Did Wyoming's constitution require the legislature to send a proposed constitutional amendment to the governor for signature before putting it on the ballot?

Plain-English summary

In 2000, Wyoming Attorney General Gay Woodhouse and her deputies issued a formal opinion to Governor Jim Geringer concluding that the Wyoming Constitution required the legislature to present every joint resolution, including those proposing constitutional amendments, to the governor for approval or veto before they could take effect. The dispute was set against the backdrop of Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839 (Wyo. 1998), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the governor's partial veto authority extended to substantive provisions inside appropriations bills. The legislature responded by trying to amend the constitution to narrow the partial veto.

In 1998 the legislature passed a joint resolution proposing such an amendment, presented it to the governor in the customary way, and watched the governor veto it; the override failed. In the 2000 budget session, the legislature tried again with Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, but this time, under newly adopted legislative Rule 4-5, sent the enrolled resolution directly to the Secretary of State, skipping presentment to the governor. The AG opinion concluded the rule was unconstitutional and the resolution was legally null and void.

The opinion's textual hook is Article 3, § 41 of the Wyoming Constitution: "Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses, shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him." The AG read "every" to mean every, and noted that the Wyoming and Montana constitutions used materially identical text, and that Montana's supreme court had reached the same conclusion in State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical context

What was at stake for the Governor's office

At the time, Governor Geringer's recently confirmed line-item veto authority over substantive provisions inside appropriations bills was politically contentious. The 1998 Supreme Court decision had given the governor a powerful tool, and the legislature was trying to take it away by constitutional amendment. The AG's opinion, signed by Gay Woodhouse, Chief Deputy Vicci M. Colgan, and Deputy Michael L. Hubbard, concluded that the governor had to be in the loop on every joint resolution, including the one targeting his own veto authority.

What was at stake for the Legislature

The legislature had passed Joint Rule 4-5 to bypass presentment for constitutional-amendment resolutions, sending them directly to the Secretary of State. That rule would have allowed two-thirds majorities in each chamber to put proposed amendments on the ballot without governor involvement. The AG opinion said that approach conflicted with the plain text of Article 3, § 41 and was therefore unconstitutional. Under the AG's reading, the legislature retained the ability to override a veto with a two-thirds vote in each chamber but could not skip presentment entirely.

What the AG drew on

The opinion treated three sources as decisive: (1) the plain text of Article 3, § 41, with the word "every" doing significant work; (2) Professor Robert Keiter's The Wyoming Constitution: A Reference Guide, which the opinion quotes for the proposition that § 41 governs joint resolutions; and (3) the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Livingstone v. Murray, where Montana's then-equivalent constitutional text led the court to enjoin the secretary of state from placing a non-presented amendment on the ballot. Wyoming and Montana shared near-identical constitutional text from their territorial period. The AG also noted that Article 4, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution requires every passed bill to be presented; the joint-resolution requirement under Article 3, § 41 was, in the AG's view, a parallel requirement.

How earlier practice cut against the legislative rule

The opinion noted that in the 110-year history of Wyoming statehood, Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 of the 2000 Budget Session may have been the first joint resolution not presented to the governor. Even Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 itself contained the "customary signature line" for the governor, an artifact of long-standing practice. Two years earlier, in 1998, essentially the same constitutional-amendment proposal had been presented to the governor and vetoed, and the legislature had not overridden. The opinion treated those facts as evidence that the legislature had previously interpreted the constitution to require presentment, and that the 2000 rule was a sudden departure.

Common questions

What was Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1?

A joint resolution from the 2000 Budget Session that would have proposed amending Article 4, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution to limit the governor's partial veto authority to general appropriations bills enacted under Article 3, § 34, narrowing the Management Council v. Geringer holding.

What did the AG conclude was the legal effect of skipping presentment?

The AG concluded the joint resolution was "legally null and void and cannot be placed on the ballot." Article 3, § 41 makes presentment a precondition to taking effect, and an enrolled act that has not been presented has not satisfied that precondition.

Was the 2000 rule completely abandoned after this opinion?

