If ICE issues a detainer on someone in a Virginia sheriff's jail, can the sheriff tell ICE when the inmate will be released so ICE can come pick them up?

Subject

Whether a Virginia sheriff who has received an ICE detainer on an inmate may notify ICE of the inmate's scheduled release date so ICE can take custody.

Plain-English summary

Bedford County Sheriff Michael W. Miller asked AG Jason Miyares whether anything in Virginia law stops a sheriff from giving ICE prerelease notification once the sheriff has received an ICE detainer on an inmate. The AG's answer is no, the sheriff is not just permitted to do it but is expressly authorized to.

The opinion walks through three layers.

The federal layer. Immigration is a federal subject. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives DHS, which includes ICE, broad authority to identify, apprehend, and remove aliens. When state or local police hold someone whom ICE wants for removal, ICE can issue a detainer (Form I-247) under 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The detainer is a request that the local agency notify ICE before release so ICE can come and take custody, plus a request that the agency hold the person briefly for ICE pickup. The U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), recognized that Congress generally limits state and local officers to the formal arrangements under § 287(g) of the INA, but also confirmed that informal cooperation is allowed under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B). One example of permissible cooperation that the Supreme Court called out is letting federal immigration officials know when an inmate will be released.

The Virginia state layer. A sheriff in Virginia is a constitutional officer under Article VII, § 4 of the Virginia Constitution. Virginia Code § 53.1-116.2 makes the sheriff "the keeper of the jail" and § 15.2-1609 makes the sheriff responsible for the custody, feeding, and care of all prisoners. On top of that base, § 53.1-220.2 expressly authorizes a sheriff in charge of a facility holding an alien to "transfer custody of the alien to [ICE] no more than five days prior to the date that he would otherwise be released from custody," upon receipt of an ICE detainer. The AG reasoned that the explicit authority to transfer custody necessarily implies the authority to communicate with ICE about the inmate's release date. You cannot transfer custody on a precise schedule without telling ICE the schedule.

The local-control layer. Some Virginia jurisdictions have considered ordinances or directives telling sheriffs not to honor ICE detainers. The opinion closes with a footnote citing 2024 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. No. 24-002 and Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274 (2015), confirming that sheriffs as constitutional officers are not subordinate to local governing bodies and answer only to legislative control by state statute. So a county or city cannot order a sheriff to refuse to notify ICE under § 53.1-220.2. The discretion is the sheriff's.

There are also other Virginia statutes that already require sheriffs to play a cooperative role in immigration enforcement. Section 19.2-83.2 requires sheriffs to inquire about citizenship for those in custody on felony charges and to ask ICE about status. Section 53.1-218 requires reporting to ICE. Sections 19.2-81.6 and 19.2-82(B) authorize sheriffs to arrest illegally present aliens who returned to the U.S. after a felony-conviction deportation. The opinion does not say sheriffs must honor detainers; it says no Virginia law prohibits doing so, and § 53.1-220.2 affirmatively authorizes the cooperation.

What this means for you

If you are a Virginia sheriff or jail administrator

Section 53.1-220.2 is your statutory hook. When you receive an ICE detainer on an inmate, you may notify ICE of the inmate's scheduled release date so ICE can come and take custody, and you may transfer custody to ICE up to five days before the otherwise-scheduled release. The opinion tells you three operational things.

First, you do not need a 287(g) agreement to do this. The AG distinguishes between formal § 287(g) deputization (which would let your deputies act as immigration officers in defined ways) and the looser cooperation authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B). Prerelease notification falls in the latter bucket.

Second, the local board cannot stop you. The opinion's closing footnote confirms that sheriffs are not subordinate to county supervisors or city councils on this issue. If you want to honor ICE detainers, you may. If you do not, that is also your decision; the opinion is permissive, not mandatory.

Third, if you transfer custody under § 53.1-220.2, the inmate gets credit for the days remaining before the scheduled release. That comes from the second sentence of § 53.1-220.2 and protects against any double-counting if the inmate later returns.

A practical note. The opinion does not address Fourth Amendment limits on holding an inmate past their release date solely for ICE pickup. Multiple federal courts have ruled that holding a person past the lawful release time without a separate basis can be an unlawful seizure. If your operation involves any holding period beyond the scheduled release, get separate counsel on the constitutional limits; the AG's opinion authorizes notification and transfer up to and at release, not extended detention beyond it.

