Can the City of Alexandria ban gas-powered leaf blowers under its noise-control authority?

Plain-English summary

Delegate Elizabeth Bennett-Parker asked the AG whether Alexandria could amend its noise-control ordinance either to ban all leaf blowers (by repealing the existing exemption for "power lawn and garden equipment") or to ban only gas-powered leaf blowers (by narrowing the exemption to electric equipment). AG Miyares concluded both approaches are within the City's authority.

The path runs through Alexandria's city charter rather than general statute. The Charter gives the City the power "to compel . . . the elimination of unnecessary noise . . . and to compel the abatement or removal of any and all other nuisances." That is an express grant of noise-control authority. From it, the AG drew a fair implication that the City can regulate noise-producing devices, including by use restrictions or outright bans, when those devices typically generate noise above the City's adopted decibel thresholds.

Two settled rules support the conclusion. First, "where the state legislature grants a local government the power to do something but does not specifically direct the method of implementing that power, the choice made by the local government as to how to implement the conferred power will be upheld as long as the method selected is reasonable." Second, the General Assembly has considered, but not enacted, bills granting localities express leaf-blower authority (e.g., S.B. 305, 2024 Reg. Sess.). The AG noted that legislative history about a failed bill does not by itself control, and the existing charter authority is sufficient on its own.

The AG was careful not to interpret Alexandria's local ordinances directly (as a longstanding Office practice). The conclusion is that the City has the underlying Dillon Rule power to amend its ordinance in either of the proposed ways. Whether a specific amendment, as drafted, is well-tailored to the empowering language is a question for the City's attorneys.

What this means for you

If you are a resident of Alexandria

The City has clear authority to restrict or ban leaf blowers. Whether and how it does so is a policy decision before the City Council. If a ban is enacted, you would need to plan for either electric-only equipment or non-power alternatives (rakes, brooms) for yard work, depending on the specific ordinance.

If you operate a landscaping or lawn care business in Alexandria

Track ordinance amendments closely; a transition from gas to electric leaf blowers is a real operational and capital-equipment change. Comparable cities (D.C., Bethesda, MD, and others in the region) have already moved in this direction. Equipment upgrades, charging infrastructure, and route timing may all need adjustment.

If you sit on the Alexandria City Council

You have authority to amend the noise ordinance. Standard considerations apply: phase-in period, exemptions for emergencies and public-works operations, enforcement mechanism, penalties, and coordination with regional jurisdictions. The opinion does not dictate any of those choices.

If you are an Alexandria city attorney drafting the ordinance

The AG opinion endorses the underlying authority but disclaims direct interpretation of Alexandria's noise ordinance text. Your job is to ensure the amendment articulates a reasonable connection to the express charter grant (eliminating unnecessary noise) and to the City's adopted decibel framework. Keep findings tied to noise impact rather than to other policy goals (air quality, climate), since those would invoke different (and less clearly granted) charter authorities.

If you are a city council member in another Virginia locality considering a leaf-blower ordinance

Check your charter first. Alexandria's authority comes from a specific charter clause about compelling the elimination of unnecessary noise. Other charters may have similar or broader language, but some may not. If your locality's noise authority is weaker, the Dillon Rule analysis may come out differently. Without a charter or general-law foundation, an ordinance is exposed.

Common questions

Q: Why didn't the AG just rely on the General Assembly's failure to pass S.B. 305?
A: Failed legislation can sometimes inform construction of an ambiguous statute, but it is not dispositive. More importantly, the AG did not need to rely on it: the Charter's express noise-elimination clause already supplies the authority. The failed bill would have made the authority more explicit, not created it.

Q: What is the "reasonable method" rule?
A: A Virginia Supreme Court doctrine (Advanced Towing Co. v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supvrs., 280 Va. 187) holding that when a state grant gives a locality a power but not a method of exercise, the locality may choose any reasonable method. Banning a class of devices that typically generate prohibited noise is one reasonable method of "compelling the elimination of unnecessary noise."

Q: Could the City regulate leaf blowers based on air-quality concerns instead?
A: A locality's air-quality authority is more constrained than its noise-control authority and is more directly tied to general-law grants. If Alexandria wanted to support a leaf-blower restriction primarily on air-quality grounds, the supporting authority would be different. The AG's analysis goes through the Charter's noise clause, which is the cleanest path here.

