After Miller v. Alabama and Wyoming's 2013 fix, when does an inmate sentenced to life for a crime committed before age 18 become eligible for parole, and does it matter what the law said when the crime was committed?

Plain-English summary

In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole for juvenile offenders. Miller did not categorically forbid life-without-parole for juveniles, but it required an individualized hearing before a court could impose that sentence.

At the time Miller was decided, Wyoming's sentencing scheme combined Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) to make every life sentence ineligible for parole. The Wyoming Supreme Court in Bear Cloud v. State held that scheme unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. The 2013 Wyoming Legislature responded by amending both statutes. As amended:

• Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) lets the Board of Parole grant parole to a person serving a sentence for an offense committed before age 18, "as provided in W.S. 6-10-301(c)."
• Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) provides that a person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before age 18 is eligible for parole "after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration," with an exception for inmates who committed certain qualifying acts after reaching age 18.

The Executive Director of the Wyoming Board of Parole asked AG Peter Michael four questions about how to apply the new statutes. The opinion answered each:

1. Do the 2013 amendments apply regardless of when the crime was committed? Yes. Wyoming statutes presumptively apply prospectively under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107, but "prospective" here means the statute governs current parole authority, not the law as it stood at the time of the crime. The 2013 amendments speak to the Board's current power and the inmate's current eligibility. They do not condition either on the law in effect when the crime was committed.

2. Can the 25-year incarceration period be reduced by good time? No. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420(a) authorizes deducting good time from the minimum or maximum sentence imposed by the trial court. Life sentences have no minimum or maximum sentence under § 7-13-201, and § 6-10-301(c) does not create one. The 25-year period is not a minimum sentence; it just identifies an eligibility date. Reading good time into § 6-10-301(c) would require adding words the Legislature chose not to include, contrary to Morris v. CMS Oil and Gas Co.

3. When a life sentence is commuted to a term of years, when does parole eligibility kick in? Under the new minimum and maximum, not the 25-year period. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) provides that eligibility comes "after commutation of his sentence to a term of years OR after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration." The use of "or" is disjunctive (Secrest v. State; Keene v. State). Once a sentence is commuted, the inmate is no longer "sentenced to life imprisonment," so § 6-10-301(c) no longer applies, and parole eligibility is determined under § 7-13-402(a) based on the new minimum and maximum.

4. How do the 2013 amendments affect multiple sentences? They don't. The amendments address eligibility for parole, not whether parole gets granted or how multiple sentences are administered. Sentence administration (consecutive vs. concurrent, life vs. indeterminate combinations) is governed elsewhere in the sentencing framework and was not changed by the 2013 amendments.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes are unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. Miller required an individualized sentencing hearing in which the court could consider "the transient qualities of youth" before imposing life without parole.

In Wyoming, life sentences carry no minimum or maximum term under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201. The pre-2013 versions of §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) excluded life sentences from the Parole Board's authority, making juveniles serving life sentences ineligible for parole as a categorical matter. Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, struck down that scheme as applied to juveniles.

The 2013 amendments added a path to parole for juvenile offenders serving life: either commutation by the Governor to a term of years, or 25 years of incarceration served. The Board's authority is exercised under § 7-13-402(a), and the eligibility framework is in § 6-10-301(c).

The good-time framework lives in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420, which lets the Governor adopt rules for "good time to be deducted from the maximum sentence or for good time to be deducted from the minimum sentence imposed by the sentencing court, or both." § 7-13-201 makes minimums and maximums mandatory for felony sentences except life and Boys' School commitments.

Common questions

Q: What is Miller v. Alabama and why does it matter?
A: A 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life-without-parole sentences for crimes committed by juveniles. Miller did not categorically forbid life without parole for juveniles, but required an individualized hearing first. States with mandatory schemes had to amend them, and Wyoming did so in 2013.

Q: Why does the 2013 fix apply to crimes committed long ago?
A: Because the statutes address the Board of Parole's current power and an inmate's current eligibility, not the law in effect when the crime was committed. The presumption of prospective application in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 doesn't lock in old eligibility rules. The 2013 fix is forward-looking.

Q: Can good time reduce the 25-year period?
A: No. Good time can be deducted only from a minimum or maximum sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420(a). Life sentences have no minimum or maximum (§ 7-13-201), and § 6-10-301(c)'s 25-year period is not a minimum, just an eligibility date.

