Can a Virginia county and town ban motorboats on private lakes used as their public drinking water supply, and impose penalties for violations?

Plain-English summary

Cherrystone and Roaring Fork are two private man-made lakes near Chatham. The Town of Chatham built and operates the dams under a land-use permit and uses the lakes as its main drinking water supply. The lakes also supply some of Pittsylvania County's water. Delegate Adams asked whether the County and Town could prohibit gasoline-powered watercraft on the lakes to protect drinking water from fuel and oil contamination, and whether they could enforce such a ban with penalties.

The Attorney General said yes on both fronts. Virginia counties have broad police power under Code § 15.2-1200 to protect public health, including the specific authority to regulate the pollution of dangerous water. Towns get similar police power under Code § 15.2-1102, but only within their corporate limits unless something else extends it. Here, the Chatham Town Charter explicitly gives Chatham extraterritorial police power over land "within the limits of the water shed, tributary to" its water supply. Under Code § 15.2-1103, charter provisions trump conflicting general statutes, so Chatham can reach beyond its borders to protect the watershed. The five-mile cap in Code § 15.2-2109 does not limit Chatham, because the broader charter language controls.

The AG also concluded that "land" within the charter language includes the water on it (the lakes themselves are within the watershed). And although the lakes are privately owned, Virginia property is subject to the police power. Restricting use to protect public health is not a constitutional taking. Both the County and Town can attach penalties (enforced as misdemeanors under Code § 15.2-1429) and can sue for an injunction under Code § 15.2-1432.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Virginia operates under the Dillon Rule, which means localities have only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily implied, and those that are essential. That sounds restrictive, but two state statutes give counties and towns substantial police power. Code § 15.2-1200 lets a county adopt any measures it deems expedient to promote health, safety, and general welfare consistent with state law, including specifically "the adoption of regulations for the prevention of the pollution of water which is dangerous to the health or lives of persons residing in the county." Code § 15.2-1102 gives municipalities a parallel general police power, but limited to the corporate limits unless other state law extends it.

The hinge of the analysis is the extraterritorial reach. The Chatham Charter says the Town has power to make rules to protect the purity of its water supply "and for this purpose to exercise full police powers and sanitation patrol over all land comprised within the limits of the water shed, tributary to any such water supply wherever such lands may be located in this Commonwealth." Code § 15.2-1103 provides that when a charter conflicts with a general statute in Title 15.2 Chapter 11 Article 1, the charter wins. Code § 15.2-2109 (more generally) caps locality jurisdiction over water-pollution prevention at five miles outside the boundary. The AG concluded Chatham's broader charter language controls, citing prior opinions and the principle that an Acts-of-Assembly charter provision survives conflicting general statutes.

Two more pieces of doctrine matter. First, on private property: the Virginia Supreme Court has held that a citizen holds property subject to the proper exercise of the police power, and that regulating use to protect public health is not a taking (Weber City). Second, on preemption: federal and state water-quality programs do not preempt local regulation aimed at the same problem, so long as the local ordinance is not more stringent than the state's water-quality standards.

Common questions

Why can a county regulate something on a private lake?
Because the lake supplies public drinking water. Code § 15.2-1200 gives counties express authority to regulate the pollution of water dangerous to residents' health. The Virginia Supreme Court has long held that protecting drinking water is one of the clearest exercises of the police power.

Does the Town of Chatham really have authority over land outside its borders?
According to this opinion, yes, but only because its charter says so. Chatham's charter expressly grants police power over watershed and tributary land "wherever such lands may be located in this Commonwealth," and Code § 15.2-1103 says a charter beats a conflicting general statute.

Doesn't Code § 15.2-2109 limit a locality to five miles?
The AG read § 15.2-2109 as the general default rule and Chatham's charter as an authorized exception. Earlier opinions had reached the same conclusion for other towns with broad charter language. The fact that § 15.2-2109 was enacted after the Chatham charter does not flip the result, because the General Assembly did not strip out the conflicting-charter exception.

