Trinity Industries, Inc.

Plain-English summary

Trinity owned a pre-1980 foundry and hired a contractor to repair a furnace covered by an insulation blanket. Trinity believed a prior contractor had removed any asbestos, but it did not perform the testing required to rebut the standard's presumption that the thermal insulation contained asbestos and did not notify the repair contractor. The judge held that the building-owner duties applied and that Trinity knew the facts triggering the testing and notice requirements. He rejected Trinity's argument that it could not be liable for another employer's workers because the cited standards specifically imposed duties on building owners for prospective contractors. However, OSHA offered no evidence showing the duration or significance of the contractor employees' asbestos exposure. The judge affirmed both items as non-serious and assessed no penalty; the Commission later reviewed the case.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(k)(2)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(k)(2)(ii)(A)
• Outcome: Both asbestos determination and notice items were affirmed as non-serious with no penalty.
• Key point: A pre-1980 building owner must use the standard's specified testing to rebut presumed asbestos in thermal insulation before contractor work begins.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

                           United States of America
           OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
                               1120 20 th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor
                                 Washington, DC 20036-3457

SECRETARY OF LABOR, :
:
Complainant, :
:
v. : OSHRC DOCKET NO. 05-0773
:
TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC., :
:
Respondent. :

Appearances:

             Judson H. P. Dean, Esquire                       Robert E. Rader, Jr., Esquire
             U.S. Department of Labor                         Rader & Campbell
             Philadelphia, Pennsylvania                       Dallas, Texas
             For the Complainant.                             For the Respondent.

Before: G. Martin Bober
Administrative Law Judge

                                DECISION AND ORDER

Background and Procedural History
This matter is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the
Commission”) pursuant to section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (“the Act”). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) conducted an inspection of a work site of Respondent, Trinity Industries, Inc. (“Trinity”
or “Respondent”), from March 30, 2005 to April 25, 2005; the site was located in McKees Rocks,
Pennsylvania. As a result of the inspection, OSHA issued to Trinity a Citation and Notification of
Penalty alleging serious violations of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.1101(k)(2)(i), and 1926.1101(k)(2)(ii)(A).
Trinity timely contested the citation and the proposed penalty.
By agreement of the parties, and with the approval of the Administrative Law Judge, the
parties have submitted this case for a decision on the record pursuant to Commission Rule 61, 29
C.F.R. § 2200.61. Rule 61 provides as follows:
A case may be fully stipulated by the parties and submitted to the Commission or
Judge for a decision at any time. The stipulation of facts shall be in writing and
signed by the parties or their representatives. The submission of a case under this rule
does not alter the burden of proof, the requirements otherwise applicable with respect
to adducing proof, or the effect of failure of proof. * * * .
Stipulation of Facts1
Complainant Secretary of Labor and Respondent Trinity Industries, Inc., make the following
stipulations of fact because they believe this case is controlled by an issue of law. Such stipulations
are made to avoid the time and expense of an evidentiary hearing and are for the purposes of this
proceeding only.
1. Trinity Industries, Inc., is an employer subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
2. The Review Commission has jurisdiction over these proceedings.
3. The citation in this case involves a foundry in McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania. Trinity
purchased the McKees Rocks facility from Century America, Corporation in late 1988. The facility
was constructed prior to 1980.
4. Shortly before Trinity purchased the McKees Rocks facility, Helmut Hvizdalek, then the
plant manager for Century America, negotiated a contract for Salem Furnace Company in Pittsburgh
to remove and replace the water system and do related work on a “pusher furnace” in the facility.
The work required removing the outer brick wall and the inner insulation blanket, intended to
prevent heat loss, all the way down to the metal furnace itself in the area where the piping goes to
the furnace.
5. Helmut Hvizdalek contracted with Salem Furnace because Century America had used
them in the past and based on their previous work Hvizdalek was confident they were experts in
repairing and rebuilding furnaces, including removal of asbestos if necessary.
6. Trinity purchased the McKees Rocks facility after Helmut Hvizdalek negotiated the
contract with Salem Furnace but before Salem Furnace began the work. After Trinity purchased the
facility, Trinity issued its own purchase order to Salem Furnace to complete the repair work on the
furnace previously negotiated by Helmut Hvizdalek. The total price for the work was $585,000 and
Trinity paid Salem Furnace that amount when the work was completed in early 1989. Trinity is