The opinion advised that the rule was unconstitutional and recommended informing the Secretary of State so the disputed resolution would not be placed on the ballot. Whether the rule was formally repealed and what subsequently happened to the underlying veto-narrowing project would require checking subsequent legislative records and is outside the scope of this opinion.

How did Montana's analogous case influence the AG?

State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960), enjoined the Montana Secretary of State from placing a non-presented constitutional amendment on the ballot, reasoning that Montana's then-existing version of Article V, § 40 plainly required presentment. Because the Wyoming Constitution had nearly identical text, the AG treated Livingstone as persuasive. The opinion also noted Montana later rewrote its constitution in 1972 and no longer requires presentment, leaving Wyoming as one of a small number of states with this requirement.

Why does Article 3, § 41 mention exceptions?

The provision excepts "the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses." Those exceptions cover purely internal legislative matters (housekeeping resolutions and adjournment votes). The AG, citing Livingstone, observed that the exceptions do not reach proposed constitutional amendments because amendments require concurrence of both chambers and have effects beyond internal legislative business.

Background and statutory framework

Wyoming's constitution couples two presentment requirements. Article 4, § 8 governs bills: "Every bill which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor." Article 3, § 41 governs other joint legislative actions: "Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the governor." Together, those two clauses cover essentially all binding joint actions of the legislature, with narrow internal-business exceptions.

Article 20, § 1 governs constitutional amendment procedure substantively: an amendment must be agreed to by two-thirds of all members of each chamber, voting separately, with yeas and nays recorded. It then must be submitted to the electors at the next general election and published in advance. The AG read § 1 as setting the substantive supermajority and publication requirements, while leaving the procedural presentment requirement to Article 3, § 41.

The opinion's interpretive method was textual. It started with the word "every" and held there. It rejected reading exceptions into the clause that the framers did not write. The AG also noted that Article 3, §§ 7-42 of the Wyoming Constitution closely tracks the equivalent sections of the 1889 Montana Constitution, supporting the use of Montana case law construing identical text.

Citations

• Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 41 (presentment of orders, resolutions, votes; gubernatorial approval; two-thirds override)
• Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 8 (presentment of bills)
• Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 9 (gubernatorial veto, including partial veto of appropriations bills)
• Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1 (procedure for proposing constitutional amendments)
• Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839 (Wyo. 1998) (partial veto of substantive provisions in appropriations bills)
• State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960) (parallel Montana presentment requirement; injunction against placing non-presented amendment on ballot)

Source

• Landing page: https://ag.wyo.gov/formal-opinions
• Original PDF: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-uookG6TajHZzcyU1ZGdE1IQjQ/view?resourcekey=0-wSjKVvT0ztl01S-M1LKm4g

Original opinion text

April 3, 2000

FORMAL OPINION NO. 2000 - 001

TO:

Honorable Jim Geringer
Governor

FROM:

Gay Woodhouse
Attorney General
Vicci M. Colgan
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Michael L. Hubbard
Deputy Attorney General

QUESTION No. 1:
Does the Wyoming Constitution require the presentation of a joint resolution
proposing a constitutional amendment to the Governor for his approval or
disapproval before the joint resolution can take effect and before the
proposed constitutional amendment can be placed on the ballot?
SHORT ANSWER: Yes, please see discussion.
QUESTION No. 2:
Is a legislative rule requiring presentation directly to the Secretary of State
of an enrolled act proposing an amendment to the Wyoming Constitution,
after signature by presiding officers of both houses, violative of the Wyoming
Constitution?
SHORT ANSWER: Yes, please see discussion.

DISCUSSION
I.

FACTS.

