When a Virginia locality has part-time and temporary employees working for a constitutional officer (sheriff, Commonwealth's attorney, commissioner of revenue, court clerk), does the locality have to give them the vacation, sick leave, and legal-holiday benefits that § 15.2-1605 requires for 'employees'?

Subject

The definition of "employee" in § 15.2-1605 includes part-time employees, such that those employees are entitled to certain vacation and sick leave benefits. Temporary employees are not covered.

Plain-English summary

The Salem City Attorney asked the Virginia AG whether § 15.2-1605, which requires every county and city to provide at least two weeks of vacation, seven days of sick leave, and legal holidays "annually" to "each employee" of certain constitutional officers (Commonwealth's Attorney, commissioner of revenue, circuit court clerk, sheriff, plus court employees paid by the state), reaches part-time and temporary workers.

The AG split the answer. Part-time employees are covered because their employment arrangement is permanent (just at fewer hours), so the statute's annual-leave framework makes sense for them. Temporary employees are not covered because by definition they work only a portion of the year, and the statute's "annual" leave structure does not apply to a relationship that does not last a full year. The locality has discretion to set accrual rules, including proportional accrual for part-time workers based on hours worked.

The AG used standard Virginia statutory-interpretation principles: words must be read in context and in light of the statute's overall purpose. The purpose is protecting permanent workers from the wage-loss consequences of needing time off, an interest that does not transfer to seasonal hires.

What this means for you

For city and county HR / administrators

If your locality covers part-time employees of a constitutional officer with less leave than the § 15.2-1605 minimums (or none at all), you likely have a compliance gap. The minimums are 2 weeks vacation, 7 sick days, and the § 2.2-3300 legal holidays per year. You can structure how part-timers accrue leave: pro-rated by hours, slower accrual rate, or some other reasonable method. You do not need to give a part-time employee the same leave amounts on day one as a full-time employee.

For constitutional officers (sheriff, Commonwealth's Attorney, etc.)

Your part-time employees are entitled to the same baseline leave benefits as full-timers, even if your locality has resisted that. If your locality has been telling part-timers they get nothing, this opinion gives you ammunition for a compliance conversation. Temporary employees (defined as those hired for projects of three months or less, by analogy to § 15.2-1604(C)) remain outside the requirement.

For part-time employees of constitutional officers

You are entitled to annual paid vacation, sick leave, and legal holidays under § 15.2-1605, but the locality can spread those out over the year through an accrual schedule rather than giving you everything upfront. If you have been denied these benefits entirely, this AG opinion supports raising the issue. The Commonwealth's Attorney enforces the State and Local Government Conflict of Interests Act locally; benefit disputes typically go through HR or the constitutional officer.

For temporary or seasonal employees

The statute does not require leave benefits for you. The AG specifically excluded "temporary employees" from coverage, defined elsewhere in Virginia law as those hired on projects of three months or less. If your locality offers temporary workers leave benefits voluntarily, those continue at the employer's discretion.

Common questions

Which constitutional officers does § 15.2-1605 cover?

Sheriff, Commonwealth's Attorney, commissioner of the revenue, circuit court clerk, plus officers and employees of a court whose salary is paid by the Commonwealth. Treasurer is conspicuously absent from this list.

What is the minimum leave required?

Per § 15.2-1605(B): at least 2 weeks vacation, at least 7 days sick leave, plus the legal holidays in § 2.2-3300. Both can be accumulated or terminated under local rules; vacation cannot be accumulated beyond 6 weeks.

How does part-time leave accrue?

The locality has discretion under § 15.2-1605(B) to set accrual rules. The AG suggested proportional approaches: "a locality's leave policy may provide that part-time employees covered by § 15.2-1605 accrue leave at a slower rate than full-time employees or afford the benefits in proportion to the individual employee's work week and workday." A 20-hour-per-week employee accruing leave at half the rate of a 40-hour employee is a defensible structure.