1
The following sets out verbatim the Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties.

                                                 2

currently the owner of the building/facility, and was the owner at the time of the alleged violation
at issue.
7. When Trinity purchased the McKees Rocks facility, Helmut Hvizdalek stayed on at the
facility as general manager of Trinity’s forged products division. Helmut Hvizdalek is the only
person still employed by Trinity with knowledge of the furnace repairs in 1989.
8. When Salem Furnace removed and replaced the insulation blanket in 1989 they did not
inform Helmut Hvizdalek or anyone else at Trinity that the inner insulation blanket was asbestos and
there was no discussion about the insulation blanket. Mr. Hvizdalek therefore believed either that
it was not asbestos or, if it was asbestos, that Salem had properly disposed of it. Either way, at the
conclusion of the work Helmut Hvizdalek believed that there was no asbestos in the area where
Salem had worked. Trinity does not currently possess any documentation relating to the work
performed by Salem Furnace in 1989.
9. In 2005 the outer brick wall in the same area of the pusher furnace needed to be replaced.
Trinity could not use Salem Furnace again because in the intervening sixteen years they sold out to
another company and are no longer in business. Trinity therefore contracted with Pli-Brico in Salem,
Ohio to replace the brick.
10. In the past, whenever Trinity has had repair work performed on furnaces it has tested for
asbestos. In this case, however, because of the repair work in 1989 and the belief that any asbestos
had been removed by Salem Furnace in the area where Pli-Brico would be working, Trinity did not
test or inspect for asbestos before hiring Pli-Brico or at any time before Pli-Brico began the work,
and Trinity did not notify Pli-Brico that asbestos was present.
11. In fact the insulation blanket did contain asbestos. Both Pli-Brico and Trinity were
surprised that the inner insulation blanket contained asbestos because this was the same area where
Salem Furnace did their repair work in 1989. In 1989 Salem had removed the outer brick and
insulation blanket all the way down to the metal. Therefore, for there to still be asbestos in that area
could only mean that Salem had either replaced an existing asbestos blanket or installed a new
asbestos blanket.
12. Trinity was aware at all times before Pli-Brico began the work that the furnace was
covered by an insulation blanket located under the outer brick exterior. However, neither Helmut
Hvizdalek nor Trinity anticipated that when Salem Furnace replaced that insulation blanket in 1989
3
that they replaced it with another asbestos blanket. Mr. Hvizdalek, and Trinity, believed that if there
had been asbestos in the area of the furnace it had been removed in 1989. Prior to the work
performed by Pli-Brico, neither Helmut Hvizdalek nor Trinity had actual knowledge that asbestos
was present in the area to be repaired by Pli-Brico.
13. The contractor Pli-Brico began its work on Saturday, March 26, 2005. The asbestos in
the insulation blanket beneath the outer brick was not identified until approximately 2:00 p.m. on
Monday, March 28, 2005 (no work was performed on Sunday, March 27, 2005), when an employee
of the facility observed that some of the insulation blanket material, which had been removed by Pli-
Brico and placed in a dumpster, looked like it contained asbestos. At this time, Pli-Brico stopped the
work, and Trinity conducted its own testing of the insulation blanket material and determined that
it did contain asbestos. The bulk samples conducted by Trinity on March 28, 2005, contained 15%
amosite asbestos.2
14. Once it was determined that the insulation blanket material contained asbestos, the area
was sealed off and arrangements were made to properly remove and dispose of the asbestos.
15. On March 30, 2005, OSHA conducted an inspection of Trinity’s facility in McKees
Rocks. The Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) collected two bulk samples of the
insulation blanket from an area where employees of the contractor (Pli-Brico), including but not
limited to Blaine Daugherty, III, and Dan Neely, had been working on March 26, 2005 for a full eight
hour shift, and on March 28, 2005 until approximately 2:00 p.m. One sample was found to consist
of fiberglass, the second sample contained 5% amosite asbestos. The CSHO also collected a bulk
sample of the insulation blanket material that had been removed and placed in the dumpster. That
sample contained 3% amosite asbestos.
16. As a result of the inspection OSHA issued a citation for: (1) a Serious violation of 29
C.F.R. § 1926.1101(k)(2)(i) based on the following alleged facts: “Before work was conducted in
the Pusher Furnace, the employer failed to determine the presence, location and quantity of asbestos­

