Does West Virginia's small-county finance statute really require the County Commission president and county clerk to hand-sign every check or pay order, even though signature stamps and e-signatures are now standard in business and government?

Plain-English summary

Lewis County's prosecuting attorney asked AG John McCuskey whether the County Commission's president and the county clerk really have to hand-sign every check leaving the county treasury, given the practical pain that creates for routine items like payroll. The answer was yes for any county under 50,000 in population.

Section 7-5-4(a) says money "may not be paid by the sheriff out of the county treasury except upon an order signed by the president of the county commission and the county clerk, and properly endorsed." The statute then says that "[i]n counties having a population in excess of 50,000," signatures may be made by mechanical or electrical device. The AG read that as a deliberate carve-out: small counties have to use wet-ink signatures, large counties can use stamps or electronic methods.

The AG also rejected the workaround that some counties have considered, namely a standing order pre-authorizing all payroll so that individual check signing becomes unnecessary. Section 7-5-6 spells out what a pay order has to include: a specific payee, a specific amount, a specific date, and an identified appropriation. A blanket standing order that authorizes "all payroll" cannot satisfy those requirements. The AG suggests the legislature could solve the problem by deleting the population threshold from § 7-5-4, and offers help if counties want to push for that.

What this means for you

If you are a Lewis County (or any sub-50,000-population county) commissioner or clerk

You and the county clerk (or your statutory alternates under § 7-5-4(b)) must hand-sign every order disbursing money from the county treasury. There is no mechanical or electrical workaround under current law, and a standing order does not satisfy § 7-5-6. Plan your meeting calendar so the president and clerk are available on a regular cadence to sign payroll and accounts payable. If you have been using a stamp, stop, and have your prosecuting attorney audit recent disbursements for compliance issues.

The AG suggests the burden could be lifted by amending § 7-5-4 to remove the population threshold. If you want that change, contact your legislative delegation. The opinion explicitly says the AG's office "stands ready to assist" in pushing for an amendment.

If you are a county that is or might soon cross 50,000

Confirm your population reading against "the last preceding federal census," which is the trigger language in the statute. The exception only kicks in once you cross that threshold. If your county is right around the line, expect to swing in and out of the wet-ink requirement based on each decennial census.

If you are over 50,000, your commission can adopt mechanical or electrical signing devices. The statute lets the "county court" (i.e., commission) "select" the device. The AG flags that the 2025 amendments to § 7-5-4 already updated this language, so the framework is current.

If you are a sheriff (the ex-officio county treasurer)

You are the legal disburser. Section 7-5-4 is structured around the sheriff's role: money "may not be paid by the sheriff out of the county treasury except upon" the required order. If you receive a check or order that you suspect lacks a proper hand signature in a sub-50,000 county, you have a real problem. The opinion treats this as mandatory, not discretionary. You can be personally exposed if you disburse on a non-conforming order. Coordinate with your prosecuting attorney before changing any signing practice.

If you are a county vendor, employee, or beneficiary expecting payment

This opinion does not change your right to be paid. It changes only the procedure the county must follow to issue the payment. If you experience delays because the president or clerk is unavailable to hand-sign, the opinion's analysis explains why. Push for state-level reform if delays become regular.

If you are advising a non-profit, contractor, or grantee receiving county funds

Make sure your pay-out path includes time for the signature step. If your contract is with a small West Virginia county, do not assume the speed of a stamp-signed check; assume the slower wet-ink path until the law changes.

Common questions

Q: Why does the population matter?
A: Section 7-5-4(a) carves out an exception for "counties having a population in excess of 50,000." The AG reads this as the legislature's deliberate choice to give larger counties (with higher disbursement volumes) flexibility while keeping a stricter rule for smaller ones. Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Manchin v. Dunfee), the express exception for big counties impliedly excludes any other workaround for small ones.

Q: Does the West Virginia Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) help?
A: No. The AG addresses this in a footnote. Section 2-2-10(a)(15) does contemplate electronic signatures, but the AG concludes that § 7-5-4's specific provisions on mechanical and electrical signatures (which were amended as recently as 2025) override UETA in this context. The more specific and more recent statute controls. The Court has acknowledged in Benjamin v. Walker (2016) that specific statutes can carve out exceptions to UETA's scope.

