Affordable Roofing and Exteriors, Inc.
Ladder and repeat roofing violations affirmed by default
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This order from 2015 bound only the parties to this case; it isn't precedent. Ezel answers your situation under the current OSHA standards and Commission precedent, with citations.
Plain-English summary
OSHA observed eleven Affordable Roofing and Exteriors employees working on a steep gas-station roof in Trenton, Illinois without conventional fall protection. The access ladder did not extend three feet above the roof, the company had stopped conducting required safety inspections, and a one-foot parapet did not satisfy the fall-protection standard. The judge found the ladder item serious and the inspection and fall-protection items repeat based on prior final citations. The company failed to comply with discovery orders or appear at trial, so the judge also found default as an alternative basis for affirmance. The Secretary withdrew one other item at the hearing. The three affirmed items carried total penalties of $23,870.
Decision snapshot
- Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1053(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(11)
- Outcome: One serious and two repeat items affirmed, one other item withdrawn and vacated; $23,870 total penalty assessed.
- Key point: A low parapet is not one of the permitted fall-protection systems for employees on a steep roof, and repeated nonparticipation can independently support default.
Full text (OSHRC public release)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
Complainant,
OSHRC DOCKET NO. 13-1689
v.
AFFORDABLE ROOFING AND
EXTERIORS, INC.,
Respondent.
Marla J. Haley, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Chicago, Illinois
For Complainant
Respondent failed to appear
Before: Administrative Law Judge Patrick B. Augustine
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Procedural History
This proceeding is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the
Commission”) pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (“the Act”). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
conducted an inspection of an Affordable Roofing and Exteriors, Inc. (“Respondent”) worksite in
Trenton, Illinois commencing on March 7, 2013 and ending on August 9, 2013. As a result of
the inspection, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty (“Citation”) to Respondent
alleging one serious and three repeat violations of the Act with penalties totaling $31,570.00.
The Citation was issued on August 23, 2013. Respondent timely contested the citation items.
At the outset of this case, Respondent was represented by Julie O’Keefe, Esq. Ms.
O’Keefe participated in the preliminary stages of litigation, including filing an Answer and
reaching a settlement in principle with Complainant. Upon being notified of the settlement, the
Court vacated the trial set for April 22, 2014, and granted the parties 30 days to submit a
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settlement agreement. During that period of time, Complainant’s counsel contracted pneumonia
and had to take extended medical leave. The Court granted an extension of time to submit the
settlement agreement. On December 30, 2014, Ms. O’Keefe filed a motion to withdraw as
Respondent’s counsel, citing Respondent’s failure to appear at multiple depositions and
uncertainty about Respondent’s future plans. The Court granted the motion on December 31,
2014, placed the case back on the trial docket, and set the matter for trial on May 27–28, 2015.1
On January 16, 2015, Complainant sent Respondent interrogatories, requests for
production, and requests for admissions. Notwithstanding repeated attempts to contact
Respondent’s owners—Jason Bliven and Joe Kehrer—Respondent failed to respond to the
discovery requests. In response, Complainant filed his Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Requests for Production and to Deem Admitted the Complainant’s Requests
for Admission by Operation of Law. On March 1, 2015, having received no response to the
Motion, the Court ordered Respondent to produce the requested documents and respond to the
interrogatories and deemed admitted the unanswered requests for admissions. Respondent failed
to comply with the Court’s order.
In light of Respondent’s noncompliance, Complainant sought to confer with
Respondent’s owners in an attempt to resolve the dispute but was unable to get in touch with
Respondent. Due to Respondent’s repeated failure to comply or even communicate,
Complainant filed a Motion for Sanctions, to which Respondent failed to respond. The Court
deemed the motion confessed and imposed sanctions preventing Respondent from introducing
witness testimony and exhibits and striking an affirmative defense. The Court declined to
- An Order Establishing Trial Date and Entry of Scheduling Order dated December 31, 2014 was not returned as
“Undeliverable” by the U. S. Postal Service. See fn. 6, infra (discussing Commission Rule 6, which requires a party
to promptly communicate changes in contact information).2dismiss the case, as it did not have enough time to resolve the matter prior to the trial, which was
scheduled for one week later.
