Could a Washington candidate hold office after a deferred felony sentence and dismissal of the charge?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 1966. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.
Plain-English summary
In 1966, the Washington Attorney General concluded that a person who had completed probation after a deferred felony sentence and obtained dismissal under RCW 9.95.240 could file for and hold an elective state or county office if otherwise qualified. The statute released the person from penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. The AG read that release as including the loss of voting eligibility that otherwise made the person ineligible for public office.
The opinion's conclusion depended on the court having dismissed the information or indictment under that statute. It also noted that an office could have additional qualifications. Its footnote said a gross misdemeanor conviction alone did not cause the particular loss of the elective franchise being discussed.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1966. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Could the person run after the court dismissed the felony case?
The AG said yes, if the dismissal followed RCW 9.95.240 and the person met all other requirements of the particular office.
Why did dismissal matter for office eligibility?
The AG read the statute's release from penalties and disabilities as removing the voting disqualification connected to the conviction. Office qualifications under RCW 42.04.020 included elector status.
Did the opinion say every conviction was erased for all purposes?
No. The quoted statute preserved use of the prior conviction in a later prosecution for another offense. The AG's answer concerned voting and office eligibility after the specified dismissal.
Background and statutory framework
The request concerned an otherwise qualified candidate who had pleaded or been found guilty of a felony, received deferred sentencing and probation, and later had the case dismissed. The AG compared RCW 42.04.020's elector qualification for office with the dismissal provision in RCW 9.95.240. The latter's express release from penalties and disabilities supplied the basis for the eligibility conclusion.
Citations and references
- Statutes discussed: RCW 9.95.240; RCW 42.04.020.
Source
- Landing page: https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/offices-and-officers-state-county-eligibility-candidate-conviction-felony-or-gross
Original opinion text
Attorney General John J. O'Connell
OFFICES AND OFFICERS ‑- STATE ‑- COUNTY ‑- ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE ‑- CONVICTION OF FELONY OR GROSS MISDEMEANOR ‑- DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER RCW 9.95.240.
Assuming a person is otherwise qualified for a particular public office, he may file for and hold, if elected, a state or county office even though he had previously entered a plea or was found guilty of a felony (an infamous crime in this state resulting in a loss of the elective franchise) where his sentence was deferred; he was placed on probation and at the expiration thereof the superior court dismissed the proceedings under RCW 9.95.240, releasing him "from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he was convicted."
January 10, 1966
Honorable Alfred E. Leland
State Representative, 48th District
P.O. Box 175
Redmond, Washington
Cite as: AGO 65-66 No. 66
Dear Sir:
By letter previously acknowledged you have asked this office for an opinion on the following question:
Is a person eligible to file for and hold, if elected, a county or state office who has entered a plea of guilty or was convicted of a felony; was placed on probation and at the expiration of such probationary period, had such proceedings dismissed pursuant to RCW 9.95.240?
We answer your question in the affirmative.
ANALYSIS
In general no person may qualify for or hold any elective public office in this state unless he be ". . . a citizen of the United States and the state of Washington, and an elector of such county, district, precinct, school district, municipality or other district or political subdivision." (Emphasis supplied) RCW 42.04.020.1/ See, also, Article III, [[Orig. Op. Page 2]] § 25 of the state constitution governing elective executive offices of the state government.
The qualifications ofelectors are set forth in Article VI, § 1, Amendment 5 of the state constitution which reads as follows:
"All persons of the age of twenty-one years or over, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections: They shall be citizens of the United States; they shall have lived in the state one year, and in the county ninety days, and in the city, town, ward or precinct thirty days immediately preceding the election at which they offer to vote; they shall be able to read and speak the English language: Provided, That Indians not taxed shall never be allowed the elective franchise: And further provided, That this amendment shall not affect the rights of franchise of any person who is now a qualified elector of this state. The legislative authority shall enact laws defining the manner of ascertaining the qualifications of voters as to their ability to read and speak the English language, and providing for punishment of persons voting or registering in violation of the provision of this section. There shall be no denial of the elective franchise at any election on account of sex."
By Article VI, § 3, of our constitution, certain persons are excluded from exercising their elective franchise. The section reads as follows:
"All idiots, insane persons, and persons convicted of infamous crime unless restored to their civil rights are excluded from the elective franchise."
An "infamous crime" is one "punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary." Section 3057, Code of 1881, cf. RCW 29.01.080. Therefore, only a "felony" which provides such punishment (RCW 9.01.020) is an infamous crime in this state.2/ See our informal opinion to the Secretary of State dated November 8, 1962, and cases cited therein.
[[Orig. Op. Page 3]]
It follows that the crucial question to be determined in regard to a person such as you have described is whether he stands convicted of a felony (within the meaning of Article VI, § 3, supra) where his sentence was deferred and after successful completion of probation the court has dismissed the information or indictment pursuant to RCW 9.95.240.
RCW 9.95.240,supra, reads as follows:
"Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period thereof, may at any time prior to the expiration of the maximum period of punishment for the offense for which he has been convicted be permitted in the discretion of the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, or if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty,the court may in its discretion set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case, the court may thereupon dismiss the information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall be informed of this right in his probation papers: Provided, That in any subsequent prosecution, for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved, and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted, or the information or indictment dismissed." (Emphasis supplied)
The language of this statute is quite clear. Once the criminal proceedings have been dismissed pursuant thereto, the defendant is thereafter "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted." This, in our judgment, includes the constitutional exclusion from the elective franchise. Accord,Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal.App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638, 36 A.L.R. 2d 1230 (1953); cf., Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964).
We therefore conclude that a person whose felony information or indictment is dismissed pursuant to RCW 9.95.240, supra, is "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted" and may qualify for or hold any elective state or county office for which he is otherwise qualified as an elector.
[[Orig. Op. Page 4]]
We trust the foregoing will be of assistance to you.
Very truly yours,
JOHN J. O'CONNELL
Attorney General
BURTON R. JOHNSON
Assistant Attorney General
*** FOOTNOTES ***
1/Reference of course would have to be had to the specific office in question to determine if there are any additional qualifications. For example, legislators must be qualified "voters." Article II, §7, Washington state constitution. Defilipis v. Russell, 52 Wn.2d 745, 328 P.2d 904 (1958); judges and the attorney general must be licensed to practice law in this state; see, In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955); and RCW 43.10.010.
2/Accordingly, taking note that your letter of inquiry also made reference to the significance of conviction of a gross misdemeanor, it is clear that such a conviction would in no event disqualify a person from exercising his elective franchise.
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