Does "land" in the charter include water on the land?
Yes. The AG noted that Black's Law Dictionary and other dictionaries define "land" to include water, and that the charter's reference to "watershed" and "tributary" presupposes bodies of water. Reading "land" to exclude water would have made the charter's water-protection grant nearly meaningless.

Does state water-quality law preempt the local rule?
No. The AG concluded that the County and Town have concurrent jurisdiction with the state's water-protection programs. The local ordinance must not be more stringent than state water-quality standards, but a prohibition on motorboats is regulating activity, not setting a standard.

Can the lake owners challenge this as a taking?
The AG said no, citing Weber City Sanitation. Restrictions imposed under the police power to protect public health are not appropriations of private property. The owner still owns the lake; only certain uses are restricted.

Who enforces, and what are the penalties?
Both the County and Town can prescribe fines and other punishments under Code § 15.2-1429, enforced as if the violations were misdemeanors. They can also seek injunctions for continuing violations under Code § 15.2-1432. Chatham's charter independently authorizes adequate penalties and injunctive relief.

What if the County and Town pass conflicting rules?
The AG noted that they will have concurrent jurisdiction over the area, and that Town ordinances affecting Pittsylvania County property may not conflict with County zoning ordinances under Code § 15.2-1101.

Citations

• Va. Code § 15.2-1102; § 15.2-1103; § 15.2-1200; § 15.2-1429; § 15.2-1432; § 15.2-2109
• Va. Const. art. VII, §§ 2-3
• Weber City Sanitation Comm'n v. R. G. Craft, 196 Va. 1140 (1955) (police power to protect drinking water)
• Kirkpatrick v. Bd. of Supvrs., 146 Va. 113 (1926) (police-power scope)
• Richmond v. Bd. of Supvrs., 199 Va. 679 (1958) (Dillon Rule)
• King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084 (1954) (conflict between local and state law)
• Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 170 (1991) (preemption)
• Chatham Town Charter § 3.7 (extraterritorial watershed police power)
• 1991 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 71 (extraterritorial authority via charter)
• 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 46 (charter trumps conflicting statute)
• 2013 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 222 (state water-quality regulation comprehensive)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2018/17-020-Adams-prohibition_of_watercraft-issued.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Mark R. Herring
Attorney General

February 15, 2018

The Honorable Les R. Adams
Member, Virginia House of Delegates
Post Office Box K
Chatham, Virginia 24531

Issues Presented
You inquire regarding the general police power authority of Pittsylvania County and the Town of
Chatham to prohibit the operation of watercraft powered by internal combustion engines on two privately
owned lakes, when these lakes contribute to the public water supply for the both the County and the
Town. If such prohibition is permissible, you ask whether the County and the Town may impose
penalties, either civil or criminal, for violations thereof.

Background
Your inquiry pertains to two man-made lakes, Cherrystone and Roaring Fork lakes, which are
located northwest of the Town of Chatham in Pittsylvania County. You indicate that these lakes are
privately owned and that the Town obtained the right to construct them on private property by means of
an easement. Each lake adjoins a dam and connects to a creek, with both creeks merging into
Cherrystone Creek.[1] The Town of Chatham has operated and maintained these two dams by means of a
land use permit since their construction in 1967.[2] The dams regulate the flow of water to the Chatham
Water Treatment Plant, which serves as the Town's sole water treatment facility.[3] The plant is located in
Pittsylvania County, less than one mile west of the Town of Chatham.[4] The two lakes serve as the main
source of water for the Town's public water supply and also provide a partial source of water for the
County's public water supply.[5]

The 2016 Chatham Comprehensive Plan notes that "[p]rotection of the watersheds is essential to
the provision of an adequate future water supply. Especially noteworthy is the Cherrystone watershed.
Should the water supply in this watershed area become polluted, it would be physically and economically
difficult for Chatham and the County to develop another alternate watershed."[6]

