VA 25-032 February 26, 2026

Can a Virginia local electoral board buy and install third-party software (like 'Ballot Verifier') that scans ballots and posts ballot images and cast vote records online for the public to inspect?

Short answer: No. Attorney General Jay Jones concluded that local electoral boards have no statutory authority to add software to their voting systems without State Board of Elections approval, and the comprehensive election integrity scheme enacted by the General Assembly does not contemplate making digital copies of ballots publicly available outside the narrow circumstances the law specifies.

Disclaimer: This is an official Virginia Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Virginia attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Prince William County's Electoral Board considered installing a third-party software product called "Ballot Verifier" on its voting machines. The software would capture digital images of every ballot cast, plus the corresponding cast vote record (CVR) showing how each ballot was tabulated, and post both to the electoral board's website. The vendor's pitch is "turning a black box into a glass box."

The Electoral Board secretary asked the AG whether the board could install the software. Attorney General Jay Jones said no, for two reasons:

A local electoral board cannot add software to a certified voting system without State Board of Elections approval. The State Board has supervisory authority over local boards. State Board guidance is explicit that "no change of any kind can be made to any voting system software or firmware unless the Department of Elections has been informed of the proposed change and made a determination on the scope and effects of those changes on the certification of the system."
Even if approved, posting images of every ballot online is incompatible with Virginia's election integrity scheme. The General Assembly built a comprehensive chain of custody for ballots: ballots are sealed, voting machines are locked, and access to the data on the machines is permitted only "(i) on the order of a court ... or (ii) on the request of an authorized representative of the State Board." Public viewing of ballot images is not on that list. The opinion concludes the legislative intent is to "guard the privacy and security of these ballots," not to make them publicly browseable.

The opinion does not say a transparency tool like this could never be used in Virginia. It says any such tool requires State Board approval, and even then, the public-viewing piece runs against the statutory chain of custody and probably requires legislative change.

What this means for you

If you are on a local electoral board

Do not procure or install third-party software for voting equipment without express written approval from the Virginia State Board of Elections, full stop. The opinion is direct: the local board's role is "the preparation of ballots, the administration of absentee ballot provisions, the conduct of the election, and the ascertaining of the results" (§ 24.2-109(B)), all subject to State Board oversight.

If your board has adopted a policy or signed a contract for software like Ballot Verifier without State Board sign-off, this opinion is grounds to halt and reverse that decision. Talk to your county attorney about unwinding any agreements, and refer the matter to the State Board for guidance.

If you are a registrar

You are part of the chain of custody for cast ballots and the storage devices from voting machines. Section 24.2-659 spells out what gets sealed, who gets it, and when it can be opened. The opinion is a reminder that this chain of custody is statutory, not advisory. If a local electoral board asks you to facilitate uploading ballot images online, this opinion is a clear basis to decline pending State Board direction.

If you advocate for greater election transparency

The opinion is not anti-transparency in spirit. It identifies legitimate transparency mechanisms the General Assembly has authorized: the statement of returns is publicly inspectable after the electoral board ascertains results (§§ 24.2-668(B), 24.2-658). Risk-limiting audits can require ballot inspection (§ 24.2-669(iv)). Court orders can authorize broader access. What the opinion forecloses is unilateral local-electoral-board action to make ballot images publicly available outside those channels.

If you want public ballot-image access in Virginia, the path is the General Assembly: amend § 24.2-659(F) and related provisions to authorize the practice, and direct the State Board to approve an associated software tool. Without statutory change, any public posting of ballot images is at significant legal risk.

If you are a county attorney advising an electoral board

Three things to do immediately if a board is considering this kind of software:
1. Confirm with the State Board of Elections whether the proposed software is on the approved vendor list and whether the planned modification has received certification.
2. Walk the board through §§ 24.2-625.1, 24.2-626, 24.2-629, 24.2-654, 24.2-657, 24.2-659, 24.2-667 through 24.2-672. The chain of custody is detailed and tightly limits who may view what, when.
3. Note the FOIA exclusion in § 24.2-625.1 for records that "describe protocols for maintaining the security of ballots or voting and counting equipment, or reveal the results of risk assessments of specific local electoral procedures." Public posting of ballot images and CVRs would arguably defeat the security purpose of this exclusion.

