Could Washington assess an omitted mobile home after someone bought the land it was attached to?

Short answer The Attorney General said the omitted-assessment bar applied only if the mobile home was permanently affixed as a real-property improvement and a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or contract buyer acquired an interest before assessment. A movable home did not meet that improvement condition.
State
Washington
Opinion
AGO 1980 No. 4
Issued
January 18, 1980
Issued by
Washington State Office of the Attorney General
Requested by
Honorable Curtis Ludwig, Benton County Prosecuting Attorney

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1980. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Washington State Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Washington attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

The Washington Attorney General concluded in 1980 that a statutory bar on omitted-property assessments could protect a mobile home only when it was permanently affixed to land as an improvement. The other required fact was that a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or contract buyer had acquired an interest in the land before the home was assessed.

A mobile home without permanent affixation remained personal property under the opinion's analysis, so the improvement-specific proviso did not apply. The AG treated the factual status of the home and the timing of the land interest as decisive.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1980. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did every mobile home count as a real-property improvement?
No. The AG drew the line at permanent affixation to the land.

Did a later land purchase block an assessment that was already made?
The opinion's condition required the qualifying interest to be acquired before the omitted improvement was assessed.

Did the rule cover a home that could still be moved?
The AG said an unattached mobile home remained personal property, outside this particular improvement proviso.

Background and statutory framework

A county prosecutor asked whether the omitted-assessment statute's protection for buyers and encumbrancers applied to mobile homes. The AG read its proviso as confined to improvements and used the case definition of a permanent improvement together with earlier tax treatment of affixed homes.

Citations and references

  • Statute discussed: RCW 84.40.080.
  • Case discussed: Forman v. Columbia Theater Co., 20 Wn.2d 685, 692, 148 P.2d 951 (1944).

Source

Original opinion text

Attorney General Slade Gorton

PROPERTY ‑- TAXATION ‑- REAL PROPERTY ‑- MOBILE HOMES ‑- IMPROVEMENTS ‑-OMITTED ASSESSMENT OF MOBILE HOMES AFFIXED TO REAL PROPERTY

Where (but only where) a mobile home is permanently affixed to a tract or realty so as to constitute an improvement, and the bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer or contract buyer has acquired an interest in the real estate upon which it is located prior to the time the mobile home is assessed, the proviso to the second sentence of RCW 84.40.080 will apply so as to prevent an omitted property assessment.


January 18, 1980

Honorable Curtis Ludwig
Prosecuting Attorney
Benton County
P.O. Box 510
Prosser, Washington 99350

Cite as: AGO 1980 No. 4

Dear Sir:

By letter previously acknowledged, you requested the opinion of this office concerning the application of RCW 84.40.080 to omitted property assessments of mobile homes. We paraphrase your question as follows:

Is a mobile home an improvement to real property within the meaning of RCW 84.40.080 so that, if the factual circumstances specified in the statute are present, an omitted property assessment of a mobile home not previously listed and assessed by the county assessor would be prohibited?

We answer your question as set forth in our analysis.

[[Orig. Op. Page 2]]

ANALYSIS

RCW 84.40.080, which authorizes omitted property to be listed and assessed for property tax purposes, reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"The assessor, upon his own motion, or upon the application of any taxpayer, shall enter in the detail and assessment list of the current year any property shown to have been omitted from the assessment list of any preceding year, at the valuation of that year, or if not then valued, at such valuation as the assessor shall determine from the preceding year, and such valuation shall be stated in a separate line from the valuation of the current year. Where improvements have not been valued and assessed as a part of the real estate upon which the same may be located, as evidenced by the assessment rolls, they may be separately valued and assessed as omitted property under this section: PROVIDED, That no such assessment shall be made in any case where a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or contract buyer has acquired any interest in said property prior to the time such improvements are assessed. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that a proviso in a specific statutory clause, such as the second sentence above quoted, applies only to that clause in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary. State ex rel. Morrison v. Seattle, 6 Wn.App. 181, 492 P.2d 1078 (1971). The proviso here in question is appended to, and was enacted as part of, the second sentence of RCW 84.40.080 dealing, specifically, with improvements that have not been valued and assessed as a part of the real estate.1/ Therefore, that proviso applies only to qualify the statutory sentence dealing with omitted property assessments of improvements as distinguished from other types of property.

