Coastal Petroleum Services, Inc.

Plain-English summary

A Coastal well-servicing rig overturned at a remote Mississippi oil well, killing one crew member and seriously injuring another. The judge vacated a general duty allegation concerning the mast's guylines and anchors because OSHA did not produce the manufacturer's specifications for the particular rig or prove that Coastal's setup departed from recognized industry practice. She also vacated an emergency-escape-line allegation because OSHA did not rebut evidence that the well had been killed and presented no fire or explosion hazard. A separate medical-attention allegation was withdrawn. The judge affirmed the remaining serious item because the worksite was six to eight miles from the nearest hospital and Coastal did not prove that anyone on the crew was adequately trained in first aid, assessing a $2,000 penalty.

Decision snapshot

• Cited standard(s): 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1910.151(b)
• Outcome: Two general duty items vacated, one item withdrawn, and serious first-aid item affirmed with a $2,000 penalty.
• Key point: At a remote worksite, an employer must ensure and document that at least one available worker has adequate first-aid training.

Full text (OSHRC public release)

Secretary of Labor,
Complainant,
v. OSHRC Docket No. 00-1383
Coastal Petroleum Services, Inc.
Respondent.

Appearances:

   Carla J. Gunnin, Esq.                            George R. Carlton, Jr., Esq.
            Office of the Solicitor                 John F. Martin, Esq.
            U. S. Department of Labor                       Godwin, White & Grubar
            Birmingham, Alabama                             Dallas, Texas
            For Complainant                                          For Respondent

Before: Administrative Law Judge Nancy J. Spies

                                 DECISION AND ORDER

      Coastal Petroleum Services, Inc. (Coastal), operates an oil field servicing company, with

its main office located in Natchez, Mississippi. On March 30, 2000, a well servicing rig that a
Coastal crew was using at a well near Magnolia, Mississippi, overturned. One member of
Coastal’s crew was killed and another was seriously injured. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) compliance officer Vivian Stevens investigated the accident from March
31 until April 6, 2000. As a result of Stevens’s investigation, the Secretary issued a citation
alleging four serious violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act).
Item 1 of the citation alleges a serious violation of § 5(a)(1) for exposing employees to
the recognized hazard of being struck by the collapsing mast of a well servicing rig. The
Secretary alleges that Coastal improperly and inadequately installed the mast’s guylines and
anchors. Item 2 alleges another serious violation of § 5(a)(1) for exposing employees to the
recognized hazard of fire and explosion due to the failure to erect a Geronimo Emergency Escape
Line on the well servicing rig. At the start of the hearing, the Secretary withdrew item 3a,
alleging a serious violation of § 5(a)(1) for not providing prompt medical attention (Tr. 5). Item
3b alleges a serious violation of § 1910.151(b) for failing to insure that there was a person or

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persons adequately trained to render first aid when there was not a hospital, clinic, or infirmary
near the worksite.
Coastal contests each of the cited items. A hearing was held in this matter on January 24,
2001, in Jackson, Mississippi. For the reasons stated below, it is determined that the Secretary
failed to prove the § 5(a)(1) violations alleged in items 1 and 2 but established the violation
alleged in item 3b.
Background
On March 29, 2000, Coastal sent a crew to an oil well (referred to as “the Allen well”)
located off Terry Creek Road near Magnolia, Mississippi, to perform routine well servicing.
Coastal planned to pull the tubing out of the wellbore, inspect it, and replace any faulty or broken
tubing (Tr. 113). Coastal’s crew, which consisted of Kenneth Reese, rig operator Robbie
Campbell, and floor hand Booker T. Jones, took a 1977 Wilson Mogul 42 Well Serving Rig with
them to the site (Tr. 114). Supervisor Gary Randall was also present on March 29, but was not at
the site on March 30, the day of the accident (Tr. 16).
The Wilson rig is a truck-mounted rig with a mast (or derrick) that can telescope to a
height of 96 feet. At the top of the mast is the crown. Approximately three-quarters of the way
down the mast is the racking board (also “monkeyboard” or “derrickman’s platform”). At the
base of the rig is the worker’s platform or floor (Exh. C-1; Tr. 11-12, 35). Coastal’s crew
“spidered” the rig, meaning they rigged guylines (also referred to as “guy wires” and “guys” at
the hearing) from the rig to the ground. The crew then “killed” the well by circulating salt water
through it. According to Coastal, this eliminated the possibility that any flammable substance
would flow out of the well while the crew was servicing it (Tr. 145-146, 160).
The next day, the crew began working at approximately 8:30 a.m. Jones was working on
the floor of the rig by the well. He heard “something make a funny sound, like a sledgehammer
hitting the derrick” (Tr. 174). The rig began to topple over. Jones and Campbell managed to exit
the rig and run out of the path of the falling rig, although Campbell sustained a broken leg.
Reese, who had been working on the racking board, was trapped beneath the overturned derrick
of the rig and sustained fatal injuries (Tr. 35, 175-176).