2
This sentence originally stated that the bulk samples contained “5% amosite asbestos.” The
Secretary’s letter of September 16, 2005 amended the sentence to read “15% amosite asbestos.”
4
containing material. Employees removing fire brick disturbed backing containing 3 to 5%3 amosite
asbestos”; and (2) a Serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(k)(2)(ii)(A) based on the following
alleged facts: “Before repair work was done on the Pusher Furnace, the employer failed to notify
prospective employers bidding for work whose employees reasonably can be expected to be exposed
to areas containing asbestos containing material (ACM) or presumed asbestos containing material
(PACM).” The citation proposes a total penalty of 2,000.
Motion to Strike
On August 12, 2005, counsel for the Secretary notified the undersigned that the parties agreed
that the “case may be decided on written motions without need of a hearing.” The parties filed a
stipulation of facts, briefs and, thereafter, response briefs. However, with her brief filed October 11,
2005, the Secretary indicated she had included the OSHA-1B form from the inspection as Exhibit
A to her brief, to support the serious classification of the violations and the proposed penalty.4
On October 26, 2005, Respondent filed its Motion to Strike. Respondent asserts that (1)
“[t]he parties agreed to submit this case on stipulated facts,” (2) “[t]o that end, the parties negotiated
and agreed to a joint Stipulation of Facts in accordance with Commission Rule 61,” (3) the parties
agreed on the stipulated facts, signed the stipulation, and filed it with the Commission, (4) the
“Stipulation of Facts include[d] ‘all material facts,’” (5) after the Stipulation of Facts was filed, the
Secretary submitted, as supplemental evidence, an OSHA-1B as an exhibit to her brief, (6) the
OSHA-1B was included in her brief “to support the classification of the citation and the proposed
penalty,” and (7) the OSHA-1B should “not be considered by the Judge or the Commission because
they are outside the agreed Stipulation of Facts.”
On November 9, 2005, the Secretary filed her reply. The Secretary asserts that: (1) “[a]t the
outset of litigation, Respondent expressly based its contest of the Citation upon one specific
argument: that, under the circumstances, Respondent acted with reasonable diligence in assuming
that the area in which Plibrico employees would be working was free of asbestos. Respondent did

