OSHRC ALJ decision Docket 02-0529 Decided October 24, 2003 Mixed result Judge Nancy J. Spies

Phillips Getschow Co.

Hoist training and overload violations affirmed

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Currency note: this decision dates from 2003
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Final order, not Commission precedent
This decision by an OSHRC Administrative Law Judge became a final order of the Commission because no Commissioner directed review (29 U.S.C. § 661(j)). It binds the parties but is not binding precedent in other cases. The full text below is from the official OSHRC release.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official OSHRC release. The full text is the Commission's own document.
Read the official release (oshrc.gov)

Plain-English summary

Phillips Getschow was removing a 4,860-pound coal-crusher cage at an Illinois power plant with an overhead hoist rated for 4,000 pounds. The cage fell from the support and pinned a millwright against a wall, causing fatal injuries. The judge found that the company had not adequately trained every employee in safe chain-hoist use and had failed to mark and observe the hoist's safe working load. She also affirmed one manufacturer-instruction violation because washers on the trolley were unevenly spaced. A support-movement item was vacated, and another support-capacity item had been withdrawn. Penalties totaling $14,500 were assessed.

Decision snapshot

  • Cited standard(s): 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.21(b)(2), 1926.554(a)(1), 1926.554(a)(2), 1926.554(a)(3), and 1926.554(a)(6)
  • Outcome: Two serious items and one instance of a third were affirmed, one item was vacated, and one was withdrawn; $14,500 was assessed.
  • Key point: Employers must verify load weight, hoist capacity, and task-specific training instead of relying on estimates or workers' prior union training.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

Secretary of Labor,
Complainant,
v. OSHRC Docket No. 02-0529
Phillips Getschow Co.,
Respondent.

Appearances:

      Rafael Alvarez, Esq., Office o f the Solicitor, U . S. De partm ent of Labo r, Chicago, Illinois
      For Com plainant

      Daniel V. Kinsella, Esq., Rooks P itts, Chicago, Illinois
      For Respond ent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Nancy J. Spies

                                         DECISION AND ORDER

      Phillips Getschow Co. (PGC) contests a citation and proposed penalties issued to it by the