Q: What happens when the Governor commutes a juvenile life sentence to a term of years?
A: The 25-year provision in § 6-10-301(c) drops out, and the inmate's parole eligibility runs under § 7-13-402(a) on the new minimum and maximum. The opinion treated the use of "or" in § 6-10-301(c) as disjunctive: commutation OR 25 years, not both. Once the sentence is commuted, the inmate is no longer serving life, and § 6-10-301(c) no longer governs.

Q: Do the 2013 amendments change how multiple sentences are administered?
A: No. The amendments address parole eligibility, not whether parole is granted, and not how multiple sentences interact (consecutive, concurrent, mixed life and indeterminate). Those questions are governed elsewhere in the sentencing framework and were not affected.

Q: What about the exception in § 6-10-301(c) for certain offenses committed after age 18?
A: The statute says: "except that if the person committed any of the acts specified in W.S. 7-13-402(b) after having reached the age of eighteen (18) years the person shall not be eligible for parole." So an inmate who committed a § 7-13-402(b) offense as an adult is ineligible for the juvenile-life parole pathway, even if some other crime in his sentence was committed before age 18.

Q: Does the opinion say juveniles serving life automatically get paroled at 25 years?
A: No. It says they become eligible for parole consideration. The Board still has discretion whether to grant parole. The 2013 amendments addressed the constitutional problem of categorical ineligibility; they did not promise release.

Citations and references

Wyoming statutes:
- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c)
- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201
- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a), (b)
- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420(a)
- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107

U.S. Supreme Court:
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)

Wyoming cases:
- Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36
- Lake v. State, 2013 WY 7, 292 P.3d 174
- Greene v. State, 2009 WY 99, 214 P.3d 222
- Mountain Cement Co. v. S. Laramie Water & Sewer Dist., 2011 WY 81, 255 P.3d 881
- Morris v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, 227 P.3d 325
- Secrest v. State, 2013 WY 102, 310 P.3d 882
- Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1991)
- RT Commc'ns, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915 (Wyo. 2000)

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.wyo.gov/formal-opinions
• Original PDF: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-uookG6TajHYi11X2NXUTRRa1E/view?resourcekey=0-tZ4oDLCnfigzho8DJvhDiQ

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General

Governor Matthew H. Mead
Attorney General Peter K. Michael
Chief Deputy Attorney General John G. Knepper
Criminal Division Deputy David L. Delicath

123 State Capitol
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
307-777-7977 Telephone
307-777-5034 Fax

November 7, 2013

FORMAL OPINION NO. 2013-001

Patrick M. Anderson
Executive Director, Wyoming Board of Parole
3120 Old Faithful Road, Suite 300
Cheyenne, WY 82002

RE: Questions pertaining to the parole eligibility of certain juvenile offenders

Dear Mr. Anderson:

You have requested an Attorney General's opinion answering the following questions concerning the parole eligibility of certain juvenile offenders:

1. Do the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) allow the Board of Parole to grant parole to individuals who were sentenced to life imprisonment for a crime they committed before reaching the age of eighteen if they have served twenty-five years of incarceration and are not otherwise ineligible, regardless of the laws in effect at the time of the commission of the crime?

2. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c), an inmate serving a qualifying sentence becomes eligible for parole "after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration." May this twenty-five year period be reduced through the application of good time and special good time allowances?

3. Where an individual committed a crime before reaching the age of eighteen, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the Governor later commuted that sentence to a term of years, when does that individual become eligible for parole under the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) if:
   a. the projected eligibility date on the new minimum term of years is greater than twenty-five years?
   b. the projected eligibility date on the new minimum term of years is twenty-five years or less?

4. Where an individual committed multiple crimes before reaching the age of eighteen and received multiple sentences, when does that individual become eligible for parole under the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) if:
   a. there are consecutive life sentences?
   b. there is at least one life sentence and one indeterminate sentence that are consecutive to each other? How does the length of the indeterminate sentence affect parole eligibility?
   c. there are concurrent life sentences?
   d. there is at least one life sentence and one indeterminate sentence that are concurrent to each other? How does the length of the indeterminate sentence affect parole eligibility?

Short Answers

1. Yes, the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) allow the Board of Parole to grant parole to otherwise qualified juvenile offenders, regardless of the laws in effect at the time of the commission of the crime.

2. No, the twenty-five year period of incarceration provided for by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) may not be reduced through the application of good time and special good time allowances.

3. Where a juvenile offender serving a life sentence receives a commutation from the governor to a term of years, parole eligibility must be determined based on the new minimum and maximum sentence, and the twenty-five year period provided for in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) has no bearing on that offender's parole eligibility.

