If I want to be a Virginia police officer but I pled guilty or no contest to a disqualifying misdemeanor and then had it dismissed or expunged, am I still barred?

Plain-English summary

Senator Stuart's question grew out of the General Assembly's 2013 expansion of officer-disqualifying offenses in § 15.2-1705. The statute now bars any prospective officer who, on or after July 1, 2013, has been "convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to" certain misdemeanors (moral turpitude, sex offenses, domestic assault), in addition to the pre-existing felony bar. Two follow-on questions came up:

1. If the prospective officer pled guilty or no contest to a disqualifying offense but the charge was later dismissed or expunged, is he still barred?
2. If the prospective officer was adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for conduct that would be a disqualifying offense, is he barred?

Dismissed or expunged pleas. Yes, the statute still applies. The text is disjunctive: it disqualifies anyone who has been "convicted of" the listed offense or who has "pled guilty or no contest to" the offense. A plea of guilty is "a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law" (Peyton v. King). A nolo contendere plea "implies a confession ... of the truth of the charge ... [and] agrees that the court may consider him guilty for the purpose of imposing judgment and sentence" (Commonwealth v. Jackson, citing Honaker v. Howe). The statute contains no language exempting people whose charges were later dismissed (under deferred-disposition statutes like §§ 18.2-57.3, 18.2-251, 19.2-303.2, 19.2-151) or expunged. The General Assembly knows how to make a statute key only to final criminal convictions when it wants to; without exempting language, the plain meaning controls.

The DCJS waiver. Section 15.2-1705(B) is important: the disqualification is not absolute. On request of a state or local law enforcement agency, the Department of Criminal Justice Services "is ... authorized to waive the requirements for qualification ... for good cause shown." That gives DCJS discretion to look at facts and equities (nature and remoteness of the offense, applicant's record since, character of the hiring department's need), and authorize a waiver where appropriate.

Juvenile adjudications. The juvenile system in Virginia is civil, not criminal, in nature (Conkling v. Commonwealth). Section 16.1-308 specifically provides that a juvenile delinquency adjudication "shall not operate to impose any of the disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction for a crime." So absent an express legislative direction to treat juvenile adjudications as convictions, they do not count as "convictions" or "guilty pleas" under § 15.2-1705. The General Assembly knows how to include juvenile adjudications when it wants to: multiple statutes do so explicitly (§§ 17.1-805(B), 18.2-270(E), 18.2-308.2(A), 19.2-295.1, 19.2-327.11, 63.2-1719, 63.2-1724). Section 15.2-1705 does not. The AG concluded juvenile adjudications do not automatically disqualify.

But that does not mean juvenile records are irrelevant. Section 16.1-308 itself authorizes hiring agencies to consider juvenile adjudications when deciding whether to extend an employment offer: "Nothing in this section shall prevent the State Police or a police department or sheriff's office that is a part of or administered by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof from denying employment to a person who has been adjudicated delinquent where such denial is based on the nature and gravity of the offense, the time since adjudication, the time since completion of any sentence, and the nature of the job sought." So the agency can consider juvenile adjudications case-by-case, just not as automatic disqualifications under § 15.2-1705.

A long list of prior AG opinions on juvenile-vs-criminal. The opinion cited a substantial body of AG opinions confirming that juvenile adjudications generally are not treated as criminal convictions: a juvenile is "charged with a delinquent act" not a "crime," a juvenile finding of "not innocent" is not a conviction, juvenile adjudications cannot enhance a later larceny offense, and a juvenile finding does not impose criminal disabilities.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2014. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Section 15.2-1705 has been amended multiple times since 2014, including expansions of the disqualifying-offense list. The DCJS waiver process under § 15.2-1705(B) remains in place. The juvenile/criminal distinction grounded in § 16.1-308 is structurally unchanged but specific procedural rules around sealing/expungement of juvenile records have been revised. Anyone applying these rules to a present-day applicant should pull current statutes and current DCJS regulations and policies.