If you are a county or city attorney

Two takeaways. First, your governing body cannot pass an ordinance directing a sheriff to refuse ICE detainers. Roop v. Whitt and the 24-002 opinion are clear that the sheriff is not subject to the local government's control on the duties of office. Second, if your locality wants to set a policy on cooperation with ICE, the channel is education or persuasion, not directive. Coordination with the sheriff's office on documentation, training, and intake procedures is still appropriate; binding them is not.

If you are an inmate or family member of someone in a Virginia jail

If ICE issues a detainer on you or a relative, the sheriff is allowed under Virginia law to tell ICE when the release is scheduled and to transfer custody to ICE up to five days early. If you have a defense to removal (asylum, a green card application, U-visa or T-visa eligibility, or any other status claim), talk to an immigration attorney before the release date. Once ICE takes custody, you are in federal removal proceedings and the timeline is different. Your immigration counsel can also evaluate whether any of the Fourth Amendment cases on detainer-based holds give you a remedy if you were held past the scheduled state release.

If you are an immigration attorney representing an inmate

This opinion does not change the Fourth Amendment landscape on detainer holds. It addresses Virginia-law authority for prerelease notification and the five-day pre-release transfer authorized by § 53.1-220.2. If your client is in a Virginia jail and has an ICE detainer, plan for handoff to ICE custody on or before the scheduled release. Use the period before release to file any pending status applications, request stays, or coordinate with ICE counsel.

The opinion also notes that the discretion under § 53.1-220.2 is vested in the sheriff and not the local government. If you have been working with a city council or board of supervisors on a non-cooperation policy, the opinion forecloses that channel.

If you are a civil rights or immigrant-rights organization

The opinion is consistent with the trajectory in other Republican-administered AG offices: state-law authorization for cooperation with ICE detainers is read broadly, local non-cooperation is read as a constitutional non-starter under Roop v. Whitt's hierarchy of state-over-local on sheriff duties. Your advocacy options going forward are at the General Assembly (revise § 53.1-220.2 or add limits on cooperation) or in federal court (Fourth Amendment challenges to specific detainer-based holds).

If you are a Virginia legislator

This opinion takes § 53.1-220.2 as written and reads it as expressly authorizing prerelease notification and transfer. If you want to change that result, the place to do it is the statute itself. Several states (e.g., California, Illinois) have enacted state-level limits on cooperation with ICE detainers. The mechanism is statutory, not local-ordinance.

Common questions

Q: Does the sheriff have to honor an ICE detainer?
A: The opinion says the sheriff "may" cooperate. Virginia law authorizes it but does not mandate it. The discretion is the sheriff's.

Q: Can my city or county pass an ordinance telling the sheriff not to honor ICE detainers?
A: No. The opinion confirms that sheriffs are constitutional officers under Article VII, § 4 of the Virginia Constitution, not subordinate to local government. The 2024 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. No. 24-002 and Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274 (2015), control.

Q: Does the sheriff need a § 287(g) agreement to do this?
A: No. A § 287(g) agreement would let local officers actually perform immigration enforcement functions. Prerelease notification and transfer to ICE custody under § 53.1-220.2 are the looser kind of cooperation that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) allows without a formal agreement.

Q: How much advance time can the sheriff give ICE?
A: Section 53.1-220.2 authorizes transfer up to five days before the inmate's otherwise-scheduled release. The inmate gets credit for the days remaining.

Q: Can the sheriff hold the inmate past the scheduled state release date for ICE pickup?
A: The opinion does not address that question. Federal courts in multiple circuits have held that detainer-based holds beyond the lawful release time raise Fourth Amendment problems. Sheriffs should consult counsel on extended-hold policies.

Q: What if I'm in custody on a misdemeanor and ICE issues a detainer?
A: Section 53.1-220.2 applies whenever an alien is incarcerated and the sheriff receives an ICE detainer. The statute is not limited to felony custody. (The separate citizenship-inquiry provisions of § 19.2-83.2 and § 53.1-218 are felony-keyed, but the cooperation authority of § 53.1-220.2 is not.)

Q: Are sheriffs required to inquire about citizenship?
A: For inmates in custody on felony charges, yes. Section 19.2-83.2 requires it.

