Can a West Virginia county use its zoning ordinance to keep a commercial slaughterhouse out of a rural conservation district when state law protects 'agricultural operations' from county zoning?

Plain-English summary

Greenbrier County's prosecuting attorney asked the AG whether the county could use its zoning ordinance to keep a proposed commercial slaughterhouse out of an "Open Space Conservation District" in unincorporated Lewisburg. The county's ordinance allowed "agriculture" in the district but specifically excluded "commercial slaughtering" from the definition of agricultural activity.

The AG's answer: no, the county cannot block the slaughterhouse with its zoning ordinance. Three lines of analysis got there.

First, a slaughterhouse is an "agricultural operation" under W. Va. Code § 19-19-2 because the statute's definition of "agriculture" sweeps in food production from animals, husbandry, packing, shipping, milling, and "any other legal animal production and all farm practices." Slaughter sits at the heart of this chain.

Second, W. Va. Code § 8A-7-10(e) prohibits counties from enacting a zoning ordinance "preventing or limiting the complete use of land for an agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2 outside of municipalities or urban areas." The proposed slaughterhouse is in unincorporated territory, so the prohibition applies.

Third, the "commercial" label in the local ordinance and in W. Va. Code § 7-1-3(a)'s general carve-out for commercial-use zoning does not save the county's ordinance. Section 7-1-3(b), added in 2024, separately revokes any county ordinance "stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation relating to agricultural operations." Because the Greenbrier ordinance is stricter than § 8A-7-10(e) as applied to slaughterhouses, it is revoked as to this operation.

What this means for you

If you are a West Virginia county planning officer or zoning administrator

State law has shifted strongly in favor of agricultural operations over the past few years. Section 8A-7-10(e) (already in place) and § 7-1-3(b) (added in 2024) together create a robust preemption: outside a municipality or urban area, your zoning ordinance cannot block, restrict, or be stricter than state agricultural law on, an agricultural operation. The 2024 amendment explicitly says that any preexisting ordinance that does so "is revoked."

Audit your zoning ordinance now. If you have provisions that:

• Carve specific agricultural activities out of the definition of "agriculture" (like Greenbrier's exclusion of commercial slaughtering),
• Impose stricter conditions on agricultural facilities than state law,
• Use "commercial" framing to indirectly exclude agriculture-related businesses,

those provisions are likely unenforceable as applied to operations that fit § 19-19-2's definition of "agricultural operation." Consider repealing or revising them rather than waiting for litigation.

If you are a rural landowner planning a slaughterhouse, meat processing facility, or other agriculture-adjacent business

This opinion strongly supports your project on land outside municipalities or urban areas. The AG reads "agriculture" broadly to include slaughtering, packing, shipping, milling, and farm practices. If your operation falls within that chain (and the AG's analysis runs through each prong of the definition), county zoning cannot block "the complete use" of your land for it.

You should still verify two things:

1. You are outside a municipality and outside an "urban area." Section 8A-1-2(ee) defines "urban area" as land within the jurisdiction of a municipal planning commission, and § 8A-3-14 limits that jurisdiction to the corporate limits of the municipality. Unincorporated territory is not an urban area. Confirm your parcel's status with the county clerk.
2. You are operating a legal facility in compliance with state agricultural and food-safety law. Article 2B of Chapter 19 covers slaughterhouse licensing and inspection. Article 2E covers humane slaughter methods. State preemption protects you from county zoning, but it does not exempt you from state regulation.

If you are a county commissioner

Resist the temptation to use creative zoning carve-outs to keep agricultural operations out of rural areas. The legislative trend, especially the 2024 amendment, is to give the state a near-monopoly on regulating agriculture. Even if a particular agricultural operation is unpopular with neighbors, your tools are limited:

• You can still regulate health, safety, and traffic to the extent state law allows.
• You can still apply non-zoning tools like nuisance law (though that has its own limits under right-to-farm doctrines).
• You cannot use zoning to ban or significantly restrict the operation in unincorporated territory.