If you are a Virginia legislator

This opinion is a roadmap for what the existing Election Code permits and does not permit. If members want to authorize public ballot-image transparency tools, the statutes that need to change include at least § 24.2-659(F) (chain of custody and access limits), § 24.2-625.1 (security records FOIA exclusion), and § 24.2-629 (voting system standards). Authorization for the State Board to certify such tools could go in § 24.2-103.

If members want to harden the existing scheme against unauthorized modifications, the opinion provides a textual basis for additional enforcement provisions or penalties for unauthorized voting-system modifications.

Common questions

Q: Could the State Board of Elections itself approve a tool like Ballot Verifier?
A: The opinion does not directly resolve this. It says the State Board has authority over voting-system certification (§ 24.2-629). But the opinion's second reason for rejecting the proposal (incompatibility with the chain-of-custody scheme) suggests that even if the State Board approved the tool, the public-viewing function would conflict with statutory access limits. The cleanest path is statutory authorization, then State Board approval.

Q: What about posting only the CVR, without ballot images?
A: The opinion does not draw that line. It notes that "[d]igitally scanning the ballots and the CVR appears to create a new record" outside the statutory chain of custody, and that "making the images generally viewable is inconsistent with the provisions that allow for examination of election materials only in specified, exceptional circumstances." A CVR-only tool would face the same chain-of-custody objection in addition to the system-modification objection.

Q: Do election workers and party representatives still get the access they currently have?
A: Yes. The opinion does not change § 24.2-659, § 24.2-669, or § 24.2-671. Authorized representatives of each political party and each independent and primary candidate retain their existing rights to be present for ascertainment of results and for any examination of voting machines.

Q: What if the electoral board's intent is to "free up time otherwise spent fielding public record requests"?
A: The vendor's marketing materials make this argument. The opinion treats it as irrelevant to the legal analysis. Section 24.2-625.1 makes records about ballot security and risk assessments confidential and excluded from FOIA precisely because public availability could compromise election security. Reducing FOIA workload does not justify creating a new disclosure regime the General Assembly has not authorized.

Q: Is risk-limiting audit data publicly available?
A: Section 24.2-669(iv) authorizes ballot inspection "for the purpose of conducting a risk-limiting audit." The opinion does not address whether the audit's outputs are publicly disclosable. Risk-limiting audit results are typically reported in summary form by the State Board; how raw inputs are handled is governed by State Board policy and the FOIA exclusion in § 24.2-625.1.

Q: Could a private group set up a website that posts ballot images obtained through FOIA or a court order?
A: The opinion does not address private parties. It addresses what a local electoral board can do. FOIA access to ballot security records is itself constrained by § 24.2-625.1.

Background and statutory framework

Virginia's election code divides authority between the State Board of Elections (and its Department of Elections) at the top, and city and county electoral boards plus general registrars at the local level. The State Board, "through the Department of Elections, shall supervise and coordinate the work of the county and city electoral boards and of the registrars to obtain uniformity in their practices and proceedings and legality and purity in all elections" (§ 24.2-103(A)).

Voting system certification is an explicit State Board function. Local boards can buy and use only voting systems "of a kind approved by the State Board" (§ 24.2-626(A)). Vendors apply to the State Board for certification (§ 24.2-629(A)), and the system must meet detailed performance and security requirements (§ 24.2-629(B)). Once certified, no software or firmware change is allowed without State Board notification and a determination on the scope and effects (GREB Handbook § 4.2, cited in the opinion).

The chain of custody for ballots and voting machines is granular. Officers of election close the polls (§ 24.2-654), determine and announce results (§ 24.2-657), enter the count on the statement of results (§ 24.2-658), and seal voting machines (§ 24.2-659). The statement of returns is delivered to the clerk of court or general registrar; ballots, pollbooks, machine data devices, and keys go in sealed envelopes (§§ 24.2-659, 24.2-668). The next day, the local electoral board ascertains results (§ 24.2-671) and may correct the officers' returns (§ 24.2-672). Voting machines stay locked and sealed until the recount deadline passes; access is allowed only on court order or State Board direction (§ 24.2-659(F)).

