VA 11-052 May 13, 2011

Can a Virginia volunteer fire department bill a homeowner's or auto insurance policy after responding to a fire call?

Short answer: No. The AG concluded that volunteer fire and rescue squads have no statutory authority and no implied-contract right to bill a beneficiary's home or auto insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency. Limited recovery exists only through cost-recovery ordinances after a conviction, or for actual EMS/ambulance services.

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2011. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Virginia law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 2011
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Virginia Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Virginia attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A Virginia delegate asked whether volunteer fire departments could send a bill to a homeowner's or auto insurance policy after responding to a fire. Cuccinelli concluded they could not. Virginia law gives volunteer fire and rescue squads a few narrow channels to recover costs: § 32.1-111.14(B) lets them bill insurers for true ambulance services; § 15.2-1716 lets a locality enact an ordinance for cost recovery after a specified crime conviction (recovery is from the individual, not directly from the insurer, and follows a restitution order or civil suit); and the Health Commissioner's permitting authority over EMS agencies and vehicles supports Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Outside those channels, the Code does not authorize routine billing for fire responses.

Quantum meruit, Virginia's implied-contract doctrine, also did not provide a basis. Implied contracts require circumstances where the recipient would reasonably expect to be charged. People who call 911 for help do not understand themselves to be hiring a contractor; they understand the squad to be a charitable organization. The doctrine traditionally bars quantum meruit recovery for services rendered out of religious or charitable motives. The General Assembly has known how to authorize fee billing when it wanted to, and absent such authorization, volunteer fire and rescue squads have no claim.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What about ambulance bills?
Section 32.1-111.14(B) lets localities make reasonable charges for use of emergency medical services vehicles, including bills to insurers for ambulance services. The AG drew a line: if the squad is providing medical or ambulance services, billing the insurer is allowed; if the response is purely a fire call, it is not.

What is a "cost recovery ordinance" under § 15.2-1716?
A locality can enact an ordinance allowing volunteer fire and rescue companies to recover expenses incurred when responding to certain calls connected to specified crime convictions. The recovery comes through a restitution order at sentencing, or through a separate civil lawsuit, and is directed at the individual, not the insurance company.

How did the AG handle the implied-contract theory?
Quantum meruit requires that the recipient have "reason to believe [the services] were performed with the expectation of compensation." A homeowner calling the fire department understands the squad to be a charitable, public-safety organization, not a contractor. Courts have long refused quantum meruit recovery for services rendered out of charitable or religious motives.

How were volunteer companies expected to be funded?
The Code generally contemplates locality funding, either through per-response payments under § 15.2-953(D) or through property taxes under § 27-47.

Background and statutory framework

Virginia localities are permitted to "contract with or provide for any volunteer fire-fighting or emergency medical services companies or associations in the county, city or town for the fighting of fire or provision of emergency medical services." The Code provides several narrow cost-recovery routes:

  • § 32.1-111.14(B) authorizes localities to make reasonable charges for emergency medical services vehicles, including billing insurers for ambulance services.
  • § 15.2-1716 authorizes localities to enact ordinances allowing volunteer fire and rescue companies to recover response expenses when a conviction for specified crimes has occurred, with recovery through restitution or a separate civil action against the convicted individual.
  • The Commissioner of Health is authorized to issue permits for EMS agencies and vehicles to ensure compliance with federal Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement rules.

Quantum meruit recovery is qualified in Virginia. The opinion stated the implied-contract rule (services performed at the request of another with no agreement on compensation can imply a reasonable-value contract) but added the gatekeeping requirement that the recipient must have "reason to believe [the services] were performed with the expectation of compensation." It is "well established that no recovery can be had, on a quantum meruit basis, for services rendered by reason of religious or charitable motives."

The AG also noted that other states have enacted express authorization for non-member fire-service billing (citing Lawson Rural Fire Ass'n v. Avery, 764 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)), which underscored that Virginia had not.

