Could Washington county commissioners impose one personnel system on every county office in 1982?

Short answer For a noncharter county, the AG said commissioners could not unilaterally control hiring, promotion, suspension, and discharge across independently elected offices. They could set covered employees’ compensation and certain initial hiring procedures; broader coordination required continuing agreement among affected officers.
State
Washington
Opinion
AGO 1982 No. 8
Issued
June 17, 1982
Issued by
Washington State Office of the Attorney General

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1982. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Washington State Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Washington attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

A prosecutor asked whether commissioners in a Washington noncharter county could create a personnel system for every county employee, including employees appointed by other elected county officers. The AG said existing state law gave the board no unilateral power to control all hiring, pay, promotion, suspension, and discharge. Elected officers retained authority over their own appointees.

The board still had narrower powers. It could set a countywide compensation schedule for covered personnel and establish suitable procedures connected to its required consent for initial employment. It could not choose specific people for other elected officers or control their later promotion, suspension, or discharge. A broader shared system was possible only while all affected elected officials continued to consent, without delegating away discretion that the law assigned to them.

“Such a program, however, would be effective only with the continuing mutual consent of those other elected officials and could not involve a delegation oftheir discretion to others.” (Official opinion)

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1982. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could noncharter county commissioners set pay for employees appointed by other elected officers?
A: The AG said commissioners generally could fix those employees’ compensation and create a countywide compensation schedule, subject to a qualification noted for the assessor’s office.

Q: Could commissioners select deputies for another elected officer?
A: No. The board’s consent to hiring did not give it the power to choose the individuals appointed by independent elected officials.

Q: Could commissioners decide whether another officer’s deputies were promoted or fired?
A: No. The AG said the board could not unilaterally regulate later promotion, suspension, or discharge of those employees.

Q: Could county elected officers agree on shared personnel rules?
A: The opinion said a more extensive program could be built through joint action, but it depended on continuing mutual consent and could not transfer each official’s legally assigned discretion to someone else.

Background and statutory framework

RCW 36.16.070 gave county commissioners a role in consenting to employment and fixing compensation, while leaving appointments and revocation of appointments with the appointing officer. The AG found no general authorization in RCW 36.32.120 for commissioners to create a countywide civil service system for employees of other elected officials. It expressly discussed noncharter counties and distinguished charter counties.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed RCW 36.16.070, RCW 36.32.120, and RCW 36.21.011.

Source

Original opinion text

Attorney General Ken Eikenberry

OFFICES AND OFFICERS ‑- COUNTY ‑- COMMISSIONERS ‑- EMPLOYEES ‑- CIVIL SERVICE ‑- ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

There is no authority, under existing state law, for the adoption and implementation, by the board of county commissioners of a noncharter county, of a county personnel system covering the employment, compensation, subsequent promotion, suspension or discharge of all county employees‑-including those appointed by other, independent, county elected officials; there are, however, certain limited actions which may be taken in this area pursuant to a joint agreement between all affected county offices.


June 17, 1982

Honorable Robert K. Leick
Prosecuting Attorney
Skamania County
Courthouse Building
Stevenson, Washington 98648

Cite as: AGO 1982 No. 8

Dear Sir:

By letter previously acknowledged you requested our opinion regarding the legal authority of the board of county commissioners of a noncharter county to establish a county personnel system. In addition, you provided us with a draft copy of the text of a document providing for such a system which, as we understand it, would cover the employment, compensation, subsequent promotion, suspension or discharge of all county employees‑-including those appointed by other, independent, county elected officials.

We respond to your inquiry in the manner set forth below.

ANALYSIS

Much the same question as you have now asked was submitted to this office several years ago and led to our issuance of AGO 55-57 No. 306, copy enclosed. In that opinion we first quoted the following language of RCW 36.16.070:

"In all cases where the duties of any county office are greater than can be performed by the person elected to fill it, the officer may employ deputies and other necessary employees with the consent of the board of [[Orig. Op. Page 2]] county commissioners. The board shall fix their compensation and shall require what deputies shall give bond and the amount of bond required from each. The sureties on deputies' bonds must be approved by the board and the premium therefor is a county expense.

". . . The officer appointing a deputy or other employee shall be responsible for the acts of his appointees upon his official bond and may revoke each appointment at pleasure."

We then noted that an earlier version of that statute had been held by the court, inThomas v. Whatcom County, 82 Wash. 113, 143 Pac. 881 (1914), to vest each appointing officer with exclusive control over the appointment and dismissal of his own deputies‑-although the board of county commissioners determines the numbers and salaries of those deputies. We also alluded to the absence of any express language in RCW 36.32.120 (relating, generally, to the powers of county commissioners) which would permit a board of commissioners to establish a county civil service or merit system. We therefore answered the question posed in the negative and said that some form of statutory authorization would be needed in order to facilitate the establishment of such a system.

Thereafter, in 1958, an initiative was approved by the voters which provided for the establishment of a statewide civil service system for one particular class of county personnel; namely, deputy county sheriffs.1/ However, the legislature has enacted no similar law covering other county employees‑-and there is thus a presumption that the legislature has intentionally withheld such authority. See,Washington Education Association v. Smith, 96 Wn.2d 601, P.2d (1981). We also note in this regard that on at least one occasion, in 1977, the legislature considered but declined to pass a bill (HB 787) which was specifically designed to deal with the matter.

We must, therefore, once again respond to your basic question, in the negative. In so doing, however, we would also offer certain suggestions regarding the possibility of a somewhat more limited approach which might be considered under the existing laws as they relate to noncharter counties.2/ We will divide this further [[Orig. Op. Page 3]] discussion into two parts, the first relating to possible courses of action which a board of county commissioners may itself pursue, unilaterally, and the second covering the possibility of some form of joint action by the various county officials, acting in concert.

Unilateral Action By County Commissioners:

A board of county commissioners has the express power, under RCW 36.16.070,supra, to fix the compensation of subordinate county officers and employees‑-including those appointed by independent elected officials.3/ Accordingly, in the exercise of that authority, the county commissioners could by unilateral action establish a countywide compensation schedule for those classes of personnel over whom the board has such control. Accord, AGO 55-57 No. 48, a copy of which is also enclosed. And, of course, "compensation" includes such fringe benefits as medical insurance, or the like, which counties are authorized to provide for their employees.4/

In addition, RCW 36.16.070 also has the effect of making the consent of the board of county commissioners a necessary condition to the appointment, or employment, of most county personnel. Therefore, in the exercise of that function, the commissioners might also establish, unilaterally, appropriate procedures for the initial employment (or hiring) of those personnel. Please note, however, that we are not here suggesting the existence of a power, in the county commissioners, to select the particular individuals to be appointed or employed by any of the several independent [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] county elected officials.5/

Nothing in RCW 36.16.070, supra, however, purports to vest the county commissioners with the power, acting unilaterally, to regulate the subsequent promotion, suspension or discharge of those deputies or other employees who are appointed by, and thereafter serve at the pleasure of, other county elected officials referred to in that statute. Accord, AGO 55-57 No. 306,supra.

Joint Action By Other County Elected Officials:

A somewhat more extensive program, on the other hand, would appear to be possible through the joint action of all affected county elected officials acting in concert. In fact, we understand that something along those lines has been done, in the past, in other counties including (according to our information) Cowlitz, Clark, Yakima, Spokane, Skagit, Whatcom, Walla Walla, Whitman and Kitsap. Such a program, however, would be effective only with the continuing mutual consent of those other elected officials and could not involve a delegation oftheir discretion to others. For it is well established that in the absence of express statutory authority, a public official may not delegate to others those discretionary functions which have been vested in him by law. See,State ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wn.2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955); andRoehl v. PUD No. 1, 43 Wn.2d 214, 261 P.2d 92 (1953).

We trust that you will find the foregoing to be of assistance.

Very truly yours,
KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY
Attorney General

ROBERT F. HAUTH
Senior Assistant Attorney General

*** FOOTNOTES ***

1/See, Initiative No. 23, since codified as chapter 41.14 RCW.

2/What we are here saying with regard to the necessity for legislative authorization, of course, is generally inapplicable in the case of those counties which have adopted their own home rule charters under Washington Const., Art. 11, § 4 (Amendment 21). See,Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958) which, although it dealt with charter cities, contains reasoning which is equally applicable to charter counties.

3/See, however, RCW 36.21.011 which apparently creates a qualified exception for employees in the county assessor's office‑-to the extent that it purports to require each board of county commissioners to which a budget estimate is submitted by the assessor to ". . . allow sufficient funds for such positions. . . ."

4/See, RCW 41.04.180, et seq.

5/See also, in that regard, AGO 55-57 No. 48, supra.

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