meetings he regularly attended (Tr. 32, 56-57).
Respondent had no written safety program, but Mr. DeMouy testified Respondent’s policy was
to have employees use a personal fall arrest system when working on scaffolds (Tr. 53, 93). He
also testified he communicated with his employees every day about safety (Tr. 33). In a
statement to CSHO Yeend, Mr. Wells stated he had been corrected by Mr. DeMouy for not using
fall protection (Tr. 103).
Mr. DeMouy testified he believed Mr. Wells had been tied off the entire day of the
inspection, including at the time the photograph contained in Exhibits C-1B and C-2 1 was taken
(Tr. 35). He could not state for certain whether Mr. Wells was tied off at the time the photograph
in Exhibit C-1A was taken (Tr. 35). AAD Stawowy testified only four to six minutes passed

1
AAD Stawowy testified Exhibit C-2 is an enlarged version of the photograph in Exhibit C-1B (Tr. 21).
between taking the two photographs (Tr. 23, 28). AAD Stawowy also testified Mr. Wells was
not tied off when he observed him on the scaffold (Tr. 27, 29). Several months after the onsite
portion of the inspection, CSHO Yeend interviewed Mr. Wells by telephone (Tr. 103). CSHO
Yeend testified Mr. Wells informed him he was not tied off during the afternoon on the day of
the inspection (Tr. 102, 111).
According to AAD Stawowy and CSHO Yeend, even if Mr. Wells had been tied off, the
system in place did not comply with the requirements of a personal fall arrest system (Tr. 27, 77-
78). CSHO Yeend testified a personal fall arrest system is an acceptable form of fall protection
for the type of scaffold in use (Tr. 73). However, such a system requires the employee be tied
off to an appropriate anchorage point, which was not the case here (Tr. 27, 78). The rope in use
was neither substantial enough, nor properly attached (Tr. 27, 78-79; Exhs. C-4A, 4B, and 4C).
CSHO Yeend conceded the rope used as an anchor point for Mr. Wells’ harness was part of a
commercially available kit, as Mr. DeMouy had testified (Tr. 76). However, CSHO Yeend
explained the rope is designed to serve as a “lifeline” not as an anchorage point (Tr. 80).
According to CSHO Yeend, a proper anchorage point should be a stable point, such as on the
building itself, and should be located above the employee’s head, not, as in this case, at waist
level (Tr. 79, 95-96). Finally, CSHO Yeend testified he had always seen guardrails used with the
type of scaffold at the worksite and the scaffold came with end rails and a safety net (Tr. 71, 74,
96).
Mr. DeMouy testified Respondent provided its employees with a personal fall arrest
system because he felt it was the best method of fall protection (Tr. 48). He disagreed that a
guardrail system was a preferable form of fall protection on the type of scaffold in use. He
testified a safety net would not protect employees from falls to the exterior of the scaffold (Tr.
115). Finally, Mr. DeMouy testified he was unaware of a requirement that anchor points be
located above the employee’s head when working on scaffolds (Tr. 43).
During the course of his inspection of the worksite, CSHO Yeend measured the height at
the point Mr. DeMouy and Mr. Wells were working using a trench rod (Tr. 84-85). He also
compared the measurement to the elevation drawings for the project (see Exhs. C-5A and 5B).
He found the scaffold to be approximately 20 feet above the ground (Tr. 85; Exh. C-6A).
CSHO Yeend testified falls from such heights could result in severe injuries such as broken
bones or head trauma (Tr. 83).
The Citation
The Secretary has the burden of establishing the employer violated the cited standard. To
prove a violation of an OSHA standard, the Secretary must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) the cited standard applies; (2) the employer failed to comply with the terms of
the cited standard; (3) employees had access to the violative condition; and (4) the cited
employer either knew or could have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence of the
violative condition. JPC Group, Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1859, 1861 (No. 05-1907, 2009).
The Secretary alleges Respondent violated the standard at 29 CFR § 1926.451(g)(1). The
standard requires “[e]ach employee on a scaffold more than 10 feet (3.1 m) above a lower level
shall be protected from falling to the lower level.” 29 CFR §1926.451(g)(1). The Citation
alleges two conditions violated that standard. In instance A, the Secretary alleges “[o]n or about
December 12, 2013, the employer did not require the use of the provided fall protection which
exposed an employee to falls up to 20-feet to the ground below.” (emphasis added). In instance
B, the Secretary alleges “[o]n or about December 12, 2013, the employer did not ensure the use
of the provided fall protection which exposed an employee to falls up to 20-feet to the ground
below.” (emphasis added). CSHO Yeend testified instance A referred to Mr. DeMouy’s failure
to use any type of fall protection while working on the scaffold and instance B referred to Mr.
Wells’ failure to tie off while working on the scaffold (Tr. 97).