Q: Are gas leaf blowers really louder than electric?
A: The questioner represented to the AG that both gas and electric leaf blowers exceeded the residential 55 dB and commercial 65 dB thresholds in the City, but gas models were noted as typically louder. The AG accepted that framing without independently verifying the empirical claim. The legal authority would extend to either ban or to a narrower restriction; the empirical question is for the City Council's record.

Q: Does this opinion apply to other power equipment, like lawn mowers and chainsaws?
A: The opinion's logic does. The Charter clause refers generically to "unnecessary noise" and "nuisances," and the City could presumably extend its analysis to other power equipment that exceeds adopted decibel limits. Each amendment would be evaluated on its own reasonable-method record.

Background and statutory framework

Virginia's Dillon Rule limits local government authority to powers expressly granted, fairly implied, and essential to declared local purposes. City charters are the primary express-grant vehicle. Alexandria's Charter, in the noise/nuisance clause, gives the City explicit authority over noise abatement.

The City already adopted noise regulations (Title 11, Chapter 5 of the Alexandria City Code) keyed to decibel thresholds: 55 dB at the property boundary in residential areas, 65 dB in commercial. The current ordinance contains an exemption for "power lawn and garden equipment." The proposed amendments either (a) repeal the exemption, banning leaf blowers along with other power lawn equipment that exceeds the limits, or (b) narrow the exemption to electric devices, leaving gas-powered devices subject to the standard noise prohibition.

The AG used the Virginia Supreme Court's reasonable-method doctrine to bridge the gap between Charter grant and ordinance method. The grant ("compel the elimination of unnecessary noise") does not specify the regulatory mechanism. A use-prohibition is one reasonable mechanism. Variations in which devices are banned (all power lawn equipment vs. only gas-powered leaf blowers) are alternative reasonable methods.

The opinion declined to interpret the City's ordinance directly. Virginia AG practice is that local-ordinance interpretation is for local counsel and the courts. The opinion adopts the questioner's framing of how the current ordinance works and reaches the underlying authority question.

Citations

• Charter of the City of Alexandria, Va. (noise/nuisance clause)
• Code of the City of Alexandria, Va., Title 11, Chapter 5 (noise control)
• Advanced Towing Co., LLC v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supvrs., 280 Va. 187 (2010) (reasonable-method rule)
• City of Richmond v. Bd. of Supvrs., 199 Va. 679 (1958) (Dillon Rule reformulated)
• Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg, 297 Va. 566 (2019) (locality cannot conflict with state law)
• City of Va. Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217 (1999) (implied power must be reasonably necessary)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2024/24-018-Bennett-Parker-issued.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Attorney General

Jason S. Miyares 202 North Ninth Street
Attorney General Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071

August 12, 2024 Fax 804-786-1991

Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1
The Honorable Elizabeth Bennett-Parker
Member, Virginia House of Delegates
107 South West Street, #152
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear Delegate Bennett-Parker:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of
the Code of Virginia.

Issues Presented

You inquire whether the City of Alexandria (“City”) is permitted to amend its noise control
ordinances either (1) to repeal an exemption afforded power lawn and garden equipment—thereby
incidentally banning the use of all leaf blowers in the City—or (2) to continue to allow the use of electric
leaf blowers but prohibit gas-powered leaf blowers.

Response
It is my opinion that the City may amend its noise ordinances in either of the manners you describe.
Applicable Law and Discussion

The Commonwealth of Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction, which provides that
a municipal corporation “can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient but
indispensable.”” “[T]he implied power need not be absolutely indispensable, and it is sufficient if it is

| The City’s noise control ordinances, as currently in effect, are set forth in Title 11, Chapter 5 of The Code of the
City of Alexandria, Virginia, 1981. I note that in addressing these issues, I adopt your framing of them as set forth in
your request; because this Office traditionally does not interpret local ordinances, see, e.g., 2004 Op. Va. Att’y Gen.
92, 93, the Dillon-Rule analysis herein assumes the correctness of your understanding as to the application of the
current ordinances and the practical effect of the described potential amendments.