The trial was held on May 28, 2015, in St. Louis, Missouri. Respondent failed to appear,
so Complainant put forth uncontroverted evidence in support of his prima facie case.2 Prior to
presenting his evidence, however, Complainant motioned the Court to withdraw Citation 2, Item
1, which the Court granted. Based on the evidence submitted by Complainant, which is
recounted below, the Court finds that Complainant established its prima facie case for each of
the remaining citations and penalties. Further, as will also be discussed below, the Court finds,
alternatively, that Respondent has abandoned its case and that a default judgment in favor of
Complainant is proper.
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to § 10(c) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c), by the issuance of the Complaint and the
Respondent’s filing of a Notice of Contest and an Answer. The record illustrates that
Respondent is engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce and has employees. (Tr. 25,
29–30; Answer at ¶ 3). See 29 U.S.C. § 652(c).
III. Factual Background
On March 7, 2013, the Fairview Heights District Office received an anonymous call
about fall protection hazards at Respondent’s worksite, located at the corner of S.R. 160 and U.S.
50 in Trenton, Illinois. (Tr. 21–24). CSHO Frank Fuchs III was sent to the worksite
approximately one hour after the call was received. (Tr. 24). When he arrived at the worksite, he
observed eleven of Respondent’s employees, including one foreman, on the roof of a gas station
- In addition to the witness testimony, the Court admitted Exhibits C1 to C4 and C6 to C-16 into evidence.
3without any fall protection. (Tr. 25). Fuchs also observed an extension ladder that was not
extended three feet above the roof line, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1053(b)(1).
After making his observations at a distance, CSHO Fuchs conferred with Ed Pendergraft,
who was identified as Respondent’s on-site foreman. (Tr. 28). During this conversation with
Fuchs, Pendergraft stated that he believed the one-foot tall parapet wall on the edge of the roof
served as an adequate slide guard and that they were complying with the regulations. (Tr. 37).
According to Fuchs, Pendergraft stated that he did not know the current fall protection
requirements for this particular worksite. (Tr. 44).
Fuchs also interviewed one of Respondent’s employees, Chris Williams. (Tr. 45–46).
According to Williams, Respondent had, in the past, conducted safety inspections and audits of
its worksite; however, recently, it had stopped conducting such inspections. (Tr. 46).
Accordingly, Fuchs determined that Respondent violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(2).
The roof of the gas station was approximately 12–13 feet high to the eave and an
additional 12–18 inches to the top of the parapet. (Tr. 38–39, 66; Ex. C-12). Fuchs testified that
the parapet wall was insufficient as fall protection because the slope of the roof was “8-in-12”,
which means that the roof rises 8 inches vertically for every 12 inches of lateral distance. (Tr.
34). Accordingly, he concluded that conventional fall protection—personal fall arrest systems,
guardrails, or safety nets—was required. (Tr. 37). Thus, he recommended that Respondent be
cited pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(11).
IV. Discussion
a. Applicable Law
To establish a prima facie violation of section 5(a)(2) of the Act, the Secretary must
prove: (1) the standard applies to the cited condition; (2) the terms of the standard were violated;
(3) one or more of the employees had access to the cited condition; and (4) the employer knew,
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or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of the violative condition. Ormet
Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2134 (No. 85-0531, 1991).
A violation is classified as serious under the Act if “there is substantial probability that
death or serious physical harm could result.” 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). Commission precedent
requires a finding that “a serious injury is the likely result if an accident does occur.” Mosser
Constr., Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1044, 1046 (No. 08-0631, 2010) (citation omitted); see Omaha
Paper Stock Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 304 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2002). Complainant does not
need to show there was a substantial probability that an accident would occur; he need only show
that if an accident did occur, serious physical harm could result. Id.