Why are temporary employees excluded?

The AG focused on three textual cues: (1) the statute says benefits are "annual," implying a year-round relationship; (2) "vacation" and "leave" presuppose time when work would otherwise be expected; and (3) the policy rationale (protection from burnout and wage loss for permanent workers) does not transfer cleanly to short-term hires. Reading "employee" to include temporaries would also produce odd results like a one-week temp being entitled to two weeks of vacation.

Where does "temporary employee" come from?

§ 15.2-1604(C) defines "temporary employees" of constitutional officers as those "hired to work on special projects that have durations of three months or less." The AG borrowed that definition by reference.

Can a locality set part-time benefits below the statutory minimums?

No. The statute sets a floor. Localities can be more generous; they cannot give less than 2 weeks vacation, 7 sick days, and the listed holidays.

What about the Treasurer's employees?

§ 15.2-1605 does not include the Treasurer. Treasurer's employees would need to look to other statutory or charter sources for leave entitlements.

Does the federal Family and Medical Leave Act change anything?

No, but the AG noted FMLA exists separately at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2620. FMLA provides unpaid leave for qualifying medical and family reasons and is independent of § 15.2-1605's paid-leave requirements.

Background and statutory framework

§ 15.2-1605 sits in the Virginia Code's local-government chapter and sets baseline employment benefits for constitutional officers' staffs. The statute uses "employee" without defining whether part-time or temporary workers are included. Virginia's statutory-interpretation approach starts with the statute's text, places terms in context, and respects the overall legislative purpose. Both Virginia Supreme Court (Kohl's, Roop v. Whitt) and Court of Appeals (MAD Properties) decisions instruct courts to read undefined words in context, not in isolation.

The AG's office had previously analyzed § 15.2-1605 and its predecessor § 15.1-19.3 in 1977-78 and 1985-86 opinions, all upholding local discretion over accrual mechanics. This opinion is consistent with that line.

The opinion also nods to the broader Virginia employment-law definition at § 40.1-2 ("any person who, in consideration of wages, salaries, or commissions, may be permitted, required, or directed by any employer to engage in any employment"), which is generally broad, but emphasizes that broad general definitions yield to narrower contextual readings when the statute's purpose so requires.

Citations

• Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-505 (authority for advisory opinions)
• Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3300 (legal holidays)
• Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1604(C) (temporary employees definition)
• Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1605 (leave benefits for constitutional officers' employees)
• Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-2 (general employment-law definitions)
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2620 (FMLA)
• Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, 295 Va. 177 (2018)
• MAD Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Augusta, 83 Va. App. 141 (2024)
• Suffolk City Sch. Bd. v. Wahlstrom, 302 Va. 188 (2023)
• Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274 (2015)
• Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365 (1999)
• Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 (2013)
• Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)
• 1977-78 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 382, 383
• 1985-86 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 28

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2025/23-044-Guynn-issued.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General
December 31, 2025

Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Esquire
Salem City Attorney
Guynn Waddell, P.C.
415 South College Avenue
Salem, Virginia 24153

Dear Mr. Guynn:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented

You inquire whether § 15.2-1605 of the Code of Virginia requires a locality to provide the leave benefits specified therein to part-time or temporary employees of certain constitutional officers serving the locality.

Response

It is my opinion that a locality is required to provide the leave benefits afforded under § 15.2-1605 to full-time and part-time employees of constitutional officers, but not to temporary employees. With respect to employees eligible for such benefits, a city or county may establish its own rules as to how the benefits may be accumulated and terminated.

