Could a Vermont sheriff charge a service-of-process fee for finding the right address or otherwise locating someone, even if no service was actually made?

Plain-English summary

The Washington County Sheriff asked whether the service-of-process fees in 32 V.S.A. § 1591(1) covered preparatory work, like determining a correct address, when no service was ultimately made. Senior Assistant Attorney General Robert Gagnon answered that the statute keyed payment to "presentation of each return of service," meaning the act of filing a return that the process was actually served. No return, no fee.

The opinion treated this as a plain-language reading reinforced by the statute's structure. The fees were flat amounts. The legislature had not chosen to compensate per hour or per attempt. Mileage was paid through a separate statutory provision. The drafters had thought about how to handle ancillary costs and chose not to authorize fees for preparatory effort.

So even where address-finding or locator work made eventual service possible, that work fell outside what § 1591(1) compensated.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The civil process fee schedule in 32 V.S.A. § 1591 has been amended several times since 2000. Anyone evaluating a current sheriff's fee should consult the present version of § 1591 and any successor statutes governing service-of-process compensation.

Historical summary

For sheriffs (at the time): No fee could be charged for locator services or unsuccessful attempts. The fee schedule paid the flat rate only when a return was filed certifying actual service.

For statutory interpretation researchers: This is a tidy worked example of the expressio unius canon. Because the legislature explicitly authorized mileage reimbursement, its silence on time and incidental costs was treated as deliberate.

For civil litigators: The opinion is useful background when sheriffs or counties try to bill for unsuccessful service attempts. The AG's view at the time was that such bills had no statutory authorization.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• 32 V.S.A. § 1591(1) (sheriff's service-of-process fees, payable on return of service)

Source

• Landing page: https://ago.vermont.gov/about-attorney-generals-office/attorney-general-opinions
• Original PDF: https://ago.vermont.gov/sites/ago/files/2025-11/IO%207-18-00.pdf

Original opinion text

July 18, 2000

Informal Opinion #2000-4

Donald G. Edson, Sheriff
Washington County Sheriff's department
P.O. Box 678
Montpelier, Vermont 05601
Dear Sheriff Edson:
You have asked for an interpretation 32 V.S.A. §1591(1), which relates to the fees payable for certain types of service of process in civil cases. These fees, provided for in subsections (1)(A)(ii)(iii) and (iv), are payable "upon presentation of each return of service for the service of…" It has long been the practice for no fees to be sought or paid unless service has in fact been effected. There is now a question as to whether or not the determination of and reporting of correct address information or some other assistance in locating the individual to be served is a service for which this section authorizes payment of a fee. The plain meaning of the language of the statute would preclude any payment except for the actual service of the process. It is the act of filing a return of service stating that the process was in fact served that triggers payment. Actual service is the activity for which the fees are authorized. Even though one were to make several trips to effect service of process and many hours might be expended in effecting the service, the time involved is not the basis for the fee. It is a flat rate for the act of serving the process. It is illustrative to note the treatment given mileage to effect service in the statute. It is dealt with by it's own separate legislative provision. The legislature created a special provision to deal with mileage reimbursement. They made no such provision for time or other incidental expense that might be involved in effecting the service of process. Therefore, even though the activities under discussion have value and might lead to a successful service of process or make it happen more efficiently, these preparatory acts are not made compensable under the statute. Payment of the fee is presently authorized only for the actual service of the process.

Should you have any questions, please let me know. Thank you for this opportunity to be of service. Sincerely yours,

Robert W. Gagnon
Senior Assistant Attorney General