In a West Virginia county that imposes an ambulance fee, does the sheriff have to be the one who bills and collects it, or can the county commission give the job to someone else?

Plain-English summary

Tucker County's prosecutor asked the AG a billing-administration question that comes up in lots of counties: when a county commission imposes an ambulance fee under the Emergency Ambulance Service Act, who has to do the billing and collection work? Is the sheriff stuck with the job, or can the commission move it to another county employee or contractor?

Attorney General Patrick Morrisey reconciled two statutes that pull in slightly different directions. W. Va. Code § 7-5-1 makes the sheriff the "ex officio county treasurer" and says the sheriff "shall receive, collect and disburse all moneys due such county or any district thereof." That sounds exclusive. But Title 7, Article 15, the Emergency Ambulance Service Act, gives the county commission broad discretion in providing ambulance service "through its agents, servants and employees; or through private enterprise; or by its designees; or by contracting with individuals, groups, associations, corporations or otherwise; or it may cause such services to be provided by an authority." Section 7-15-17 specifically authorizes the commission to "impose upon and collect from the users of emergency ambulance service within the county a special service fee."

Reading the statutes together, the AG concluded:

• If the commission says nothing, the sheriff has to collect the fee. The sheriff cannot refuse, because § 7-5-1 uses "shall" and the Damron line of cases treats the treasurer role as ministerial.
• If the commission affirmatively designates someone else, by ordinance or by contract, the sheriff is not displaced from any inherent duty; the commission's specific § 7-15-17 authority controls over § 7-5-1's general one.

The opinion leaned on three things: the canon that statutes on the same subject are read together (Barber v. Camden Clark); the canon that the more specific statute prevails over the more general (Newark Ins. v. Brown); and prior West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decisions reading the Emergency Ambulance Service Act as the "full and complete authority" for county ambulance services (Teets v. Miller).

A 2018 opinion from the same office, dealing with referral of unpaid ambulance fees to a collections agency, was consistent with this reading.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Why isn't the sheriff just always the collector?
A: Section 7-5-1 makes the sheriff the default county treasurer with a mandatory "shall" duty. But a more specific statute (the Emergency Ambulance Service Act, § 7-15-17) gives the commission its own authority to collect ambulance fees, and West Virginia courts have read the Act as the comprehensive authority for county ambulance services. The opinion reconciled the two by treating the sheriff as the default and the commission's designation power as a specific override.

Q: Can the sheriff just refuse to collect the fees?
A: No. State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell and Nelson v. W. Virginia Public Employees Ins. Board together stand for the proposition that the sheriff's treasurer role is ministerial and the "shall" in § 7-5-1 is mandatory. A sheriff cannot decline the job at the commission's request.

Q: How does the commission move the work elsewhere?
A: Section 7-15-4 lists the available avenues: through its own agents, servants, and employees; through private enterprise; through designees; through contractual arrangements with individuals, groups, associations, or corporations; or by causing services to be provided by an authority. Section 7-15-17 says the commission imposes and collects the fee "by ordinance," which is the formal mechanism for moving collection to a non-sheriff entity.

Q: Does this opinion apply to other county fees, not just ambulance fees?
A: The reasoning is keyed to the Emergency Ambulance Service Act's specific delegation, with the Act's "full and complete authority" framing from Teets v. Miller. Other county fees would need a similar specific-statute analysis. The general default in § 7-5-1 still puts the sheriff at the front of the line absent specific contrary authority.

Q: What happens to delinquent fees?
A: Earlier AG guidance (2018 WL 4608630) said the commission may refer unpaid ambulance fees to a collections agency under § 7-15-17. This 2020 opinion treats that earlier opinion as supporting the broader conclusion that the commission has flexibility in how it bills and collects.

Q: Was there an actual conflict between § 7-5-1 and § 7-15-17?
A: The opinion said "some tension" but not "irreconcilable conflict." Reading the statutes together, the AG treated the sheriff as the default and the commission's choice to designate a non-sheriff collector as a specific exception. If a court ever read the two as truly conflicting, Newark Ins. v. Brown says the more specific statute prevails, which means the commission's § 7-15-17 authority would still win.

Background and statutory framework

The factual setup was simple: Tucker County wanted to know whether the sheriff had to collect ambulance fees, or whether the commission could put the work elsewhere. That question has practical bite for sheriffs whose offices already handle property tax collection and who would prefer not to absorb a separate billing operation.