Q: Does this opinion authorize police on the street to arrest someone for being in the country illegally?
A: No. The opinion is about jails and inmates. Street-level civil immigration arrests by Virginia police, outside the narrow exceptions in § 19.2-81.6 and § 19.2-82(B) (returning aliens after a felony-conviction deportation), are not addressed and remain governed by Arizona v. United States and the federal preemption framework.

Background and statutory framework

The federal framework. The INA gives DHS broad authority over immigration administration and enforcement. ICE detainers (Form I-247) are issued under 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) when ICE has reason to believe an alien in state or local custody is removable. The detainer asks the receiving agency to notify ICE before release and to maintain custody briefly for ICE pickup. Arizona v. United States distinguished between the formal § 287(g) agreement, which deputizes local officers as immigration officers, and the broader cooperation under § 1357(g)(10)(B), which allows informal assistance like prerelease notification. Letting federal immigration officials know when an inmate will be released was specifically called out as permissible cooperation.

The Virginia framework. Sheriffs are constitutional officers under Article VII, § 4. Code § 53.1-116.2 designates the sheriff as keeper of the jail. Code § 15.2-1609 makes the sheriff responsible for all prisoners' custody, feeding, and care. Code § 19.2-83.2 requires sheriffs to inquire about citizenship for inmates held on felony charges and to ask ICE about status. Code § 53.1-218 requires reporting to ICE. Code §§ 19.2-81.6 and 19.2-82(B) authorize sheriffs to arrest illegally present aliens who returned to the U.S. after deportation following a felony conviction.

The provision the opinion turns on is § 53.1-220.2, enacted in 2008 (with later amendments). It says the sheriff in charge of the facility holding an alien "may, upon receipt of a detainer from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, transfer custody of the alien to [ICE] no more than five days prior to the date that he would otherwise be released from custody." The transferred inmate "shall receive credit for the number of days remaining" before the original release date. The AG read the explicit authority to transfer custody as necessarily including the predicate authority to communicate the release date to ICE.

The local-control overlay. Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274 (2015), held that sheriffs are not subordinate to local governing bodies on the duties of the office. The 2024 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. No. 24-002 (June 17, 2024), reaffirmed that "sheriffs, as constitutional officers, are not subordinate to the local government, and their duties are subject only to legislative control by state statute." The 1978-79 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 237 reaches the same conclusion. So a county or city resolution telling a sheriff to refuse ICE detainers does not bind the sheriff.

The federalism overlay. Immigration is federal. State and local cooperation operates inside the framework set by Congress in the INA. The opinion does not authorize anything beyond what § 1357(g)(10)(B) and § 53.1-220.2 allow, and it confirms that prerelease notification fits within both.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (immigration officer powers, including § 1357(g))
- 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (ICE detainer authority)
- Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-220.2 (transfer to ICE upon detainer)
- Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-116.2 (sheriff as keeper of jail)
- Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1609 (sheriff custody and care of prisoners)
- Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-83.2 (citizenship inquiry on felony custody)
- Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-218 (reporting to ICE)

Cases:
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal preemption framework; cooperation under § 1357(g)(10)(B))
- Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274 (2015) (sheriff is constitutional officer, not subordinate to local government)
- United States v. Alas, 63 F.4th 269 (4th Cir. 2023) (operation of § 287(g))
- Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 924 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2019) (DHS removal as enforcement tool)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2024/24-031-Miller-issued.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Attorney General
202 North Ninth Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
September 5, 2024
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General

The Honorable Michael W. Miller
Sheriff, Bedford County

1345 Falling Creek Road
Bedford, Virginia 24523

Dear Sheriff Miller:

Issue Presented

You ask whether a sheriff is prohibited by law from cooperating with federal immigration authorities by notifying United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers, after receipt of an ICE-issued detainer related to an inmate in the sheriff's custody, of the release of that inmate in order for ICE to attain custody of the inmate prior to or upon release.

Response

It is my opinion that sheriffs may cooperate with ICE with respect to inmates in their custody who are the subject of an ICE detainer by providing immigration officers prerelease notification of those inmates' scheduled releases.

Applicable Law and Discussion

It is well established that "[t]he office of sheriff is a constitutional office created pursuant to Article VII, § 4 of the Constitution of Virginia (1971), the duties [and powers] of which 'shall be prescribed by general law or special act' of the General Assembly."¹ Your inquiry, however, relates to immigration, which "is an area traditionally regulated by the federal government."² Accordingly, a discussion regarding applicable federal law is warranted.