Read together, these provisions express what the opinion calls a "comprehensive procedure to ensure election integrity" and a "tightly regulated scheme [that] evinces a legislative intent to guard the privacy and security of these ballots." Adding public ballot-image viewing on top of this scheme by local-board action conflicts with both the statutory access limits and the broader principle that "when [the law] specifies the method by which something shall be done, it implies that it may not be done otherwise" (Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356 (1982)).

Citations and references

Cases:
- Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356 (1982)

Source

Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2026/25-032-Moyer-Issued.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General

Jay Jones
Attorney General

202 North 9th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120

February 26, 2026

Mr. Marcus Moyer
Secretary, Prince William County Electoral Board
9250 Lee Avenue, Suite 1
Manassas, Virginia 20110

Dear Mr. Moyer:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented

You inquire regarding the authority of a local electoral board to install software purchased from a private business on voting or counting machines. You specifically ask about software that records, and allows for public display of, a digital image of each ballot in real time along with the Cast Vote Record (CVR), which translates the marks on the ballot into an ongoing tabulation of votes.

Response

It is my opinion that a local electoral board has no authority to add software to its voting system without approval from the State Board of Elections nor to display publicly a digital copy of a ballot or the CVR.

Background

Expressing a desire to "enhance legitimacy, trust, and transparency in [y]our electoral process," you relate that the electoral board is exploring the use of new software, specifically "Ballot Verifier," as part of its election practices. The software integrates with existing voting machine systems by, as you explain, "utiliz[ing] the digital ballot images captured by the scanners along with their corresponding CVRs" and then "compil[ing] and format[ting] this information for publication" on the electoral board's website. You advise that "[t]his tool enables the public to view digital images of all ballots cast in an election, accompanied by a record of how each ballot was recorded in the CVR."

Per the vendor, the software "proactively makes granular election data readily accessible online, eliminating barriers to transparency, and freeing up time otherwise spent fielding public record requests." Ballot Verifier enables individuals to "[a]ccess scanned images of all ballots and their corresponding cast vote records" and to "[b]rowse, zoom and compare side-by-side the exact CVRs and ballots linked to the [searched election] contests[,]" thereby "putting every ballot and CVR at your fingertips." As described by the software's marketing, "Ballot Verifier is the perfect way to 'turn a black box into a glass box.'"

Applicable Law and Discussion

In Virginia, local electoral boards generally are responsible for "the preparation of ballots, the administration of absentee ballot provisions, the conduct of the election, and the ascertaining of the results of the election." Local electoral boards, however, are subject to oversight by the State Board of Elections (State Board), who "through the Department of Elections, shall supervise and coordinate the work of the county and city electoral boards and of the registrars to obtain uniformity in their practices and proceedings and legality and purity in all elections."

"Pursuant to its supervisory authority, the [State Board] is charged with promulgating regulations and issuing guidance on the appropriate methods by which local authorities are to implement the Commonwealth's election laws." The State Board also is required to "develop a description of the duties and responsibilities of the local electoral boards." In addition to "follow[ing] (a) the elections laws and (b) the rules and regulations of the State Board ... [,]" each electoral board member must "faithfully discharge all duties and responsibilities set forth in that description."

The General Assembly has enacted numerous statutes related to voting equipment and systems. Local governments are required to provide electronic voting systems at their expense, but only those "of a kind approved by the State Board" are permitted to be used. The General Assembly has set forth certain system requirements that must be met to be eligible for State Board approval. Among the specifications are the abilities to "correctly register or record and accurately count all votes cast[,]" to allow a voter to correct any errors, and to "ensure voting in absolute secrecy." Once approved, a system "may be adopted for use at elections[,]" but "[n]o form of voting system ... not so approved shall be adopted by any county or city."