Applicable Law and Discussion
The Commonwealth possesses inherent police powers that may be exercised "in the interest of the
public welfare, the public health and the public safety."[7] "The extent of this power is difficult to define,
but it is elastic, and expands automatically to protect the public against the improper use of private
property to the injury of the public interest."[8] It is well established that these powers embrace the
authority to prevent contamination of the public water supply.[9] Virginia abides by the Dillon Rule of
strict construction, pursuant to which a locality may exercise only those powers expressly granted by the
General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and
indispensable.[10] Section 15.2-1200 of the Code of Virginia extends general police powers to counties and
specifically delegates the authority to prevent the contamination of water for the purpose of safeguarding
public health:[11]

Any county may adopt such measures as it deems expedient to secure and promote the
health, safety and general welfare of its inhabitants which are not inconsistent with the
general laws of the Commonwealth. Such power shall include, but shall not be limited to
... the adoption of regulations for the prevention of the pollution of water which is
dangerous to the health or lives of persons residing in the county.[12]

Prior opinions of this Office acknowledge that the general grant of police power afforded by this statute is
broadly construed for the purpose of protecting public health.[13]

Section 15.2-1102 provides a general grant of police powers to cities and towns, and it
specifically limits the exercise of these powers to "the area within the corporate limits of the municipality,
unless otherwise conferred in [applicable state law]."[14]

The Chatham Town Charter, however, grants extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Town for the
purpose of protecting its water supply:

[i]n addition to the powers elsewhere mentioned in this charter and powers conferred by
general law, and the Constitution, the ... Town of Chatham shall have the ... power[] ...
to make reasonable rules and regulations for promoting the purity of its ... water
supply, and for protecting the same from pollution; and for this purpose to exercise full
police powers and sanitation patrol over all land comprised within the limits of the water
shed, tributary[15] to any such water supply wherever such lands may be located in this
Commonwealth;[16] to impose and enforce adequate penalties for the violation of any such
rules and regulations; and to prevent by injunction any pollution or threatened pollution
of such water supply, and any and all acts likely to impair the purity thereof, and to carry
out the powers herein granted ....[17]

Section 15.2-1103 provides that "[w]henever there appears to be a conflict between any provision
of [Title 15.2, Chapter 11, Article 1] ... and that of any charter of a municipal corporation, the provisions
of the charter shall be construed and held to take precedence over such conflicting or apparently
conflicting provisions of this article or of any amendment hereof."[18] Thus, the Town possesses police
power jurisdiction over Cherrystone and Roaring Fork lakes for the purpose of protecting its water
supply, even though they are located outside town boundaries.

I note that the broad grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction contained in the Charter is not in conflict
with § 15.2-2109, which provides that a "locality may ... prevent the pollution of water and injury to
waterworks for which purpose its jurisdiction shall extend to five miles beyond the locality."[19] "A
recognized principle of statutory construction is that where a charter and a statute conflict, the charter
controls."[20] The fact that the General Assembly enacted § 15.2-2109 subsequent to the Chatham Town
Charter does not alter this conclusion.[21]

I further note that this grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction should not be construed to encompass
only dry land, thereby excluding bodies of water. The Charter does not define the term "land."
"Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning."[22] "[This] rule also requires that the courts should be guided by 'the context in which [the word
or phrase] is used.'"[23] Black's Law Dictionary provides that "[i]n its legal significance, 'land' is not ...
confined to solids, but may encompass within its bounds such things as gases and liquids."[24] Further, the
Charter mentions land within the context of two terms, watershed and tributary, both of which include
bodies of water.[25] Thus, the Charter's grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction extends both to dry land and
bodies of water thereon, including the two private lakes at issue.[26]