Secretary on March 13, 2002. The citation was issued to PGC as a result of a fatality
investigation conducted by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance
officer Robert Vazzi on September 19, 2001.
A hearing was held in this matter on April 15, 16, and 17, 2003, in St. Louis, Missouri.
The Secretary and PGC stipulated on the record that PGC was engaged in a business affecting
commerce and that the Review Commission has jurisdiction over this action. The parties also
stipulated that PGC is a mechanical contractor whose business office is located in Joliet, Illinois.
They further stipulated that on September 18, 2001, PGC was working at the Ameren facility
located at 134 CIPS Lane in Coffeen, Illinois. PGC was removing a Pennsylvania coal crusher
cage weighing 4,860 pounds (Exh. J-1). At that time, PGC employed approximately 750
employees (Tr. 6).
The citation alleged five serious violations of the Part 1926 construction standards. At
the beginning of the hearing, the Secretary withdrew item 3 of the citation, which alleged a
violation of § 1926.554(a)(2) for failing to ensure that the supporting structure to which an
overhead hoist was attached had a safe working load equal to that of the hoist (Exh. J-2). (The
Secretary’s withdrawal of item 3 will be reflected in the Order at the end of this Decision).
The remaining four items, for which the Secretary proposed penalties of $7,000.00 each,
are:
Item 1: § 1926.21(b)(2)–failure to instruct each employee in the recognition and
avoidance of unsafe conditions.
Item 2: § 1926.554(a)(1)–failure to indicate the safe working load of an overhead hoist,
as determined by the manufacturer, and ensuring this safe working load was not exceeded.
Item 4: § 1926.554(a)(3)–failure to arrange the support for an overhead hoist so as to
provide for free movement of the hoist and/or restrict the hoist from lining itself with the load.
Item 5: § 1926.554(a)(6)–failure to ensure that overhead hoists met the applicable
requirements for construction, design, installation, testing, inspection, maintenance, and
operation as prescribed by the manufacturer.
In its answer PGC asserted the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee
misconduct. PGC presented no testimony or evidence with respect to this defense at the hearing,
nor did its counsel refer to it. It is deemed abandoned. The Secretary has filed a post-hearing
brief (PGC declined to do so). For the reasons set out below, it is determined that the Secretary
established items 1 and 2, and one instance of item 5. The Secretary failed to prove item 4.
Background
PGC has a longstanding business relationship with Ameren Energy Generating Group, an
electric utility. Although PGC does not always have employees actively working at Ameren’s
Coffeen coal power plant, it does maintain an office at the plant. Ameren periodically contracts with
PGC to perform maintenance on its equipment there (Tr. 122, 134-135). In 2001, Ameren contracted
PGC to remove four coal crushers from the Coffeen plant. PGC’s assignment was to dismantle and
replace the old coal crushers with new ones. PGC hired ironworkers and millwrights to perform the
required tasks (Tr. 592-593).
PGC superintendent David Barone was responsible for the overall project. PGC’s general
foreman over the ironworkers was Andrew Macari (Tr. 378, 445-447). On September 16, 2001,
PGC employees removed the first of two coal crusher cages from their housing. Millwrights took
off the door to the crusher cage and loosened the bolts. The ironworkers rigged the coal crusher to
a chain fall hoist and trolley fitted to an I-beam and removed the cage from the building (Tr. 453,
477).1
Macari assigned PGC ironworkers James Whitaker and James Camden to remove the second
coal crusher cage on September 18, 2001 (Tr. 386). Whitaker and Camden suspended a two-ton
trolley from the I-beam and rigged the coal crusher cage to it with a chain fall hoist. As they were
moving the suspended cage, PGC millwright Frank Hackney, who had earlier loosened the bolts on
the cage, returned to the area to retrieve his tool bucket. As Whitaker, Camden, and PGC employee
Chris Dee tugged at the cage, the load fell from the I-beam. The cage dropped and rolled onto
Hackney, pinning him against the concrete wall. Hackney died as a result of his injuries (Exh. R-14;
Tr. 30-31).
OSHA assigned Robert Vazzi to investigate the fatality. He arrived at the Coffeen plant on
September 19, 2001, and examined the site of the accident and interviewed employees. As a result
of Vazzi’s investigation, the Secretary issued the citation in the instant case.
The Citation
The Secretary alleges that PGC committed serious violations. She has the burden of proving
this violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
In order to establish a violation of an occupational safety or health standard,
the Secretary has the burden of proving: (a) the applicability of the cited standard, (b)
the employer’s noncompliance with the standard’s terms, (c) employee access to the
violative conditions, and (d) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the
violation (i.e., the employer either knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence
could have known, of the violative conditions).

Atlantic Battery Co., 19 BNA OSHC 2131, 2138 (No. 90-1747, 1994).
Item 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1926.21(b)(2)
The Secretary alleges that PGC committed a serious violation of § 1926.21(b)(2), which
provides:
The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of
unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control
or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury.

     The citation alleges that PCG “did not instruct the ironworkers in the recognition and