3
On September 16, 2005, the Secretary, without objection from Respondent, amended the last
sentence of paragraph 13. As noted in footnote 2, supra, the amendment changed the sentence
from “contained 5% amosite asbestos” to “contained 15% amosite asbestos.” No such change
was requested for paragraph 16.
4
Despite the Secretary’s statement in her brief, there was no Exhibit A included with the brief.
5
not at any time indicate to Complainant that it intended to dispute the proposed penalty;” (2) “the
OSHA-1B form had already been produced to Respondent during discovery, and Respondent
therefore had full knowledge of the factual basis for OSHA’s proposed penalty at this time;” and (3)
admitting the OSHA-1B into the record “would be fair under the circumstances: the accuracy of this
information is not disputed by Respondent; the information does not in any way contradict any of
the Factual Stipulations already submitted; and the sole reason that not all of the penalty-related
information from the OSHA-1B appears in the Stipulated Facts is because Respondent did not
disclose its intention to challenge the proposed penalty.”
As Respondent points out, evidentiary stipulations are binding on the parties who make them,
including the government. See Thrash v. O’Donnell, 448 F.2d 886, 889 n.7 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713, 716 (2d Cir. 1966). Moreover, “facts agreed to by the parties
... are to be considered facts on the trial, without further evidence....The trial court may not disregard
the facts stipulated to by the parties or require evidence to support them.” U.S. v. Sommers, 351 F.2d
354, 357 (10th Cir. 1965). In addition, a pretrial stipulation remains binding between the parties
during subsequent proceedings unless a failure to modify or set it aside would result in manifest
injustice. Waldorf v. Borough of Kenilworth, 878 F. Supp. 686, 694 (D. N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom.
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 618 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case, when the Secretary entered into
stipulation discussions with Trinity, she had in her possession the OSHA-1B at issue. The Secretary
should have made the contents of the OSHA-1B a stipulation at that time, particularly since it
contained information relevant to the serious classification of the alleged violations and to the
appropriateness of the proposed penalty. When she did not do so, she relinquished her legal right to
include the contents of the OSHA-1B in the stipulation of facts. Under the circumstances of this
case, I find that there is no manifest injustice in not receiving the OSHA-1B in evidence. Trinity’s
motion to strike is accordingly granted.
Essential Facts
The essential facts are not in dispute. In 1988, Trinity purchased a foundry, located in
McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania, from Century America Corporation (“Century”). The facility was
constructed prior to 1980. Shortly before Trinity purchased the facility, Century’s plant manager,
Helmut Hvizdalek, contracted with Salem Furnace Company (“Salem”) to work on a pusher furnace
at the facility. The contract provided that Salem would remove the outer brick wall and the inner
6
insulation blanket all the way down to the metal pusher furnace in the area where the piping went
to the furnace. When Salem removed and replaced the insulation blanket in 1989, it did not inform
anyone at Trinity that the insulation blanket contained asbestos. Trinity issued its own purchase order
to Salem, and Salem was paid $585,000 after the work was completed in early 1989.
In 2005, the outer brick wall in the same area of the pusher furnace needed to be replaced,
and Trinity contracted with Pli-Brico to replace the brick. Based upon its belief that Salem would
have either informed it of the presence of asbestos or removed any asbestos material from the
furnace during the work in 1989, Trinity mistakenly assumed that the area to be worked on contained
no asbestos. Trinity, therefore, did not test or inspect the furnace area for the presence of asbestos
before Pli-Brico commenced its work. However, the insulation blanket did in fact contain asbestos,
and both Pli-Brico and Trinity were surprised to learn that such was the case in light of the work that
Salem had done in 1989. Before Pli-Brico performed its work, neither Mr. Hvizdalek nor Trinity had
actual knowledge that asbestos was present in the area to be repaired.
Pli-Brico began its work at the facility on March 26, 2005, and continued its work on March
28, 2005.5 At about 2:00 p.m. on March 28, an employee of the facility observed that some of the
insulation blanket material, which had been removed by Pli-Brico and placed in a dumpster, looked
like it contained asbestos. At that point, Pli-Brico stopped its work, and Trinity conducted its own
testing of the insulation blanket material and determined that it did contain asbestos. The area was
then sealed off and arrangements were made to properly remove and dispose of the asbestos. On
March 30, 2005, an OSHA Compliance Officer conducted an inspection of the foundry, and,
thereafter, the Citation and Notification of Penalty described supra was issued.
The Cited Regulations
Item 1a alleges a violation of 29 C.F.R.1926.1101(k)(2)(i), which provides as follows:
(k) Communication of hazards. (2) Duties of building and facility owners. (i) Before
work subject to this standard is begun, building and facility owners shall determine