On February 11, 1998, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Management Council of the
Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839 (Wyo. 1998), ruled that the partial veto
authority (line-item veto authority) of the Governor conferred by Article 4, Section 9 of the
Wyoming Constitution applied to any portion of any bill making appropriations, including
substantive provisions that do not appropriate money.
During the 1998 Budget Session of the Wyoming Legislature, a joint resolution,
"House Joint Resolution No. HB0010," was introduced proposing to amend Article 4,
Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (lineitem veto authority) to general appropriations bills and to appropriations items within those
bills. House Joint Resolution No. HB0010 was enacted by the House of Representatives
and the Senate and became "House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1." House Enrolled
Joint Resolution No. 1 was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and presented to the Governor for his approval or disapproval. The Governor
vetoed House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 on March 12, 1998. An attempted
legislative override of the veto was unsuccessful.
During the 1999 General Session of the Wyoming Legislature a joint resolution,
"House Joint Resolution No. HB0006," was introduced proposing to amend Article 4,
Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (lineitem veto authority) to general appropriations bills and to appropriations items within those
bills. House Joint Resolution No. HJ0006 did not pass the house of origin.
During the 2000 Budget Session of the Wyoming Legislature a joint resolution,
"Senate Joint Resolution No. SJ0001," was introduced proposing to amend Article 4,
Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution to limit the Governor's partial veto authority (lineitem veto authority) to general appropriations bills enacted pursuant to Article 3, Section
34 of the Wyoming Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution No. SJ0001 was enacted by the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Senate Joint Resolution No. SJ0001 became
"Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1, Senate" of the Budget Session of the Fifty-fifth
Legislature of the State of Wyoming. Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 was signed
by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Senate Enrolled Joint
Resolution No. 1 contained the customary signature line for the Governor but was not
presented to the Governor for his approval or disapproval.
Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 of the 2000 Budget Session was presented
directly to the Secretary of State, without presentation to the Governor, pursuant to newly
enacted provisions of the Legislature's rules. The joint resolution was received by the
Secretary of State on March 6, 2000.

Sometime during the 2000 Budget Session, the Fifty-fifth Legislature of the State
of Wyoming adopted the following rules regarding the "Presentment to Governor":
PRESENTMENT TO GOVERNOR
4-4 When both presiding officers have signed an enrolled
act, except for an act proposing an amendment to the
Wyoming Constitution, the messenger shall present the act to
the governor for approval and exchange the act for a signed
receipt which gives the day and hour of presentation to the
governor. [ref: Mason's §§ 740]
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS; DELIVERY
TO SECRETARY OF STATE
4-5 When both presiding officers have signed an enrolled act
proposing an amendment to the Wyoming Constitution, the
messenger shall deliver the act to the Secretary of State and
exchange the act for a signed receipt which gives the day and
hour of delivery to the Secretary of State.
The only other joint resolution enacted by the Fifty-fifth Legislature was "House
Joint Resolution No. HJ0001," regarding a proposed constitutional amendment to military
eligibility. This became "House Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1" and was presented to the
Governor on March 13, 2000. This joint resolution was signed by the Governor and filed
with the Secretary of State. The Chief Clerks of both the House and the Senate
subsequently sent letters to the Governor contending that presentation of House Enrolled
Joint Resolution No. 1 to him had been in error according to Joint Rule 4-5.
It is our belief that Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 of the 2000 Budget
Session of the Fifty-fifth Legislature is the only joint resolution enacted by any Wyoming
Legislature that has not presented to the Governor for approval or disapproval in the 110year history of the State of Wyoming.
II.

ANALYSIS

With regard to the issued of presentation to the Governor, the Wyoming
Constitution provides at Article 3, Section 41:
§ 41. Resolutions; approval or veto.
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the
concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on
the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the
transaction of the business of the two houses, shall be

presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect
be approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed
by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case of
a bill. (Emphasis added)
With regard to amendments, the Constitution provides at Article 20, Section 1:
§ 1. How amendment proposed by legislature and submitted
to people.
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may
be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and, if the
same shall be agreed by two-thirds of all the members of
each of the two houses, voting separately, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays
thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty
of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments
to the electors of the state at the next general election, and
cause the same to be published without delay for at least
twelve (12) consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in at
least one newspaper of general circulation, published in each
county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same,
such amendments shall become a part of this constitution.
(Emphasis added)
With regard to Article 3, Section 41, Professor Keiter of the Wyoming Law School
and Tim Newcomb in their book, THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE,
explain:
This section establishes procedures governing the passage of
legislative orders or resolutions that are virtually identical to
the procedures necessary to enact a bill into law. Whenever
both houses must concur on a matter, except adjournment or
internal procedures, it must be presented to the governor for
approval or disapproval. If the governor disapproves, then the
matter must be repassed by a two-thirds vote of both houses
before it is valid. This procedure seemingly governs the
legislature's joint resolutions as well as legislative orders
entered upon review of administrative regulations.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at p. 106.
In a thesis entitled "The Background of the Wyoming Constitution" by Richard
Kenneth Prien (August 1956), the author explains that sections 7 through 42 of Article 3