1
The metal structure attached to the ceiling from which the trolley was suspended was not actually an I-beam. It
was two “C channels” welded together back to back to form a structure similar to an I-beam (Tr. 28). Throughout
the hea ring, however, witnesses and attorneys referred to the welde d cha nnels as an I-beam, an d it will be referred to
as such in this Decision.
avoidance of the unsafe use of chain hoists and the regulations applicable to their work environment
to control or eliminate the overloading of chainfall hoists and use of chainfall hoists which do not
have inspection tags on them.” Vazzi testified that the citation for this item was based on
information that “the chain hoist itself had been used without the certification and rating posted on
the side as is should be, there was no inspection tag on the chain itself or sticker that’s normally there
as well, the fact that they used that, the rating and use of the trolley to some extent, how it was done,
the centering of the trolley, proper use of it, and the lifting of the case with the weight of the cage
unknown” (Tr. 63).
PGC safety director John Bernadoni told Vazzi that PGC relied on the trade union halls to
supply the company with trained skilled labor (Tr. 64). PGC contacted Daniel Bauer, business agent
for Local Ironworkers 392, and asked him to provide ironworkers to do the rigging for the Ameren
project. Bauer provided, among others, Andrew Macari, James Whitaker, Chris Dee, and James
Camden. Dee had been through 3 years of training in the Joint Apprenticeship Program (Program),
an employer-funded training program designed to provide both classroom and on-the-job training
to ironworkers (Tr. 242-248, 434, 437-438).
PGC’s position, as stated in its pre-hearing statement, is that the training provided by the
Program, as well as its own orientation program administered to new hires and the weekly toolbox
meetings held at the Ameren facility were sufficient to adequately train employees as required by
§ 1926.21(b)(2).
Bauer testified that Macari and Whitaker both went through the Program (Tr. 437-438). He
testified that James Camden, although dispatched from Local 392, did not go through the Program
(Tr. 439). Bauer stated that every member of Local 392 goes through the Program, but that it
dispatches ironworkers from other locals too. An employer would not know whether an ironworker
dispatched by Local 392 had been through the Program (Tr. 442-443). Bauer testified that the Joint
Apprenticeship Program occasionally holds an upgrading class for journeyman ironworkers, “but
most of the safety, the new regulations are done . . .on the projects,” that is, the work sites to which
the ironworkers have been assigned (Tr. 443-444).
Macari testified that PGC’s orientation program lasted approximately an hour, and consisted
of being given the company’s safety manual and filling out tax forms (Tr. 388, 391). He stated that
PGC had a supervisor present, who “had us to fill out the paperwork and gave us a safety manual to
read it and sign the back of it when we got done reading it” (Tr. 392). Camden told Vazzi that he
received no training when he was hired by PGC but was given a copy of the safety manual “and told
to read it when he had the chance” (Tr. 73).
“An employer complies with § 1926.21(b)(2) when it instructs its employees about the
hazards they may encounter on the job and the regulations applicable to those hazards. Concrete
Construction Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1614, 1619 (No. 89-2019, 1992). The specific deficiency cited
for this item is the failure to train employees in the use of chainfall hoists. PGC’s use of the chainfall
hoist and other similar rigging was a common occurrence at Ameren. The hoist used by PGC’s
employees the day of the accident was not marked with its weight capability. Typically, the
manufacturer marks the rating on the side of the hoist’s block (Tr. 35). Generally, PGC would test
chainfall hoists and place an inspection tag on the chain listing the rating. The chainfall hoist in
question was not tagged at the time of the accident (Tr. 71). Foreman Macari testified that if a hoist
is not tagged or otherwise visibly rated for hoisting capability, the procedure is, “You don’t use it.
If you don’t know what it is, you shouldn’t use it” (Tr. 396). Despite this policy, there is no
indication that this safety rule was part of the training of any of the ironworkers involved in the
hoisting accident.
The Commission has held that while § 1926.21(b)(2) “does not limit the employer in the
method by which it may impart the necessary training, an employer that places too much trust in the
quality of experience and training an employee has already acquired elsewhere runs the risk of
violating the standard.” Ford Development Corp., 15 BNA OSHC 2003, 2009 (No. 90-1505, 1992).
The Secretary has established that PGC failed to train each employee in the recognition and
avoidance of the unsafe use of chainfall hoists. Such training was not a part of the PGC’s orientation
and onsite training. Not all of its employees had completed the ironworkers training Program. The
Secretary has established a violation of § 1926.21(b)(2).
The Secretary alleges that the violation is serious. Under § 17(k) of the Act, a violation is
serious if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the
violation. PGC’s employees lifted a coal crusher cage without knowing its weight or the capacity
of the chainfall hoist. The weight of the coal crusher cage exceeded the capacity of the chainfall
hoist. By failing to train its employees in the safe use of chainfall hoists, PGC exposed its employees
to the hazard of being crushed by the falling cage. The violation is classified as serious.
Item 2: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1926.554(a)(1)
The Secretary alleges that PGC committed a serious violation of § 1926.554(a)(1), which
provides:
The safe working load of the overhead hoist, as determined by the manufacturer,
shall be indicated on the hoist, and this safe working load shall not be exceeded.