The United States government "has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens[,]"³ and "[f]ederal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex."⁴ As reflected in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),⁵ Congress has "established a 'comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization' and set 'the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.'"⁶ The law more specifically establishes categories of aliens who may not be admitted to the United States, identifies which aliens may be removed from the United States, and sets forth removal procedures.⁷

The INA clearly vests the Secretary of Homeland Security and his delegees (collectively, DHS), which includes ICE,⁸ with "the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens."⁹ Seeking removal of aliens is among the "enforcement tools" available to DHS,¹⁰ and "ICE officers are responsible 'for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States.'"¹¹ Among other enforcement activities, ICE officers and other authorized federal employees serving as "immigration officers" are permitted to detain aliens civilly while removal proceedings are pending and while awaiting their ultimate removal.¹² Doing so furthers the federal government's interests in "ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings" and "preventing danger to the community."¹³

In contrast to the authority conferred upon federal immigration officers to execute enforcement actions under the INA, Congress has authorized state and local officers to perform the same or similar functions only in specific, limited circumstances.¹⁴ One express method by which local officers can undertake such functions is through a formal arrangement entered into pursuant to Section 287(g)(1) of the INA, which "permits ICE to deputize local law enforcement officers to perform immigration enforcement activities pursuant to a written agreement[.]"¹⁵ In the absence of such an agreement or other specific authorization, nonfederal enforcement power is more limited, and state and local officers lack the full functionality of an immigration officer.¹⁶

Although a Section 287(g)(1) agreement may be the "principal example" of permissible cooperation identified by the U.S. Supreme Court, "consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system" even in the absence of a formal agreement.¹⁷ The INA therefore otherwise permits state and local officers without "immigration officer" status to "cooperate with [federal agencies] in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States."¹⁸ The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]here may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation under the federal law[,]"¹⁹ but it also has highlighted that DHS recognizes "allow[ing] federal immigration officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities" as an example of permissible cooperation.²⁰

DHS regulations correspondingly authorize ICE officers to issue a detainer to state and local law enforcement agencies when the agency is holding an alien who is subject to removal proceedings.²¹ The detainer advises the receiving law enforcement agency that DHS "seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien[,]"²² and it "request[s] that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible."²³ Accordingly, state and local officials "can also assist the Federal Government by responding to requests for information about when an alien will be released from their custody[,]"²⁴ and ICE detainers facilitate "the orderly administration of federal immigration laws" through "cooperation between local and federal authorities."²⁵

In Virginia, "[a] sheriff may exercise all powers that are conferred upon him expressly in the law, as well as all powers that are necessarily implied from expressly-conferred powers, and he is free to discharge the duties of his office in the manner he deems appropriate."²⁶ Per statute, "[t]he sheriff of each county or city shall be the keeper of the jail thereof[,]"²⁷ and he is "charged with the custody, feeding and care of all prisoners confined [therein]."²⁸

Significant to your inquiry is Virginia Code § 53.1-220.2, which confers specific authority to sheriffs who are "in charge of the facility in which an alien is incarcerated" that is in addition to the general powers granted sheriffs over jails and their inmates. The General Assembly expressly provides in § 53.1-220.2 that the sheriff "may, upon receipt of a detainer from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, transfer custody of the alien to [ICE] no more than five days prior to the date that he would otherwise be released from custody."²⁹ Because the ability to transfer custody necessarily involves the authority to communicate with ICE regarding the alien's release date, I must conclude that the sheriff is permitted to honor an ICE detainer by advising ICE officers of the imminent release of an alien from the sheriff's custody.³⁰

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that no law precludes a sheriff from notifying United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, after receipt of an ICE-issued detainer related to an inmate in the sheriff's custody, of the release of that inmate in order for ICE to attain custody of the inmate prior to or upon release. On the contrary, it is my opinion that a sheriff is expressly authorized to cooperate with federal officials by providing them prerelease notification as requested by the detainer.³¹