The two statutes:

• W. Va. Code § 7-5-1. Designates the sheriff as ex officio county treasurer with a duty to "receive, collect and disburse all moneys due such county or any district thereof." State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell (1965) describes the role as ministerial, with no discretion to refuse or alter.
• W. Va. Code § 7-15-4 and § 7-15-17. Part of the Emergency Ambulance Service Act of 1975. Section 7-15-4 gives the commission broad discretion in how to provide ambulance service. Section 7-15-17 lets the commission impose and collect fees by ordinance. Section 7-15-18 says the Act "shall be liberally construed."

The Supreme Court of Appeals' decisions support the AG's reading. Teets v. Miller (2016) calls the Act "the full and complete authority for the provision of emergency ambulance service" and "the only authority relied upon by a county commission" in that area. Randy Waugh's Mobile Home Park v. Morgan County Emergency Medical Services Board (2015) blessed an ambulance authority's collection of delinquent fees through civil action with commission authorization.

The interpretive moves were standard: read related statutes together (Barber v. Camden Clark); when conflict exists, prefer the specific over the general (Newark Ins. Co. v. Brown).

Citations and references

Statutes:
- W. Va. Code § 5-3-2 (AG advice to prosecutors)
- W. Va. Code § 7-5-1 (sheriff as ex officio county treasurer)
- W. Va. Code § 7-15-4 (Emergency Ambulance Service Act; service delivery options)
- W. Va. Code § 7-15-17 (fee imposition and collection)
- W. Va. Code § 7-15-18 (Act liberally construed)

Cases:
- State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell, 149 W. Va. 773, 143 S.E.2d 469 (1965)
- Nelson v. W. Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982)
- Barber v. Camden Clark Mem. Hosp. Corp., 240 W. Va. 663, 815 S.E.2d 474 (2018)
- Newark Ins. Co. v. Brown, 218 W. Va. 346, 624 S.E.2d 783 (2005)
- Teets v. Miller, 237 W. Va. 473, 788 S.E.2d 1 (2016)
- Randy Waugh/Waugh's Mobile Home Park v. Morgan Cty. Emergency Med. Servs. Bd., Inc., 236 W. Va. 468, 781 S.E.2d 379 (2015)

Prior AG opinions:
- Opinion of the Attorney General Concerning Collection of Emergency Ambulance Service Fees, 2018 WL 4608630 (W. Va. A.G. July 18, 2018)

Source

• Landing page: https://ago.wv.gov/media/17696/download?inline
• Original PDF: https://ago.wv.gov/media/17696/download?inline

Original opinion text

State of West Virginia
Office of the Attorney General
1900 Kanawha Blvd E
Building 1, Room 26-E
Charleston, WV 25305-0220
Patrick Morrisey
Attorney General

(304) 558-2021
Fax (304) 558-0140

July 9, 2020

The Honorable Raymond LaMora
Tucker County Prosecuting Attorney
211 First Street, Suite 207
Parsons, WV 26287

Dear Prosecuting Attorney LaMora:

You have asked for an Opinion of the Attorney General about billing for ambulance fees. This Opinion is being issued pursuant to West Virginia Code Section 5-3-2, which provides that the Attorney General "may consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the official duties of their office." To the extent this Opinion relies on facts, it depends solely on the factual assertions in your correspondence with the Office of the Attorney General.

Your letter raises the following legal question:

Is the Tucker County Sheriff required to bill and collect the money associated with a county ambulance fee, or may another county employee fulfill this role at the request of the Tucker County Commission?

We conclude that if a county commission does not designate a party to collect the county's ambulance fee, then the county sheriff must collect the fees. A county commission is not required to use the sheriff's office to collect the ambulance fee, however, and may delegate responsibility for this task to a different county employee.

Discussion

West Virginia Code § 7-5-1 appoints sheriffs as their county's "ex officio county treasurer." As the treasurer, the sheriff "shall receive, collect and disburse all moneys due such county or any district thereof." Id. Sheriffs act in a purely administrative capacity as treasurer, and have "no discretion in making payment of claims" or in collecting claims. Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell, 149 W. Va. 773, 143 S.E.2d 469 (1965). Further, a sheriff may not decline to act as treasurer because the Legislature used the word "shall" in Section 7-5-1; "in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature," the term "shall" "should be afforded a mandatory construction." Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982). At a county commission's request a sheriff therefore has a duty to collect any fees owed to the county.

