Could a Washington sheriff personally accept a federal postal reward for helping solve a crime?

Short answer The AG said a sheriff could not receive a reward from the U.S. Post Office Department for a matter connected with sheriff duties. The statutory bar did not cover a reward for a matter wholly unrelated to those services.
State
Washington
Opinion
AGO 61-62 No. 5
Issued
January 30, 1961
Issued by
Washington State Office of the Attorney General
Requested by
Honorable Alf M. Jacobsen, Prosecuting Attorney, Wahkiakum County

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1961. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Washington State Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Washington attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

In 1961, the Washington AG concluded that a county sheriff could not receive a U.S. Post Office Department reward for help solving a postal crime if the rewarded matter was connected with the sheriff's official services. The federal department was outside the government sources from which the then-current statute permitted connected compensation or rewards.

The AG read the law's reference to an “other public officer” as covering county sheriffs, even though they were local rather than state-agency officers. Its answer preserved the statute's limit: a reward for a matter in no way connected with or related to sheriff services was outside this prohibition. The letter distinguished the right to receive a reward from separate issues addressed in earlier opinions about claiming or retaining rewards.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1961. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did a federal reward count as an allowed payment from Washington government?
A: No. The AG treated the Post Office Department as a source outside the statute's listed Washington state, local, and employing-government sources.

Q: Did the ethics rule apply to a county sheriff?
A: Yes. The AG said the sheriff was an “other public officer” covered by the provision.

Q: Was every reward to a sheriff prohibited?
A: The opinion limited its conclusion to matters connected with sheriff services. It said the bar would not apply if the rewarded matter was wholly unrelated to those duties.

Background and statutory framework

The Wahkiakum County prosecutor asked about a postal-service reward under RCW 42.22.040(2). The AG examined the rule against rewards from outside government sources for matters related to public duties and explained why it covered a county sheriff. The letter also referred to older opinions about a sheriff's ability to claim or retain rewards, while keeping its own answer focused on receipt under the 1959 statute.

Source

Original opinion text

Attorney General John J. O'Connell

OFFICES AND OFFICERS ‑- COUNTY ‑- SHERIFF ‑- AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE A REWARD FROM THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT

A county sheriff is prohibited by RCW 42.22.040 (2) from receiving a reward from the United States Post Office Department for the performance of services instrumental to the solution of a crime relating to the postal service, unless the matter for which the reward is offered is in no way connected with or related to his services as county sheriff.


January 30, 1961

Honorable Alf M. Jacobsen
Prosecuting Attorney
Wahkiakum County
Cathlamet, Washington

Cite as: AGO 61-62 No. 5

Dear Sir:

By letter, previously acknowledged, you have requested an opinion of this office on a question which we paraphrase as follows:

Under the provisions of RCW 42.22.040 (2), is a county sheriff prohibited from receiving a reward offered by the United States Post Office Department for the performance of services which are instrumental to the solution of a crime relating to the Postal Service?

In our opinion a county sheriff is prohibited from receiving such a reward, unless the matter for which the reward is offered is in no way connected with or related to his services as county sheriff. Our reasons for this conclusion are set forth in our analysis.

ANALYSIS

RCW 42.22.040 (2), codifying subsection (2) of section 4, chapter 320, Laws of 1959, reads as follows:

"No officer or employee of a state agency, or other public officer shall, directly or indirectly, give orreceive or agree to receive any compensation, gift, [[Orig. Op. Page 2]] reward, or gratuityfrom any source except the state of Washington, its political subdivisions, or employing municipal government, for any matter connected with or related to his services as such an officer or employee unless otherwise provided for by law." (Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to the enactment of this statute, this office had occasion to pass upon certain aspects of the problem of receipt of rewards by county sheriffs other than the precise aspect of the problem which is here presented. In an opinion to the Honorable F. M. Turner, Prosecuting Attorney, Stevens County, dated July 17, 1933, a copy of which is enclosed herein, we concluded that a sheriff has no legally enforceable claim to a reward for the rendition of services which it was his official public duty to perform. See also, AGO 57-58 No. 148, dated January 17, 1958, to the Honorable John Panesko, Prosecuting Attorney of Lewis County, a copy of which is also enclosed.