Applicable Law and Discussion

Section 15.2-1605 requires local governments to provide paid leave to employees and deputies of specified constitutional officers and to certain court personnel. Specifically, "[e]very county and city for which such employees work shall annually provide for each employee at least two weeks vacation with pay, at least seven days sick leave with pay, and such legal holidays as are provided for in § 2.2-3300."[1] For purposes of this provision, "employee" is defined as: (1) an employee or deputy of a Commonwealth's Attorney, a commissioner of the revenue, a circuit court clerk, or a sheriff; and (2) an officer or employee of a court whose salary is paid by the Commonwealth.[2] Local governments have the discretion to fix the time period in which leave is accrued or terminated.[3]

When interpreting statutes such as § 15.2-1605, the "primary objective is to give effect to the legislative intent, which 'is initially found in the words of the statute itself[.]'"[4] In applying statutory language, an "undefined term must be given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used."[5] Because statutes are not to be interpreted "by isolating particular words or phrases,"[6] it follows that "[t]he context of [a] term includes the other language used in the particular statute,"[7] which may determine the scope of the term.[8] In addition, statutory language should be construed in light of the overall purpose of the statute.[9] Accordingly, "a statute should be read and considered as a whole,"[10] whereby "[w]ords and phrases must be considered in context to arrive at a construction that will promote the object and purpose of the statute."[11]

Divorced from any context, the term "employee" can have a broad scope. The term is often used to refer generally to "'one employed by another,' or '[s]omeone who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance.'"[12] Under this general usage, the term encompasses "full-time employee[s]," who are "hired to work at least the normal number of hours in a workweek as defined by an employer or a statute"; "part-time employee[s]," who work "fewer hours . . . than the normal number"; and temporary, or "seasonal employee[s]," who are "engaged to work only for a certain time of the year."[13] Nevertheless, "[a] statute's meaning does not always 'turn solely' on the broadest imaginable 'definitions of its component words.'"[14]

Read in its entirety, the context and underlying purpose of § 15.2-1605 indicate that the General Assembly intended the term "employee" as used in the statute to have narrower scope. The statute contemplates that benefits will be provided "annually," which signifies an indefinite, i.e., permanent, employment arrangement. While part-time employees have such an arrangement, temporary employees, by definition, have a limited duration of employment, such that granting leave on a recurring yearly basis is not applicable. Further, the required benefits in § 15.2-1605 are expressed as paid "leave" and "vacation." These terms refer to time off when an employee otherwise would be expected to work. Absent § 15.2-1605, a full-time employee could be required to work 5 days a week 52 weeks a year.[15] The law enables such an employee to take some time away from his regular employment without fear of lost wages, and it also helps protect employers from the negative effects of ill or burnt-out employees. While the same considerations exist for part-time employees working year-round, they generally do not apply to temporary employees, who work only a small portion of a year. Therefore, based on the statute as whole, I conclude that the benefits afforded under § 15.2-1605 extend only to permanent full-time and part-time employees.[16]

I note further that, in conferring benefits to eligible employees, § 15.2-1605 does not require that they be provided in an up-front, lump sum manner or that a part-time employee be subject to the same method of leave accrual as full-time employees.[17] A locality therefore has some discretion in how it implements the law, and the local government may establish its own rules as to how leave may be accumulated and terminated.[18] For example, a locality's leave policy may provide that part-time employees covered by § 15.2-1605 accrue leave at a slower rate than full-time employees or afford the benefits in proportion to the individual employee's work week and workday.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that a locality is required to provide the leave benefits afforded under § 15.2-1605 to full-time and part-time employees of constitutional officers, but not to temporary employees. With respect to employees eligible for such benefits, a city or county may establish its own rules as to how the benefits may be accumulated and terminated.