5
As set out in Stipulation 13, supra, no work was performed on March 27, 2005, a Sunday.
7
the presence, location, and quantity of ACM and/or PACM6 at the work site pursuant
to paragraph (k)(1) of this section.
Item 1b alleges a violation of 29 C.F.R.1926.1101(k)(2)(ii)(A), which states that:
(ii) Building and/or facility owners shall notify the following persons of the presence,
location and quantity of ACM or PACM at the work sites in their buildings and
facilities. Notification either shall be in writing, or shall consist of a personal
communication between the owner and the person to whom notification must be
given or their authorized representatives: (A) Prospective employers applying or
bidding for work whose employees reasonably can be expected to work in or adjacent
to areas containing such material.
The Positions of the Parties
According to the Secretary, the issue in this case is whether Trinity violated the two cited
standards by (1) failing to determine the presence, location and quantity of PACM before the
contractor began work at the site, and (2) failing to communicate information about the PACM to
the contractor hired to perform the work in the area where the PACM was located. The Secretary
contends she has met her burden of proof as to all elements of the alleged violations.
According to Respondent, the citation must be dismissed as a matter of law. It notes that
there was exposure only to employees of Pli-Brico, a separate employer, and that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that an employer cannot be found in violation of a standard if its own
employees are not affected by the noncompliance. Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d
706, 711 (5th Cir. 1981). Trinity points out that it is headquartered in Dallas, Texas, which is located
in the Fifth Circuit, and that the Commission must apply Fifth Circuit precedent in this case.
Respondent further contends that even if Trinity had liability for the exposure of Pli-Brico
employees, the citation must still be dismissed because the Secretary has not proved knowledge.
Trinity notes that the Secretary asserts that the element of knowledge in this case is established by
a presumption that the insulation blanket around the furnace contained asbestos as the building was
built before 1980; because of this presumption, she argues, Trinity is deemed to have knowledge that