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The Citation
Item 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 5(a)(1)
The Secretary alleges that Coastal committed a serious violation of § 5(a)(1), which
provides:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.

   In order to establish a § 5(a)(1) violation, the Secretary must prove that:
   (1) a workplace condition or activity presented a hazard, (2) the employer or
   industry recognized it, (3) it was likely to cause serious physical harm, and (4) a
   feasible and useful means of abatement existed by which to materially reduce or
   eliminate it.

Kokosing Construction Co. Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 1869, 1872 (No. 92-2596, 1996).
The citation alleges that Coastal’s employees were exposed to the:
Hazard of being struck by collapsing structure of the mast (derrick) of a well
service rig resulting from improperly and inadequately installed mast foundation,
guylines and anchors on or about March 30, 2000, at the Allen well location off
Terry Creek Road, near Magnolia, MS, when the employer did not follow the
manufacturer’s recommended specifications for the placement of the mast
foundation, and safe guying of the mast to ensure adequate anchorage of the
Wilson Mogul 42 Workover Rig, SN 10498, while employees performed work on
the rig floor and the pipe racking board.

   The Secretary contends that Coastal violated § 5(a)(1) by failing to follow the

manufacturer’s specifications regarding the guying pattern and the use of anchors when setting
up the well servicing rig. Coastal argues that it rigged and anchored the guylines in accordance
with the manufacturer’s specifications.
Guylines
The Secretary introduced a copy of a section of the American Petroleum Institute’s (API)
recommendations to the oil well service industry regarding guylines and anchors (Exh. C-4; Tr.
23). Coastal objects that the Secretary offered a copy of the 1981 edition of API Recommended
Practice (RP) 54, which has been superseded twice since its publication. Coastal contends, “An
outdated, superseded twenty-year-old Recommended Practice obviously cannot constitute

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evidence of what the industry currently recognizes as a hazard in 2000 or 2001” (Coastal’s brief,
p. 6, emphasis in original). However, Coastal has not shown that the current edition of the API
Recommended Practice changes the recommended practices relied upon by the Secretary.
Furthermore, the section adduced by the Secretary, API RP 54 § 8.4.3, merely refers the
employer to the manufacturer’s specifications (Exh. C-4):
8.4.3 The guying system for derricks and masts should be constructed in
accordance with manufacturer’s guying specifications.

   The Secretary introduced a copy of the manufacturer’s specification taken from a manual

for a Wilson rig model different than the one at issue here. The manual states (Exh. C-9):
The proper way to guy the mast is shown on the plates on the mast. (see drawings
A-53641 and A-53642, appendixes I & II) Wilson masts are of the leaning type
and must be guyed for overturn stability to carry their full hook load. Use of wind
guys are necessary. Guys from the bottom of the racking board (as shown on the
above mentioned plate) are required to stabilize the racking board, and provide
overturn stability.

   Exhibit C-7 is presumably a copy of one of the plates referred to above. It states

“Manufactured by WILSON MANUFACTURING CO.” and contains two diagrams--a side view
of the well servicing rig and an overhead view, both with the guylines in place. The side view of
the rig shows four guylines attached to the rig. Two of the guylines, running from the crown of
the rig to the ground, are labeled as “A” lines. The third guyline running from the crown to the
ground is labeled as “C.” The fourth guyline runs from the racking board to the ground, and is
labeled “B.” The overhead diagram shows six guylines attached to the rig. Four “A” guylines
run from the crown to the ground, and two “B” guylines run from the racking board to the
ground. A table on the plate categorizes the guylines (Exh. C-7):

      NO.                     DESCRIPTION                       POUNDS MINIMUM
      A                       Crown to Ground                   32,000
      B                       Racking Board Guys                25,000
      C                       Load Guys                         40,000