Common questions

What offenses are disqualifying?
Under the 2013-amended § 15.2-1705(A) (relevant as of the opinion): any felony; any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude (including petit larceny under § 18.2-96); any misdemeanor sex offense (including sexual battery under § 18.2-67.4 or consensual sexual intercourse with a minor 15+ under § 18.2-371(ii)); domestic assault under § 18.2-57.2 (or out-of-state equivalent). The current list should be verified against the current text of § 15.2-1705.

What is "moral turpitude"?
A term of art covering crimes involving dishonesty, fraud, or conduct contrary to community standards. Petit larceny is the most common example. Whether a particular misdemeanor involves moral turpitude can be a fact-specific question.

How do I apply for a waiver?
A state or local law enforcement agency makes the request to DCJS on the applicant's behalf. The applicant typically cannot apply directly. The agency must show "good cause." DCJS criteria for waivers are administrative; check current DCJS regulations.

What if my charge was deferred and dismissed under § 18.2-251 (first-offender drug)?
You still pled guilty (or evidence sufficient to find guilt was admitted), so the plea triggers § 15.2-1705 disqualification under this opinion. The DCJS waiver is the path to qualifying.

What about expungement under § 19.2-392.2?
The opinion treats expungement the same way as dismissal: the underlying plea still triggers disqualification. Expungement seals the record but does not erase the historical fact of the plea, which is what the statute keys to.

Why is the rule so strict?
The General Assembly's policy choice was to set a high bar for the integrity of law enforcement officers. The 2013 amendments expanding the list reflected concern that even misdemeanor pleas in certain categories raised integrity concerns. The waiver mechanism softens the rule for cases where remediation or context justifies it.

Do juvenile adjudications stay on my record forever for police hiring purposes?
Not automatically barring under § 15.2-1705, but they may be considered case-by-case under § 16.1-308. Juvenile records may also be subject to sealing or expungement under separate statutes; current rules should be checked.

Can I appeal a DCJS waiver denial?
The opinion did not address waiver appeals. DCJS administrative procedures and the Virginia Administrative Process Act provide the general framework for challenging agency decisions; specific procedures for § 15.2-1705 waiver denials are governed by DCJS regulations.

Background and statutory framework

• Va. Code § 15.2-1705(A): minimum qualifications for law enforcement officers; lists felony and misdemeanor disqualifications applicable to officers entering duty on or after July 1, 2013.
• Va. Code § 15.2-1705(B): DCJS waiver authority for good cause shown, on request of a state or local law enforcement agency.
• Va. Code § 16.1-308: juvenile adjudications do not impose ordinary criminal disabilities, but expressly allows law enforcement employers to consider juvenile adjudications when deciding whether to deny employment.
• Va. Code § 18.2-96: petit larceny (listed example of moral turpitude misdemeanor).
• Va. Code § 18.2-67.4: sexual battery (listed example of misdemeanor sex offense).
• Va. Code § 18.2-371: contributing to delinquency, including clause (ii) consensual sexual intercourse with a minor 15 or older (listed example).
• Va. Code § 18.2-57.2: domestic assault.
• Va. Code §§ 18.2-57.3, 18.2-251, 19.2-303.2, 19.2-151: examples of deferred-disposition/dismissal statutes.

The interpretive moves:

• The disjunctive text of § 15.2-1705 captures pleas as well as final convictions.
• A guilty or nolo plea is itself a self-supplied conviction.
• Absence of an exception for dismissed/expunged cases means the statute applies despite dismissal/expungement.
• DCJS waiver authority moderates the harshness.
• Juvenile adjudications are not "convictions" absent express statutory inclusion; § 16.1-308 confirms the rule and allows case-by-case consideration.