Nevertheless, in at least some circumstances a sheriff's mandatory duty to collect fees is not exclusive. For certain functions and fees, the Legislature has granted county commissions power to collect fees directly. One example is the Emergency Ambulance Service Act of 1975, which bestows on county commissions authority to provide "emergency ambulance service . . . to all the residents of the county where such service is not otherwise available." W. Va. Code § 7-15-4. A commission may provide the service "through its agents, servants and employees; or through private enterprise; or by its designees; or by contracting with individuals, groups, associations, corporations or otherwise; or it may cause such services to be provided by an authority." Id. The "provisions of this [Act] shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose." Id. § 7-15-18. And critically, it provides that commissions may "by ordinance, impose upon and collect from the users of emergency ambulance service within the county a special service fee." Id. § 7-15-17 (emphasis added).

Reading this provision together with a sheriff's duty to collect fees in Section 7-5-1, we conclude that in the specific context of collecting ambulance fees, a sheriff must collect fees owed to the county unless the commission designates another individual or entity to do so.

First, it is a key canon of statutory construction that "[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syl. pt. 8, Barber v. Camden Clark Mem. Hosp. Corp., 240 W. Va. 663, 815 S.E.2d 474 (2018) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Unless two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, courts must "construe such statutes so as to give effect to each." Syl. pt. 9, id. (citation omitted). Here there is admittedly some tension between the two statutes at issue, but they are not in irreconcilable conflict. It is a fair interpretation, reading and applying the statutes together as required, that sheriffs "shall" collect fees in the sense that they are the default officer with this responsibility and cannot refuse to fulfill this role when asked, but that the commission also has discretion not to call on the sheriff's office and instead take direct responsibility for collecting fees.

Second, any conflict between the statutes would be resolved in favor of the more specific Emergency Ambulance Act. When "faced with a choice between two statutes, one of which is couched in general terms and the other of which specifically speaks to the matter at hand, preference generally is accorded to the specific statute." Newark Ins. Co. v. Brown, 218 W. Va. 346, 351, 624 S.E.2d 783, 788 (2005). Section 7-15-17 deals with authority to collect ambulance fees specifically. By contrast, Section 7-5-1 speaks to a sheriff's general authority to collect county debts. Thus, even if a reviewing court finds that the two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, it would very likely give effect to the commission's specific power to collect ambulance fees in Section 7-15-17.

Third, the Supreme Court of Appeals has affirmed county commissions' broad discretion in how to collect ambulance fees. The Court has explained that "because the [Emergency Ambulance Act] identifies itself as the full and complete authority for the provision of emergency ambulance service . . . it plainly is intended to be the only authority relied upon by a county commission in undertaking its duty to provide such ambulance authority." Teets v. Miller, 237 W. Va. 473, 482, 788 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2016) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

And in Randy Waugh/Waugh's Mobile Home Park v. Morgan Cty. Emergency Med. Servs. Bd., Inc., the petitioner argued that the local ambulance authority could not collect ambulance fees he owed because only the commission had authority to sue for collection of ambulance fees. 236 W. Va. 468, 475, 781 S.E.2d 379, 386 (2015). The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the commission had statutory authority to authorize the ambulance authority to collect delinquent emergency ambulance fees through a civil action. Id. The question of a sheriff's separate duty to collect fees was not at issue in this case, but the Court's acknowledgment of commissions' statutory discretion in this area further supports our conclusion that it would reaffirm that discretion if presented with the specific question you raise. After all, if a commission has power to authorize an ambulance authority to bill and collect the money for ambulance fees, then it necessarily has discretion not to use the services of the sheriff's office for the same task. See also Opinion of the Attorney General Concerning Collection of Emergency Ambulance Service Fees, 2018 WL 4608630, at *2 (W. Va. A.G. July 18, 2018) (concluding that a county commission may refer "unpaid fees to a collections agency" under Section 7-15-17).

In short, reading both relevant statutes together confirms that although a county sheriff's office may not decline to collect fees if the county commission does not designate another entity, a county commission may also choose, through ordinance, to vest the duty of billing and collecting of fees in one of its employees or to another entity.

Sincerely,

Patrick Morrisey
Attorney General

Lindsay See
Solicitor General

Benjamin Fischer
Assistant Solicitor General