“A violation is repeated under section 17(a) of the Act if, at the time of the alleged
violation, there was a Commission final order against the same employer for a substantially
similar violation.” Potlatch, 7 BNA OSHC 1061 (No. 16183, 1979). One of the ways in which
Complainant can establish substantial similarity is by showing that the prior and present
violations are for failure to comply with the same standard under section 5(a)(2) of the Act. Id.
A prima facie showing of substantial similarity can be rebutted by evidence that the conditions
and hazards associated with the violations are different. Id.
b. Citation 1, Item 1
Complainant alleged a serious violation of the Act as follows:
29 CFR 1926.1053(b)(1): Where portable ladders were used for access to an
upper landing surface and the ladder’s length allows, the ladder side rails did not
extend at least 3 feet (.9m) above the upper landing surface being accessed:
Eleven employees were exposed to an approximately 13 foot fall due to the use of
an extension ladder which did not have the ladder’s side rails extend at least 3 feet
about [sic] the upper landing surface being accessed.
The cited standard provides:
When portable ladders are used for access to an upper landing surface, the ladder
side rails shall extend at least 3 feet (.9 m) above the upper landing surface to
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which the ladder is used to gain access; or, when such an extension is not possible
because of the ladder’s length, then the ladder shall be secured at its top to a rigid
support that will not deflect, and a grasping device, such as a grabrail, shall be
provided to assist employees in mounting and dismounting the ladder. In no case
shall the extension be such that ladder deflection under a load would, by itself,
cause the ladder to slip off its support.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.1053(b)(1).
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the standard applies and was violated.
Respondent used a portable, 24-foot extension ladder to access the roof of the gas station. (Tr.
70; Ex. C-9). According to Fuchs’ observations and measurements, the side rails of the ladder
did not extend at least three feet above the surface being accessed, even though the roof was only
thirteen-feet tall. (Tr. 26). There was no indication that the ladder was secured to the structure,
nor was there any evidence that Respondent installed a grabrail to assist employees in mounting
or dismounting the ladder.
The Court finds that Respondent’s employees were exposed to the condition. Fuchs
testified that he observed eleven of Respondent’s employees on the roof of the gas station. (Tr.
25; Ex. C-8, C-9, C-10). Fuchs observed employees accessing and exiting the roof via the
ladder, and there was no testimony to suggest that there were alternative means of doing so. (Tr.
27–28). Because the ladder was the only means of ingress and egress, the Court finds that each
of the eleven employees was exposed to the hazard of falling from the roof.
Respondent also knew about the condition. According to Fuchs, Mr. Pendergraft was the
onsite foreman. Mr. Pendergraft was working on the roof and, thus, had to use the ladder in
order to access it. (Tr. 28). This constitutes direct knowledge of the violation. Further, since Mr.
Pendergraft was a management employee, his knowledge is imputable to Respondent. See Dun
Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1962 (No. 82-928, 1986) (the actual or constructive
knowledge of an employer’s foreman can be imputed to the employer).
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The violation was serious. The point of ingress and egress for the ladder was located
approximately 12–13 feet above the ground. If an employee were fall from that height onto the
concrete surface below, he could suffer serious physical injury, up to and including death. See
Mosser Constr., Inc., 23 BNA OSHC at 1046
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Respondent violated 29 C.F.R. §
1926.1053(b)(1) as alleged in Citation 1, Item 1, and that the violation was serious. Accordingly,
Citation 1, Item 1 shall be AFFIRMED.
c. Citation 2, Item 2
Complainant alleged a repeat violation of the Act as follows:
29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2): The employer did not initiate and maintain a safety
program which provides for frequent and regular inspections of jobsites,
materials, and equipment to be made by competent person (i.e., a person who is
capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or
working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has the authority to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them):
Eleven employees were working on an approximately 13 foot high 8 in 12 pitch
roof without fall protection to the lower level and the employer did not initiate
and maintain an accident prevention program to control and eliminate the hazards
present at the jobsite in accordance with the OSHA regulations.