As provided in the relevant statutory provisions, local governing bodies in receipt of properly
delegated police powers must exercise this authority in a manner consistent with applicable state and
federal law.[27] However, "[local] ordinances are not deemed inconsistent with state statutes and
regulations unless they are so contradictory that the two cannot coexist,"[28] such as when "the ordinance
purports to authorize what the statutes prohibit, or prohibit what the statutes expressly authorize."[29] But
"they are not deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail."[30] I can find no state law
that would thus conflict with the proposed prohibition.[31] In addition, state law may preempt local police
power when "state regulations [are] so comprehensive that the state may be considered to occupy the
entire field."[32] Nevertheless, "[t]he Commonwealth and localities may have concurrent jurisdiction over
the same subject matter, and the fact that the Commonwealth, in the exercise of its police power, has
made regulations with respect to a subject does not necessarily prohibit a county from legislating on the
same subject."[33] Thus, although federal and state regulatory schemes exist for the purpose of protecting
public drinking water, these programs would not preempt the proposed prohibition.[34]

In light of the clear delegation of police power, I therefore conclude that both the County and the
Town possess the authority to enact an ordinance establishing the proposed prohibition. I note that if the
Town exercises extraterritorial police power over the lakes, "persons and businesses in this area must
comply with both county and town regulatory requirements."[35] A "[c]harter provision [granting a town
extraterritorial jurisdiction] ... does not remove the affected area from the regulatory jurisdiction of ...
[the] County, nor does it require the County board to obtain the Town Council's approval before the
County may exercise its regulatory authority. Rather, [a] grant of limited extraterritorial jurisdiction to
[a] Town results in the governing bodies' having concurrent jurisdiction over the area."[36] Further, any
ordinance enacted by the Town of Chatham affecting property in Pittsylvania County may not conflict
with County zoning ordinances.[37]

This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the proposed prohibition would affect privately-owned lakes. In Virginia, "[a] citizen holds his property subject to the proper exercise of the police power
either by the General Assembly directly, or by municipal corporations or other State agencies to which
such power has been delegated."[38] Thus, "[t]he legislature may, in the exercise of the police power,
restrict personal and property rights in the interest of public health ... and for the promotion of the
general welfare."[39] Further, "this power to restrain a private injurious use of property is very different
from the right of eminent domain. It is not a taking of private property for public use."[40]

You next inquire regarding enforcement of the proposed prohibition through the imposition of
penalties. Section 15.2-1429 of the Code provides that "[a]ny locality may prescribe fines and other
punishments for violations of ordinances, which shall be enforced by proceedings as if such violations
were misdemeanors."[41] Further, a locality may petition a "court of competent jurisdiction" to "enjoin ...
[a] continuing violation" of the ordinance.[42] The Charter likewise provides that the Town may "impose
and enforce adequate penalties for the violation of [its] rules and regulations" and "to prevent by
injunction any pollution or threatened pollution of such water supply, and any and all acts likely to impair
the purity thereof."[43] Thus, the County and the Town possess the authority outlined above to enforce their
respective ordinances by imposing penalties.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that both Pittsylvania County and the Town of Chatham possess the
police power authority to protect the public water supply by prohibiting the use of watercraft powered by
internal combustion engines upon Cherrystone and Roaring Fork Lakes, and that an ordinance enacted for
this purpose may be enforced through the imposition of penalties and by injunction when appropriate.
With kindest regards, I am
Very truly yours,

Mark R. Herring
Attorney General

[1] The two dams are known as Cherrystone Creek dams 1 and 2A. See USDA, Chatham to hold public meeting to discuss rehabilitation projects, GODANRIVER.COM (May 12, 2016), available at http://www.godanriver.com/news/pittsylvania_county/usda-chatham-to-hold-public-meeting-to-discuss-rehabilitation-projects/article_b9169782-1893-11e6-84b7-87b9fele0b49.html. See also Cherrystone Lake, Virginia, GOOGLE MAPS, available at https://www.google.com/maps/place/Cherrystone+Lake+Rd,+Chatham,+VA+24531/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).

[2] 2016 CHATHAM COMPREHENSIVE PLAN at 13-14, available at https://www.chatham-va.gov/files/20160708_Chatham_2016_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).

[3] Id. at 14. Water is taken from the creek and then pumped to the plant for purification. Id.

[4] See id. See also Chatham Water Plant, GOOGLE MAPS, available at https://www.google.com/maps/place/Chatham+Water+Plant/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).