2 City of Richmond v. Bd. of Supvrs., 199 Va. 679, 684 (1958) (quoting Donable’s Adm’r v. Town of Harrisonburg,
104 Va. 533, 535 (1905) (Dillon, J.)). When a “local ordinance exceeds the scope of this authority, the ordinance is
invalid.” City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enters., 253 Va. 243, 246 (1997).

Honorable Elizabeth Bennett-Parker
August 12, 2024
Page 2

reasonably necessary to effectuate a power expressly granted.” Such power can be conferred by general
law or special act.*

If there is “reasonable doubt whether legislative power exists, the doubt must be resolved against
the local governing body.”> However, “where the state legislature grants a local government the power to
do something but does not specifically direct the method of implementing that power, the choice made by
the local government as to how to implement the conferred power will be upheld as long as the method
selected is reasonable.’ A method is “unreasonable if it is contrary to the legislative intent or inappropriate
for the ends sought to be accomplished by the grant of the power.”

No statute expressly authorizes a locality to regulate the use of leaf blowers.® Nevertheless, the
City’s Charter grants the City the power “to compel . . . the elimination of unnecessary noise . . . and to
compel the abatement or removal of any and all other nuisances whatsoever within the city.” Pursuant to
this power, the City has adopted a series of ordinances that establish various noise regulations that include
restrictions based on the nature of the noise, decibel levels, time of day, and location.'® Generally, it is
unlawful to project noise beyond the boundaries of a property when that noise exceeds 55 decibels, when
in residential areas, or 65 decibels, when in commercial areas.'! You relate your understanding that both
gas and electric leaf blowers typically generate noise exceeding these decibel limits, but that under what
you dub an “exemption,” the use of “power lawn and garden equipment”—including both gas and electric

3 See 1975-76 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 62, 64 (quoting Connelly v. Clark Cnty., 307 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973)).

4 See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 18 Va. App. 103, 107 (1994) (citing VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2); 1981-82 Op. Va.
Att’y Gen. 461, 461 (citing VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3).

5 Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg, 297 Va. 566, 578 (2019) (quoting Bd. of Supvrs. v. Reed’s Landing
Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400 (1995)). The Virginia Supreme Court “recognize[s] the ‘reasonable selection of method’ rule,
which permits local governing bodies to exercise discretionary authority when a statutory grant of power has been
expressly made but is silent upon the mode or manner of its execution.” Advanced Towing Co., LLC v. Fairfax Cnty.
Bd. of Supvrs., 280 Va. 187, 193 (2010).

® City of Va. Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221 (1999).

7 Id. at 222 (holding that the City’s decision of hiring assistant city attorneys by appointment of the city council to
serve at the pleasure of the city attorney is a reasonable method of implementing the power to hire).

8 As you note, legislation granting localities explicit authority to ban gas-powered leaf blowers has been introduced
multiple times in the past few years, including during the 2024 regular session of the General Assembly, but those
measures have not been enacted. See, e.g., S.B. 305, 2024 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2024). This legislative history is not
dispositive of your inquiry. Although failed legislation may be considered in construing ambiguous statutes, see Tabler
v. Bd. of Supvrs., 221 Va. 200, 203 (1980), the rejection of a proposed amendment is not dispositive, for “several
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such [rejection], including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Central Bank of
Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)). Accordingly, I will not speculate
as to the understanding of certain members of the General Assembly in proposing, or the intent of the body as a whole
in rejecting, an amendment to the Code.

9 CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VA., § 2.04(m). See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1102 (2018) (providing a
general grant of police powers to cities and towns within their boundaries); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-980 (Supp.
2023) (allowing a locality, by ordinance, to “adopt a uniform schedule of civil penalties for violations of that locality’s
noise ordinance’’).

'0 See CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VA., Code §§ 11-5-1 through 11-5-16.

"Id. at § 11-5-5(a)(1)}(a)(3) (setting decibel limits for residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional use
areas).

Honorable Elizabeth Bennett-Parker
August 12, 2024
Page 3

leaf blowers—is permitted under the City’s current ordinance (subject to time restrictions), notwithstanding
the generally applicable decibel limitations.'* You seek guidance regarding potential amendments to the
City’s noise ordinances that would affect the use of leaf blowers.

