Could Washington let a city council choose whether its clerk or attorney was elected or appointed?

Short answer The AG said proposed legislation could give eligible second- and third-class city councils that choice by ordinance without unconstitutionally delegating legislative power. Its answer concerned city clerks and, in third-class cities, city attorneys under the specific proposal.
State
Washington
Opinion
AGO 55-57 No. 10
Issued
January 17, 1955
Issued by
Washington State Office of the Attorney General

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This page answers the general question as of 1955. Ask about yours and see what current Washington law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Washington State Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Washington attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

The Washington AG concluded that proposed legislation could let certain city councils choose by ordinance whether the city clerk or city attorney would be elected or appointed. The proposal covered clerks in second- and third-class mayor-council cities and attorneys in third-class cities. The AG treated selection of those local officers as a municipal matter the Legislature could leave to city councils without an invalid delegation of state legislative power.

This was an assessment of a proposed statute, not a claim that councils already had that choice under an enacted law.

The opinion states: “the determination of whether the offices of city clerk or city attorney shall be elective or appointive in second and third class cities, is a matter of local concern which may lawfully be left to the city council to decide by ordinance under power granted to it by the state legislature.” (source).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1955. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Would the proposed local choice violate the ban on delegating legislative power?
A: The AG said no. It characterized the method of choosing these city officials as a local concern.

Q: Which city positions did the proposal cover?
A: It addressed city clerks in second- and third-class mayor-council cities and city attorneys in third-class cities.

Q: Did the opinion itself give every council immediate authority to change selection methods?
A: No. It assessed whether the Legislature could enact a law granting that authority.

Background and statutory framework

The Association of Washington Cities asked about proposed legislation under Amendment VII of the Washington Constitution. The AG reasoned that the Constitution left regulation of city offices to general state law and that local selection methods could be delegated to municipal councils.

Source

Original opinion text

Attorney General Don Eastvold

CITIES AND TOWNS ‑- OFFICERS ‑- ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT OF ‑- NOT INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

A statute enacted by the state legislature providing that the city council may determine by ordinance whether certain city officials shall be elective or appointive would not constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power under Amendment VII of the Washington Constitution.


January 17, 1955

Honorable Chester Biesen
Executive Secretary
Association of Washington Cities
250 Smith Hall, University of Washington
Seattle 5, Washington Cite as: AGO 55-57 No. 10

Dear Sir:

By letter you have asked whether a statute providing that second and third class cities may, by ordinance, specify whether the offices of city clerk and city attorney are to be elective or appointive would constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power under Amendment VII, of the Washington Constitution.

In our opinion, such a statute would not constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.

ANALYSIS

A study is being made of proposed legislation to provide (1) that in cities of the second and third class operating under the mayor-council form of government, the city clerk either may be elected by the people or appointed by the mayor, as may be provided by ordinance, and (2) that in such third class cities the city attorney either may be elected by the people or appointed by the mayor, as may be provided by ordinance.

[[Orig. Op. Page 2]]

The Washington Constitution, though providing that certain county officers shall be elected under Article XI, § 5, does not provide for the election of city officials but leaves it to the legislature to determine how those offices shall be regulated. Article XI, § 10 provides that

" * * cities or towns heretofore or hereafter organized, and all charters thereof framed or adopted by authority of this Constitution shall be subject to, and controlled by general laws. * * "

Thus the legislature is given complete freedom to regulate cities and city officials as it seems fit.

The precise issue presented here is whether such proposed legislation would constitute invalid delegation of legislative authority under Amendment VII, of the Washington Constitution.

The general rule throughout the nation, recognized in Washington, is that the delegation by a state legislature to a municipal corporation of the power to legislate, subject to the paramount law, concerning local affairs, does not violate the inhibition against the delegation of the legislative function. Nelson v. Troy, 11 Wash. 435, 39 Pac. 974; Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17, 42 Pac. 625; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 43 L.Ed. 341, 19 S.Ct. 77 (1898); Cooley, Constitution Limitations, 389. The rule recognizes the fact that as to local matters, the city council has superior knowledge. 6 RCL 168, 169.

The question as to what matters are purely of local concern was discussed in Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 99 Misc. Rep. 66. 165 N.Y.S. 305, 312 (1917), in which the court analyzed the problem as follows:

" * * The distinction between powers purely municipal that can be delegated, and those which involve state functions and therefore cannot be delegated, is stated in McGrath v. Grout, 69 App. Div. 314, 320, 74 N.Y. Supp. 782. The former is said to relate to matters of local [[Orig. Op. Page 3]] government and local concern, with which the state at large has no specific duties to perform, and with which it has no general concern, while the latter includes matters in which the state at large has an interest, such as questions relating to the public health, education, taxation, and the like, which are therefore said to involve state functions. * * "

Is the determination as to whether city officials shall be elective or appointive merely a matter of local concern? InCraft v. Baker, 238 S.W. 389 (1922), the court of appeals in Kentucky indicated the answer is "yes". The court said at page 391, referring to legislation similar to that proposed here:

"The purpose of the enactment of the legislature seems to have been to delegate to the council the authority to determine the manner of the selection of the mayor, because of the latters presumed superior knowledge of local conditions, and, if in its judgment it was necessary or profitable to change the manner of selecting the mayor from election by the voters to appointment by the council, it might do so if it exercised the power in the manner and the time prescribed."

Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court inFitzgerald et al. v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913), held that a constitutional provision giving cities powers of local self government included the right to determine whether certain officials shall be elective or appointive.

In discussing a statute which allowed cities of the first class to select the type of city government they wanted, the court said inState ex rel. Hunt v. Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 79, as follows:

" * * the rule is well established that a statute does not delegate legislative power so long as it is complete in itself when it has passed the legislature and has been approved by the governor, even though it is left to some local body [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] to determine whether and when it shall go into operation. * * "

Therefore, it is our opinion that the determination of whether the offices of city clerk or city attorney shall be elective or appointive in second and third class cities, is a matter of local concern which may lawfully be left to the city council to decide by ordinance under power granted to it by the state legislature.

Very truly yours,

DON EASTVOLD
Attorney General

EDWARD M. LANE
Assistant Attorney General

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