Could Washington county commissioners spend public money advertising the county's recreational attractions in 1964?

Short answer No. The AG said the commissioners' general statutory powers did not expressly or by necessary implication authorize promoting the county as a tourist destination. It set aside advertising a specific county facility as a different question.
State
Washington
Opinion
AGO 63-64 No. 121
Issued
September 17, 1964
Issued by
Washington State Office of the Attorney General
Requested by
Honorable Robert J. Salvesen, Prosecuting Attorney, Skamania County

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1964. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Washington State Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Washington attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

The Washington Attorney General concluded in 1964 that county commissioners lacked authority to spend public money advertising the county's recreational advantages and facilities as a form of tourist promotion. The commissioners' general powers over county property, funds, and business did not expressly authorize that advertising, and the AG found the power could not be implied as legally necessary to carry out an express power.

The opinion drew a boundary around its answer. It addressed advertising the county itself as a tourist destination. It did not decide whether a county managing a particular recreational facility could advertise that facility to attract patrons.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1964. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could county commissioners pay for ads promoting recreation across the county?
A: No. The AG found no express or necessarily implied authority for that use of county funds under the law it analyzed.

Q: Did the commissioners' power to manage county funds authorize tourism advertising?
A: No. The opinion said the general management provision did not supply the specific advertising authority.

Q: Did the AG bar advertising a particular county recreation facility?
A: The opinion did not decide that question. It distinguished facility advertising from promotion of the county itself.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion applied the rule that a county has powers granted expressly or by necessary implication and read the commissioners' general authority in RCW 36.32.120. Finding no grant for the proposed countywide promotion, it concluded the expenditure would be invalid under the law then in force.

Citations and references

The opinion discusses RCW 36.32.120.

Source

Original opinion text

Attorney General John J. O'Connell

COUNTIES ‑- BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ‑- TOURIST PROMOTION ‑- ADVERTISING RECREATIONAL FACILITIES ‑- EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS.

The board of county commissioners of a county does not have the authority to expend public funds for tourist promotion by advertising the county in terms of recreational advantages and facilities to be found therein.


September 17, 1964

Honorable Robert J. Salvesen
Prosecuting Attorney
Skamania County
Stevenson, Washington

Cite as: AGO 63-64 No. 121

Dear Sir:

By letter previously acknowledged you have requested the opinion of this office on the following paraphrased question:

Do the county commissioners have the authority to expend public funds to advertise the county in terms of the recreational advantages and facilities to be found therein?

We answer your question in the negative as explained in our analysis.

ANALYSIS

Boards of county commissioners have only such powers as have been granted to them, expressly or by necessary implication, by the constitution and statutes of the state. Sasse v. King County, 196 Wash. 242, 82 P. (2d) 536 (1938).

As a creature of statute, exercising delegated authority, the county has limited powers, strictly construed. The principle of strict construction is summarized in Griggs v. Port of Tacoma, 150 Wash. 402, 273 Pac. 521 (1928), as follows:

". . . if the power is not expressly granted or fairly implied as incidental and essential to the powers granted, such powers must be denied."

[[Orig. Op. Page 2]]

The words "necessary" or "essential" refer to legal necessity rather than actual necessity. State ex rel. State Board Etc. v. Clausen, 84 Wash. 279, 283, 146 Pac. 630 (1915). Further implied powers are such as are necessary to carry into effect those which are expressly granted, and which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant. City of Madison v. Daley, 58 Fed. 751, 755 (1893). If there is a fair or reasonable doubt as to whether or not a particular power has been granted, it must be denied. Griggs v. Port of Tacoma, supra; Pacific Etc. Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn. (2d) 347, 178 P. (2d) 351 (1947); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 10.12, p. 609.

With these fundamental principles in mind, we now consider whether or not the advertising of recreational advantages or other attractive features of the county and the concomitant expenditure of county funds for that purpose can properly be considered as within the powers of the board of county commissioners. RCW 36.32.120 sets out in general the powers and duties of county commissioners. In so far as is pertinent here that statute provides:

"The several boards of county commissioners shall:

". . .

"(6) Have the care of the county property and the management of the county funds and business and in the name of the county prosecute and defend all actions for and against the county, and such other powers as are or may be conferred by law;"

A reading of this statute does not reveal any express grant of power which would authorize the expenditure of public funds for the purposes contemplated by your question. Thus, the inquiry must turn upon whether or not such authority can be implied; i.e., whether it may be considered as legally necessary to the accomplishment of the express powers granted.

In 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 127, p. 740, we find authority to the contrary as follows:

[[Orig. Op. Page 3]]

"In accordance with the general rule that municipal funds cannot be expended for private or nonpublic uses, it is held that a municipality has no power to make expenditures for advertising or other forms of publicity, in the absence of legislative authority in either the charter or by statute. . . ."1/

See, also, 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 39.21, pp. 54-55.

The foregoing is in conformity with a view expressed by this office in a letter dated May 19, 1945, written to the prosecuting attorney of Yakima county in reply to a similar question. A copy of this letter is enclosed for your information. Since the legal principles involved have not changed, we must reaffirm the views expressed therein.

In passing it should be pointed out that we are here discussing the question of a county's authority to advertise the county itself in terms of its recreational facilities; not whether a county in the management of a specific recreational facility as a proprietary function may advertise that facility to attract patrons.

Therefore, it is our opinion that since the general powers of the county commissioners do not expressly grant the authority in question here, and because advertising in the proposed manner cannot be implied, expenditures of county funds for such purposes would not be valid.

We trust the foregoing will be of assistance to you.

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. O'CONNELL
Attorney General

GARY SULLIVAN
Assistant Attorney General

*** FOOTNOTES ***

1/The legislature has given such express statutory authority to the state's department of commerce and economic development. See, RCW 43.31.050.

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