The City is clearly authorized to enact noise restrictions, and it has done so. Noise control
ordinances “may be amended or repealed in the same manner . . . in which . . . ordinances are adopted.”’!
In granting the City the power to regulate excessive noise, the General Assembly was silent as to its method
of execution. Accordingly, the method the City uses to exercise its power will be upheld so long as it is
reasonable.'* Any “doubt in the reasonableness of the method selected is resolved in favor of the locality.”'°

As a general proposition, basing noise restrictions on decibel levels is a reasonable method for the
City to adopt in seeking the “elimination of unnecessary noise.” No state law required the City to afford
exceptions to leaf blowers or other specific equipment in the first instance; rather the City exercised its
discretionary authority to permit the general use of such equipment based on other policy considerations
and preferences existing at the time. Subsequently amending the noise control ordinances to repeal the
exemption of power lawn and garden equipment—necessarily banning all leaf blowers—because such
equipment exceeds otherwise applicable, reasonable decibel limits is also within the City’s discretionary
authority under its Charter to regulate noise.'°

It similarly follows that the City may amend its noise control ordinances to prohibit the use of gas-
powered leaf blowers while continuing to allow the use of electric-powered leaf blowers. To the extent that
gas-powered blowers emit greater decibels or pollutants than their electric counterparts, they present
distinct policy considerations.'’ The City is empowered not only to address noise concerns, but it is also
more broadly authorized to “adopt ordinances . . . for the preservation of the safety, health, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, morals and welfare of its inhabitants.”'® In the absence of General Assembly
action limiting the City’s discretion to adopt and amend ordinances designed to eliminate unnecessary noise,
it is reasonable for the City to create and limit noise-restriction exemptions with other policy goals in mind.
Finding no contrary legislative intent and that such means are consistent with the overall ends of noise
reduction, I conclude that this proposed amendment is a permitted exercise of the City’s express Charter
powers.

'2 See id. at § 11-5-2(32) (defining “power lawn and garden equipment” to include “snow and leaf blowers”);
§ 11-5-4(16) (prohibiting the use of power lawn and garden equipment only before 7:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m.
Monday through Friday, and before 9:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays).

'3 Section 15.2-1427(D) (Supp. 2023).

4 Hay, 258 Va. at 221.

lis) Id.

'6 See Advanced Towing Co., LLC, 280 Va. at 193 (holding, in addressing local power to regulate the storage of
towed vehicles, that “[w]ith respect to the territory within which vehicles are to be stored after being towed, the
statutory grant of power to regulate towing is silent as to the manner of its execution. It follows that the localities may
exercise reasonable discretion in prescribing, by ordinance, the territory within which towed vehicles shall be stored
without contravening the Dillon Rule.”).

'7 See Paul Hope, Gas vs. Electric Leaf Blower: Which Is Better?, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 16, 2023),
https://www.consumerreports.org/home-garden/leaf-blowers/gas-vs-electric-leaf-blower-which-is-better-
a6 16845602 1/.

'8 CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VA., § 2.04.

Honorable Elizabeth Bennett-Parker
August 12, 2024
Page 4

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the City of Alexandria has the power to repeal the noise control
provision that exempts power and lawn equipment from otherwise applicable decibel limits, thus banning
the use of leaf blowers in the City. It is my further opinion that the City may amend its noise control
ordinances to distinguish between leaf blower types, allowing the use of electric-powered leaf blowers but
prohibiting the use of gas-powered leaf blowers.'°

With kindest regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

Zw

Attorney General

'9 As determining “[w]hether a method chosen to implement an express or implied power is reasonable will depend
upon the circumstances of each case[,]”Hay, 258 Va. at 222, this Opinion is limited to the specific scenarios described
in your request. Although not present here, I can envision circumstances where the City’s implementation of its power
to regulate noise could be deemed arbitrary or capricious or to otherwise “expand[] the power beyond rational limits
necessary to promote the public interest,” rendering it unreasonable. /d. This Opinion also is limited to the legal
conclusions stated herein; I offer no comment on the merits of any particular policy the City may chose to adopt.