If you are a neighbor concerned about a proposed slaughterhouse or large agricultural operation

Your county zoning is unlikely to be the right tool. State preemption is strong. Consider:

• Engaging directly with the operator about siting, buffers, road access, and odor mitigation.
• Working with state regulators (Department of Agriculture, Department of Environmental Protection) on permitted issues like wastewater, animal welfare, and food safety.
• Pushing for legislative change at the state level if you think the preemption framework is too broad.

If you operate within a municipality (or in an urban area subject to municipal planning)

The preemption in § 8A-7-10(e) does not apply to you. Inside the corporate limits of an incorporated city or town (or within a municipal planning commission's jurisdiction), municipal zoning still controls. The opinion is specifically about county-level zoning over unincorporated land.

Common questions

Q: Why is a slaughterhouse "agriculture"?
A: The AG walks through the § 19-19-2(a) definition. Agriculture includes "the production of food . . . by the conduct of animal . . . husbandry," "the practice of . . . packing, shipping, milling, and marketing of agricultural products," and the catchall "any other legal . . . animal production and all farm practices." A slaughterhouse produces food from animals raised through husbandry, packs and ships meat products, mills (processes raw materials), and is part of the standard farm practice continuum. Excluding slaughter would protect raising livestock and marketing meat while leaving out the necessary middle step.

Q: What does "complete use" mean in § 8A-7-10(e)?
A: The AG cites Merriam-Webster: "total, absolute" use. Restricting "complete use" means the county cannot block, ban, or significantly impair the agricultural operation through zoning.

Q: Does the "commercial" label matter?
A: No. The opinion gives two reasons. Section 7-1-3(a)'s "commercial" carve-out applies only "to that section" and does not override the more specific anti-agricultural-zoning rule in § 8A-7-10(e). And § 7-1-3(b), added in 2024, expressly revokes county ordinances "stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation relating to agricultural operations." Treating commercial slaughterhouses as outside agriculture would essentially nullify § 7-1-3(b).

Q: What if the slaughterhouse is in a municipality?
A: The opinion notes that the preemption applies only "outside of municipalities or urban areas." If the slaughterhouse were in incorporated Lewisburg or within the jurisdiction of a municipal planning commission, the analysis would be different. Municipal zoning is not preempted by § 8A-7-10(e).

Q: Can the county still impose any conditions on a slaughterhouse?
A: The opinion is narrow: county zoning cannot block "the complete use" of land for the agricultural operation. State and federal regulation still applies (animal welfare, food safety, environmental protection, water quality, road and traffic safety). The county may have non-zoning tools available depending on the issue, but anything that ends up looking like a zoning restriction stricter than state agricultural law is at risk under § 7-1-3(b).

Q: What is the 2024 amendment in § 7-1-3(b)?
A: Section 7-1-3(b) says: "County commissions may not adopt or enact an ordinance, rule, license requirement, or other authorization that contravenes or is stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation relating to agricultural operations, as defined in §19-19-2 of this code. Any ordinance, rule, regulation, license requirement, or other authorization previously adopted by a county commission that contravenes or is stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation regarding agricultural operations is revoked." The opinion treats this as the 2024 amendment governing the case.

Background and statutory framework

The framework is built on two layers of state law and a constitutional limit on county power.

The constitutional limit. Article IX, § 11 of the West Virginia Constitution gives county commissions only those powers the legislature confers, expressly or by necessary implication. Within those powers they have "wide discretion" (Cummings, 2011), but they cannot manufacture authority that the legislature has not granted (State Line Sparkler, 1992).

The zoning preemption. Section 8A-7-1(a)(3) authorizes county commissions to "regulate land use" through zoning. But § 8A-7-10(e) carves out a major exception: a county "shall not adopt and enforce any zoning ordinance . . . preventing or limiting" "the complete use" of land for an "agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2" outside municipalities or urban areas.