                              Applicability of the Standard
   Respondent does not dispute it was required to provide fall protection to its employees

working on the pump jack scaffold at the worksite at issue under the cited standard. Thus, I find
the standard applies to the cited conditions and Respondent was obligated to provide fall
protection to Mr. Wells. However, Respondent disputes it was obligated under the Act to
provide fall protection to Mr. DeMouy, arguing Mr. DeMouy, as the company owner, is not an
employee of Respondent.
Corporate officers, including presidents, who are exposed to workplace hazards while
performing their duties are considered employees under the Act. Although the Review
Commission has not directly addressed the issue, over the years, a number of administrative law
judges have found that corporate officers are employees of their companies. Dri-Mix Products
Corporation, 3 BNA OSHC 1191 (No. 9810, 1975); Magnus Firearms, 3 BNA OSHC 1214 (No.
9342, 1975); and Hydraform Products Corporation, 7 BNA OSHC 1995 (No. 78-5274, 1979).
As these decisions demonstrate, the question of whether an individual is an employee should be
resolved in favor of employment in order to accomplish the remedial purposes of the legislation
involved.
Here the facts establish Mr. DeMouy performed construction work alongside
Respondent’s other employees. Thus, he performed functions on behalf of the corporation, in
this case installing siding, which constituted services outside of his functions as the sole
shareholder of the corporation. I find Mr. DeMouy was an employee of Respondent within the
meaning of section 3 (6) of the Act for whom Respondent was required to provide fall protection
under the sited standard.

                              Failure to Comply with the Standard
    Having found Mr. DeMouy an employee of Respondent for whom Respondent was

required to provide fall protection under the Act and the cited standard, there is no evidentiary
dispute Respondent was in violation of the standard as alleged in instance A of the Citation. The
scaffold platform was more than 10 feet above the lower level and Mr. DeMouy was not
protected in any way from a fall of that distance. In dispute, however, is whether Respondent
was in violation of the standard as alleged in instance B for failing to ensure Mr. Wells was
protected from the fall hazard.
AAD Stawowy testified he observed both Mr. DeMouy and Mr. Wells on the scaffold
without any fall protection as he drove past the worksite. He then stopped and photographed the
condition. His photographs are in the record at Exhibits C-1A, 1B, and 2. These photographs
are not of sufficient clarity for me to determine whether Mr. Wells’ harness was attached to any
anchorage point. However, AAD Stawowy’s testimony that Mr. Wells was not tied off when he
took the photograph in Exhibit C-1A is uncontroverted on the record. Therefore, I find
Respondent failed to comply with the standard as alleged in instance B of the Citation as well as
instance A. 2

                               Employee Exposure to the Hazard

2
The Secretary presented testimony at the hearing about the adequacy of the personal fall arrest system used by
Respondent, much of it hearsay. Because the evidence establishes Mr. DeMouy was unprotected from falls by any
system and Mr. Wells was unprotected at the time he was observed by AAD Stawowy, I find it unnecessary to
address the issue of whether the personal fall arrest system used by Respondent met the requirements of any other
part of the subpart L to find the Respondent in violation of the cited standard.
Respondent does not dispute the only fall protection provided to its employees was the
personal fall arrest system. It is also uncontroverted on the record Mr. DeMouy was not using
the personal fall arrest system while working on the scaffold and, therefore, was exposed to a
serious fall hazard. Equally uncontroverted is the fact Mr. Wells was exposed to a serious hazard
during the time he was not tied off while working on the scaffold. CSHO Yeend testified, and
there can be no dispute, falls from such a height could result in serious injuries such as broken
bones or head trauma. Therefore, I find Respondent’s employees were exposed to a serious
hazard.
Mr. DeMouy testified he believed, based upon his review of the photographs, Mr. Wells
was tied off when the photographs in Exhibits C-1B and C-2 were taken. Other evidence,
including the testimony of AAD Stawowy about his observations and CSHO Yeend’s testimony
about his review of the photographs and his recollection of a conversation several months later
with Mr. Wells support a contrary finding. As previously noted, the photographs are not of
sufficient clarity to determine definitively whether or not Mr. Wells’ harness is attached to the
rope. Given it is uncontroverted Mr. Wells is not tied off in Exhibit C-1A, I take Respondent’s
position to be that the short duration of exposure, i.e., the few minutes between which AAD
Stawowy took the two photographs, defeats the Secretary’s proof of employee exposure to a
hazard. I disagree.
First, I give the greater weight to the testimony of AAD Stawowy about his observations
at the time the photographs were taken than to the testimony of Mr. DeMouy of what he believes
the photographs show. Thus, the duration of Mr. Wells’ exposure was greater than the four to
six minutes that passed between AAD Stawowy’s taking of the two photographs. Moreover,
duration of exposure is a factor taken into consideration when assessing the penalty, not in
determining whether employees are exposed to the hazard. Frank Swidzinski Co., 9 BNA OSHC
1230 (No. 76-4627, 1981); see also Brock v. L.R. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1386
(D.C. Cir. 1985); and Walker Towing Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2072 (No. 87-1359, 1981). Thus, I
find the Secretary has met his burden to establish employee exposure to a serious hazard.