AFFORDABLE ROOFING AND EXTERIORS INC WAS PREVIOUSLY
CITED FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH STANDARD OR ITS EQUIVALENT STANDARD (29 CFR
1926.20(B)(2)), WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN OSHA INSPECTION
NUMBER 313012999, CITATION UMBER [SIC] 01, ITEM NUMBER 001b,
ISSUED ON 8-31-2009, AND WAS AFFIRMED AS A FINAL ORDER N [SIC]
9-24-09 WITH RESPECTS [SIC] TO A WORKPLACE LOCATED AT
WEATTHERBY ROAD & HUNTERS TRAIL IN MASCOUTAH, ILLINOIS.
The cited standard provides:
Such programs shall provide for frequent and regular inspections of the job sites,
materials, and equipment to be made by competent persons designated by the
employers.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(2).
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The evidence presented by Complainant establishes that the standard applies and was
violated. Respondent is engaged in construction and, pursuant to this regulation, is required to
designate a competent person to conduct inspections of the worksite, materials, and equipment.
According to Fuchs, he interviewed an employee who stated that inspections and audits had
occurred in the past; however, he also indicated that such inspections had not occurred recently.
(Tr. 46). When coupled with the fact that Pendergraft was unable to identify the necessary
protections to be implemented at the worksite, Fuchs concluded that the required inspections by
competent persons were not occurring, and the Court agrees.
With respect to the issues of exposure and knowledge, the Court hereby incorporates its
findings described above in Section IV.b, supra. Thus, the Court finds that Complainant has
proved his prima facie case.
Complainant has also alleged that the violation was repeated. On August 31, 2009,
Respondent was cited pursuant to 1926.20(b)(2)—the same standard cited in the present case—
for failing to have an inspection program. (Ex. C-6 at 6). That citation was settled by the parties
through an informal settlement agreement on September 11, 2009. As part of the agreement,
Respondent agreed to waive its rights to contest the citation, thereby rendering it a final
disposition of the case. The facts of the 2009 case were nearly identical to those in the present
case: employees working on a steep-pitch roof without proper fall protection. In both cases,
proper inspections likely would have uncovered the violations. Because the underlying violation
was issued pursuant to the same standard and involved an almost-identical set of facts as the
violation at issue, the Court finds that the violations were substantially similar. Because the
violations were substantially similar, the Court finds that the citation item was properly
characterized as “repeat”.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Respondent violated 29 C.F.R. §
1926.20(b)(2) as alleged in Citation 2, Item 2, and that the violation was repeated. Accordingly,
Citation 2, Item 2 shall be AFFIRMED.
d. Citation 2, Item 3
Complainant alleged a repeat violation of the Act as follows:
29 CFR 1926.501(b)(11): Each employee on a steep roof with unprotected sides
and edges 6 feet (1.8 m) or more above lower levels was not protected from
falling by guardrail systems with toe boards, safety net systems, or personal fall
arrest systems:
Eleven employees were working on an approximately 8 in 12 pitch roof which
was approximately 11 feet from a lower level was exposed to fall hazards while
conducting work without guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall
arrest systems.
AFFORDABLE ROOFING AND EXTERIORS INC WAS PREVIOUSLY
CITED FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH STANDARD OR ITS EQUIVALENT STANDARD (29 CFR
1926.20(B)(13)), WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN OSHA INSPECTION
NUMBER 423703, CITATION UMBER [SIC] 02, ITEM NUMBER 001,
ISSUED ON 6-15-2012, AND WAS AFFIRMED AS A FINAL ORDER ON 6-
03-13 WITH RESPECTS [SIC] TO A WORKPLACE LOCATED AT 200 E
CEDAR STREET IN NEW BADEN, ILLINOIS.3
The cited standard provides:
“Steep roofs.” Each employee on a steep roof with unprotected sides and edges 6
feet (1.8 m) or more above lower levels shall be protected from falling by
guardrail systems with toeboards, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest
systems.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(11).