Citations

  • Va. Code § 32.1-111.14(B) (charges for EMS vehicles)
  • Va. Code § 15.2-1716 (cost recovery ordinance after conviction)
  • Va. Code § 15.2-953(D) (per-response payments to volunteer companies)
  • Va. Code § 27-47 (property tax funding)
  • Lawson Rural Fire Ass'n v. Avery, 764 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (other states' express billing statutes)

Source

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II

May 13, 2011

Attorney General

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

The Honorable Clarence E. "Bud" Phillips
Member, Virginia House of Delegates
Post Office Box 36
Castlewood, Virginia 24224
Dear Delegate Phillips:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia.

Issue Presented
You inquire whether volunteer fire departments may assess and charge a fee to an individual's homeowners' insurance policy or automobile insurance policy for responding to a fire emergency.

Response
It is my opinion that a volunteer fire or rescue squad lacks the statutory authority or the contractual right to bill the beneficiary's home or automobile insurance policy for responding to a call about a fire emergency.

Applicable Law and Discussion
Virginia localities are allowed to "contract with or provide for any volunteer fire-fighting or emergency medical services companies or associations in the county, city or town for the fighting of fire or provision of emergency medical services." The Code provides several avenues for volunteer fire and rescue squads to seek reimbursement for expenses incurred in responding to calls for help.

Under § 32.1-111.14(B), localities are authorized to "make reasonable charges for use of emergency medical services vehicles," including charging insurers for ambulance services. To the extent a volunteer fire or rescue squad is providing medical or ambulance services, as opposed to responding to a call concerning a fire, the volunteer company may bill an insurance company for such services.

In addition, § 15.2-1716 allows localities to enact ordinances allowing for volunteer fire and rescue companies to a recover expenses incurred in responding to certain calls when a conviction for specified crimes has occurred. Recovery may be through restitution following a conviction or through a separate civil lawsuit. To the extent the individual can be reimbursed through his insurance company for these expenses, he may seek to do so. In this situation, the fire or rescue squad would not bill the insurance company. Rather, it would recover from the individual based on the court's order of restitution or from a separate civil lawsuit.

Finally, the Commissioner of Health is authorized to issue permits for emergency medical services agencies and vehicles to ensure compliance with federal regulations relating to reimbursement of ambulance services pursuant to Medicare and Medicaid.

Aside from the few exceptions noted above, nothing in the Code of Virginia expressly authorizes volunteer fire and rescue squads to bill home or automobile owners, or insurance companies, for responding to routine calls for service. When the General Assembly has found it wise to authorize fire and rescue squads to recover for their services, it expressly has done so. In the absence of express authorization from the General Assembly, fire or rescue squads would have no statutory basis upon which to bill an individual's homeowners' or automobile insurance police for responding to a fire emergency.

Virginia law recognizes a cause of action for an implied contract, known as quantum meruit. Under this theory,

[w]here service is performed by one, at the instance and request of another, and nothing is said between the parties as to compensation for such service, the law implies a contract, that the party who performs the service shall be paid a reasonable compensation therefor. The remedy available to the plaintiff is an award of damages amounting to the reasonable value of the work performed, less compensation actually received for that work.

This doctrine of quantum meruit is qualified, however, in its application. The law will recognize an implied contract for services when the services were performed under circumstances that would give the beneficiary "reason to believe they were performed with the expectation of compensation." Persons who call on the assistance of volunteer fire or rescue services do not have the expectation that they are impliedly contracting for a service. Fire and rescue squads are charitable organizations, who provide their services out of a benevolent rather than a commercial motivation. "It is well established that no recovery can be had, on a quantum [m]eruit basis, for services rendered by reason of religious or charitable motives." Therefore, quantum meruit affords no basis for a fire or rescue squad billing an individual or that individual's insurance company for responding to a call.

Some states expressly allow for such bills. See Lawson Rural Fire Ass'n v. Avery, 764 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing statute that specifically allows volunteer fire companies to charge persons who are not members for services rendered).

The Code generally contemplates that volunteer fire and rescue squads will be financed from localities, either through payments made by the locality based on each response to a call for assistance, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-953(D) (2010), or through property taxes, VA. CODE ANN. § 27-47 (2009).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion that a volunteer fire or rescue squad lacks the statutory authority or the contractual right to bill the beneficiary's home or automobile insurance policy for responding to a call about a fire emergency.

With kindest regards, I am

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read a 2011 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Virginia statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.