                                   Employer Knowledge

      Finally, the Secretary has the burden to establish Respondent was aware of the violative

conduct. To establish employer knowledge of a violation the Secretary must show the employer
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of a hazardous condition.
Dun Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1962, 1965-66 (No. 82-928, 1986).
Because corporate employers can only obtain knowledge through their agents, the actions
and knowledge of supervisory personnel are generally imputed to their employers, and the
Secretary can make a prima facie showing of knowledge by proving a supervisory employee
knew of or was responsible for the violation. Todd Shipyards Corp., 11 BNA OSHC 2177, 2179
(No. 77-1598, 1984); see also Dun Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1962 (No. 82-
928, 1986) (the actual or constructive knowledge of an employer’s foreman can be imputed to
the employer). Actual knowledge refers to an awareness of the existence of the conditions
allegedly in noncompliance. Omaha Paper Stock Co., 19 OSHC 2039 (No. 01-3968, 2002). An
employer is chargeable with knowledge of conditions which are plainly visible to its supervisory
personnel. A.L. Baumgartner Construction Inc., 16 BNA OSHC 1995, 1998 (No 92-1022,
1994). Along with his wife, Mr. DeMouy is 100% owner of Respondent and directed the work
of his employee on the worksite. As such, his knowledge of the conditions at the worksite on the
day of the inspection can be imputed to Respondent.
The evidence establishes Mr. DeMouy was aware of his own non-compliance, believing
he was not under an obligation to use any type of fall protection himself. Mr. DeMouy’s
mistaken belief about his obligation, however, does not defeat the undisputed evidence
establishing he knowingly exposed himself to a fall hazard. Peterson Brothers Steel Erection
Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 90-2304, 1993, aff’d 26 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 1994); N & N
Contractors, Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 2121 (No. 96-0606, 2000). In addition, Mr. DeMouy had
constructive knowledge of Mr. Wells’s noncompliance, being only a few feet away from Mr.
Wells at the time he was not tied off. See ComTran Group, Inc., v. U.S. Department of Labor,
722 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir., 2013) citing Hamilton Fixture, 16 BNA OSHC 1073 (No. 88-
1720, 1993).
Even if Mr. DeMouy had not noticed Mr. Wells had failed to attach his harness to the
rope, Respondent failed to exercise reasonable diligence to ensure its employee complied with
the standard. Respondent had no written safety program; there is no evidence Respondent
provided any employees with safety training, other than some unspecified verbal instructions;
nor is there any evidence in the record of Respondent’s enforcement of its requirement for use of
personal fall arrest system, other than some occasional verbal warnings. Therefore, I find
Respondent had constructive knowledge of the violative condition.

                                  Affirmative Defenses

   Respondent initially raised the affirmative defense of infeasibility of compliance. In