    The Secretary alleges both that the safe working load of the hoist was not indicated on the

hoist and that PGC exceeded the safe working load. Vazzi testified that the hoist in question was
not marked, as is usual, with the rated capacity on its block. Neither was it tagged (Tr. 34, 63).
PGC’s counsel showed Vazzi a photograph of a green hook with a “2,” indicating a 2-ton
capacity, marked on it (Exh. C-9).2 Vazzi testified that the photograph was not taken by him, but
was sent to him by Bernardoni after his closing conference with PGC (Tr. 33). Vazzi stated that
despite his examination of the chainfall hoist, he did not see a marking on the day of his inspection.
It is determined that the hoist mechanism was not marked with the safe working load. Even if a “2”
was visible upon close inspection of the hook, it would not indicate the hoist’s capacity. Vazzi
stated that the hook can be replaced on the hoist, so that the “2” indicates only the capacity of the
hook, not the entire hoist (Tr. 35).
Vazzi eventually concluded that the safe working load of the hoist was 2 tons (or 4,000
pounds) (Exh. R-3; Tr. 83-84). Vazzi received various estimates of the cage’s weight from PGC’s
employees. Barone estimated its weight at 3,200 pounds. Bernardoni estimated it from 3,200 to
3,500 pounds. Macari put it at 4,000 pounds (Tr. 51). Following the accident, PGC weighed the
cage and found, as the parties stipulated, that the actual weight was 4,860 pounds, thus exceeding
the hoist’s safe working load by 860 pounds (Exh. C-20; Tr. 56-57).
The Secretary must establish that PGC knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
could have known that the cage exceeded the safe working load of the hoist. It is apparent that PGC
did not have actual knowledge of the cage’s weight prior to the accident. With the exercise of
reasonable diligence, however, PGC could have known it. Macari stated that Barone told him the
weight of the cage, but did not know how Barone obtained that information nor did he remember
what the weight was (Tr. 387-388). Barone testified that he estimated the weight of the cage “by

2
The hook in some of the photographs appeared to be dark blue. The actual color was dark green, the PCG color
(Tr. 373).
looking in the crusher door and trying to take some estimate of pound per foot those types of bars
would weigh and come to some reasonably close calculation of the total weight” (Tr. 458). He did
not check with Ameren or the manufacturer to see if either one knew the actual weight of the cage
(Tr. 458-459). Barone testified that he was able to estimate the weight because, “I basically know
what pieces of steel this size, the weight per foot; and from that, you can get some type of a
calculation of what you think it would be, somewhat more of a guess, more accurate” (Tr. 463).
Barone stated that he estimated the cage weighed 3,600 pounds (Vazzi testified that Barone’s
estimate was 3,200 pounds) (Tr. 463). It is noted that Barone’s high estimate is 1,260 pounds less
than the actual weight of the cage. His method of calculation failed to account for 25% of the cage’s
weight. When asked if it would have been a good idea to find out the actual weight, Barone
conceded, “There probably should have been some pre-job information available from the plant” (Tr.
493).
PGC did not exercise reasonable diligence in determining the weight of the coal crusher cage.
It made no attempt to contact the manufacturer or obtain documentation that might indicate the
cage’s weight. Instead, it relied on an inaccurate estimate made by its job superintendent after his
brief visual inspection of the cage. Given the risks involved in miscalculating such a large weight,
reasonable diligence required something more than PGC’s minimal attempt to gauge the cage’s
weight. PGC did not have the manufacturer’s safe working load marked on the hoist. It exceeded
the safe working load when it lifted the coal crusher cage.
The Secretary has established a violation of § 1926.554(a)(1). Failure to comply with this
standard resulted in a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could occur to the
employees using the chainfall hoist. The violation is serious.
Item 4: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1926.554(a)(3)
Section 1926.554(a)(3) provides:
The support shall be arranged so as to provide for free movement of the hoist and
shall not restrict the hoist from lining itself up with the load.

    The Secretary has two bases for this allegation: (1) the I-beam had an indentation or raised

area in the lower rail that prevented the free movement of the trolley and hoist, and (2) the number
of spacers on the trolley were unequal and prevented the trolley from being centered (Tr. 86-87).
Inspection of I-beam
Exhibit C-12 is a photograph showing a small nick at the edge of the I-beam. It was Vazzi’s
opinion that this nick impeded the free movement of the hoist. He stated that PGC’s employees had
used the hoist earlier that day with no problem, but when they attempted to move the cage, they
couldn’t: “It was like it was hung up” (Tr. 90).
Based upon his interviews with PGC employees, Vazzi explained his understanding of how
the accident occurred (Tr. 94):
Mr. Camden told me what occurred during this accident. He told me that he
and Jim Whitaker were moving this along the I-beam; had tried to. They ran into
where they couldn’t move it. It stopped and wouldn’t move anymore.
At that time they stopped, he went out and got Chris Dee, another ironworker.
There were two ironworkers outside. Chris Dee came in to help them. He told me
that Chris Dee and he and Mr. Whitaker started to push the object again to try to
move it, and that it suddenly gave way, and that’s when the trolley came down.