[[Orig. Op. Page 3]]

Essentially, your question is whether the proviso has application to mobile homes. The answer depends upon whether a mobile home is an "improvement" within the meaning of the previous sentence of RCW 84.40.080, supra. If so, and the other factual requirements therein are present, then clearly the effect of the proviso to that sentence would be to bar omitted property assessments of such mobile homes under the circumstances specified.

The term "improvements" has been held by our court to mean:

". . . improvements of the realty; that is to say, such things as are placed thereon by the way of betterments which are of a permanent nature and which add to the value of the property as real property. This would include buildings and structures of every kind, . . ."2/ (Emphasis supplied)

In a prior opinion of this office we stated that ". . . those mobile homes which are permanently affixed in location upon land owned or leased by the owner will be subject to taxation as real property, and all other mobile homes will be subject to taxation as personal property . . ." See AGO 1972 No. 13 (copy enclosed) at page 4. And, more specifically, we said in another opinion that a mobile home permanently affixed thereby "becomes real property and subject to ad valorem taxationthe same as any other structure attached to the land." AGO 1971 No. 3 (copy enclosed) at page 4 (emphasis supplied).

Permanent affixation of a mobile home to the real property on which it is located carries with it, for purposes of taxation, legal consequences which are not new in the state of Washington. As early as 1957, when mobile homes were still subject to an excise tax as "house trailers," an exemption therefrom applied where permanent affixation had occurred. See § 8, chapter 269, Laws of 1957 (RCW 82.50.180(5)). A subsequent amendment3/ provided that mobile homes, once permanently affixed, were to be entered on the real property tax rolls for purposes of ad valorem [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] taxation. Then, with the enactment of chapter 299, Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., all mobile homes became subject to the property tax rather than the excise tax and, as stated in AGO 1972 No. 13,supra, those which were permanently affixed were to be taxed as real property while other mobile homes were to be taxed as personal property. And finally, even more recently, permanently affixed mobile homes have qualified as residences for purposes of the senior citizens' real property tax exemption, RCW 84.36.383(2), and as realty for purposes of the one percent real estate excise tax. See, chapter 266, Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess.

Thus, both on the basis of the above‑noted judicial definition of an improvement,Forman v. Columbia Theater Co., supra, and of the foregoing legislative enactments declaring that permanently affixed mobile homes are to be treated (for ad valorem taxation purposes) in the same manner as realty generally, we conclude as follows: The second sentence of RCW 84.40.080 and its proviso do apply to such mobile homes in the same fashion as they would with regard to any other structure attached to the land. On the other hand, where permanent affixation is absent, the mobile home will not have lost its character as personalty and, therefore, would not constitute an "improvement." Accordingly, where (but only where) the mobile home is permanently affixed so as to constitute an improvement, and a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer or contract buyer has acquired an interest in the real estate upon which it is located prior to the time the mobile home is assessed, the proviso to the second sentence of RCW 84.40.080 will apply so as to prevent an omitted property assessment.

We trust the foregoing will be of assistance.

Very truly yours,
SLADE GORTON
Attorney General

LARRY R. SCHREITER
Assistant Attorney General

*** FOOTNOTES ***

1/Chapter 8, Laws of 1951, 1st Ex. Sess., amended, chapter 8, Laws of 1973, 2nd Ex. Sess.

2/Forman v. Columbia Theater Co., 20 Wn.2d 685, 692, 148 P.2d 951 (1944), (emphasis supplied), quoting Siegloch v. Iroquois Mining Co., 106 Wash. 632, 181 Pac. 51 (1919).

3/Sec. 56, chapter 149, Laws of 1967, 1st Ex. Sess.

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