Why did Virginia AG Jay Jones withdraw his January 16, 2026 opinion (26-001) on firearm licensing and assault weapon bans, and what does the withdrawal mean for people who relied on the original opinion?
Plain-English summary
On January 16, 2026, Virginia Attorney General Jay Jones issued Opinion 26-001 in response to a request from Delegate Michael Webert. That opinion analyzed whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibit (a) a licensure requirement to purchase a firearm and (b) a ban on commonly used firearms, accessories, and components.
Nine days later, on January 25, 2026, Jones withdrew Opinion 26-001 in its entirety. He explained the reason in plain terms: the original opinion rested on a "materially inaccurate factual and analytical premise," specifically the assertion that there is no history or tradition within the United States of jurisdictions requiring licensure or comparable governmental authorization prior to the purchase or acquisition of firearms. Jones concluded that this assertion was factually wrong: multiple U.S. jurisdictions had imposed licensing, permitting, or authorization requirements as a condition for firearm acquisition, both historically and in the modern era.
Because that historical assertion was integral to the opinion's Second Amendment analysis (which under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), requires modern firearm regulations to be consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation), Jones determined he could not stand behind the conclusions as written.
The withdrawal letter is careful about what it does and does not do. It does not adopt a contrary constitutional conclusion. It does not opine on the validity of any existing or proposed firearm legislation. It does not preclude a future opinion on the same or related questions. The withdrawal simply removes Opinion 26-001 from the body of guidance the AG's office considers valid. Jones invited Delegate Webert (or any other authorized requester) to submit a renewed or reformulated request that would be evaluated independently and on its merits.
This is an unusual but procedurally significant action. Withdrawals of formal AG opinions are rare. When they happen, they signal that the AG's office has identified a defect serious enough to warrant retracting the prior guidance entirely rather than merely supplementing or clarifying it.
What this means for you
If you relied on Opinion 26-001 in policy or compliance decisions
Stop relying on it. The opinion has been formally withdrawn and "should not be cited, relied upon, or treated as reflective of the current views of the Office of the Attorney General." Any policy memorandum, compliance plan, or legal argument that cites Opinion 26-001 should be revised to remove that reliance.
If you cited 26-001 in litigation, court filings, or administrative submissions, consult counsel about whether you need to file a notice of supplemental authority, withdraw the citation, or otherwise address the withdrawal with the tribunal.
If you are a Virginia legislator considering firearm legislation
The withdrawal removes the AG's January 16 guidance from the analytical landscape. As of the withdrawal date, the Office of the Attorney General has not opined on whether the Second Amendment or the Virginia Constitution prohibit licensure requirements or bans on commonly used firearms.
If you want guidance on either question, you can submit a new request under § 2.2-505. Jones expressly invited "a renewed or reformulated request" and noted that any such request will be evaluated independently and on its merits. A reformulated request that engages with the actual historical record of firearm-licensing regimes (for example, the New York Sullivan Act of 1911, various state and local permit-to-purchase regimes, modern carry-permit licensing) would receive a fresh analysis.
If you are a Second Amendment attorney
The withdrawal is an admission that the historical-tradition prong of the Bruen test was incorrectly applied in 26-001. The historical record actually does include multiple jurisdictions imposing licensing or permitting requirements before firearm acquisition. The Bruen analysis must engage with that record.
This withdrawal does not bind you, of course, and you remain free to argue any position. But the prior AG opinion is no longer useful as authority for the proposition that no historical tradition supports licensing requirements. The withdrawal letter itself can be cited for the more limited proposition that the AG's office acknowledges the existence of historical licensing tradition.
If you are a firearm dealer or industry compliance professional
The withdrawal does not change any current Virginia statute or regulation. Firearm sales in Virginia continue to be governed by the operative Virginia statutes (background check requirements, age requirements, prohibited-person rules) and federal law. The withdrawal of an advisory opinion has no direct operational effect on retail compliance.
What it does is remove a piece of legal commentary that some advocates may have used to argue against future licensing or restriction proposals. Future legislative debate is now back to a baseline without that commentary.
If you are a journalist or civic researcher
The withdrawal is itself a story. It documents a candid admission by a sitting AG that a recent formal opinion was based on an incorrect historical premise. The reasoning matters: the Bruen test makes historical evidence dispositive in many Second Amendment cases, so getting the history wrong leads to wrong conclusions. The withdrawal also signals that the AG's office is willing to retract opinions when defects are found, which is itself a procedural norm worth noting.
The substance of what historical licensing regimes actually existed is independently researchable: the Sullivan Act of 1911, the various 19th-century state laws regulating firearm sales, modern permit-to-purchase regimes in states like Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland.
Common questions
Q: Is Opinion 26-001 still available to read?
A: The original PDF may remain accessible on the Virginia AG's website for transparency purposes, but it should not be relied upon. The withdrawal letter explicitly states the opinion "should not be cited, relied upon, or treated as reflective of the current views of the Office of the Attorney General."
Q: Does the withdrawal mean firearm licensing is constitutional?
A: No. The withdrawal does not adopt any contrary position. It simply removes the prior opinion. As of the withdrawal date, the AG's office has not taken a public legal position on the constitutionality of firearm licensure requirements or commonly-used-firearm bans.