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Stevens testified that she copied Exhibit C-7 “from a manual that we had in the [OSHA]
area office” (Tr. 30). Counsel for the Secretary stated that Exhibit C-7 was not the
manufacturer’s specifications for the particular Wilson rig that overturned in the present case, but
was being introduced as “a guideline of the typical guying that is recommended by the
manufacturer in the API standards” (Tr. 32). Stevens stated that there was no plate similar to the
one copied in Exhibit C-7 on the mast of Coastal’s Wilson rig (Tr. 34). Although Stevens and
counsel for the Secretary asserted at different times that the manual found in the OSHA area
office and Coastal’s manual were identical (Tr. 31, 37), Stevens clarified that they were not, in
fact, the same manual (Tr. 37-38): “[Coastal’s president] Newman had actually two additional
drawings that correspond to this placement. They were large fold-out drawings, and we
discussed the anchor placement, the use of four anchors in different zones.”
Coastal’s Wilson rig differed from the one referenced in Exhibit C-7 in mast height and
in the location of the derrick platform (Tr. 60). Stevens conceded that the derrick weight and the
hook load of Coastal’s rig were both “considerably lower” than those listed in Exhibit C-7 (Tr.
63). Despite the acknowledged differences between Coastal’s Wilson rig and the rig for which
Exhibit C-7 was drafted (and despite the fact that the Secretary made no attempt to distinguish
between a rig that requires six guylines and a rig that requires only four), the Secretary treats
Exhibit C-7 as the manufacturer’s specifications for the Wilson rig that overturned in this case.
The Secretary contends, “Respondent did not follow the recommended practices for guying and
anchoring the rig. By not following the recommended practices, the Respondent violated §
5(a)(1) of the Act” (Secretary’s brief, p. 6). However, absent a copy of the manufacturer’s
specifications for the particular model of the Wilson rig that overturned at Coastal’s site, it is not
possible to determine whether or not Coastal followed the manufacturer’s specifications.
Even assuming that the Secretary established that the manufacturer’s specifications
require the use of four guylines, she failed to establish her claim that Coastal used only two
guylines. Stevens testified that she determined that Coastal had attached two guylines to two
anchors (Tr. 94). The only witness who was actually present at the site the day of the accident
was Booker T. Jones. He testified repeatedly and unwaveringly that he, Campbell, and Reese
attached four wind guylines to the rig. Jones stated that the four guylines were attached to two

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anchors. One set of two guylines was attached to the front of the rig, and the other set of two
guylines was attached to the back. Each set came down to one anchor, forming a “V” shape (Tr.
161, 172, 183-184, 186, 198).
The Secretary attempted to impeach Jones’s testimony by using a statement that Jones
had given to Stevens on March 31, the day after the accident. Coastal questioned the accuracy of
the statement, noting that Stevens wrote the statement and that Jones said he did not read the
statement before signing it (Tr. 196). The written statement does not, however, contradict
Jones’s testimony at the hearing. The statement reads, in pertinent part (Exh. C-10, emphasis
added):
Used sledge hammer to drive rod for anchor, Larry or Kenny may have put that
one in over by the tree.

      The Secretary argues that Jones’s use of the word “one” reveals that only one guyline was

used on each side. But the only logical inference from the statement is that Jones was referring
to an anchor, not a guyline, when he said “that one.” The only antecedent for the word “one” is
“anchor.”1
The Secretary also relies on two photographs Stevens took of the pine tree that Coastal
used for one of its anchors (Exhs. C-5, C-6). Exhibit C-5 shows a chain wrapped around the pine
tree. Because there is only one chain, the Secretary asserts that this proves that the pine tree
anchored only one guyline. Jones testified without contradiction that Coastal’s crew had looped
one chain around the pine tree and then attached the two guylines to the chain. The photograph
shows only the chain (Tr. 162).

     1
        This is not the only time that Stevens and the Secretary seemed to confuse “anchor” with “guyline,” or at

least use them interchangeably. At one point, with Stevens on the stand, counsel for the Secretary responded to an
objection raised by Coastal. This exchange followed (Tr. 38, emphasis added):

     Secretary’s Counsel: The document pretty much spelled out the guying patterns, although I think
     we’ve gotten off--because a ll the objectio ns, we’ve gotte n off my origina l question whic h was, I
     was asking he r what OS HA’s po sition would b e in relation to w hether or no t additional guylines
     would have been helpful to prevent the mast from collapsing, and then we got an objection, but she
     never really answered that question.

     Judge Spies: I’ll overrule the objection.

     Stevens: OSHA’s position is that this particular rig would have needed four ancho rs.

