National Association of Government Employees, Local R1-109 and United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center, Newington, Connecticut (Authority decision, June 15, 1994)

Newington VA Medical Center and NAGE Local R1-109 (FLRA 0-AR-2531): Fee reconsideration denied

Decision type
Authority decision
Docket
0-AR-2531
Decided
June 15, 1994
Outcome
Procedural
Precedential status
Citable Authority precedent
Checked against source
2026-10-01

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This is citable Authority precedent from 1994, and it may have been appealed since. Ezel checks how it stands today and answers your situation, with citations.

Currency note: this decision dates from 1994
The federal labor-relations law may have been amended, and later Authority or court decisions may have changed the analysis since then. Treat this page as historical context, not current advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.
About this page: The plain-English summary and decision snapshot below were written by Ezel based on the official FLRA release. The full text is the agency's own release.
Read the official release (flra.gov)

Final FLRA decision. This Authority order denies reconsideration of its earlier decision on exceptions to an arbitration fee award and ends the reconsideration proceeding. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(1), an order involving an arbitral award is generally excluded from judicial review unless it involves an unfair labor practice under 5 U.S.C. § 7116. This decision concerns attorney fees and does not decide an unfair labor practice.

Plain-English summary

The Authority had set aside an arbitrator's denial of attorney fees because the arbitrator had not explained the ruling under the Back Pay Act's requirements. NAGE Local R1-109 asked the Authority to reconsider that decision and to reconsider its general rule requiring reasoned fee decisions. The Authority held that the union had shown no extraordinary circumstances under its reconsideration rule. It found the union's arguments to be disagreement with the earlier ruling and an attempt to relitigate the fee issue. The motion was denied, leaving the earlier decision in place.

Decision snapshot

  • Authority: Reconsideration under 5 C.F.R. § 2429.17; attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
  • Outcome: Union motion for reconsideration denied.
  • Key point: Disagreement with the Authority's requirement for a reasoned attorney fee award did not justify reconsideration.

Full text (FLRA public release)

[ v49 p1372 ]
49:1372(122)AR

The decision of the Authority follows:

49 FLRA No. 122

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

_____

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

LOCAL R1-109

(Union)

and

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

MEDICAL CENTER

NEWINGTON, CONNECTICUT

(Agency)

0-AR-2531

(49 FLRA 815 (1994))

_____

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

June 15, 1994

_____

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on a motion filed by the Union under section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the Union's exceptions in National Association of Government Employees, Local R1-109 and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center, Newington, Connecticut, 49 FLRA 815 (1994).(1) The Agency did not file an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

For the following reasons, we conclude that the Union has failed to establish that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration of our decision. Accordingly, we will deny the Union's motion for reconsideration.

II. The Decision in 49 FLRA 815

In 49 FLRA 815, we determined that the Arbitrator's denial of attorney fees was not supported by a fully reasoned and articulated decision, as required under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. In this regard, we noted that the Arbitrator's finding that attorney fees were not warranted in the interest of justice was conclusory and did not address the statutory criteria relevant to that issue. Accordingly, we set aside the award.

III. Motion for Reconsideration

The Union claims first that the award was fully articulated and reasoned. Second, the Union asserts that the award is based on an erroneous application of criteria applicable to determining attorney fees under the Back Pay Act. The Union also asserts that the FLRA should "look beyond the arbitrator's award to the parties['] pleadings in order to make a proper award of attorney fees." Motion at 7.

The Union acknowledges that, consistent with American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1770 and U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 44 FLRA 1287, 1289-90 (1992) (Fort Bragg), the Authority sets aside unarticulated denials of attorney fees. However, the Union claims that the Authority's policy "deprives the Union of the ability to represent its members in arbitration proceedings by demonstrating a lack of enforcement of backpay awards against [an] agency." Motion at 8-9. Accordingly, the Union requests the Authority to reconsider Fort Bragg.

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a party that can establish extraordinary circumstances to request reconsideration of a decision or order of the Authority. We conclude that the Union has not established extraordinary circumstances in this case.

In resolving a request for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, an arbitrator must provide a fully articulated, reasoned decision setting forth specific findings supporting determinations on each pertinent statutory requirement. For example, U.S. Department of the Army, Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia and National Association of Government Employees, Local R4-6, 38 FLRA 186, 191 (1990), request for clarification denied, 40 FLRA 84 (1991). An award granting or denying fees which fails to provide a fully articulated decision is deficient and will be set aside. See Fort Bragg, 44 FLRA at 1289.

We reject the Union's unsupported claim that the Arbitrator's award was fully reasoned and articulated. This claim constitutes mere disagreement with our decision in 49 FLRA 815, and does not establish extraordinary circumstances which warrant reconsideration of that decision. See U.S. Department of the Army, Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia and National Association of Government Employees, Local R4-6, 40 FLRA 945, 946 (1991). Similarly, the Union's request that we make our own findings based on the record constitutes an attempt to relitigate the merits of the attorney fee issue, and provides no basis for reconsidering our decision in 49 FLRA 815. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and American Federation of Government Employees, National Council of EEOC Locals No. 216, 49 FLRA 7, 10 (1994), petition for review filed sub nom. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. FLRA, No. 94-1168 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 1994).

Finally, we deny the Union's request that we reconsider Fort Bragg. The request constitutes nothing more than disagreement with our determination in Ft. Bragg, to set aside unarticulated denials of fees. We have previously determined that such disagreement provides no basis for reconsidering that decision. See U.S. Department of the Army, Fort Polk, Louisiana and National Association of Government Employees, Local R5-168, 45 FLRA 971 (1992), petition for declaratory relief and writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. National Association of Government Employees v. McKee, Armendariz, Talkin and FLRA, No. 2:93-CV83 (E.D. Va. June 29, 1993).

As the Union has not established that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration of our decision in 49 FLRA 815, we will deny the Union's motion.

V. Order

The Union's motion for reconsideration is
denied.

FOOTNOTES:
(If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.)

  1. The Union also filed a separate
    request that the Authority take official notice of, and apply, a recent Merit Systems Protection Board decision. However, as the Authority's Rules and Regulations do not provide for the filing of supplemental submissions, we have not considered the submission. For example, U.S. Department of the Navy, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California and Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, 49 FLRA 802 n.1 (1994).

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