In conformity with the governing statutes, the State Board's implementing guidance explains that "[c]hoosing a voting and counting system is at the discretion of the local electoral board, but the systems chosen must be from the [State Board] approved vendor and system list." Adopted systems remain subject to the State Board's supervisory power. The State Board instructs that

Modification to a previously certified voting system requires a determination of whether the proposed change requires full recertification or is de minimis. No change of any kind can be made to any voting system software or firmware unless the Department of Elections has been informed of the proposed change and made a determination on the scope and effects of those changes on the certification of the system.

In addition, the local electoral board, which "is responsible for the security of all voting systems," is required to "develop and annually update written plans and procedures to ensure the security and integrity of its electronic voting systems." Upon investigation or review, the State Board "may decertify any previously approved voting system if it no longer complies with the standards adopted by the State Board or has critical software or hardware issues."

Whether a particular voting system and associated software meet or continue to meet the applicable standards is a determination that rests with the State Board and is a question beyond the scope of an opinion of this Office. Based on the scheme described above, however, it is my opinion that a local electoral board may not install new voting system software unless it first has been approved by the State Board.

You indicate, however, that the data produced by the proposed software will not be restricted to the electoral board or other election officials for their use; rather, the intent is to use the software to afford the general public access to the scanned images of the ballot and CVR. I therefore caution that, apart from requiring that voting systems and modifications thereof be approved by the State Board, the General Assembly has established detailed procedures for ascertaining official election results and imposed restrictions on the access to voting systems and ballots.

In addition to pre-election security precautions, when the polls close on Election Day, the ballot counting machines are locked to prevent further voting. In the presence of select witnesses, officers of election "determine and announce the results as shown" by either the machines themselves or from a printed return sheet. The count is entered on the statement of results form prescribed by the State Board, and the voting machines are secured. The officers of elections then place the statement of results, pollbooks, any printed inspection and return sheets, data storage devices from the machines, and the keys to the machines in envelopes provided by the State Board. An officer of election then delivers that envelope to either the Clerk of Court or the General Registrar. All counted ballots, and those ballots which were "unused, defaced, spoiled [or] set aside" must also be delivered to the appropriate office by noon on the day following the election. That same day, the local electoral board meets "at or before 5:00 p.m." in order to ascertain the results; in ascertaining the results, the electoral board is permitted to correct the returns of the officers of election.

The keys or the data storage devices are placed under seal, and the voting systems "shall remain locked and sealed until the deadline to request a recount ... has passed and, if any contest or recount is pending thereafter, until it has been concluded." Access to the equipment is strictly limited:

Such [voting] machines and any envelope containing data storage devices shall be opened and all data examined only (i) on the order of a court ... or (ii) on the request of an authorized representative of the State Board, or the electoral board or general registrar at the direction of the State Board, in order to ensure the accuracy of the returns.

The authority to be present for any such examination generally is limited to representatives of each political party and each independent or primary candidate. Under the established scheme, only the statement of returns is to be made available for inspection, and only after the electoral board has ascertained the results.

It thus is clear that the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive procedure to ensure election integrity, one that includes a specific chain of custody for each cast ballot. This process does not contemplate that digital copies of ballots will be made available for public consumption; rather, the tightly regulated scheme evinces a legislative intent to guard the privacy and security of these ballots. Digitally scanning the ballots and the CVR appears to create a new record of these ballots and of the results, one that is not accounted for in the established chain of custody. Furthermore, making the images generally viewable is inconsistent with the provisions that allow for examination of election materials only in specified, exceptional circumstances. I find no authority for an electoral board to deviate from the proscribed procedures; rather "when [the law] specifies the method by which something shall be done, it implies that it may not be done otherwise."

In sum, in the absence of any express statutory authority establishing otherwise, I conclude that a local electoral board not only lacks power to procure and use any voting or counting system without prior approval from the State Board, but that the electoral board also may not introduce a tool into the established election process that alters the procedures set forth by the General Assembly or State Board.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that there is no statutory authority for a local electoral board to purchase then install software for voting machines that scan and make public the ballots or the CVR.

With kindest regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

Jay Jones
Attorney General