The 2024 amendment. In 2024, the legislature added § 7-1-3(b), which goes further: it revokes any county ordinance, rule, license requirement, or other authorization "stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation relating to agricultural operations." The ordinance does not need to be a zoning ordinance to be revoked. Anything stricter than state agricultural law is gone.

The agriculture definition. Section 19-19-2(a) defines "agriculture" expansively. The chapter is remedial (§ 19-19-1, "agricultural production of food . . . is a basic necessity"), so the AG construes the definition broadly per State ex rel. City of Wheeling Retirees Ass'n (1991) and standard remedial-statute interpretation rules. Agriculture includes:

• Production of food by cultivation, husbandry of animals, dairy, apiary, equine, and poultry,
• Packing, shipping, milling, and marketing of agricultural products,
• Any other legal animal production and all farm practices.

Where slaughterhouses fit. The AG runs the definition prong-by-prong. Slaughterhouses produce food (by killing and butchering livestock raised through husbandry). They engage in packing, shipping, and marketing. Slaughter is also a "farm practice" (the Charter Communications and In re A.P. canons against absurd or surplusage readings reinforce this). And Chapter 19 itself separately regulates slaughterhouses in articles 2B (licensing and inspection) and 2E (humane slaughter), confirming that the legislature treats them as part of the agricultural framework.

Where the proposed facility sits. The proposed slaughterhouse is in unincorporated territory (per § 8-2-1, § 8-2-7, and § 8-6-1, unincorporated land is not part of a municipality), and § 8A-3-14 confines municipal planning commission jurisdiction to corporate limits. So the slaughterhouse is also not in an "urban area." The preemption in § 8A-7-10(e) applies.

The "commercial" argument fails. Section 7-1-3(a)'s preservation of commercial-use zoning authority applies only "to that section." Section 8A-7-10(e) is in a different article. Stanley v. Department of Tax & Revenue (2005) confirms that later-enacted, more specific statutes prevail over earlier general ones. Even if there were some tension between subsections (a) and (b) of § 7-1-3, subsection (b) (2024) and its specific anti-agriculture-restriction language wins.

Citations and references

Statutes and Constitution:
- W. Va. Code § 5-3-2 (AG advice)
- W. Va. Code § 7-1-3 (county commission powers)
- W. Va. Code § 8A-7-1, § 8A-7-10 (zoning powers and limits)
- W. Va. Code § 19-19-1, § 19-19-2 (agriculture definitions and remedial purpose)
- W. Va. Code §§ 19-2B-1, 19-2E-5 (slaughterhouse licensing and humane slaughter)
- W. Va. Code §§ 8-1-2, 8-2-1, 8-2-7, 8-6-1, 8A-1-2, 8A-3-14 (municipality and urban-area definitions)

Cases:
- State ex rel. State Line Sparkler of WV, Ltd. v. Teach, 187 W. Va. 271, 418 S.E.2d 585 (1992)
- Cnty. Comm'n of Greenbrier Cnty. v. Cummings, 228 W. Va. 464, 720 S.E.2d 587 (2011)
- State ex rel. Farley v. Spaulding, 203 W. Va. 275, 507 S.E.2d 376 (1998)
- Raymond H. v. Cammie H., 242 W. Va. 640, 837 S.E.2d 701 (2019) (text first)
- W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Clark, 245 W. Va. 510, 859 S.E.2d 453 (2021) (canons)
- State ex rel. City of Wheeling Retirees Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 185 W. Va. 380, 407 S.E.2d 384 (1991) (remedial construction)
- Stanley v. Dep't of Tax & Revenue, 217 W. Va. 65, 614 S.E.2d 712 (2005) (later/specific statute prevails)
- Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (in pari materia)
- Charter Commc'ns VI, PLLC v. Cmty. Antenna Serv., Inc., 211 W. Va. 71, 561 S.E.2d 793 (2002) (avoid absurd results)

Source

• Landing page: not separately published (the PDF is the official record)
• Original PDF: https://ago.wv.gov/media/37656/download?inline

Original opinion text

State of West Virginia
Office of the Attorney General
John B. McCuskey
Attorney General

Phone: (304) 558-2021
Fax: (304) 558-0140
November 25, 2025

The Honorable Nicole G. Campbell
Greenbrier County Prosecuting Attorney
912 Court Street N, Suite 7
Lewisburg, West Virginia 24901

Dear Prosecutor Campbell:

You have asked for an Opinion of the Attorney General about whether Greenbrier County can apply a local zoning ordinance to bar a proposed slaughterhouse from operating.