Citations

• Va. Code § 15.2-1705
• Va. Code § 15.2-1705(A)
• Va. Code § 15.2-1705(B)
• Va. Code § 16.1-308
• Va. Code §§ 17.1-805(B), 18.2-270(E), 18.2-308.2(A), 19.2-295.1, 19.2-327.11, 63.2-1719, 63.2-1724 (examples of statutes that distinguish or include juvenile adjudications)
• Va. Code §§ 18.2-57.2, 18.2-57.3, 18.2-61(C), 18.2-67.1(C), 18.2-67.2(C), 18.2-67.4, 18.2-96, 18.2-251, 18.2-371, 19.2-151, 19.2-303.2 (referenced offenses and deferred-disposition mechanisms)
• David v. David, 287 Va. 231, 754 S.E.2d 285 (2014)
• Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1969)
• Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 Va. 552, 449 S.E.2d 276 (1988)
• Honaker v. Howe, 60 Va. (19 Gratt.) 50 (1869)
• Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 707 S.E.2d 273 (2011)
• Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 657 S.E.2d 142 (2008)
• Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 330 S.E.2d 84 (1985)
• Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 518, 612 S.E.2d 235 (2005)
• Commonwealth ex rel. Va. Dep't of Corrs. v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 529 S.E.2d 96 (2000)
• 2013 Va. Acts chs. 307, 468 (amending § 15.2-1705)
• Numerous prior AG opinions on the civil character of juvenile proceedings: 1974-75 at 227; 1975-76 at 198, 199; 1977-78 at 94, 203; 1978-79 at 83; 1986-87 at 155; 1987-88 at 260; 2001 at 82, 85; 2002 at 124.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2014/14-025_Stuart.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Mark R. Herring
Attorney General

July 10, 2014

The Honorable Richard H. Stuart
Member, Senate of Virginia
Post Office Box 1146
Montross, Virginia 22520

804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Dear Senator Stuart:

I am responding to your request for an official advisory Opinion in accordance with § 2.2-205 of the Code of Virginia.

Issues Presented

You inquire whether § 15.2-1705 of the Code of Virginia, as amended in 2013, prohibits an individual from qualifying as a law enforcement officer when that individual pled guilty or no contest to a disqualifying crime, but the charge was later dismissed or expunged. You also ask whether an individual who, as a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent based on conduct that would be a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult is precluded from serving as a law enforcement officer.

Response

It is my opinion that § 15.2-1705 disqualifies a prospective law enforcement officer from service if that individual has been convicted of, or has pled guilty or no contest to, one of the offenses specified in the statute, even if the charge is later dismissed or expunged. Nevertheless, upon request of a state or local law enforcement agency, the Department of Criminal Justice Services may waive this disqualification for good cause shown. It is further my opinion that, although an individual who was adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for an enumerated offense is not automatically disqualified from service as a law enforcement officer pursuant to the statute, state and local law enforcement agencies are authorized to consider certain aspects of juvenile adjudications as a basis for denying employment.

Applicable Law and Discussion

Section 15.2-1705 of the Code of Virginia, as amended in 2013, establishes the minimum qualifications for an individual who wishes to serve as a law enforcement officer. It provides, in pertinent part, that

all such officers who enter upon the duties of such office on or after July 1, 2013, shall not have been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to (a) any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, including but not limited to petit larceny under § 18.2-96, or any offense involving moral turpitude that would be a misdemeanor if committed in the Commonwealth, (b) any misdemeanor sex offense in the Commonwealth, another state, or the United States, including but not limited to sexual battery under § 18.2-67.4 or consensual sexual intercourse with a minor 15 or older under clause (ii) of § 18.2-371, or (c) domestic assault under § 18.2-57.2 or any offense that would be domestic assault under the laws of another state or the United States.[1]

In construing a statute, we "give effect to the legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain meaning of statutory language, 'unless a literal interpretation would result in manifest absurdity.'"[2] We must "construe the law as it is written," for it is "unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction when a statute is free from ambiguity and the intent is plain."[3] Moreover, "[w]e 'assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute[;]'"[4] and courts are not free to add to or ignore language contained in statutes.[5]

With respect to your first inquiry, the plain language of § 15.2-1705 expressly provides that a prospective law enforcement officer will be disqualified from service if he has "been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to" any of the delineated offenses.[6] The statute is stated in the disjunctive: it applies when a prospective law enforcement officer has been "convicted of" a listed offense, and it also applies when that individual has "pled guilty or no contest to" a disqualifying offense.[7] Section 15.2-1705 contains no language exempting such persons whose charges against them later were dismissed or expunged.[8]

The language of § 15.2-1705 is clear and unambiguous. Had the General Assembly wished to limit application of § 15.2-1705 to proceedings resulting in a finalized criminal conviction, it would have so provided. Because I cannot conclude "that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually expressed"[9] in § 15.2-1705, "the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it."[10] Accordingly, if a prospective law enforcement officer has been convicted of, or has pled guilty or no contest to a listed offense, the statute applies and serves to disqualify him from service, regardless of whether the underlying charge is ultimately dismissed.