6
Under the standard, ACM refers to asbestos-containing material, and PACM refers to presumed
asbestos containing material. Further, PACM includes thermal system insulation and surfacing
material found in buildings constructed no later than 1980. The designation of material as PACM
may be rebutted pursuant to paragraph (k)(5) of the standard. See 29 C.F.R. 1926.1101(b).
8
asbestos was present unless Trinity affirmatively proved otherwise by using the specific testing
procedures set forth in the standard.
Respondent asserts that the effect of such a presumption is to shift the burden of proof as to
knowledge from the Secretary to Trinity and that doing so is contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent. It
points out that in that Circuit, the only effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of producing
evidence in regard to the presumed fact; it does not shift the burden of persuasion. Pennzoil Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 1128, 1136 (5th Cir. 1986). It also points out that once
a respondent produces evidence challenging the presumed fact, the presumption disappears from the
case; the presumption is dispelled upon the introduction of evidence that would support a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. Id. at 1136-38. Respondent notes that pursuant to the
parties’ stipulations, Trinity had no actual knowledge of the presence of asbestos and reasonably
believed that any asbestos had been removed by the previous contractor. Respondent argues that,
under Pennzoil, the presumption that Trinity knew of the presence of asbestos is dispelled by the
stipulations showing Trinity’s lack of knowledge; thus, the presumption of knowledge disappears
from this case, and the Secretary has no evidence to meet her burden of showing knowledge.
Finally, Respondent contends the Secretary has not proved either the serious classification
or the appropriateness of the proposed penalty. It notes that the serious classification depends on
whether there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the
condition. It also notes there is no evidence of how much time was spent actually removing the
insulation blanket itself or how much of the blanket was removed before it was identified as possibly
containing asbestos; without evidence of exposure, there can be no determination the citation was
serious, and the lack of evidence also precludes the determination of an appropriate penalty.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To prove a violation of a specific OSHA standard, the Secretary has the burden of proving
that the standard applies, that the terms of the standard were not met, that employees had access to
the violative condition, and that the cited employer had actual or constructive knowledge (i.e., either
knew or could have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence) of the violative condition.
Access Equip. Sys., Inc.,18 BNA OSHC 1718, 1720 ((No. 95-1449, 1999).
The stipulated facts in this case establish that Trinity was the owner of the subject building
and facility, that the building was constructed before 1980, and that in 2005, Trinity contracted with
9
Pli-Brico to repair the outer brick wall of the building in the area where the pusher furnace was
located. The facts also show that the pusher furnace had an insulation blanket over it to prevent heat
loss, that at least part of the blanket was removed during Pli-Brico’s work at the site, and that testing
of the blanket material revealed it contained from 3 to 15% amosite asbestos. Finally, the facts
demonstrate that Trinity did not inspect or test for asbestos before hiring Pli-Brico or at any time
before Pli-Brico began the work and that Trinity did not notify Pli-Brico that asbestos was present.
(Stip. Nos. 3, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15).
OSHA’s asbestos standard applies to, inter alia, the “[c]onstruction, alteration, repair,
maintenance, or renovation of structures, substrates, or portions thereof, that contain asbestos.” See
29 C.F.R. 1926.1101(a)(3). In addition, asbestos-containing material, or ACM, means “any material
containing more than one percent asbestos,” and thermal system insulation, or TSI, means “ACM
applied to pipes, fittings, boilers, breeching, tanks, ducts or other structural components to prevent
heat loss or gain.” See 29 C.F.R. 1926.1101(b). Section 1926.1101(k)(1), which is referred to in the
first cited standard, provides as follows:
This section applies to the communication of information concerning asbestos
hazards in construction activities to facilitate compliance with this standard. Most
asbestos-related construction activities involve previously installed building
materials. Building owners often are the only and/or best sources of information
concerning them. Therefore, they, along with employers of potentially exposed
employees, are assigned specific information conveying and retention duties under
this section. Installed Asbestos Containing Building Material. Employers and
building owners shall identify TSI and sprayed or troweled on surfacing materials in
buildings as asbestos-containing, unless they determine in compliance with paragraph
(k)(5) of this section that the material is not asbestos-containing. Asphalt and vinyl
flooring material installed no later than 1980 must also be considered as asbestos
containing unless the employer, pursuant to paragraph (g)(8)(i)(I) of this section
determines that it is not asbestos-containing. If the employer/building owner has
actual knowledge, or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, that
other materials are asbestos-containing, they too must be treated as such. When
communicating information to employees pursuant to this standard, owners and
employers shall identify “PACM” as ACM. Additional requirements relating to
communication of asbestos work on multi-employer worksites are set out in
paragraph (d) of this section.
Based upon the foregoing stipulated facts, the provisions of the asbestos standard set out
above, and the language of the cited standards, it is clear the cited standards applied to Pli-Brico’s
work at the site. It is also clear that Trinity did not satisfy the terms of the standards and that Pli­
10
Brico’s employees had access to the insulation blanket due to Trinity’s failure to comply with the
standards. As to knowledge, Trinity had no actual knowledge the insulation blanket covering the
pusher furnace contained asbestos. However, Trinity, as the building owner, knew the building was
constructed before 1980; it also knew an insulation blanket covered the pusher furnace. (Stip. Nos.
3, 4, 5, 12). The asbestos standard plainly requires an employer to identify TSI in buildings
constructed no later than 1980 as asbestos-containing unless the employer affirmatively determines
that it is not. As Trinity did not do so, the Secretary has demonstrated the knowledge element.
As set out supra, Trinity argues the Secretary has not proved knowledge in this case, citing
to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 1128,
1136 (5th Cir. 1986).7 Specifically, Trinity asserts the standard presumes employer knowledge of the
presence of asbestos, for situations like the one here, unless the employer proves otherwise by using
the testing procedures set forth in the standard; Trinity further asserts the presumption improperly
shifts the burden of proof. However, the standard presumes only the presence of asbestos in
circumstances like those in this case, which the employer may rebut by performing the specified
testing. The Commission agreed with this interpretation in Odyssey Capital Group, 19 BNA OSHC
1252 (No. 98-1745, 2000). There, the employer’s employees were scraping off sprayed-on acoustic
paint from apartment ceilings in a building that was built before 1981. The Commission stated, as
to the presumption in the standard, as follows:
An employer may overcome the presumption that sprayed- or troweled-on surfacing
material in pre-1981 buildings is ACM, if it establishes that an analysis of bulk
samples collected in the manner described in 40 C.F.R. § 763.86 shows that the
surfacing material does not contain more than one percent asbestos. 29 C.F.R. §§
1926.1101(k)(1), (5).