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The Secretary has failed to establish either that the manufacturer of the Wilson rig
required the use of four guylines for the particular model used by Coastal, or that Coastal did not
use four guylines.
Anchors
API RP 54 § 8.4.4 provides in pertinent part (Exh. C-4):
Guyline ground anchors should be expanding type anchors, concrete deadmen, or
any other type that provides the holding strength required for the anticipated
service conditions. Soil conditions, terrain, and use of surrounding land will
determine the most applicable type anchor.

   Stevens stated that the manufacturer’s manual for the Wilson rig “calls for anchors in four

locations” (Tr. 37). As noted above, the manual for the Wilson rig model in question was not
adduced at the hearing. The record contains no evidence that the rig’s wind guylines should have
been anchored in four places rather than two.
The Secretary also asserts that it was unacceptable for Coastal to use a pine tree for one of
its anchors and that the ground conditions were not suitable for holding the other anchor, a metal
stake. The only evidence the Secretary has to support this theory is the testimony of Stevens,
who gave her opinion that these anchors were inadequate. Stevens conceded that she had no
experience in the oil field industry in general, nor in the specialized field of oil well servicing.
She had inspected one well servicing rig prior to her inspection in this case (Tr. 53-54).
Coastal president Steve Newman had worked in the oil well servicing industry for 25
years at the time of the hearing (Tr. 110). He stated that it was recognized industry practice to
use trees as anchors for guylines attached to well servicing rigs (Tr. 120-121). Jones, who has
worked in the oil well servicing industry since 1973, also stated that it was industry practice to
use trees as anchors (Tr. 164-165). Both Newman and Jones believed the metal stake was an
appropriate anchor to use considering the ground conditions (Tr. 124, 165).
The Secretary perhaps would have benefited from expert testimony relating to adequate
anchors for guylines attached to well servicing rigs. As the record stands, the Secretary has
presented no evidence that the anchors at the Allen well site were used in contravention of either
the rig manufacturer’s specifications or recognized industry practice.
Item 1 is vacated.

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Item 2: Alleged Serious Violation of § 5(a)(1)
The Secretary alleges in the citation that Coastal’s employees were exposed to:
The hazard of fire and explosion due to the failure to erect a Geronimo Emergency
Escape Line with a properly installed Geronimo Emergency Escape Device at the
Allen well on March 20, 2000, where the Wilson Mogul 42 workover rig, SN
10498 was in service and employee was working on the pipe racking
board/monkeyboard approximately 55 feet above ground.

   The first element that the Secretary must prove in a § 5(a)(1) case is that a workplace

condition or activity presented a hazard. The hazards identified by the Secretary to which
Coastal’s employees were exposed by the failure to erect an escape line are “fire and explosion.”
“Hazard recognition may be shown by either the actual knowledge of the employer or the
standard of knowledge in the employer’s industry--an objective test.” Kokosing, 17 BNA OSHC
at 1873.
Coastal contends that no hazard of fire or explosion existed at the well site. Coastal
argues (Coastal’s brief, pp. 19-20; emphasis in original; citations to transcript of Newman’s
testimony added):
The only possible source of a fire or explosion at the site was the live well
head (i.e., a well under pressure) when Coastal arrived. However, Coastal’s crew
then proceeded to kill the well, i.e., eliminate all pressure in the well bore by
pumping brine water into the well bore (Tr. 145-146). Killing the well ensures
that “the well doesn’t flow” on the men at the site; the process keeps any
flammable fluids or hydrocarbons from exiting the well (Tr. 146).
The killing process indicates that the well at the site was safe, with no
danger whatsoever of any fire or explosion (Tr. 147). Indeed, the well had
negative pressure after Coastal killed the well--the well had gone to a suction after
the killing (Tr. 176-177). No gas or hydrocarbons could have escaped from the
well bore, as the fluids Coastal put into the well were heavier than the gas or
hydrocarbons, which simply could not punch their way through the heavier brine
to get to the surface (Tr. 155).

   Even if one were dubious that the method used to “kill” the well actually eliminates the

hazard of fire and explosion, the Secretary offered no contradictory evidence to Coastal’s
position. Stevens did not appear to be familiar with the technical aspects or the consequences of
killing the well (Tr. 74-77). Again, the Secretary may have helped herself by presenting expert

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testimony on this issue. She did not, and the undersigned is left with the unrebutted testimony of
Newman, an experienced veteran of the oil well servicing industry.
The Secretary has failed to show that a hazard of fire or explosion existed. Item 2 is
vacated.
Item 3b: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.151(b)
The Secretary alleges that Coastal committed a serious violation of § 1910.151(b), which
provides:
In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, or hospital in near proximity to the
workplace which is used for the treatment of all injured employees, a person or
persons shall be adequately trained to render first aid. Adequate first aid supplies
shall be readily available.