We are issuing this Opinion under West Virginia Code § 5-3-2, which provides that the Attorney General "may consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the official duties of their office." When this Opinion relies on facts, it depends solely on the factual assertions in your correspondence and discussions with the Office of the Attorney General.

You explain that a slaughterhouse operator has proposed to construct and operate a commercial slaughterhouse and working farm in Greenbrier County's Open Space Conservation District. The county has "designed [this district] to reflect the rural character and beauty of" Greenbrier County. Greenbrier Cty., W. Va., Rev. Zoning Ordinance § 900.01 (2003). The proposed slaughterhouse site is in an unincorporated part of Lewisburg. See id. § 100.02 (explaining that zoning ordinance applies to the "unincorporated areas of Lewisburg"). The slaughterhouse will also pack and ship meat onsite.

According to your letter, Greenbrier County has enacted a zoning ordinance that would prohibit construction of the slaughterhouse in the Open Space Conservation District if the ordinance could be properly applied to it. See id. §§ 200.07, 900.02. The ordinance permits land in Open Space Conservation Districts to be used for limited purposes, including "agriculture." Id. § 900.02(F). But it excludes commercial slaughterhouses from the definition of that term. Id. § 200.07 ("Agricultural activity shall not include commercial slaughtering.").

State law, however, bars a county from implementing a zoning ordinance restricting "the complete use" of land for an "agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2" "outside of municipalities or urban areas." W. VA. CODE § 8A-7-10(e). You thus ask whether Greenbrier County can properly apply its zoning ordinance to bar operation of the slaughterhouse, especially in light of a recent opinion from the West Virginia Commissioner of Agriculture finding that the slaughterhouse is within the definition of agriculture under West Virginia Code § 19-19-2.

With these facts in mind, your letter raises the following legal question:

Can Greenbrier County bar the proposed slaughterhouse by applying its local zoning ordinance?

We conclude Greenbrier County cannot apply its local zoning ordinance to prohibit the proposed slaughterhouse because it is an "agricultural operation" outside an urban area or municipality. It does not matter that the slaughterhouse might be labeled "commercial."

DISCUSSION

We begin with the familiar maxim that the Greenbrier County Commission, like all county commissions, is "created by statute, and possessed only of such powers as are expressly conferred by the Constitution and legislature, together with such as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the full and proper exercise of the powers so expressly given." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. State Line Sparkler of WV, Ltd. v. Teach, 187 W. Va. 271, 272, 418 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1992) (cleaned up); see generally W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 ("Powers of county commissions"). Although county commissions have limited powers, when they do have a power, the commissions are "vested with a wide discretion" in its execution. Syl. pt. 1, Cnty. Comm'n of Greenbrier Cnty. v. Cummings, 228 W. Va. 464, 466, 720 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2011). Thus, where a county commission has broad express powers, it enjoys substantial implied authority as well. See, e.g., State ex rel. Farley v. Spaulding, 203 W. Va. 275, 283, 507 S.E.2d 376, 384 (1998) (finding implied authority to employ security personnel at a statutorily required judicial facility).

The key question, then, is whether some statute provides the county power to regulate the proposed slaughterhouse through zoning. County commissions have limited power to regulate agricultural activities through zoning. West Virginia Code § 8A-7-1(a)(3) authorizes county commissions to "regulate land use" by "enacting a zoning ordinance." But county commissions are barred from enacting a zoning ordinance "preventing or limiting" "the complete use" of land for an "agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2" "outside of municipalities or urban areas." W. VA. CODE § 8A-7-10(e). Restricting the "complete use" of land means impeding the "total, absolute" use. Complete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM.