7
The Secretary’s suggestion that there is no basis for considering Fifth Circuit precedent in this
matter is rejected. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) and (b), any person adversely affected by an
order of the Commission may obtain review in any United States court of appeals for the circuit
(1) in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, (2) where the employer has its principal
office, or (3) in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. While the Secretary
asserts there is no evidence in the record as to the location of Trinity’s principal office, I take
judicial notice of the fact that Trinity’s web site states the company is headquartered in Dallas,
Texas. See www.trin.net/. Trinity has cited to two cases in the Fifth Circuit in support of its
position, which persuades me that, if Trinity does not prevail in this case, it is highly probable
that Trinity would file an appeal in the Fifth Circuit. See D.M. Sabia Co., 17 BNA OSHC 1413,
1414 & n.3 (No. 93-3274, 1995).
11
Id. at 1254. See also James R. Howell & Co., 19 BNA OSHC 1277 (No. 99-1348, 2000). The
stipulated facts establish that Trinity did not perform the required testing. (Stip. No. 10). Trinity,
consequently, cannot rebut the presumption in the standard.
Moreover, as the Secretary points out, her burden of proof with respect to knowledge in this
case is the same as that for all cases, that is, she must show that the employer had actual knowledge
of the conditions constituting the violation or that the employer, with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have known of the conditions. See, e.g., Access Equip. Sys., Inc.,18 BNA OSHC
1718, 1720 ((No. 95-1449, 1999). As the Secretary also points out, the Commission in Odyssey
Capital Group, discussed above, stated that the employer there “was aware of all the conditions
constituting the violation.” Specifically, it knew that the building had been constructed before 1981,
that many of the apartment ceilings had sprayed-on surfacing material, and that no testing under the
standard had been done. 19 BNA OSHC at 1254. Odyssey asserted, however, that it was entitled to
rely on environmental studies done for its financing entity, showing that no samples of the ceiling
material contained as much as one percent asbestos, to establish that it was reasonably diligent in
determining the apartments did not contain sufficient asbestos to trigger application of the cited
standards. The Commission rejected this assertion, noting that the asbestos standard defined what
constituted reasonable diligence; that is, it required the employer to take precautions unless specific
testing, done in a way that Odyssey had not done, showed that the material involved contained no
more than one percent asbestos. The Commission found that the employer thus “knew or reasonably
could have known that the ceiling surface material at issue was PACM and that it failed to conduct
the specific testing called for in the [standard].” The Commission therefore agreed with the judge’s
having affirmed the cited standards. 19 BNA OSHC at 1254-55. See also James R. Howell & Co.,
cited supra. Trinity’s first argument is accordingly rejected.
Trinity’s other argument, also set out above, is that only Pli-Brico employees had access to
the violative condition and that the Fifth Circuit has held that an employer cannot be found in
violation of an OSHA standard if its own employees are not affected by the noncompliance.
Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1981). I have reviewed the
Melerine decision, and it does, in fact, state that “[i]n this circuit, therefore, the class protected by
OSHA regulations comprises only employers’ own employees.” Id. at 712. However, the court in
Melerine was addressing a regulation giving OSHA accreditation to certain other regulations also
12
at issue. Further, the accrediting regulation required “[e]ach employer [to] protect the employment
and places of employment of each of his employees engaged in ship repair or a related
employment....” Id. (Citation omitted). (Italics in decision). Thus, the court was not addressing an
OSHA standard like the ones cited here, which specifically require building and facility owners to
determine the presence, location and quantity of ACM and/or PACM at their work sites and to
communicate the existence of such materials to prospective employers applying or bidding for work
whose employees reasonably can be expected to work in or near areas containing the materials. I
conclude, therefore, that Melerine is not relevant to this decision because it does not address OSHA
standards like the ones in issue in this case. Trinity’s second argument is rejected, and the Secretary
has met her burden of proving violations of the cited standards.
Trinity’s final argument is that the Secretary has not shown the violations were serious or that
the proposed penalty is appropriate. As set out supra, the OSHA-1B, which contained information
about the serious nature of the violations and the appropriateness of the proposed penalty, was not
admitted into evidence, and there was no other evidence as to these two issues. According to the
record, the bulk samples taken by OSHA and Trinity show the insulation material contained from
3 to 15 percent amosite asbestos; further, two Pli-Brico employees were working in the area of the
furnace for a full eight-hour shift on March 26, 2005, and for an unspecified amount of time on
March 28, 2005, but in any case no later than 2:00 p.m. (Stip. Nos. 13, 15). However, as Trinity
points out, Pli-Brico’s first task was to remove the outer brick wall, and it could well be that this task
took all day on March 26 and most of the employees’ workday on March 28. It could also well be
that, after removing the brick wall, the only exposure the employees had to the insulation material
was when one or both of them pulled off a portion of the material and placed it in the dumpster. This
activity could have taken just minutes and could have occurred right before the Trinity employee
discovered the material in the dumpster and reported it, at which point Pli-Brico ceased its work. As
Trinity notes, the Secretary cannot seriously contend that a single exposure to the insulation material
of as little time as 15 minutes, for example, could be classified as a serious violation.
I am aware of the cases the Secretary cites stating that, to show a serious violation of a health
standard, the question is whether a disease could result from the violative condition and whether
there is a substantial probability of death or serious physical harm if the disease does occur. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Co., 10 BNA OSHC 1893, 1897 (No. 77-699, 1982); Anaconda Aluminum Co.,
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9 BNA OSHC 1460, 1474-77 (No. 13102, 1981). I am also aware that overexposure to asbestos can
result in diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma. See, e.g., Dec-Tam Corp., 15 BNA OSHC
2072, 2081-82 (No. 88-523, 1993). However, it is the Secretary’s burden to present evidence in
support of the classification of her citations, and here, there is no evidence to show any significant
exposure to asbestos. Under the limited circumstances of this case, I find the Secretary has not met
her burden of proving the violations were serious. She has likewise not met her burden of showing
the proposed penalty is appropriate. Consequently, Items 1a and 1b are affirmed as “other,” or non-
serious, violations, and no penalty is assessed.8
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that:
1. Items 1a and 1b of Serious Citation 1, alleging violations of 29 C.F.R. §§
1926.1101(k)(2)(i) and 1926.1101(k)(2)(ii)(A), respectively, are AFFIRMED as “other,” or non-
serious, violations. No penalty is assessed for either violation.