Q: Doesn't Gerhardt v. Board of Canvassers allow signature stamps?
A: Gerhardt (1932) involved an injured county clerk using a signature stamp on ballots, and the Court accepted the stamp as a "signature." But the AG distinguishes Gerhardt because § 7-5-4 expressly addresses when mechanical devices may be used (only in counties over 50,000). If Gerhardt covered § 7-5-4, the population-threshold exception would be redundant, and statutes are not read to make any provision superfluous (In re A.P., 2021).

Q: Could the County Commission adopt a standing order that pre-authorizes all payroll, so individual signatures are not needed?
A: No. Section 7-5-6 requires every pay order to identify a specific payee, amount, date, and appropriation. A blanket standing order cannot satisfy those requirements. Section 7-5-5 (which addresses periodic payments like payroll) similarly contemplates individual orders. A standing order can pre-authorize payroll as a category of expenditure (so the commission does not have to vote on each individual paycheck), but it cannot replace the individual pay orders that the statutes require for each disbursement.

Q: Can the order and the check be different documents?
A: Yes. The AG explicitly recognizes (citing 263 Towing v. Marcum Trucking, 2008, and § 7-5-4(d)) that an "order" and a "check" can be separate. Some counties have an order (signed by the president and clerk) authorizing the sheriff to issue a check (which the sheriff then signs). The hand-signature requirement applies to whichever document is the "order." If the same instrument is both order and check, that one document must bear the wet-ink signatures.

Q: Who are the "alternative signatories"?
A: Section 7-5-4(b) (which the opinion references but does not quote at length) provides for alternates when the president or clerk is unavailable. Counties should consult subsection (b) for the specific designated alternates and the procedure for using them.

Background and statutory framework

Section 7-5-4(a) is the foundation: "Money may not be paid by the sheriff out of the county treasury except upon an order signed by the president of the county commission and the county clerk, and properly endorsed." That language goes back decades and has been read repeatedly as mandatory. State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell (1965) said: "[a] county of this state has no other mode of paying claims against it except by orders drawn upon the treasury." Bennett v. Westfall (1986) confirmed that the county clerk must sign any order paying money from the county treasury.

The phrase "may not" in the statute is mandatory, not permissive. Barr v. Gainer (1998) confirms that "may not" has the force of "shall not" in West Virginia statutes; In re Brandt and Wikle v. Boyd are out-of-state cases the AG cites for the same reading.

The single carve-out for mechanical or electrical signatures applies only "[i]n counties having a population in excess of 50,000." Under Manchin v. Dunfee (1984)'s expressio unius reasoning, the express exception for one population class implies the absence of any exception for the others. State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson (1995) supplements with the principle that "[a] statute which specifically provides that a thing is to be done in a particular manner, normally implies that it shall not be done in any other manner."

The opinion carefully distinguishes "orders" from "checks." Section 7-5-4(d) refers to "warrant[s], order[s], or check[s]" as distinct items. 263 Towing v. Marcum Trucking (2008) describes a process where the commission and clerk sign a pay order separately from the sheriff's check. So the hand-signature rule fastens to the pay order, not necessarily to the negotiable instrument; but if a single document serves as both, then both the order and the check require wet-ink signatures.

Section 7-5-6's specificity requirements are what defeat the standing-order workaround. Each pay order must identify a specific sum, paid on a specific date, to a specific payee, drawn against an identified appropriation. A blanket pre-authorization for all payroll cannot meet those requirements.

The opinion ends with policy advice. The legislature could simply remove the population threshold from § 7-5-4, eliminating the small-county carve-out and allowing all counties to use mechanical or electronic signature devices. The AG flags this as a sensible amendment given the prevalence of electronic signatures elsewhere.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- W. Va. Code § 5-3-2 (AG advice)
- W. Va. Code § 7-5-4 (treasury disbursement)
- W. Va. Code § 7-5-5 (stated-interval payments)
- W. Va. Code § 7-5-6 (pay order elements)
- W. Va. Code § 2-2-10 (signature general rule)