The Secretary has the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

    In order to establish a violation of an occupational safety or health standard, the
    Secretary has the burden of proving: (a) the applicability of the cited standard, (b)
    the employer’s noncompliance with the standard’s terms, (c) employee access to
    the violative conditions, and (d) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge
    of the violation (i.e., the employer either knew or, with the exercise of reasonable
    diligence could have known, of the violative conditions).

Atlantic Battery Co., 16 BNA OSHC 2131, 2138 (No. 90-1747, 1994).
Coastal does not dispute that there was no infirmary, clinic, or hospital in proximity to the
Allen well site. The well was approximately 6 to 8 miles from the closest hospital. To get to the
site, the crew had to turn off the interstate highway onto a county road, then onto a dirt road, and
then drive across a private pasture and through a gate (Tr. 47). After the rig overturned, the truck
was pinned beneath it so that Jones, the only crew member not injured in the accident, had to
walk to the road and flag down a vehicle for help (Tr. 48). Compliance with the cited standard
requires that at least one of the crew members be adequately trained to render first aid.
Coastal claims that two of its crew members, Jones and Campbell, had received first aid
training while working for Well Tech, another oil well servicing company. The Secretary
established that it was more likely than not that none of the crew members had received adequate
first aid training.

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During the OSHA inspection, Newman told Stevens that he was not aware of any of his
crew members having been trained in rendering first aid. Jones also told Stevens that he had
received no first aid training (Tr. 47, 87). Stevens acknowledged that if any of the crew members
had received first aid training and a Red Cross certification card while working for another
company, Coastal would not be in violation of § 1910.151(b).
At the hearing, Newman stated that the members of the crew that were at the Allen well
the day of the accident had worked with him for “close to ten years,” including a period of time
when they had all worked for Well Tech (Tr. 127). Newman testified that Campbell and Jones
received first aid training and certificate cards while at Well Tech (Tr. 127-128). Jones stated
that he had worked at Well Tech for approximately 5 years. Given the chronology of his work
history, it would appear that he was at Well Tech during the early 1990s (Tr. 158-159). While at
Well Tech, Jones stated, he and Campbell had taken first aid training together and had received
certificate cards (Tr. 159-160). When asked what happened to his card, Jones replied, “I ripped it
in the oil fields. The water got it wet so many times, it just ate it away, and I just throwed it
away” (Tr. 160).
When cross-examined on his training, Jones became vague and evasive in his responses.
He first stated that he had received training in 1981 or 1982. When confronted with the fact that
he was not at Well Tech during those years, Jones stated that he may have said the wrong year
(Tr. 174-175). Jones’s demeanor became defensive and his answers were non-responsive (Tr.
175-178):
Q.: What did you do to render first aid on that day the rig collapsed?

   A.: I can’t hear you.2

   Q.: What did you do to render first aid to your fellow coworkers the day that the
   rig collapsed?

   A.: What did I do? I can’t hear you.



   2
      It is noted that Jones’s difficulty in hearing the questions posed by counsel for the

Secretary was markedly more pronounced when he was being cross-examined on the training
issue than when being questioned regarding other issues.

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Q.: What did you do the day the rig collapsed in terms of rendering first aid to
your coworkers?

A.: What did I do?

Q.: Yes.

A.: I went around and got the operator out of the way from the rig, and I went
around to the other side and looked for the derrickman. I couldn’t find him right
then. And, I ran back around there again, and I found him laid underneath the
derrick. . . .

Q.: Did you do anything in first aid? Did you perform any kind of first aid to the
two coworkers?

A.: I don’t believe it would of did any good.

Q.: My question was, did you?

A.: Huh?

Q.: Did you?

A.: No, I did not.

Q.: From your first aid training, what did you learn you should do for people in
that situation?

A.: I can’t hardly hear you.

Q.: What did you learn from your first aid training that you should do for people
who are injured as your coworkers were?

A.: Coworkers? Give them mouth-to-mouth and give them something like to
cover their heads or something like that; what to do to them.

Q.: What is that it that you should do?

A.: Huh?

Q.: What is it that you should do for people in that situation? You said mouth-to-
mouth and you said--then I couldn’t understand what you said next after you said
mouth-to-mouth.