                                                   /s/
                                                         G. Marvin Bober
                                                         Judge, OSHRC

Dated: February 13, 2006
Washington, D.C.

8
I have disposed of this matter pursuant to the relevant Commission precedent, i.e., Odyssey
Capital Group, 19 BNA OSHC 1252 (No. 98-1745, 2000). However, had the Commission not
already decided Odyssey, and had Trinity directly challenged the validity of the presumption in
the standard, I would have found the presumption invalid because, in my opinion, it turns the
burden of persuasion “on its head” by requiring the non-proponent to prove a negative rather then
requiring the Secretary to meet her burden by a preponderance of the evidence, in violation of
section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act and section 10(c) of the Act. See also Director,
OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 2259 (1994) (holding that the “true doubt rule”
used by Administrative Law Judges to decide cases arising under both the Black Lung Benefits
Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act impermissibly shifted the burden
of persuasion so as to permit a claimant to prevail despite failing to prove entitlement by a
preponderance of the evidence). I would also have found the Secretary’s assertion of jurisdiction
over building and facility owners, as set out in the cited standards, as invalid. In this regard, I
note the Secretary used the term “building owners who are statutory employers” in her proposed
rule, set out at 55 Fed. Reg. 29712, 29729 (July 20, 1990), but not in her final rule, set out at 59
Fed. Reg. 40964, 40970-40972, 41132 (August 10, 1994), and that she offered no explanation for
her change in terminology.
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