[5] 2016 CHATHAM COMPREHENSIVE PLAN at 13, supra note 2; 2010 PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN at 6-7, available at https://www.pittsylvaniacountyva.gov/Archive.aspx?AMID=36 (last visited Feb. 13, 2018)

[6] 2016 CHATHAM COMPREHENSIVE PLAN at 5, supra note 2.

[7] Kirkpatrick v. Bd. of Supvrs., 146 Va. 113, 126 (1926).

[8] Weber City Sanitation Comm'n v. R. G. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1149 (1955) (quoting Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 560-61 (1926) (further citations omitted)). See also 1987-1988 Op. Va. Atty. Gen. 147, 148 (citing 6A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.08 (3d ed. 1988); C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 19.19 (1980)) ("Such grants of the police power are generally considered to be elastic, dynamic and sufficiently flexible to adjust to modern circumstances.").

[9] "It is, of course, settled that the protection of the public health is a valid object for the exercise of the police power. A pure water supply is so intimately connected with the health of the community that the provisions with regard to it are properly a part of the police power of the State." Weber, 196 Va. at 1150.

[10] Richmond v. Bd. of Supvrs., 199 Va. 679, 684 (1958) (citations omitted) (setting forth the Dillon Rule as it applies to municipal corporations); Bd. of Supvrs. v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 117 (1975) (citations omitted) (applying the Dillon Rule to boards of supervisors).

[11] See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2 ("The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the ... powers ... of counties, cities, towns, and regional governments."); Id. art. VII, § 3 ("The General Assembly may provide by general law or special act that any county, city, town, or other unit of government may exercise any of its powers or perform any of its functions ....").

[12] VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1200 (2012) (emphasis added).

[13] See 1992 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 59, 61; 1987-1988 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 147, 148.

[14] Section 15.2-1102 (2012).

[15] "A true watershed is an area of land and water defined by a boundary such that all surface drainage within the boundary converges to a single point." Hydrologic Unit Geography, VA. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION AND RECREATION (May 18, 2017), available at http://www.dcr.virginia.gov/soil-and-water/hu. A tributary is "[a] stream that flows into a larger stream or other body of water." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE p. 1841 (4th ed. 2009). Cherrystone and Roaring Fork lakes are located within the Cherrystone Creek Watershed. See Watershed Rehab, USDA: NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., available at https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).

[16] "The general rule applicable to all local ordinances is that they are effective only within the boundaries of the locality unless a State statute specifically provides otherwise. A town has no powers beyond its corporate limits except those which are clearly and unmistakably delegated to it by the General Assembly for such exercise, and its extraterritorial acts are ultra vires in the absence of an authorizing statute." 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 111, 111-12 (citing Kelley v. County of Brunswick, 200 Va. 45, 48 (1958); Jordan v. Town of South Boston, 138 Va. 838, 843 (1924)). See also § 15.2-1102; Richmond v. Bd. of Supvrs., 199 Va. 679, 684 (1958) (citation omitted) ("The legislature has undoubted authority to confer upon cities and towns jurisdiction for sanitary and police purposes in territory contiguous to the corporation.").

[17] CHARTER FOR THE TOWN OF CHATHAM, VA., § 3.7, available at https://law.lis.virginia.gov/charters/chatham/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). See also VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2 ("The General Assembly may ... provide by special act for the organization, government, and powers of any county, city, town, or regional government ....").

[18] Section 15.2-1103 (2012) "A municipal corporation, in addition to the powers granted by § 15.2-1102, shall have all the powers granted to it in its charter; and nothing contained in this article shall be construed to in anywise repeal, amend, impair or affect any provision of any existing charter or of any charter hereafter granted to a municipal corporation or any provision of any other applicable law, unless such amendment or repeal so provides." Id.

[19] Section 15.2-2109 (2012).