With kindest regards, I am,
Very truly yours,

Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General

¹ 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 144, 144-45.
² United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529 (4th Cir. 2013). "The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012).
³ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394. This federal power stems from the United States government's "constitutional power to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,' and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations[.]" Id. at 394-95 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
⁴ Id. at 395.
⁵ 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
⁶ Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011) (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976)). For instance, "[u]nlawful entry and unlawful reentry into the country are federal [criminal] offenses." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326).
⁷ Arizona, 567 U.S at 395, 396 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182). "Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law." Id. at 396 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227). Federal law provides and governs the "exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States" and such determinations are made solely by immigration judges. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
⁸ 8 C.F.R. § 100.1.
⁹ 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). See 6 U.S.C. § 112(b)(1) (authorizing the Secretary, with some exceptions, to "delegate any of the Secretary's functions to any officer, employee, or organizational unit of the Department"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 ("All authorities and functions of [DHS] to administer and enforce the immigration laws are vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary . . . may, in the Secretary's discretion, delegate any such authority or function to any official, officer, or employee of [DHS.]"). Enforcement powers previously resided with the Attorney General but were transferred to DHS in 2002. Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 671, 677 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 402, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002)). Nonetheless, "the [U.S.] Attorney General retains the authority to administer removal proceedings and decide relevant questions of law." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2 (2019).
¹⁰ Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir. 2019). "[T]he removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409.
¹¹ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 397 (quoting DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, p. 2 (2011)).
¹² 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a, 1231; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1, 1241.2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (defining "immigration officer" to mean certain federal employees designated "to perform the functions of an immigration officer specified by [applicable law]"); 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (defining "immigration officer" to mean the enumerated classes of "employees of the Department of Homeland Security"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (setting forth powers of immigration officers); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (same).
¹³ Huanga v. Decker, 599 F. Supp. 3d 131, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).
¹⁴ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408; Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451, 463 (2013).
¹⁵ United States v. Alas, 63 F.4th 269, 274 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Sosa-Carabantes, 561 F.3d 256, 257 (4th Cir. 2009)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 574 (2024). The Fourth Circuit recently explained that, under § 287(g)(1), upon specified conditions being met, "certain qualified state officers and employees specified by the agreement may enforce federal immigration laws." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) & (2)). The prescribed agreement form is available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf.
¹⁶ See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408; Santos, 725 F.3d at 463.
¹⁷ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408, 411-12.
¹⁸ 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B).
¹⁹ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410.
²⁰ Id. (citing DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Guidance on State and Local Governments' Assistance in Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters 13-14 (2011)). The Arizona Court noted other, specific examples of permissible cooperation as defined under the INA: authorization by the Secretary of DHS in response to an actual or imminent "mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States"; arrest "in [the] specific circumstance" of a noncitizen who has been convicted of a felony, deported, and returned, only "after consultation with the Federal Government"; and authorization "to arrest for [the federal crime of] bringing in and harboring certain aliens[.]" Id. at 408-09 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(10), 1252(c), 1324(c)).
²¹ 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (authorizing immigration officers to issue, at any time, "a Form I-247, Immigration Detainer—Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency").
²² Id.
²³ Id.
²⁴ Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)).
²⁵ Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989), cited in Gonzalez v. Morris, No. 20-20359-CV-KING, 2020 WL 13548616, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2020).
²⁶ 2019 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 96, 96-97 (footnotes omitted).
²⁷ Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-116.2 (2020).
²⁸ Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1609 (2018).
²⁹ Section 53.1-220.2 (2018). The statute further provides that, "[u]pon transfer of custody, . . . the alien shall receive credit for the number of days remaining before he would otherwise have been released."
³⁰ I note that Virginia law recognizes other situations in which sheriffs can play a cooperative role in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. For instance, sheriffs are required to inquire as to the citizenship of those in custody for felony offenses and then inquire of ICE as to the alien's status so that results can be reported in turn to other state agencies. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-83.2 (2022), accord § 53.1-218 (2020). See also §§ 19.2-81.6 (2022) & 19.2-82(B) (2022) (setting forth the authority, conditions, and procedures for a sheriff to make arrests of illegally present aliens again in the United States after departure subsequent to a felony conviction).
³¹ The discretion to notify ICE of the release is vested in the sheriff. See § 53.1-220.2. Local governing bodies are not authorized to restrict that discretion. See, e.g., 2024 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. No. 24-002, p. 3 (June 17, 2024) ("[S]heriffs, as constitutional officers, are not subordinate to the local government, and their duties are subject only to legislative control by state statute." (citing Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274, 280 (2015))); 1978-79 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 237, 237 ("As a constitutional officer, the sheriff is not subject to the control and jurisdiction of the governing body.").