4. Where an inmate is serving multiple sentences, the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) do not affect how those sentences should be administered.

Discussion

I. Introduction

The 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) referenced in the questions above were made in order to bring Wyoming's sentencing scheme into compliance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). In Miller, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime committed. Id. at 2469. The Supreme Court explained that the holding did not prohibit sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole under all circumstances. Id. at 2471. Instead, it requires an individualized hearing where the transient qualities of youth are to be considered before a judge or jury may impose that sentence. Id. at 2467-68.

At the time Miller was decided, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) functioned to make all individuals serving life sentences ineligible for parole in Wyoming. Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 32, 294 P.3d 36, 44-45 (Wyo. 2013). Therefore, in light of Miller, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that portion of Wyoming's sentencing scheme unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. Id. ¶ 38, 294 P.3d at 45.

The Legislature acted swiftly to amend Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c). As amended, these two statutes make Wyoming's sentencing scheme constitutional as applied to juvenile offenders serving life sentences by providing the possibility of parole. Wyoming Statute § 7-13-402(a) now provides:

The board may grant a parole to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence, except a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a life sentence, ordered by any district court of this state, provided the person has served the minimum term pronounced by the trial court less good time, if any, granted under rules promulgated pursuant to W.S. 7-13-420. The board may also grant parole to a person serving a sentence for an offense committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age as provided in W.S. 6-10-301(c).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a). Wyoming Statute § 6-10-301(c) further provides:

Any sentence other than a sentence specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is subject to commutation by the governor. A person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed after the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted the person's sentence to a term of years. A person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration, except that if the person committed any of the acts specified in W.S. 7-13-402(b) after having reached the age of eighteen (18) years the person shall not be eligible for parole.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c).

II. The laws in effect at the time the juvenile offender committed the crime do not affect the offender's current eligibility for parole.

The interpretation and application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) is controlled by the "ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." Lake v. State, 2013 WY 7, ¶ 15, 292 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2013). Statutes must be construed as a whole so that effect is given to every word, clause, and sentence and no part of the statutory scheme is rendered superfluous. Id. Grammatical principles may provide guidance. RT Commc'ns, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization for State of Wyo., 11 P.3d 915, 922 (Wyo. 2000). However, a statute cannot be "enlarge[d], stretch[ed], expand[ed], or extend[ed] to matters that do not fall within its express provisions." Lake, ¶ 15, 292 P.3d at 178. Further, statutory amendments apply prospectively unless expressly made retroactive by the Legislature. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107; Greene v. State, 2009 WY 99, ¶¶ 11-13, 214 P.3d 222, 225-26 (Wyo. 2009).

Nothing in the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) addresses the laws in effect at the time the juvenile offender committed the crime or suggests that either statute would apply retroactively. Instead, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402 generally sets forth the powers and duties of the Board of Parole (Board). Subsection (a) specifically gives the Board authority to grant parole to a qualified class of people. The class of people to whom the Board may grant parole is broadly defined as "any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence." However, the remainder of the first sentence of subsection (a) is devoted to exceptions and qualifications to that broad rule.

The second sentence of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) then specifically grants the Board the authority to parole a different class of inmates — juvenile offenders — according to the terms of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c). Section 6-10-301(c) governs commutation and parole eligibility for people sentenced to life and life without parole and, regarding juvenile offenders, specifically provides eligibility for parole "after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration."

In keeping with the presumption that statutory amendments apply prospectively, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-402(a) and 6-10-301(c) must be understood as addressing the Board's current authority to grant parole and the current eligibility of the qualified class of people they define. Further, there is no mention in either section of any sort of parole eligibility limitation based on the date the crime was committed or the laws in effect at the time. Therefore, to limit the Board's authority to grant parole or eligibility for parole based on the laws in effect at the time of the commission of the crime would read something into the statute not contained in its express terms. As a result, the 2013 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) allow the Board to grant parole to qualifying juvenile offenders, regardless of the laws in effect at the time of their offense.

III. The twenty-five year period in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) may not be reduced through the application of good time and special good time allowances.

Wyoming Statute Annotated § 6-10-301(c) makes juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment eligible for parole "after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration." As discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by the Legislature controls. "Serve" is defined as "to work for, to meet the requirements of, to work through or complete, to be in prison for (a period or term)." American Heritage College Dictionary 1267 (4th Edition 2002). "Incarcerate" is defined as "to put in jail, to shut in; confine." Id. at 700. Under the ordinary meaning of these words, the twenty-five year term of confinement must be completed before a juvenile offender can become eligible for parole.