Q: Why does the AG care about historical tradition for firearm laws?
A: After New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), the Supreme Court requires that modern firearm regulations be "consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." That makes historical evidence dispositive in many Second Amendment cases. An AG opinion that mischaracterizes the historical record is providing wrong guidance.
Q: Can the same delegate submit another opinion request on the same topic?
A: Yes. Section 2.2-505 of the Virginia Code authorizes the AG to issue advisory opinions to specified officials, including members of the General Assembly. Delegate Webert (or any other authorized requester) may submit a renewed request, and the AG has expressly stated that any such request will be evaluated on its merits.
Q: How often do AGs withdraw opinions?
A: Withdrawals are uncommon. Most AG opinions remain in the body of guidance even when later opinions or court decisions effectively supersede them. A formal withdrawal in writing nine days after issuance is unusual and signals a serious defect identified shortly after publication.
Q: What does this mean for someone who has been arguing in court that Virginia gun laws are unconstitutional?
A: Opinion 26-001 cannot be cited in support of that argument anymore. The substantive constitutional argument can still be made on its own merits, but it cannot rely on the AG's withdrawn opinion as authority.
Background and context
Section 2.2-505 of the Virginia Code authorizes the Attorney General to issue advisory opinions to certain state officials, including members of the General Assembly. These opinions are persuasive authority and inform public officials' interpretations of Virginia law, but they are not binding on courts.
The Bruen decision (New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)) restructured Second Amendment doctrine. Under Bruen, when modern firearm regulations are challenged, the government must show that the regulation is consistent with "the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." This makes historical evidence dispositive. Courts and AG opinions analyzing modern firearm laws routinely catalog historical analogues, and the strength of the historical record can make or break a regulation's constitutionality.
Opinion 26-001 was Jones's first significant Second Amendment opinion. The withdrawal letter does not detail which specific historical assertions were incorrect, but it identifies the core problem: the opinion asserted that no jurisdictions had historically required licensure for firearm acquisition. That assertion is contradicted by the actual record. New York's Sullivan Act of 1911 required a permit to possess a handgun. Other jurisdictions have imposed similar requirements at various points. Whether any of those historical regimes is a sufficient analogue to validate a particular modern licensing requirement is a complex legal question, but the unqualified assertion that no such regimes existed was factually wrong.
The withdrawal is a model of opinion-revision practice. It is candid about the reason. It does not pretend the original opinion was correct or try to salvage portions of it. It does not adopt a position on the underlying constitutional question, leaving that for a future fully informed opinion. It invites a renewed request and commits to evaluating it on its merits.
For the public reading these opinions, the lesson is that AG opinions are revisable. When new analysis or new evidence reveals a problem with an opinion, the office can and does pull the opinion. That is healthy practice. It also means that anyone relying on AG opinions for compliance or legal arguments should periodically check whether an opinion has been withdrawn or superseded.
Citations and references
Statutes:
- § 2.2-505, Va. Code Ann. (Attorney General advisory opinions)
Cases (background, not cited in the withdrawal letter itself):
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (history-and-tradition test for Second Amendment regulations)
Source
- Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
- Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2026/OAG-Opinion-Withdrawing-Opinion-26-001.pdf
Original opinion text
COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Jay Jones
Attorney General
202 North 9th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
January 25, 2026
The Honorable Michael J. Webert
Virginia House of Delegates
General Assembly Building, Room 714
201 North 9th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Dear Delegate Webert:
I am writing regarding Attorney General Opinion 26-001 dated January 16, 2026, in response to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia. The opinion issued addressed whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibit (i) a licensure requirement to purchase a firearm and (ii) a ban on commonly used firearms, accessories, and components.
Reason for Withdrawal
Upon subsequent review, I have determined that the January 16, 2026 opinion rests, in part, on a materially inaccurate factual and analytical premise, namely, the assertion that there is no history or tradition within the United States of jurisdictions requiring licensure or comparable governmental authorization prior to the purchase or acquisition of firearms.
That premise is incorrect. Multiple jurisdictions in the United States, both historically and in the modern era, have imposed licensing, permitting, or authorization requirements as a condition precedent to firearm acquisition. Because the challenged assertion was integral to the opinion's historical-tradition analysis, I do not have confidence in the opinion's conclusions as written.
Action Taken
Accordingly, I am withdrawing the January 16, 2026 advisory opinion in its entirety. The opinion should not be cited, relied upon, or treated as reflective of the current views of the Office of the Attorney General.
Scope and Effect of Withdrawal
The withdrawal does not:
1. adopt a contrary constitutional conclusion,
2. opine on the validity of any existing or proposed firearm legislation, or
3. preclude the Office from issuing a future opinion on related or the same questions.
The withdrawal reflects my obligation to ensure that advisory opinions accurately reflect relevant historical and legal authority and meet the standards expected of official guidance issued by the Commonwealth's Attorney General.
Future Requests
Delegate Webert, you or any other authorized requester may submit a renewed or reformulated request for an advisory opinion. Any such request will be evaluated independently and on its own merits.
Sincerely,
Jay Jones
Attorney General