However, it is important for me to note that the disqualification is not absolute. It may be waived. § 15.2-1705(B) states, in relevant part, that upon request of a state or local law enforcement agency, "the Department of Criminal Justice Services is ... authorized to waive the requirements for qualification ... for good cause shown."

Turning to your second question, I note that "[t]he rule in Virginia has been clear for some time that proceedings in juvenile court are civil, and not criminal, in nature."[11] Thus, Virginia law provides that "a finding of guilty on a petition charging delinquency ... shall not operate to impose any of the disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction for a crime."[12] Consequently, absent an express indication of legislative intent, an adjudication of delinquency is not considered a "conviction" for purposes of other provisions of the Code of Virginia.[13]

Nothing in the language of § 15.2-1705 indicates that it is intended to encompass juvenile adjudications of delinquency. "Where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute."[14] Moreover, the General Assembly clearly knows how to exercise "its ability to draft a statute that specifically delineates when a juvenile status adjudication may be considered."[15] Therefore, because the General Assembly declined to do so in § 15.2-1705, I conclude that juvenile adjudications of delinquency will not disqualify an individual from service as a law enforcement officer under § 15.2-1705.[16]

Nevertheless, although juvenile adjudications of delinquency will not operate as a specific disqualifying event under § 15.2-1705, prospective employers are not barred from considering the existence of any such adjudications when deciding whether to extend an offer of employment to a prospective law enforcement officer. Rather, state and local law enforcement agencies are permitted to consider certain characteristics of juvenile adjudications in denying employment:

Nothing in this section shall prevent the State Police or a police department or sheriff's office that is a part of or administered by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof from denying employment to a person who has been adjudicated delinquent where such denial is based on the nature and gravity of the offense, the time since adjudication, the time since completion of any sentence, and the nature of the job sought.[17]

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that § 15.2-1705 disqualifies a prospective law enforcement officer from service if that individual has been convicted of, or has pled guilty or no contest to, one of the offenses specified in the statute, even if the charge is later dismissed or expunged. Nevertheless, upon request of a state or local law enforcement agency, the Department of Criminal Justice Services may waive this disqualification for good cause shown. It is further my opinion that, although an individual who was adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for an enumerated offense is not automatically disqualified from service as a law enforcement officer pursuant to the statute, state and local law enforcement agencies are authorized to consider certain aspects of juvenile adjudications as a basis for denying employment.

With kindest regards, I am

Very truly yours,

Mark R. Herring
Attorney General

[1] VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1705(A) (Supp. 2014). Prior to the 2013 amendment, the statute listed conviction, etc. of a felony as a disqualifying condition. That portion of the statute remains in effect. The 2013 amendments merely served to add conviction of certain misdemeanor offenses as additional, or expanded, disqualifying conditions. See 2013 Va. Acts chs. 307, 468.

[2] David v. David, 287 Va. 231, 237, 754 S.E.2d 285, 289 (2014) (quoting Hollingsworth v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 279 Va. 360, 366, 689 S.E.2d 651, 654 (2010)).

[3] Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. City of Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978).

[4] Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 261, 590 S.E.2d 563 (2004) (quoting Barr v. Town & Country Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)).

[5] Signal Corp. v. Keane Sys., 265 Va. 38, 46, 574 S.E.2d 253, 257 (2003).

[6] Section 15.2-1705(A).

[7] I note that, under Virginia law, "a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused is, in reality, a self supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law." Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969). Similarly, "by entering a plea of nolo contendere, the defendant 'implies a confession ... of the truth of the charge ... [and] agrees that the court may consider him guilty' for the purpose of imposing judgment and sentence." Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 Va. 552, 555, 449 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1988) (quoting Honaker v. Howe, 60 Va. 50, 53 (1869)) (omissions and alteration in original).