Cases:
- Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson, 239 W. Va. 723, 806 S.E.2d 154 (2017) (textual interpretation)
- State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson, 195 W. Va. 121, 464 S.E.2d 763 (1995) (specific manner requirements)
- Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain, 237 W. Va. 722, 791 S.E.2d 168 (2016) (meaning of "may")
- Barr v. Gainer, 203 W. Va. 379, 508 S.E.2d 96 (1998) (mandatory "may not")
- State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell, 149 W. Va. 773, 143 S.E.2d 469 (1965) (treasury disbursement modes)
- Bennett v. Westfall, 640 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.W. Va. 1986) (county clerk sign-off)
- Gerhardt v. Bd. of Canvassers of Berkeley Cnty., 113 W. Va. 214, 167 S.E. 130 (1932) (general signature stamp authority, distinguished here)
- 263 Towing, Inc. v. Marcum Trucking Co., 222 W. Va. 80, 662 S.E.2d 522 (2008) (orders vs. checks)
- Manchin v. Dunfee, 174 W. Va. 532, 327 S.E.2d 710 (1984) (expressio unius)
- W. Va. Auto. v. Ford Motor Co., 251 W. Va. 352, 913 S.E.2d 534 (2025) (giving effect to every word)
- In re A.P., 245 W. Va. 248, 858 S.E.2d 873 (2021) (no superfluous statutory provisions)
- Benjamin v. Walker, 237 W. Va. 181, 786 S.E.2d 200 (2016) (specific statute can override UETA)
- Newark Ins. Co. v. Brown, 218 W. Va. 346, 624 S.E.2d 783 (2005) (specific over general)

Source

• Landing page: not separately published (the PDF is the official record)
• Original PDF: https://ago.wv.gov/media/37692/download?inline

Original opinion text

State of West Virginia
Office of the Attorney General
John B. McCuskey
Attorney General

Phone: (304) 558-2021
Fax: (304) 558-0140
March 17, 2026

The Honorable Christina C. Flanigan
Lewis County Prosecuting Attorney
117 Court Avenue, Room 201
Weston, West Virginia 26452

Dear Prosecutor Flanigan:

You requested an Opinion of the Attorney General interpreting West Virginia Code § 7-5-4(a). Specifically, you ask whether all checks and written disbursements of money must be hand-signed when a county's population is less than 50,000.

We are issuing this opinion under West Virginia Code § 5-3-2, which provides that the Attorney General "may consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the official duties of their office." When this Opinion relies on facts, it depends solely on the factual assertions in your correspondence and discussions with the Office of the Attorney General.

Your letter raised the following legal questions:

(1) Does West Virginia Code § 7-5-4 require a County Commission to have an individual commissioner execute, by hand signature, all checks/written disbursements of money?

(2) If a County Commission has a standing order authorizing payroll, does West Virginia Code § 7-5-4 prohibit the use of a signature stamp to authorize payroll checks?

Although the relevant statutes contain some uncertainties, we ultimately conclude that the president of the county commission and county clerk (or an alternative signatory under West Virginia Code § 7-5-4(b)) must hand-sign an order directing payment in a county with a population of less than 50,000. So where a check or disbursement is the only "order," that check must be hand-signed, too. A standing order for all payroll would not suffice because it would not meet the requirements of West Virginia Code § 7-5-6.

DISCUSSION

West Virginia Code § 7-5-4(a) provides that "[m]oney may not be paid by the sheriff out of the county treasury except upon an order signed by the president of the county commission and the county clerk, and properly endorsed." Courts would "look first to the statute's language" when determining how this provision should be applied. Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson, 239 W. Va. 723, 726, 806 S.E.2d 154, 157 (2017) (cleaned up). When the plain meaning of the text "answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed." Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the statutory language speaks for itself. "[A]n order signed by the president of the county commission and the county clerk, and properly endorsed," is the only listed way to secure money from the county treasury. W. VA. CODE § 7-5-4(a) (emphasis added). "A statute which specifically provides that a thing is to be done in a particular manner, normally implies that it shall not be done in any other manner." State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson, 195 W. Va. 121, 128, 464 S.E.2d 763, 770 (1995). The statute's blanket "may not" provision separately confirms as much. "The phrase 'may not' has exactly the same meaning as 'shall not.'" In re Brandt, 437 B.R. 294, 298 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010) (cleaned up); see also Wikle v. Boyd, 297 So. 3d 1255, 1267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (same). Just as the word "may" implies discretion, Pioneer Pipe, Inc. v. Swain, 237 W. Va. 722, 725, 791 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2016), the provision "may not" implies a lack of discretion, that is, a mandatory provision, see Barr v. Gainer, 203 W. Va. 379, 383, 508 S.E.2d 96, 100 (1998) (finding Legislature intended "may not" as used in statute had mandatory effect).

