Did Washington's new limited-jurisdiction court rules replace the traffic-case venue statute in 1964?

Plain-English summary

The Washington Attorney General concluded in 1964 that newly adopted rules for courts of limited jurisdiction had not superseded the traffic-case venue provision in RCW 46.52.100. The court rules did not specifically repeal venue laws, and the AG found no conflict with the statute. A procedural court rule could alter a statute with which it conflicted, but the opinion said these rules did not do so.

The opinion's footnote narrowed where that answer applied. It said a separate statute governing counties in the new justice court system affected class AA and A counties, which it identified as King, Pierce, and Spokane, and counties that elected to enter the system, then Jefferson. In all other counties, the opinion said RCW 46.52.100 continued to apply.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1964. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the new court rules repeal Washington's traffic venue statute?
A: No. The AG found the rules consistent with RCW 46.52.100 and said they did not supersede it.

Q: Did the opinion apply RCW 46.52.100 in every county?
A: No. Its footnote said the statute continued to apply in counties outside the new justice court system; another venue provision affected counties within that system.

Q: Why did the AG keep the statute in force?
A: The new rules had no provision specifically repealing venue laws, and their general rule preserved statutes that were not inconsistent with the rules.

Background and statutory framework

The request asked whether RCW 46.52.100 still controlled venue for motor vehicle code violations after the state supreme court adopted rules for limited-jurisdiction courts. The AG compared the venue statute with those rules and RCW 2.04.200. The footnote also identified RCW 3.66.070 as relevant to counties under the new justice court system.

Citations and references

The opinion discusses RCW 46.52.100, RCW 2.04.200, and RCW 3.66.070.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/courts-justice-courts-venue-traffic-cases

Original opinion text

Attorney General John J. O'Connell

COURTS ‑- JUSTICE COURTS ‑- VENUE ‑- TRAFFIC CASES.

The statutory venue of justice courts defined in RCW 46.52.100 has not been superseded by the rules for courts of limited jurisdiction adopted by the supreme court.

June 24, 1964

Honorable Will Bachofner
Chief, Washington State Patrol
General Administration Building
Olympia, Washington

Cite as: AGO 63-64 No. 109

(Revised)

Dear Sir:

By letter previously acknowledged you have requested an opinion of this office on the following question:

Are the provisions of RCW 46.52.100 relating to venue in the case of violations of the motor vehicle code still in effect?

We answer your question in the affirmative.

ANALYSIS

Prior opinions of the attorney general1/ have held that the venue provision in RCW 46.52.100 applied to all violations under the motor vehicle code. Copies are enclosed for your convenience.

RCW 46.52.100 continues to read, in so far as is material, as follows:

"Venue in all justice courts shall be before one of the two nearest justices of the peace in incorporated cities and towns nearest to the point the [[Orig. Op. Page 2]] violation allegedly occurred: Provided, That in counties of class A and of the first class such cases may be tried in the county seat at the request of the defendant."

Your opinion request, however, was prompted by the possibility that the rules for courts of limited jurisdiction, recently adopted by our state supreme court, may have superseded this statutory provision.

We have reviewed the general, civil, criminal and traffic rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as rules), and they contain no provisions which specifically repeal laws controlling jurisdiction or venue.

Under the general rules, Rule J 2. provides:

"These rules shall govern the procedure of civil, criminal, and traffic cases in all courts of limited jurisdiction inferior to the Superior Court. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Failure to set forth herein any provisions of common law or statute, not inconsistent with these rules, shall not be construed as an implied repeal thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that the supreme court by rule may alter procedural regulations controlling legal proceedings. Its rules, however, do not abrogate previous statutes with which they do not conflict. (RCW 2.04.200.)

We are of the opinion that RCW 46.52.100 is clearly consistent with the supreme court's rules for courts of limited jurisdiction and has not been superseded thereby.

[[Orig. Op. Page 3]]

We therefore conclude that venue for motor vehicle violations remains unaltered by the recent rules adopted for the courts of limited jurisdiction.2/

We trust the foregoing will be of assistance to you.

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. O'CONNELL
Attorney General

M. H. HEMMEN
Assistant Attorney General

*** FOOTNOTES ***

1/AGO 55-57 No. 122 [[to Ella Wintler, State Representative on July 29, 1955]]; AGO 55-57 No. 118 [[to Prosecuting Attorney, Lewis County on July 20, 1955]].

2/Lest there be any confusion, however, as to the scope of our conclusion reference should be made to the provisions of § 118, chapter 299, Laws of 1961 (cf. RCW 3.66.070), which reads:

"All criminal actions shall be brought in the justice court district where the alleged violation occurred: Provided, that (1) the prosecuting attorney may file felony cases in the district in which the county seat is located and (2) with the consent of the defendant criminal actions other than those arising out of violations of city ordinances may be brought in or transferred to the district in which the county seat is located."

This statute affects only those counties which are governed by the provisions of the new justice court system established by chapter 299, Laws of 1961, i.e., class AA and A counties (King, Pierce and Spokane) and the counties electing (as only Jefferson has done to date) to come under the coverage of the new system. In all other counties, RCW 46.52.100,supra, continues to apply.