In order to establish that the standard applies, the roof of the gas station must be
classified as a “steep roof”. A steep roof, according to the regulations, is “a roof having a slope
greater than 4 in 12 (vertical to horizontal).” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(b)(2). According to Fuchs,
- The citation to 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(13) is a typographical error. As noted in the June 15, 2012 Citation and
Notification of Penalty, and in CSHO Fuchs’ testimony, the underlying citation was issued pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1926.501(b)(13). Accordingly, the Court shall base its “repeat” determination on this standard.9the roof of the gas station was 8 in 12, which is a steeper pitch than the minimum required by the
standard. (Tr. 34). Thus, the standard applies.
The Court also finds that the terms of the standard were violated. Respondent’s
employees were on a steep roof, which was 12–13 feet above the ground. None of the
employees were wearing personal fall arrest systems, nor was the roof equipped with a guardrail
or safety net system. (Ex. C-8, C-9, C-10). Pendergraft told Fuchs that he believed the parapet
wall around the perimeter of the roof constituted a slide guard, which he believed was sufficient
to comply with the standard. (Tr. 37). Fuchs testified that the parapet wall was insufficient as a
means of fall protection because it did not qualify as one of the listed forms of fall protection.
(Tr. 37–39). Further, he testified that the only way in which the parapet wall would qualify is if it
met the requirements for a standard guardrail, including a 42-inch height, midrail, and toeboard.
(Tr. 38–39). Since the parapet was only 12–18 inches high, it did not qualify. (Id.).
The Court agrees with Complainant. The cited standard lists three, and only three,
acceptable methods of fall protection, none of which include the use of slide guards. Respondent
was not available to provide countervailing evidence or to establish an affirmative defense such
as greater hazard. Thus, the Court finds that the terms of the standard were violated.
As with Citation 2, Item 2, the Court hereby incorporates its findings described above in
Section IV.b, supra. Thus, the Court finds that Complainant has proved his prima facie case.
Complainant has also alleged that the violation was repeated. On June 15, 2012,
Respondent was cited pursuant to 1926.501(b)(13). This was not the exact standard cited in the
present case; however, the language of the two standards is nearly identical. (Ex. C-7 at 7).
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(11) with 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13). The differences
between the two are minor. Specifically, (b)(11) is entitled “Steep roofs” and (b)(13) is entitled
“Residential construction”. The only other notable difference is that (b)(13) has exceptions for
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greater hazard and the possibility of alternative fall protection measures, whereas (b)(11) does
not. The 2012 citation was settled by the parties and became a final order of the Commission on
June 3, 2013. (Ex. C-7). The facts of the 2012 case were nearly identical to those in the present
case: employees working on an 8-in-12 pitch roof, over 12 feet off the ground, without proper
fall protection, and exposed to fall hazards. Because the underlying violation was issued
pursuant to a standard with near-identical language and involved an almost-identical set of facts
as the violation at issue, the Court finds that the violations were substantially similar. Because
the violations were substantially similar, the Court finds that the citation item was properly
characterized as “repeat”.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Respondent violated 29 C.F.R. §
1926.501(b)(11) as alleged in Citation 2, Item 3, and that the violation was repeated.
Accordingly, Citation 2, Item 2 shall be AFFIRMED.
e. Default.
As an alternative to the foregoing, the Court also finds that Respondent is in default.