    The trolley was manufactured by Saginaw Products Corporation and was rated at 2 tons (Exh.

C-20; Tr. 96). According to the manufacturer’s operating instructions, workers using the trolley
should “[c]heck I-beam carefully so that the trolley can run smoothly without encountering weld
marks, splice plates, beam irregularities, or debris which may have accumulated on beam” (Exh. C-
20, p. 2).
None of the employees present at the time of the accident testified at the hearing. Vazzi
wrote a narrative of his inspection on an OSHA 1A. Although he stated at the hearing that the
employees did not inspect the I-beam prior to using it, but only brushed coal dust off of it, in his
OSHA 1A Vazzi states (Exh. R-14, p. 4):
The morning of the accident, two ironworkers clamped the block and tackle, chainfall
style hoist onto an I-beam above the crusher and tightened the bolts with wrenches,
inspected the hoist, and checked it for easy movement along the I-beam.

    The Secretary offers no proof that the small nick photographed in Exhibit C-12 prevented

the easy movement of the hoist. According to Vazzi’s own notes, the PGC’s employees had checked
for easy movement prior to using the hoist. They had used the hoist earlier in the day to move
another load without encountering any problems. The Secretary has made no showing that the
arrangement of the hoist was deficient so as to prevent its free movement. The coal crusher cage
weighed over 1,000 pounds more than the employees thought it did. The Secretary does not examine
whether this increased weight may have contributed to the difficulty in moving the cage. She has
failed to establish that the nick on the I-beam constituted noncompliance with the cited standard.
Spacing of washers
When Vazzi examined the trolley, he noted that the number of washers, or spacers, was
uneven inside the plate of the trolley. There were four washers to the right of the center hanger shaft
inside the plate, and no washers to the left of the hanger shaft (Exh. C-10; Tr. 41). Vazzi testified
that this uneven spacing restricted the hoist from lining itself up with the load (Tr. 95):
By not being centered onto the I-beam changes the forces of the movement
of the object. So it restricts it from lining up.
...
The spacers on each side would allow the tightening and clamping of this
trolley onto the I-beam. It changes the central tendency of this trolley on that I-beam
by placing spacers unequally on each side of the plates and the trolley itself.

   The Secretary cited PGC under the following item, item 5, for violating § 1926.554(a)(6)

by failing to follow the trolley manufacturer’s specifications for a number of things, including the
spacing of the washers. It is determined that § 1926.554(a)(6) is more applicable to the issue of
spacing washers than § 1926.554(a)(3). The spacing issue as cited in items 4 and 5 is duplicative,
and the Secretary has not shown that the difference of four washers on one side of the hanger shaft
restricted the hoist from lining itself up with the load. The uneven spacing of the washers will be
treated below. Item 4 is vacated.
Item 5: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1926.554(a)(6)
Section 1926.554(a)(6) provides:
All overhead hoists in use shall meet the applicable requirements for construction,
design, installation, testing, inspection, maintenance, and operation, as prescribed by
the manufacturer.

   The citation lists the following ways in which PGC failed to ensure that the hoist met the

manufacturer’s specifications: PGC’s employees did not know the rated capacity of the hoist and
did not know the weight of the load to be lifted; they did not assure that the hoist and load were in
a straight line and the load centered; they did not make sure the load was free to move; they did not
promptly report any malfunction; they did not make sure that all nuts were drawn up tightly; they did
not make sure the trolley plates were spaced properly; they did not check the I-beam to make sure
the trolley could run smoothly; and they did not ensure that the supporting structure had a load rating
at least equivalent to the load rated capacity of the trolley plus the weight of the hoist.
With the exception of the allegation that the PGC’s employees did not make sure that all nuts
were drawn tightly, all of the allegations are covered by the other cited items, including the item
withdrawn by the Secretary. To the extent that item 5 alleges noncompliance with the
manufacturer’s specifications that are identical to allegations cited in the previous 4 items, item 5
is vacated as duplicative.
The manufacturer’s operating instructions for the trolley specify that the washers must be
evenly spaced in order to center the load (Exh. C-20; p. 3):
The hoisting mechanism must be on the centerline of the hoist trolley. Place equal
numbers of the approximately c” thick and 1/16" thick washers on each side of the
hanger shaft to obtain the “A” dimension (See Figure 3) between side plates.

