U.S. Department of the Treasury, United States Customs Service, New York, New York and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 153 (Authority decision, January 17, 1996)

New York Customs Service and NTEU Chapter 153 (FLRA 0-AR-2658): Reduced discipline upheld

Decision type
Authority decision
Docket
0-AR-2658
Decided
January 17, 1996
Outcome
Upheld
Precedential status
Citable Authority precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-01

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This is citable Authority precedent from 1996, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1996
The federal labor-relations law may have been amended, and later Authority or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FLRA release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (flra.gov)

Final FLRA decision. The Authority denies the agency's exception to an arbitration award. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(1), an order involving an arbitral award is generally excluded from judicial review unless it involves an unfair labor practice under 5 U.S.C. § 7116. This decision does not address an unfair labor practice.

Plain-English summary

The Customs Service suspended an inspector for ten days after negligent performance of his duties. An arbitrator found the suspension excessive and reduced it to an official reprimand, considering the circumstances under the parties' agreement. The agency argued that she had misunderstood how its penalty table treated prior discipline. The Authority denied the exception because the agreement controlled the penalty decision and the agency had not shown that the disputed reading of its regulation changed the result. The reprimand remained in place.

Decision snapshot

  • Authority: Arbitration review under 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a).
  • Outcome: Agency exception denied; reprimand in place of ten-day suspension upheld.
  • Key point: A possible error about an agency penalty table did not invalidate an award grounded in the parties' agreement.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v51 p743 ]
51:0743(64)AR

The decision of the Authority follows:

51 FLRA No. 64

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

_____

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

(Agency)

and

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION

CHAPTER 153

(Union)

0-AR-2658

_____

DECISION

January 17, 1996

_____

Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; and Tony Armendariz, Member.

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on an exception to an award of Arbitrator Susan T. MacKenzie filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Regulations. The Union filed an opposition to the Agency's exceptions.

The Arbitrator sustained a grievance contesting the Agency's 10-day suspension of the grievant and reduced the penalty to an official reprimand. For the following reasons, we conclude that the Agency's exception fails to establish that the Arbitrator's award is deficient under section 7122(a) of the Statute. Accordingly, we deny the exception.

II. Arbitrator's Award

The Agency suspended the grievant, a Customs Inspector, for 10 days for negligent performance of assigned duties. The Union filed a grievance over the suspension and, when it was not resolved, it was submitted to arbitration on the following issues, as stipulated by the parties:

Is the . . . case arbitrable based on the timeliness of the invocation?

Does the Agency decision to suspend [the grievant] promote the efficiency of the Service?

Is the Agency decision to suspend [the grievant] for just cause?

Award at 1.

The Arbitrator determined that the Union timely invoked arbitration on the grievance and that, therefore, it was arbitrable.(1) On the merits, the Arbitrator determined that the Agency's decision to discipline the grievant was "appropriate," but that the 10-day suspension was "excessive under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 13.

The Arbitrator stated that the grievant admitted performing his duties in a negligent manner. However, according to the Arbitrator, the negligence resulted from a "mere mistake." Id. at 15. The Arbitrator also stated that, although the grievant previously had been suspended, that suspension "was for conduct wholly unrelated to the conduct here under review." Id. at

  1. Citing Article 28, Section 5 of the parties' agreement, which
    identifies factors to be considered by the Agency in determining the appropriate level of discipline,(2) and noting, among other things, that the Agency's regulatory table of penalties provided a range of discipline from an official reprimand to a 2-day suspension for a "first offense" of negligence, the Arbitrator concluded that the appropriate discipline under the circumstances of this case was an official reprimand.(3) Id. at 18. Accordingly, the Arbitrator sustained the grievance and ordered the 10-day suspension to be reduced to an official reprimand.

III. Positions of the Parties

A. Agency

The Agency claims that the award is based on a nonfact. In particular, the Agency argues that the Arbitrator "misapprehended the meaning of the term 'offense' for purposes of the Agency's table of penalties[,]" and also "misapprehended that the offense was only the grievant's first offense." Exceptions at 2. According to the Agency, decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board establish that prior discipline is an important factor in assessing an appropriate penalty for subsequent misconduct, and that prior discipline "need not be related to make a current offense a second offense . .
. ." Id. at 3. The Agency asserts that, if the Arbitrator had known "that prior offenses of any type may form the basis for proposing progressive discipline and that the minimum discipline recommended for the cited second offense was a suspension, she would not have reduced the discipline to a letter of reprimand." Id. at 2.

B. Union

The Union asserts that the Arbitrator both considered the grievant's prior suspension and acknowledged that, under the Agency's table of penalties, discipline is to be progressive. According to the Union, the Agency has not established that the Arbitrator's finding on a central fact is clearly erroneous and, as such, has not demonstrated that the award is based on a nonfact. The Union also claims that Article 28, Section 5 of the parties' agreement "takes preemption" over the table of penalties, Opposition at 3, and that the Arbitrator properly applied the agreement in her award.

IV. Analysis and Conclusion

To establish that an award is based on a nonfact, the appealing party must demonstrate that the central fact underlying the award is clearly erroneous, but for which a different result would have been reached by the arbitrator. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado and National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1497, 48 FLRA 589, 593 (1993). The mere fact that the appealing party disputes an arbitral finding does not provide a basis for finding that an award is based on a nonfact. See Electronics Corp. of America v. IUE, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974).

The Agency's exception assumes that application of its table of penalties, an Agency regulation, is dispositive of the issues before the Arbitrator. However, it is well established that collective bargaining agreements, rather than agency regulations, govern the disposition of matters to which they both apply. U.S. Department of the Army, Fort Campbell District, Third Region, Fort Campbell, Kentucky and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2022, 37 FLRA 186, 194 (1990). Both the regulation and Article 28, Section 5 of the parties' agreement concern the same matter: factors to be considered in assessing the appropriateness of disciplinary penalties. Accordingly, even if the Arbitrator erred in interpreting the regulation, such error would not provide a basis on which to find the award deficient because the agreement--not the regulation--controlled the disposition of the grievance.

In particular, although the Arbitrator's statement regarding the grievant's "first offense" refers to the Agency's table of penalties, the Arbitrator expressly linked her conclusion regarding the appropriate discipline of the grievant only to "consideration of the factors to be included in deciding the appropriate level of discipline pursuant to Article 28.5." Award at 18. The Agency has not demonstrated that but for the Arbitrator's statement regarding the range of penalties for a first offense of negligence under the Agency's table of penalties, the award, which is based on the parties' agreement, would have been different. Consequently, without addressing whether the disputed statement is clearly erroneous, it does not provide a basis on which to find the award deficient.

Accordingly, we deny the Agency's exception.

V. Decision

The Agency's exception is denied.

FOOTNOTES:
(If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.)

  1. As no exceptions were filed to this
    determination, we will not address it further.

  2. Article 28, Section 5 provides, in
    pertinent part that, "[i]n deciding what action is appropriate, the Employer shall give due consideration to the relevance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances." Award at 2. The provision lists 13 separate "illustrative" factors to be considered. Id.

  3. The Arbitrator referred to Customs
    Directive (CD) 51751-01, Table of Offenses and Penalties, which provides, in part:

. . . Disciplinary actions shall be progressive. However, progressive discipline need not follow any specific sequence of disciplinary actions . . .
.

Award at 3; Attachment to Exceptions.

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