According to Commission Rule 101(a):
When any party has failed to plead or otherwise proceed as provided by
these rules or as required by the Commission or Judge, he may be declared
to be in default either on the initiative of the Commission or the Judge,
after having been afforded an opportunity to show cause why he should
not be declared in default . . . . Thereafter, the Commission or Judge, in
their discretion, may enter a decision against the defaulting party . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(a). As recounted in Section I, supra, Respondent has demonstrated a
pattern of disregard for the procedural requirements and authority of the Commission by: (1)
failing to respond to motions filed by Complainant; (2) failing to comply with orders issued by
this Court, and (3) failing to appear at trial. With the exception of one letter, none of the Court’s
correspondence was return as undeliverable, and the Court used the address provided by
Respondent at the outset of this case. Thus, the Court has no reason to believe that Respondent
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has not received the filings and notifications in this case.4 Further, Respondent has been given
multiple opportunities to engage in the litigation process and has failed at nearly every
opportunity. Respondent’s repeated failure to participate in this proceeding constitutes
contumacious conduct justifying sanctions. Philadelphia Construction Equipment, Inc., 16 BNA
OSHC 1128, 1993 CCH OSHD ¶30,051 (No. 92-0899, 1993); Sealtite Corporation, 15 BNA
OSHC 1130, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶29,398 (No. 88-1431, 1991). Accordingly, with respect to the
above-referenced docket, the Court finds Respondent in default. Respondent’s Notice of Contest
is hereby VACATED, and the violations and penalties alleged in the Citation and Notification of
Penalty are AFFIRMED.
V. Penalty
In determining the appropriate penalty for affirmed violations, section 17(j) of the Act
requires the Commission to give due consideration to four criteria: (1) the size of the employer’s
business, (2) the gravity of the violation, (3) the good faith of the employer, and (4) the
employer’s prior history of violations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). Gravity is the primary consideration
and is determined by the number of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the
precautions taken against injury, and the likelihood of an actual injury. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
15 BNA OSHC 2201, 2214 (No. 87-2059, 1993). It is well established that the Commission and
its judges conduct de novo penalty determinations and have full discretion to assess penalties
based on the facts of each case and the applicable statutory criteria. E.g., Allied Structural Steel
Co., 2 BNA OSHC 1457, 1458 (No. 1681, 1975); Valdak Corp., 17 BNA OSHC 1135, 1138
(No. 93-0239, 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1995).
- The Court received one Order that was returned as undeliverable. However, given that Respondent represented to
Complainant that it was considering liquidating the company, and considering that follow-up calls to Respondent’s
office were met with a message that the phone line has been disconnected, the Court finds that any failure of notice
is Respondent’s. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.6 (“Any change in [contact] information shall be communicated promptly in
writing to the Judge, or the Executive Secretary if no Judge has been assigned, and to all other parties and
intervenors. A party or intervenor who fails to furnish such information shall be deemed to have waived his right to
notice and service under these rules.”).12Based on the testimony of CSHO Fuchs, the Court finds that the proposed penalties are
appropriate. Respondent is a small employer, which Complainant accounted for in applying a
40% reduction in penalty. However, Respondent has received multiple citations regarding fall
protection over the course of the last several years, and thus the Court agrees that the penalty
should account for repeated misconduct. Further, the violations themselves exposed eleven
employees to the potential for falls of over 12 feet onto concrete, which can cause serious
physical injury and possibly death. In light of these facts, the Court finds that the penalties
proposed by Complainant are appropriate.
ORDER
The foregoing Decision constitutes the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that:
-
Citation 1, Item 1 is AFFIRMED as a serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1053(b)(1),
and a penalty of $5,390.00 is ASSESSED.
-
Citation 2, Item 1 was withdrawn by Complainant at the commencement of the hearing.
Accordingly, Citation 2, Item1 is hereby VACATED.
-
Citation 2, Item 2 is AFFIRMED as a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.20(b)(2), and a
penalty of $7,700.00 is ASSESSED.
-
Citation 2, Item 3 is AFFIRMED as a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(11),
and a penalty of $10,780.00 is ASSESSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patrick B. Augustine
Patrick B. Augustine
Date: July 27, 2015 Judge, OSHRC
Denver, Colorado
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