We therefore must consider whether the proposed slaughterhouse is an agricultural operation, evaluate whether it falls within a municipality or urban area, and address whether any other provision of law might nevertheless empower the county to act against it.

I. A Slaughterhouse Is An "Agricultural Operation."

We must first consider whether the proposed slaughterhouse is an "agricultural operation." We conclude that it is.

Under West Virginia Code § 19-19-2(c), an "[a]gricultural operation" is "any facility utilized for agriculture." In turn, "[a]griculture" is "the production of food … by means of cultivation … and by the conduct of animal, livestock, dairy, apiary, equine or poultry husbandry" and "the practice of … packing, shipping, milling, and marketing of agricultural products," "or any other legal … animal production and all farm practices." W. VA. CODE § 19-19-2(a). In interpreting these definitions, we begin with the text. See Raymond H. v. Cammie H., 242 W. Va. 640, 644, 837 S.E.2d 701, 705 (2019).

The plain language supports inclusion of slaughterhouses with "agriculture" for many reasons:

• The definition begins by identifying agriculture as "the production of food ... by means of cultivation ... and by the conduct of animal … husbandry." W. VA. CODE § 19-19-2(a). Slaughterhouses are engaged in the production of food from animals. They kill and butcher livestock for human consumption, after that livestock has been raised through "husbandry." See Slaughterhouse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (defining a "slaughterhouse" as "an establishment where animals are butchered"); Husbandry, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (defining "husbandry" as "the cultivation or production of plants or animals").

• The statute also includes "the practice of ... packing, shipping, milling, and marketing of agricultural products" within the definition of agriculture. W. VA. CODE § 19-19-2(a). Slaughterhouses regularly engage in packing meat products for distribution and sale. See also Packinghouse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (defining a "packinghouse" as "an establishment for slaughtering livestock and processing and packing meat, meat products, and by-products"). Just consider this proposed slaughterhouse, which you've indicated will pack and ship meat. And many are directly involved in marketing their products to retailers, restaurants, and consumers, too.

• The term "milling" further supports inclusion, as it refers to processing raw agricultural materials into usable products, precisely what slaughterhouses do with livestock. Mill, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (defining "mill" as "to grind into flour, meal, or powder"). These terms signal that the definition covers the full lot of activities for transforming farm-raised animals into marketable food products. Slaughtering animals is one of those activities.

Beyond these specific provisions, the general catchall of "any other legal … animal production and all farm practices" covers slaughterhouses. W. VA. CODE § 19-19-2(a). This catchall follows several specific, enumerated activities representing various stages of agricultural production and the agricultural supply chain. So, under the ejusdem generis and noscitur a socis canons, the catchall "will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerate," and its meaning "is or may be known from the meaning of accompanying specific words." W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Clark, 245 W. Va. 510, 520, 859 S.E.2d 453, 463 (2021) (cleaned up).

Slaughterhouses share the essential character of the listed activities. They are integral to the process of producing food from animals and converting livestock into marketable agricultural products. The definition covers not only the raising of animals through "husbandry," but the downstream activities for bringing agricultural products to market, like "packing, shipping, … and marketing." W. VA. CODE § 19-19-2(a). Slaughter fits squarely within this continuum. It is the link between livestock husbandry and meat packing or marketing. Moreover, slaughtering animals is a typical "farm practice."

Reading the definition in pari materia with the rest of Chapter 19, "agriculture" includes slaughtering. "Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syl. pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 109, 219 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1975). Chapter 19 governs "agriculture." And within it, the Legislature saw fit to regulate slaughterhouses. Article 2E provides the "methods of humane slaughter," W. VA. CODE § 19-2E-5, and article 2B governs "the licensing of commercial slaughterers, custom slaughterers and processors, and the inspection of slaughterhouses[.]" id. § 19-2B-1.