Thus, "[a] county of this state has no other mode of paying claims against it except by orders drawn upon the treasury and directed to the sheriff, the exofficio treasurer." State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell, 149 W. Va. 773, 776, 143 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1965) (interpreting Code § 7-5-4); cf. Bennett v. Westfall, 640 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.W. Va. 1986), aff'd by, 836 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1988) (referencing Code § 7-5-4 and explaining that plaintiff "[a]pparently . . . joined [county clerk] because of the statutory provision which requires the Clerk of the County Commission to sign off on any order paying monies out of the county treasury").

"Signing" implies that all the relevant parties will apply their own signatures. Sign, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Were that not clear enough, Section 2-2-10(a)(15) says that, "when the signature of any person is required, it must be in his or her own proper handwriting, or his or her mark, attested, proved, or acknowledged."

A single exception to this non-discretionary signature requirement was written into the code, but that exception only confirms that Lewis County must apply wet-ink signatures to its payment orders. "In counties having a population in excess of 50,000 …[,] such signatures may be made by means of such mechanical or electrical device as the county court may select." W. VA. CODE § 7-5-4(a). But the familiar maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, applies here. Syl. pt. 3, Manchin v. Dunfee, 174 W. Va. 532, 327 S.E.2d 710 (1984). When the Legislature carved out this singular exception for larger counties, the Legislature impliedly excluded any other exception to the general rule. Because Lewis County has a population smaller than 50,000, it cannot take advantage of the "mechanical device" exception.

In Gerhardt v. Board of Canvassers of Berkeley County, a county clerk injured his shoulder, so he began individually applying a stamped copy of his signature on ballots; the Court found that stamp to be an acceptable "signature." 113 W. Va. 214, 214, 167 S.E. 130, 131 (1932). Gerhardt is likely the best authority for the notion that stamped signatures are generally enough, but we ultimately find it distinguishable. As explained, Section 7-5-4 expressly addresses the circumstances in which mechanical devices may be used, while the statute at issue in Gerhardt did not. That distinction matters. If Gerhardt applied to Section 7-5-4, then the statute's "mechanical device" exception described above would become surplusage. "If possible, the court must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence; it must not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant." In re A.P., 245 W. Va. 248, 254, 858 S.E.2d 873, 879 (2021) (cleaned up).

We also conclude that the standing order your request contemplates would not comply with the statute. We recognize that the statute does not require the "order" and the negotiable instrument that renders payment to the third-party payee to be one and the same. For instance, in 263 Towing, Inc. v. Marcum Trucking Co., 222 W. Va. 80, 84-85, 662 S.E.2d 522, 526-27 (2008), the Court seemed to describe a process in which a pay order from the commission and clerk was separate from the check ultimately issued by the sheriff. See also W. VA. CODE § 7-5-4(d) (referring to "warrant[s], order[s], or check[s]" as distinct items).

But separating "orders" from "checks" would still not permit the "standing order" approach. Section 7-5-6 describes the necessary elements of a pay order, and those orders must identify a specific sum paid on specific date to a specific payee based on an identified appropriation. Likewise, Section 7-5-5 addresses payments made at "stated intervals," like payroll, and that section similarly contemplates an individual pay order for each payment due. A standing order would not seem to meet any of these requirements.

In other words, a standing order may lawfully pre-authorize the disbursement of payroll as a category of expenditure, relieving the commission of the need to vote on each individual paycheck. But a standing order cannot override or waive the statutory requirements for individual pay orders.

Ultimately, West Virginia Code § 7-5-4(a) requires the president of the county commission and the county clerk, or their alternative signatories, to sign the order by hand. Although counties with populations of more than 50,000 are exempt from the hand signature requirement, smaller counties are not.

The Legislature could end the need for hand signatures by simply removing the population clause ("In counties having a population in excess of 50,000 as shown by the last preceding federal census") from Section 7-5-4. Given the increasing prevalence of electronic signatures and common use of non-handwritten signatures in at least some West Virginia counties, such an amendment seems advisable. The Attorney General's Office stands ready to assist counties in enlisting the Legislature's help if counties like yours agree that handwritten signatures are an unjustified burden in all West Virginia counties, big and small. Until then, the language of the statute controls.

Sincerely,

John B. McCuskey
West Virginia Attorney General

Michael R. Williams
Solicitor General