   Place equal numbers of the remaining washers between the side plates and the lock
   nut.
   ...
   Observe trolley operation. Trolley should move freely with the flanges on the wheels
   as close as possible to the edge of the I-beam. If it appears trolley side plates could
   be moved closer together with freedom of movement maintained, remove an equal
   number of washers from each side. . .

   It is undisputed that the trolley used by PGC had an unequal number of washers on each side

of the hanger shaft. PGC made the point during the hearing that it had not purchased the trolley that
the employees used (which PGC thought was rated for 4 tons), but that it had “migrated” into its
equipment sometime in the 1980s, presumably when a PGC employee or employees decided to
“adopt” it. The trolley was painted green, the color that PGC used to identify its equipment, over
its original color (Tr. 44, 342). Even if PGC did not purchase the trolley, it had been in its
possession for several years and PGC was responsible for its maintenance and safe use.
The Secretary has established a violation of § 1926.554(a)(6) with respect to the uneven
spacing of the washers.
The only allegation not dealt with in items 1 through 4 is that the nuts on the hoist were not
tightly drawn. This is based on Vazzi’s examination of the hoist following the accident, when he
discovered that he could turn one of the nuts by hand (Tr. 150). Yet in his OSHA-1A narrative,
Vazzi stated that the employees told him that the morning of the accident, two ironworkers
“tightened the bolts with wrenches” (Exh. R-14, p. 3).3 Vazzi conceded that the nut could have been
loosened in the accident, stating, “I cannot prove one way or the other whether or not they tightened
it” (Tr. 163).
The Secretary has failed to prove that PGC did not comply with the manufacturer’s
specifications by not tightening the nuts on the hoist prior to its use. Such noncompliance cannot
be inferred from the looseness of one nut on a hoist following its collapse under a load weighing
more than 2 tons.
Item 5 is affirmed only on the issue of the uneven spacing of the washers.
Penalty Determination
The Commission is the final arbiter of penalties in all contested cases. In determining an
appropriate penalty, the Commission is required to consider the size of the employer’s business,
history of previous violations, the employer’s good faith, and the gravity of the violation. Gravity
is the principal factor to be considered.
The parties stipulated that PGC employed approximately 750 employees at the time of the
accident (Tr. 6). The Secretary presented no history of previous violations. Vazzi noted that PGC
was cooperative during his investigation (Exh. R-14, p.3).
The gravity of the violation of § 1926.21(b)(2) is high. PGC relied on the Joint
Apprenticeship Program to train its employees and expended no real effort in ensuring that its new
hires were trained in the specific hazards to which they would be exposed on the job. The employees
were working with heavy equipment that required numerous safety procedures. A penalty of
$7,000.00 is assessed.
The gravity of the violation of § 1926.554(a) in item 2 is also high. When working with
loads whose weights are measured in tons, exceeding the safe working load can have catastrophic
results. A penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed.
The gravity of the violation of § 1926.554(a)(6) in item 5 is low. The spacing of the washers,
while uneven, was not shown to have dramatically restricted the hoist from lining up over the load.
Only one instance of item 5 is affirmed. A penalty of $500.00 is assessed.

3
Vazzi clarified that in his narrative he intended “nuts” when he wrote “bolts” (Tr. 150).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance

with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED that:
1. Item 1 of the citation, alleging a violation of § 1926.21(b)(2), is affirmed, and a
penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed;
2. Item 2 of the citation, alleging a violation of § 1926.554(a)(1), is affirmed, and a
penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed;
3. Item 3 of the citation, alleging a violation of § 1926.554(a)(2), was withdrawn by the
Secretary and is vacated, and no penalty is assessed:
4. Item 4 of the citation, alleging a violation of § 1926.554(a)(3), is vacated, and no
penalty is assessed; and
5. Item 5 of the citation, alleging a violation of § 1926.554(a)(6), is affirmed with
respect to the issue of the uneven spacing of washers, and a penalty of $500.00 is
assessed.

                                                        /s/
                                                        NANCY J. SPIES
                                                        Judge

Date: September 19, 2003

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