order to establish this defense, an employer must prove that compliance with the standard is
functionally impossible or would preclude performance of required work, and that alternative
means of employee protection are unavailable or in use. M. J. Lee Construction Co., 7 BNA
OSHC 1140 (No. 15094, 1979). First, no such defense can apply to Mr. DeMouy’s failure to use
any form of fall protection as alleged in Instance A of the citation. With regard to Instance B,
although Respondent made the assertion there were times when the employee would have to
unhook and move around (Tr. 54), such that he could not be in compliance with the standard,
Mr. DeMouy’s testimony is vague as to when or why those instances would occur. More
significantly, Respondent failed to establish the unavailability of other means of protection
during those periods. CSHO Yeend testified the scaffold system in use came with a safety net
(Tr. 71) and he had seen similar pump jack scaffolds with guardrail systems (Tr. 74). Mr.
DeMouy conceded he had seen pictures of pump jack scaffolds with guardrails (Tr. 114). He
testified only that he did not believe either a safety net or guardrails would provide the same
protection. This is insufficient to meet Respondent’s burden.
Finally, although Respondent did not formally raise the defense of unpreventable
employee misconduct at the prehearing conference, Respondent did raise it at the hearing. To
establish the defense of unpreventable employee misconduct, an employer must meet a four-part
test. The employer must prove (1) it established work rules designed to prevent the violation; (2)
is had adequately communicated these rules to its employees; (3) it had taken steps to discover
violations; and (4) it had effectively enforced the rules when violations were discovered.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1951 (No. 16162, 1978). I find Respondent failed to
meet this burden. Although Respondent did provide its employees with a personal fall arrest
system, there is little evidence to establish Respondent had a specific rule designed to prevent the
violation that was both communicated and consistently or effectively enforced. The only
evidence is Mr. DeMouy’s bare statement that he spoke with is employees daily about safety and
required them to wear the harness he provided. I find Respondent failed to meet its burden.
Penalty Determination

     The Commission is the final arbiter of penalties. Hern Iron Works, Inc., 16 BNA OSHC

1619, 1622, (No. 88-1962, 1994), aff’d, 937 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991) (table); see Valdak Corp.,
17 BNA OSHC 1135, 1138 (No. 93-0239, 1995) (“The [OSH] Act places limits for penalty
amounts but places no restrictions on the Commission’s authority to raise or lower penalties
within those limits.”), aff’d, 73 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996). In assessing a penalty, the
Commission gives due consideration to all of the statutory factors with the gravity of the
violation being the most significant. OSH Act § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j); Capform Inc., 19
BNA OSHC 1374, 1378 (No. 99-0322, 2001), aff’d, 34 F. App’x 152 (5th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished). “Gravity is a principal factor in a penalty determination and is based on the
number of employees exposed, duration of exposure, likelihood of injury, and precautions taken
against injury.” Siemens Energy and Automation, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 2196, 2201 (No. 00-1052,
2005). Section 17(j) of the OSH Act, 29 U. S. C. § 666(j), requires the Commission to give due
consideration to the gravity of the violation and the employer’s size, history of violation, and
good faith.” Burkes Mechanical Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 2136, 2142 (No. 04-0475, 2007).
Respondent is a very small employer with only a few employees, including Mr. DeMouy.
Due to its small size, CSHO Yeend applied a 60% reduction to the proposed penalty. In the past
five years, Respondent has received only one serious citation which was reduced, pursuant to an
informal settlement agreement, to an other-than-serious citation (Exh. C-9). 3 Therefore, a 10%
reduction for history should have been applied (Tr. 94). CSHO Yeend did not apply a reduction
in the penalty for good faith because Respondent did not have a comprehensive safety and health
program, did not train its employees, and had an ineffective method of monitoring or enforcing
compliance with its safety policies (Tr. 93). As to the gravity of the violations, CSHO Yeend
testified the violations were rated as high in severity because falling from the scaffold could
cause serious injuries or death (Tr. 92). The violations were rated as greater probability because
one employee had no protection from falling at any time and another was not using what
protection had been provided (Tr. 92). I agree the gravity of the violation is high, taking into
consideration the potential for injury and the duration of both the exposure of Mr. DeMouy and
Mr. Wells. I also agree no reduction in penalty for good faith is appropriate. Although

3
The record does contain evidence of a prior serious citation, but that citation was issued more than five years ago
(Exh. C-8).
Respondent provided its employees with a personal fall arrest system, there is no evidence of
consistent, effective enforcement of its use (Tr. 93). Moreover, although I believe Mr. DeMouy
sincerely thought he had no legal obligation to use fall protection himself, his failure to do so
voluntarily set a poor example for his subordinates. Considering all of the statutory factors, it is
determined that a penalty of $2100.00 is appropriate.

                FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in

accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          ORDER
    Based upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED that:
    1.     Item 1, Citation 1, alleging a violation of § 1926.451(g)(1) is affirmed, and a
    penalty of $2,100.00 is assessed; and
    2.     Item 2, Citation 1, alleging a violation of § 1926.451(j)(1) is vacated.




                                                          /s/

Date: October 20, 2014 HEATHER A. JOYS
Administrative Law Judge
Atlanta, Georgia

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