With kindest regards, I am,
Very truly yours,

Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General

1. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1605(B) (Supp. 2025).
2. Section 15.2-1605(A).
3. Section 15.2-1605(B) ("The county or city may provide that vacation or sick leave may be accumulated or shall terminate within a given period of time; however, such vacation may not be accumulated in excess of six weeks.").
4. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, 295 Va. 177, 185 (2018) (quoting Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill, 254 Va. 88, 91 (1997).
5. MAD Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Augusta, 83 Va. App. 141, 172 (2024) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 336, 342 (2020)). See also Suffolk City Sch. Bd. v. Wahlstrom, 302 Va. 188, 206 (2023) ("In affording statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, [a court] remain[s] cognizant of context."); Smith v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 483, 494 (2025) ("The 'ordinary meaning' of undefined words is determined 'in light of' the context in which [they are] used."' (alteration in original) (quoting Haba v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 277, 286 (2021)); 2015 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 19, 21 ("The rule that an undefined term must be given its plain and ordinary meaning also requires that courts be 'guided by the context in which [the word or phrase] is used."' (alteration in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Protestant Episcopal Church v. Truro Church, 280 Va. 6, 21 (2010)); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) ("In law as in life . . . the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things.").
6. Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369 (1999).
7. Murphy v. Norfolk Cmty. Servs. Bd, 260 Va. 334, 340 (2000). See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 125 (2008) ("The context may be examined by considering the other language used in the statute." (quoting Sansom v. Bd. of Supvrs., 257 Va. 589, 595 (1999)). Moreover, "[e]very part of a statute is presumed to have some effect and no part will be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary." Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405 (1996).
8. See 2013 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 186, 188 (using the context of a statute to determine that the term "cash," although potentially broad in meaning, should be construed narrowly to refer only to paper currency and coins). See also Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120 (2023) ("Even in cases where 'the literal language of the statute is neutral' in isolation, reading 'the whole phrase' can point to a more targeted reading." (quoting Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. 1, 7, (2018)).
9. "The purpose for which a statute is enacted is of primary importance in its interpretation or construction." Luttrell v. Cucco, 291 Va. 308, 313 (2016) (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Supvrs., 226 Va. 382, 388 (1983)). Accordingly, "[w]hen interpreting a statute, '[t]he general rule ... is that the words of a statute should receive their ordinary acceptation and significance, where such construction is consonant, and not at variance, with the purpose of the statute."' Id. at 314 (second alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Rountree Corp. v. Richmond, 188 Va. 701, 712 (1949)).
10. Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Beverly Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285 (2004).
11. 2006 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 3, 3
12. Roop v. Whitt, 289 Va. 274, 279 (2015) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 743 (1993), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (10th ed. 2014)). See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-2 (Supp. 2025) (defining, for general employment law purposes, "employee" to mean "any person who, in consideration of wages, salaries, or commissions, may be permitted, required, or directed by any employer to engage in any employment directly or indirectly").
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (11th ed. 2019); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (11th ed. 2019). See § 15.2-1604(C) (Supp. 2025) (defining, for purposes of excluding certain classes of employees from hiring advertisement requirement, "temporary employees" of constitutional officers to mean "employees hired to work on special projects that have durations of three months or less").
14. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 523 (2018) (quoting Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015)).
15. This, of course, does not account for qualifying circumstances in which the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) would apply. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611 to 2620.
16. Interpreting the statute to exclude temporary employees further affords it a "rational meaning" and avoids the "curious . . . construction" about which you express concern, i.e., that it otherwise would lead to certain "employees receiving more leave than hours worked." See, e.g., Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 237 (2013) (noting that in determining legislative intent, "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction, and a statute should never be construed in a way that leads to absurd results").
17. You suggest that "on the first day of employment by a constitutional officer, an employee would be entitled to 2 weeks of paid vacation ... even if the employee didn't finish out their first week of employment."
18. See § 15.2-1605(B); Ops. Va. Att'y Gen. 1977-78 at 382; 1977-78 at 383; 1985-86 at 28 (each addressing former Code § 15.1-19.3, predecessor statute to § 15.2-1605(B)). See also Advanced Towing Co., LLC v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supvrs., 280 Va. 187, 193 (2010) ("Virginia 'recognize[s] the "reasonable selection of method" rule, which permits local governing bodies to exercise discretionary authority when a statutory grant of power has been expressly made but is silent upon the mode or manner of its execution."' (alteration in original)).