Can a Virginia judgment debtor walk a release of judgment into the circuit court clerk's office for direct entry without going to a judge first?

Plain-English summary

A circuit court clerk asked whether a judgment debtor could walk into her office, hand her a release of judgment, and have it entered on the judgment docket. She also asked what her duty was if such a release was presented, and whether she could be liable if the release turned out to be fraudulent.

The AG answered no to the first question. Two statutes governed: § 8.01-454, which puts the obligation to enter satisfaction on the judgment creditor (not the debtor); and § 8.01-455, which gives the judgment debtor a specific path. Under § 8.01-455, a debtor can apply to the court that rendered the judgment on motion, with ten days' notice to the creditor, and on proof of payment the court will order satisfaction entered. The clerk's role is to follow the court's order, not to process a release that the debtor presents directly.

The § 8.01-455 route builds in ten days' notice to the creditor and a judicial determination, on proof of payment, that the judgment has been satisfied. The AG noted that statutes have to be read together as a whole, and the two-statute combination tells the clerk she is responding to the court's order, not to documentation provided solely by the judgment debtor.

Because the answer to the first question was no, the second question (about the clerk's duty in entering such a release) was moot.

The third question, about sovereign immunity if the clerk erroneously recorded a release, the AG declined to answer. The availability of the sovereign immunity defense is necessarily a fact-specific question that cannot be answered in the abstract.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Who's normally responsible for filing a release of judgment in Virginia?
The judgment creditor. Section 8.01-454 says it is "the duty of the judgment creditor, himself, or by his agent or attorney, to cause such payment or satisfaction by the defendant ... to be entered within thirty days after the same is made, on such judgment docket."

What if the creditor refuses to file the release?
That's what § 8.01-455 is for. The judgment debtor files a motion with ten days' notice to the creditor, the court hears proof of payment, and if satisfied, orders satisfaction entered on the judgment docket. The clerk then records based on the court's order.

Could a debtor and creditor file a joint stipulation instead?
The opinion didn't address that scenario. It addressed only a debtor walking in with a release. A creditor-driven filing under § 8.01-454, or a joint motion through the court, would not fall within the prohibition the opinion identified.

What if the clerk did record a release brought in by the debtor?
The opinion didn't decide the consequences. It declined to address sovereign immunity in the abstract. Whether the clerk could be personally liable, whether the release would be valid, and whether the creditor could compel correction would all depend on specific facts.

Background and statutory framework

Section 8.01-454 places the duty to record satisfaction on the judgment creditor, unless the satisfaction is to be certified under § 8.01-455. The window is 30 days after payment.

Section 8.01-455(A) sets out the debtor's path. A defendant in any judgment, his heirs, or personal representatives may, on motion, after ten days' notice to the plaintiff, apply to the court in which the judgment was rendered to have the judgment marked satisfied. On proof that the judgment has been paid off or discharged, the court orders satisfaction to be entered on the margin of the page where the judgment was entered, with a certificate of the order sent to the clerk of the court where the judgment is docketed. The clerk then enters the satisfaction.

The opinion applies general statutory construction principles: the plain meaning of the language determines legislative intent unless a literal construction would lead to a manifest absurdity; statutes must be construed to give meaning to all the words enacted, with a court "not free to add language, nor to ignore language, contained in statutes"; and a statute is "not to be construed by singling out a particular phrase," but as a whole, with related statutes considered together.

Citations

• Va. Code § 2.2-505 (Attorney General opinions)
• Va. Code § 8.01-454 (judgment creditor's duty to file satisfaction)
• Va. Code § 8.01-455 (judgment debtor's motion process)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2012/12-047_Worthington.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General

June 29, 2012

The Honorable Judy L. Worthington
Clerk of the Circuit Court
Chesterfield County
Post Office Box 125
Chesterfield, Virginia 23832-0125

Dear Ms. Worthington:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issues Presented
You inquire whether a judgment debtor may present a release from judgment to a circuit court clerk for entry. You further inquire what a circuit court clerk's duty is with respect to entering such a release presented by a judgment debtor. Lastly, you ask whether a circuit court clerk may be held liable if a release presented by a judgment debtor is subsequently determined to be fraudulent or erroneously recorded.

Response
It is my opinion that the Code of Virginia does not permit a judgment debtor to present a circuit court clerk a release of a judgment for entry without the court granting a motion made pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-455. Because I have answered your first question in the negative, your second question is moot. Your final inquiry, whether or not a clerk would be entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity, is a fact-specific question that cannot be answered in the abstract.

Applicable Law and Discussion
Two Code provisions are relevant to your inquiry. First, § 8.01-454 provides, in relevant part:

In all cases in which payment or satisfaction of any judgment so docketed is made, which is not required to be certified to the clerk under § 8.01-455, it shall be the duty of the judgment creditor, himself, or by his agent or attorney, to cause such payment or satisfaction by the defendant, whether in whole or in part ... to be entered within thirty days after the same is made, on such judgment docket. . . .

Second, § 8.01-455(A) provides, in relevant part:

A defendant in any judgment, his heirs or personal representatives, may, on motion, after ten days' notice thereof to the plaintiff in such judgment ... apply to the court in which the judgment was rendered, to have the same marked satisfied, and upon proof that the judgment has been paid off or discharged, such court shall order such satisfaction to be entered on the margin of the page in the book wherein such judgment was entered, and a certificate of satisfaction to be entered on the margin of the page in the book wherein such judgment was entered, and a certificate of such order to be made to the clerk of the court in which such judgment is required ... to be docketed, and the clerk of such court shall immediately, upon the receipt of such certificate, enter the same in the proper column of the judgment docket opposite the place where such judgment is docketed.

In construing a statute, the plain meaning of the language determines the legislative intent unless a literal construction would lead to a manifest absurdity. Statutes must be construed to give meaning to all of the words enacted by the General Assembly, and a court is "not free to add language, nor to ignore language, contained in statutes." Additionally, "a statute is not to be construed by singling out a particular phrase," but must be construed as a whole, and related statutes must be considered together in construing their various material provisions.

Applying these principles, I make two conclusions. First, a judgment creditor, who has received whole or partial payment of a judgment from a judgment debtor, has an obligation under § 8.01-454 "to cause such payment or satisfaction by the defendant ... to be entered within thirty days after the same is made, on [the] judgment docket." Second, a judgment debtor is not authorized to present a judgment release directly to the clerk, but rather, must proceed through the motion process set forth in § 8.01-455. If the circuit court grants the motion and orders the judgment marked satisfied, the clerk of court is responding to the order of the court and not any documentation presented to the clerk by the judgment debtor. Thus, the clerk is not empowered to mark a judgment satisfied based on documentation that is provided solely by the judgment debtor.

Because I conclude that the clerk is not empowered to enter a judgment release presented by the judgment debtor, your second question is moot. With regard to your third inquiry, concerning the potential liability of a circuit court clerk for an erroneous recording of an instrument, I note that the availability of the defense of sovereign immunity is necessarily a fact-specific question. Accordingly, I cannot answer it in the abstract.

Conclusion
Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Code of Virginia does not permit a judgment debtor to present a circuit court clerk a release of a judgment for entry without the court granting a motion made pursuant to § 8.01-455. Because I have answered your first question in the negative, your second question is moot. Your final inquiry, whether or not a clerk would be entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity, is a fact-specific question that cannot be answered in the abstract.

With kindest regards, I am
Very truly yours,

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General