[20] 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 46, 46. See also § 15.2-1103; 1991 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 71, 76 (opining that, notwithstanding the five-mile limitation provided by general statute, a subsequently enacted charter provision authorized the town "to enact ordinances effective within a contiguous ten-mile area outside the town corporate limits for purposes of preventing water pollution and injury to waterworks"); 1972-1973 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 463, 465 (noting that a provision of the Ashland Town Charter authorizing the town to operate its water system outside town limits superseded a conflicting general statute that was enacted prior to the charter). Cf. 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 46, 47 (opining that a general statute superseded a city charter provision, because "the General Assembly ha[d] evidenced a clear legislative intent" to do so by amending the statute to remove an exemption for conflicting charter provisions).

[21] See 2 A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 809 (1974).

[22] Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 35 (2000) (citing McKeon v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 27 (1970)).

[23] Protestant Episcopal Church v. Truro Church, 280 Va. 6, 21 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Sansom v. Bd. of Supvrs., 257 Va. 589, 595-96 (1999)).

[24] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY p. 1008 (10th ed. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting PETER BUTT, LAND LAW 9 (2d ed. 1988)). "Land" is also defined at law as "[a] tract that may be owned, together with everything growing or constructed on it." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY p. 983 (4th ed. 2009). The term "tract," in turn, means "[a]n expanse of land or water." Id. at 1829 (emphasis added).

[25] See supra note 15.

[26] "[I]f the language of the statute 'is subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.'" Cucinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (quoting Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349-50 (2011)).

[27] 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 94, 95; 2013 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 231, 235; 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 87 ("Ordinances adopted under the board police power authority of § [15.2-1200] must not be inconsistent with State law."). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 1-248 (2017).

[28] 2007 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 53, 55 (citing 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 87).

[29] 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 87 (citing King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084, 1087 (1954)).

[30] Id.

[31] Virginia's State Water Control Law was enacted in order to "safeguard the ... waters of the Commonwealth from pollution." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.2 (2014). The Virginia Department of Health enforces federal and state drinking water quality standards in order to ensure that the public has access to safe, clean water. See Office of Drinking Water, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, available at https://www.vdh.virginia.gov/drinking-water/; National Primary Drinking water Regulations, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, available at https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/national-primary-drinking-water-regulations (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). At the federal level, the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act also regulate water pollution and drinking water quality for the purpose of protecting the public health.

[32] 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 94, 95. See also Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 170, 175 (1991) (citing King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 184, 1088 (1954)).

[33] 2013 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 231, 233 (citing 1983-1984 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 87). See also 2010 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 159, 160 ("[E]ven where a state or local law or ordinance occupies the same field of law," such law is preempted only "to the extent that a federal law dominates that field.").

[34] However, a locality may not enact water quality standards that are more stringent than applicable state or federal standards, because "the degree of federal and state regulation of water quality standards is comprehensive." 2013 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 222, 226.

[35] 1991 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 71, 75.

[36] Id.

[37] See § 15.2-1101 (2012)

[38] Weber, 196 Va. at 1148. See id. at 1143, 1147-48 (holding that a city requirement that property owners connect to city waterworks and abandon use and consumption of any other private water supply was necessary to safeguard public health and fell "directly within the police power delegated by the State;" therefore, the restriction did not constitute an "unconstitutional deprivation of property").

[39] Id. at 1149. A locality "may, by police regulations, so direct the use of [private property] that it shall not prove pernicious to ... neighbors, or ... citizens generally." Id. at 1148-49.

[40] Id. Laws and ordinances enacted pursuant to the police power in order to protect the public health may be enforced "against all similarly situated though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights. Such laws do not appropriate private property for public use but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owners." Id. at 1148.

[41] Section 15.2-1429 (2012). "[N]o fine or term of confinement for the violation of ordinances shall exceed the penalties provided by general law for the violation of a Class 1 misdemeanor, and such penalties shall not exceed those penalties prescribed by general law for like offenses." Id.

[42] Section 15.2-1432 (2012).

[43] CHARTER FOR THE TOWN OF CHATHAM, VA., § 3.7, supra note 17.