[8] I also note that, under certain circumstances, the Code of Virginia authorizes trial courts to defer disposition and ultimately dismiss criminal charges following a determination that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt, but without entering an actual adjudication of guilt. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57.3 (2014) (first offender domestic assault); 18.2-61(C) (2014) (rape, when defendant is married to the victim and all parties consent to deferral); 18.2-67.1(C) (2014) (same, forcible sodomy); 18.2-67.2(C) (2014) (same, object sexual penetration); 18.2-251 (2014) (first offender drug offense); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-303.2 (2008) (first offender misdemeanor property offenses); 19.2-151 (2008) (authorizing dismissal for certain misdemeanors following accord and satisfaction). Also, until the trial court enters an order specifically finding the defendant guilty, the court "has the inherent authority to take the matter under advisement or to continue the case for disposition at a later date." Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 226, 707 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2011).

[9] Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008).

[10] Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citing Sch. Bd. of Chesterfield Cnty. v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Richmond, 219 Va. 244, 250, 247 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1978)).

[11] Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 518, 612 S.E.2d 235 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).

[12] VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-308 (Supp. 2014).

[13] See Conkling, 45 Va. App. at 523-24, 612 S.E.2d at 238 ("That an adjudication is treated as a conviction in specific circumstances implies that it is not so treated as a general rule.").

[14] Commonwealth ex rel. Va. Dep't of Corrs. v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05, 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000).

[15] Conkling, 45 Va. App. at 522, 612 S.E.2d at 238. For statutes indicating a distinction between convictions and juvenile adjudications of delinquency, see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805(B) (Supp. 2014) (noting that, for the sentencing guidelines, "previous convictions shall include prior adult convictions and juvenile convictions"); §§ 18.2-270(E) (2014) (distinguishing between an "adult conviction" and "finding of guilty in the case of a juvenile"); 18.2-308.2(A) (2014) (distinguishing between individuals "convicted of a felony" and those "adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile"); §§ 19.2-295.1 (Supp. 2014) (listing "adult convictions" as well as "juvenile convictions and adjudications of delinquency"); 19.2-327.11 (Supp. 2014) (listing both "convictions" and "adjudications of delinquency" in the context of a petition for a writ of actual innocence); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1719 (2012) (listing "adult convictions" as well as "juvenile convictions or adjudications of delinquency"); and 63.2-1724 (Supp. 2014) (same).

[16] This conclusion is consistent with that of numerous prior opinions of this Office, which similarly have noted that juvenile adjudications of delinquency typically are not considered convictions under the Code. See, e.g., Ops. Va. Att'y Gen. 2002 at 124 ("[J]uveniles are charged with 'delinquent acts' rather than 'crimes'" and, "thus, are not subject to adult penalties."); 2001 at 85 ("[A] juvenile is not charged with a criminal act and a finding of delinquency is not a conviction of a crime."); 2001 at 82 (same); 1987-88 at 260 (juvenile adjudications may not be used to enhance a larceny offense to a felony); 1986-87 at 155 (noting intent of General Assembly to distinguish delinquent acts of juveniles from criminal acts of adults); 1978-79 at 83 (juvenile finding of "not innocent" on marijuana charge does not bar probation as a first time offender for a later adult offense); 1977-78 at 94 ("[A] juvenile is not 'convicted' if he is tried in a juvenile court.") 1977-78 at 203 ("[A] finding of delinquency by a juvenile court is not a 'conviction' of a crime under § 19.2-301.1A of the Code."); 1975-76 at 199 (juvenile adjudication is not considered a "conviction" for purposes of voter registration); 1975-76 at 198 (use of the term "felony" or "misdemeanor" is "inappropriate in juvenile proceedings" because "[a] juvenile is not charged with a crime or convicted of a criminal offense"); 1974-75 at 227 (juveniles are not "convicted" of felonies in juvenile court and, therefore, are not "subject to any of the attendant civil disabilities that are attached to a felony conviction").

[17] Section 16.1-308.