Wyoming Statute Annotated § 7-13-402(a) also supports this conclusion. That section generally provides that individuals are eligible for parole after having "served the minimum term pronounced by the trial court less good time" (emphasis added). The second sentence of § 7-13-402(a) then specifically grants the Board the authority to parole juvenile offenders according to the terms of § 6-10-301(c). However, § 6-10-301(c) does not mention deducting good time from the twenty-five year period it sets out. The "omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the [L]egislature" and words should not be read into a statute where the Legislature has chosen not to include them. Morris v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, ¶ 28, 227 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2010).

This conclusion is further supported by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420, the statute providing for good time and special good time allowances. Wyoming Statute Annotated § 7-13-420(a) commands the governor to establish rules for good time and special good time allowances that "may provide either for good time to be deducted from the maximum sentence or for good time to be deducted from the minimum sentence imposed by the sentencing court, or both" (emphasis added). Minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment must be included in all felony sentences, except for instances where imprisonment in the Wyoming boys' school or life sentences are imposed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201.

Inmates serving life sentences do not have a minimum or maximum sentence from which to deduct good time. The plain language of § 6-10-301(c) does not actually create a minimum sentence of twenty-five years for juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, it only sets a date where such an inmate may be eligible for parole. Therefore, to apply good time or special good time allowances to the twenty-five year period in § 6-10-301(c) would not only be contrary to its plain language but would also impermissibly enlarge the application of § 7-13-420(a) beyond its express terms.

IV. Where a juvenile offender serving a life sentence receives a commutation to an indeterminate term of years, parole eligibility is determined based on the new minimum and maximum terms.

Wyoming Statute Annotated § 6-10-301(c) provides that a juvenile offender serving a life sentence shall become eligible for parole under two specific circumstances: "after commutation of his sentence to a term of years OR after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration" (emphasis added). The use of "or" in a statute is generally disjunctive and conveys a choice between two or more alternatives. Secrest v. State, 2013 WY 102, ¶ 20, 310 P.3d 882, 887 (Wyo. 2013); Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 1991). Therefore, these two circumstances should be treated as independent, alternative ways to become eligible for parole. The result is that if a juvenile offender serving a life sentence receives a commutation of his sentence to a term of years, whether he has served twenty-five years of incarceration is irrelevant to his parole eligibility.

That construction is consistent with the effect of a commutation and other applicable portions of Wyoming's sentencing scheme. A commutation is a substitution of a lesser punishment for one that was more severe. Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). When a juvenile offender serving a life sentence receives a commutation to a term of years, the offender ceases to serve that life sentence and begins to serve the new term of years. Parole eligibility for inmates serving terms of years is controlled by § 7-13-402, not § 6-10-301(c). Because a juvenile offender is no longer sentenced to life imprisonment after a commutation to a term of years, the inmate no longer qualifies for parole eligibility under the express terms of § 6-10-301(c).

If § 6-10-301(c) were construed so that the twenty-five year period remains relevant after a commutation, that would conflict with the provisions of § 7-13-402 that govern parole eligibility for inmates serving terms of years. Such a construction would result in an ambiguity by creating the possibility of two distinct parole eligibility dates, one after twenty-five years of incarceration and the other based on the minimum term of years less any good time awarded. A statute should not be construed in a way that creates an inconsistency with another statute if there is another reasonable construction that results in harmony. Mountain Cement Co. v. S. Laramie Water & Sewer Dist., 2011 WY 81, ¶ 13, 255 P.3d 881, 885 (Wyo. 2011).

V. Where a juvenile offender is serving multiple sentences, these statutory changes do not affect how those sentences interact.

The plain language of §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a) does not address how sentences should be administered, regardless of whether they are ordered to run either consecutively or concurrently to each other. While those statutes do address eligibility for parole, neither addresses whether parole should actually be granted or how a grant of parole should be carried out. Instead, each of those concerns are addressed elsewhere by portions of the law not directly affected by the 2013 amendments to §§ 6-10-301(c) and 7-13-402(a).

Therefore, to read these statutes as affecting any change to the administration of sentences or grants of parole would be to impermissibly expand them beyond the scope of their express terms. The result is that the Board should not alter its current practices for deciding whether parole should be granted or carried out based on these amendments.

Sincerely,

Peter K. Michael
Attorney General

David L. Delicath
Deputy Attorney General

Christyne M. Martens
Assistant Attorney General