of the Wyoming Constitution "duplicates almost exactly" the provisions of the Montana
Constitution. In addition, the provisions are in exactly the same order.
In 1960, the Montana Supreme Court in State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354
P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960), held that an act attempting to propose a constitutional amendment
was unconstitutional because the Legislature ignored the Governor, by neglecting and
refusing to present the proposed amendment or amendments to the Governor for his
approval or disapproval, as mandatorily required by the Constitution. The Montana court
enjoined the Secretary of State from placing the matter on the ballot. Article V, Section 40
of the Montana Constitution provided in pertinent part, as quoted by the court:
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of
both houses may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the
governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him,
or being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both
houses, as prescribed in case of a bill.
Id. at 556.
The court explained that this requirement means just what it says and defined the
word "every" used in a statute to mean "Each one of all; all the separate individuals who
constitute the whole." The court further explained that the language was "clear, certain,
direct and unambiguous and in the English language; it speaks for itself; it needs no
interpretation; there is no conflict with any other provision of our State Constitution." Id.
at 556.
The court also reviewed the exceptions found in the provision, i.e., "any order,
resolution or vote, not requiring the concurrence of both Houses and questions of
adjournment and matters relating solely to the transaction of business of the two Houses
need not be submitted or presented to the governor." The court explained:
Thus resolutions and memorials of either individual House fall
into that class, but there is not the slightest reference to a
proposed constitutional amendment, because such an act
requires a vote in each House and the concurrence of both
Houses. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 557.
The court also noted that the Montana Constitution was unique among state
constitutions. The Montana Constitution was rewritten in 1972. Presentation to the
Governor of bills proposing amendments to the Montana Constitution is no longer required.
In this same vein, the Wyoming Constitution is unique. The language of Article 3,
Section 41 is unique and decisions from other jurisdictions construing their state

constitutions or the federal constitution have little value, as they construe constitutional
provisions altogether unlike our own. Other states and the federal government do not
require presentation to the Governor, or the President.
III.

CONCLUSION

The plain language of the Wyoming Constitution provides that "Every . . .
resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, . . .
shall be presented to the Governor, and before it shall take effect be approved by him,
. . .." See Article 3, Section 41. With regard to proposed constitutional amendments,
Article 20, Section 1 of the Constitution required two-thirds concurrence of both houses
voting separately. The constitutional language is clear and unambiguous, before a joint
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to the Wyoming Constitution may take
effect it must be presented to the Governor and approved by him, or if rejected by the
Governor may be repassed by two-thirds of both houses as prescribed in the case of a bill.
The Constitution, like a statute, must be considered as a whole.
In this case, Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 was not presented to the
Governor for his approval or disapproval, according to the Constitution the joint resolution
may not take effect without presentation and approval of the Governor. In other words, the
joint resolution is legally null and void and cannot be placed on the ballot. The Secretary
of State should be so informed.
The legislative rule is also in violation of the plain language of the Wyoming
Constitution. While Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 was a joint resolution, which
must be presented to the Governor pursuant to Article 3, Section 41, "every bill which has
passed the legislature" must also be presented to the Governor pursuant to Article 4,
Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Thus, every enrolled act passed by the legislature,
be it by bill or joint resolution, must be presented to the Governor for his approval and
signature, or his disapproval and veto. In the case of a bill, the Governor may let the bill
go into law without his signature.
It is interesting to note that prior to the 2000 Budget Session, the legislature
consistently interpreted the Wyoming Constitution to require presentation of all joint
resolutions to the Governor. Even Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 1 contains the
customary signature line for the Governor. Furthermore, two years ago, essentially the
same joint resolution was presented to the Governor and the legislature failed to override
the Governor's veto of the joint resolution. The legislature's new interpretation of the
Wyoming Constitution is inconsistent with the plain language, the legislative history, and
the caselaw. This may be the first time in the history of our State that a joint resolution was
not presented to the Governor.