                                      11

A.: You asked what could I do for him?

   Q.: For either one of those employees that was injured on that day, what from your
   first-aid training did you learn you should do?

   A.: Well, it’s been so long, I forgot it.

   Coastal’s position on this issue is undermined by the lack of credibility of Jones’s

testimony on the training issue, as well as the implausibility of Newman’s statements. Newman
attempted to blame Stevens’s perception that Coastal did not have trained employees on the site
on semantics (Tr. 128):
Q.: Did the compliance officer ask you if these people had had training?

   A.: Yes, sir.

   Q.: What was the question?

   A.: “Have you trained your people in first aid?”

   Q.: And, I suppose your answer was you had not?

   A.: I had not.

   Q.: Did she go any further than that?

   A.: No, sir.

   This questionable rationale for failing to inform Stevens that Coastal’s employees had

received training was weakened upon cross-examination (Tr. 140-142):
Q.: Why is it that when Ms. Stevens asked you specifically about first aid training,
you didn’t tell her they have been trained?

   A.: I assumed that Ms. Stevens meant had I furnished them training, and as I
   recall, I think that’s what she asked me, had I furnished them training at my
   company?
   ***
   Q.: Did you ever later in communications with Ms. Stevens mention to her about
   the training?

   A.: No, ma’am.


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Judge Spies: Did she talk to you in what she would call a closing conference and
tell you what she thought the violations were?

   A.: I’m sorry?

   Judge Spies: Did she have something with you that she might call a closing
   conference where she tells you what the violations are in her opinion?

   A.: We had a closing conference.

   Judge Spies: Did she bring up the fact that she didn’t think anyone was trained?

   A.: No, ma’am. She asked me, as I previously stated, had I not furnished safety
   training and I said, “no,” because I had not.

   Q.: When you received the citation, why didn’t you tell the OSHA Jackson Area
   Office that your employees were, in fact, trained; that they had received first-aid
   training?

   A.: Why didn’t I call the office and tell them?

   Q.: Yes.

   A.: I didn’t think about it.

   Newman’s failure to inform Stevens during her inspection that Jones and Campbell had

received training, and Jones’s equivocation (and lack of familiarity with basic principles of first
aid) raise doubts about Coastal’s claim that any such training took place. The citation was issued
on July 13, 2000. The hearing was held more than 6 months later, on January 24, 2001. During
that time, Coastal could have contacted either Well Tech or the local Red Cross chapter to secure
documentation of Jones’s training.
The undersigned finds Stevens’s testimony that Newman told her he was unaware of any
training provided to Coastal’s crew and that Jones told her that he had not received first aid
training to be credible. The undersigned does not credit Newman’s testimony that he
misunderstood Stevens’s question, nor does she credit Jones’s claim that he had received first aid
training from Well Tech. Failure to provide first aid training to employees who are working in

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an area remote from a hospital, infirmary, or clinic could mean the difference between life and
death for an injured employee. Item 3b is affirmed as serious.
Penalty Determination
The Commission is the final arbiter of penalties in all contested cases. In determining an
appropriate penalty, the Commission is required to consider the size of the employer’s business,
history of previous violations, the employer’s good faith, and the gravity of the violation.
Gravity is the principal factor to be considered.
Coastal employed 15 employees at the time of the accident (Tr. 51). No evidence was
presented regarding whether Coastal had a history of OSHA violations. Coastal’s failure to
provide its own first aid training for its employees, or to keep records of employees who may
have been trained on previous jobs shows a lack of good faith on Coastal’s part. The gravity of
the violation is high. An injured employee in a remote location, without radio or telephone
contact available, could die or sustain more serious injuries in the absence of a person trained to
administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation or CPR, to stop bleeding, to treat shock, or to perform
other skills taught in a basic first aid course. It is determined that a penalty of $2,000.00 is
appropriate for the violation of § 1910.151(b).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing decision, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Item 1, alleging a serious violation of § 5(a)(1), is vacated, and no penalty
is assessed;
2. Item 2, alleging a serious violation of § 5(a)(1) is vacated, and no penalty
is assessed;
3. Item 3a, alleging a serious violation of § 5(a)(1), is withdrawn by the
Secretary, and no penalty is assessed; and

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4. Item 3b, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.151(b), is affirmed, and a
penalty of $2,000.00 is assessed.

                                            /s/
                                      NANCY J. SPIES
                                      Judge

Date: May 24, 2001

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