Accordingly, the slaughterhouse that your letter describes would be an "agricultural operation" for purposes of Section 8A-7-10(e).

II. The Local Zoning Ordinance Cannot Apply To Block The Identified Slaughterhouse.

Next, we consider whether the proposed slaughterhouse is in a municipality or urban area. Because it is not, the local zoning ordinance contravenes state law and should be considered revoked as applied to this operation.

Both municipalities and urban areas are bounded by the incorporated limits of the municipal corporation. A municipality is a city, town, or village "incorporated as a municipal corporation." W. VA. CODE § 8-1-2(a). Likewise, under West Virginia Code Section 8A-1-2(ee), an "urban area" is "all lands or lots within the jurisdiction of a municipal planning commission." In turn, "[t]he jurisdiction of a municipal planning commission shall not extend beyond the corporate limits of the municipality." Id. § 8A-3-14.

The proposed slaughterhouse is not located in a municipality or an urban area. You've specified it is in unincorporated territory. Unincorporated territory is definitionally not part of a municipality. See id. § 8-2-1(a) (providing that proposed municipalities must provide a map of the area to be incorporated); id. § 8-2-7 (proclaiming municipality is defined by boundaries); id. § 8-6-1 (providing that unincorporated territory may be annexed by municipalities only under certain circumstances).

The proposed slaughterhouse is, therefore, not subject to the local zoning ordinance. Again, county commissions are barred from enacting a zoning ordinance restricting "the complete use" of land for an "agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2" "outside of municipalities or urban areas." Id. § 8A-7-10(e).

III. The Slaughterhouse's Commercial Character Does Not Change Our Analysis.

Your letter notes how West Virginia Code § 7-1-3(a), the provision generally empowering county commissions, says that "no provision in th[at] section may be construed to limit the authority of a county to restrict the commercial use of real estate in designated areas through planning or zoning ordinance." You then note how the proposed facility in Greenbrier County would seem to fall within a definition of "commercial slaughterer" found in a part of the agriculture laws. W. VA. CODE § 19-2B-2(mm) (emphasis added). You thus ask whether the "commercial" savings provision of Section 7-1-3(a) would allow Greenbrier County to enforce its ordinance.

For at least two reasons, we conclude Section 7-1-3(a) does not change our analysis.

First, Section 7-1-3(a) only applies, by its express terms, to that section. But the limitations found in Section 8A-7-10(e) are not found in that section (or even in that article). So we cannot read the preservation of general commercial zoning authority as a tacit restraint on the specific and separate prohibition on anti-agricultural zoning.

Second, Section 7-1-3(b) contains a key caveat much like the provision in Section 8A-7-10(e). That caveat, which the Legislature adopted in 2024, reads:

County commissions may not adopt or enact an ordinance, rule, license requirement, or other authorization that contravenes or is stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation relating to agricultural operations, as defined in §19-19-2 of this code. Any ordinance, rule, regulation, license requirement, or other authorization previously adopted by a county commission that contravenes or is stricter than any state law, rule, or regulation regarding agricultural operations is revoked.

W. VA. CODE § 7-1-3(b). To the extent Section 7-1-3(a) and 7-1-3(b) are inconsistent, this "later-enacted, more specific" provision would prevail over the more general language in Section 7-1-3(a). Stanley v. Dep't of Tax & Revenue, 217 W. Va. 65, 72, 614 S.E.2d 712, 719 (2005). And because the Greenbrier County ordinance is "stricter" than the "state law" found in Section 8A-7-10(e) (at least as applied to slaughterhouses), the Greenbrier County ordinance would appear to fall within this authority-stripping provision.

In short, we conclude that Greenbrier County cannot apply its zoning ordinance to foreclose the slaughterhouse operator from operating the proposed facility you describe.

Sincerely,

John B. McCuskey
West Virginia Attorney General

Holly J. Wilson
Principal Deputy Solicitor General