In addition, in the above cited opinion of July 17, 1933 to the Honorable F. M. Turner, we ruled, pursuant to § 4218 Rem. Comp. Stat. (now RCW 36.18.140), that any reward received by a county sheriff for the performance of an official public duty must be paid over by him to the county treasurer.

Of course, unlike the instant matter involving as it does an interpretation of the above quoted 1959 statute, in neither of the above noted opinions was the source of the reward considered to be material. Nor were the writers of these two opinions concerned with the precise question of the right of a county sheriff toreceive, as distinguished from the right to claim and collect or the right toretain, a reward for a matter related to the performance of his official public duty.

In relation to the question here presented, the key words and phrases in the portion of the 1959 statute above quoted, as indicated by our emphasis of same, are "other public officer," "receive or agree to receive," "reward," "from any source except the state of Washington, its political subdivisions, or employing municipal government," and "for any matter connected with or related to his services as such an officer." By the terms of your question, that which is here offered is without doubt a reward. Manifestly it is a reward from a source other than the state of Washington, its political subdivisions, or employing municipal government; i.e., it is a reward offered by the United States Post Office Department. It is evident that the applicability of [[Orig. Op. Page 3]] the statute as a bar to the receipt of such a reward by a county sheriff is dependent upon whether a county sheriff, who clearly is not an officer or employee of astate agency (state agency being defined by subsection (1) of section 2 of the Act‑-cf. RCW 42.22.020 (1)‑-as "any state board, commission, bureau, department, division, or tribunal other than a court"), is an "other public officer" within the meaning of the statute.

We think it is beyond doubt that a county sheriff is a public officer, as distinguished from a mere public employee. Quoting fromState ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 Pac. 411 (1927), the Washington Supreme Court, inState ex rel. McIntosh v. Hutchinson, 187 Wash. 61, 59 P. (2d) 1117 (1936) set forth the test bearing on this subject as follows:

"After an exhaustive examination of the authorities, we hold that five elements are indispensable in any position of public employment, in order to make it a public office of a civil nature: (1) It must be created by the Constitution or by the legislature or created by a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the legislature; (2) it must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public; (3) the powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative authority; (4) the duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power, other than the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office, created or authorized by the legislature and by it placed under the general control of a superior officer or body; (5) it must have some permanency and continuity and not be only temporary or occasional. In addition, in this state, an officer must take and file an official oath, hold a commission or other written authority, and give an official bond, if the latter be required by proper authority."

An examination of chapter 36.28 RCW, creating the office of county sheriff and prescribing in detail the qualifications and duties of the person holding this office leaves no doubt but that a county sheriff is a public officer within the purview of the above quoted test.

However, it is equally clear that a county sheriff, though a public officer, is essentially an officer of a political subdivision of the state of Washington, rather than an officer of [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] the state government itself. Thus, if it was the intention of the legislature, in enacting subsection (2) of section 4, chapter 320, Laws of 1959 (RCW 42.22.040 (2)), supra, to merely limit the activities of officers of thestate government, it would follow that the statute in question would have no application to a county sheriff. However, we do not believe that this is the case. It will be noted that the portion of the statute excepting certain sources of rewards from the general prohibition contained therein reads, "from any source except the state of Washington, its political subdivisions, or employing municipal government, . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) This modification of the phrase "municipal government" with the word "employing" makes it clear, we believe, that the legislature intended that this particular subsection of the subject statute, prohibiting the receipt of rewards except from certain designated sources, should cover officers of municipal governments, including county governments, as well as officers of the state government. Therefore, we conclude that this subsection of the statute is applicable to a county sheriff.

Consequently, it follows that pursuant to this statutory provision, a county sheriff is prohibited from receiving a reward from the United States Post Office Department for the performance of services which are instrumental to the solution of a crime relating to the postal service unless in fact the matter for which the reward is offered is in no way "connected with or related to his services as" county sheriff.

We trust that the foregoing will be of assistance to you.

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. O'CONNELL
Attorney General

PHILIP H. AUSTIN
Assistant Attorney General

What does Washington law say today, for your facts?

This opinion is from 1961. Ezel checks the current Washington statutes and case law, applies them to your situation, and cites what it relies on.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace