Could Charlotte Court House appoint a town sergeant and contract with Drakes Branch for that officer's police services?

Plain-English summary

Virginia Attorney General Robert F. McDonnell concluded in 2008 that Charlotte Court House could appoint a town sergeant and other necessary officers to enforce Commonwealth law within the town. Its charter expressly allowed the council to appoint "a town sergeant, who shall be the conservator of the peace," and § 15.2-1701 recognized that a town's chief law-enforcement officer could be called the town sergeant.

The AG also concluded that Charlotte Court House could enter a reciprocal agreement with Drakes Branch under § 15.2-1726. Both town charters authorized appointment of a town sergeant, distinguishing the arrangement from one involving a municipality with no police charter, no police force, and no authority to create one.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The Charlotte Court House charter granted the town powers conferred on Virginia towns and authorized the council to appoint a town sergeant. Appointees served at the council's pleasure. The town had entered a July 2008 through June 2009 agreement under which the Drakes Branch town sergeant would provide fourteen hours of law-enforcement assistance per week at $28 per hour.

Section 15.2-1102 supplied general municipal police powers, while § 15.2-1701 addressed the chief law-enforcement officer in a locality. Section 15.2-1726 authorized reciprocal agreements for cooperation in police services and allowed covered officers to exercise agreement-defined powers in each subscribing jurisdiction.

The opinion relied on the Dillon Rule, under which municipalities could exercise powers expressly granted, necessarily or fairly implied, or essential and indispensable to the granted powers.

What the AG concluded

The charter authorized a town sergeant. The word "may" made appointment permissive, and the council could decide whether the office was necessary and proper.

The town could appoint other necessary officers. The AG's response extended beyond the town sergeant to other officers needed to enforce Commonwealth law within Charlotte Court House.

The Drakes Branch agreement was authorized. Because both town charters allowed a town sergeant, the AG treated the agreement as reciprocal police cooperation permitted by § 15.2-1726.

The result depended on both towns having police authority. The opinion distinguished AG Opinion 08-028, which denied authority where one proposed contracting municipality lacked a police charter or force.

Common questions

Was Charlotte Court House required to appoint a town sergeant?
No. The opinion read the charter's use of "may" as permission rather than a command.

Could the town appoint officers other than the town sergeant?
Yes. The AG concluded that the town could appoint the town sergeant and any other necessary officers to enforce Commonwealth law within the town.

Why was the agreement with Drakes Branch considered reciprocal?
Both town charters authorized a town sergeant, so each locality had the police authority that the AG considered necessary for reciprocal cooperation under § 15.2-1726.

What powers did the shared officer receive?
The opinion quoted § 15.2-1726's rule that officers covered by a cooperating agreement had the same powers, rights, privileges, and immunities in subscribing jurisdictions, subject to the agreement's conditions.

Citations

• Va. Code Ann. §§ 15.2-1102, 15.2-1701, 15.2-1726
• 1989 Va. Acts ch. 117, §§ 2.1, 4.1 (Charlotte Court House charter)
• 1998 Va. Acts ch. 275 (Drakes Branch charter amendment)
• Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 602 S.E.2d 126 (2004)
• Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 497 S.E.2d 858 (1998)
• Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 300 S.E.2d 603 (1983)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2008/08-076-Siegel.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Robert F. McDonnell

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Attorney General

October 9, 2008

Daniel M. Siegel, Esq.
Town Attorney for Charlotte Court House
P.O. Box 1998
Richmond, Virginia 23218
Dear Mr. Siegel:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of
the Code of Virginia.
Issue Presented
You ask whether the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a town sergeant and
any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the Town. You also ask
whether Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Town of Drakes
Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.
Response
It is my opinion that the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a town sergeant
and any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the Town. It further is
my opinion that Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Town of
Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.
Background
You advise that the Town Charter (the “Charter”) for the Town of Charlotte Court House provides
that the Town “shall have and may exercise all powers which are now or hereafter may be conferred upon
or delegated to towns under the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as fully and
1
completely as though such powers were specifically enumerated herein.” The Charter further provides
2
that the town council may appoint “a town sergeant, who shall be the conservator of the peace.”
You also advise that Charlotte Court House has entered into a reciprocal agreement with Drakes
Branch for the provision of law enforcement assistance for the period from July 1, 2008 through June 30,
2009. Under the terms of the agreement, the officer serving as Drakes Branch’s town sergeant will
1

1989 Va. Acts ch. 117, § 2.1, at 162, 162.
Id., § 4.1, at 163-64. Section 4.2 of the Charter provides that appointees serve at the pleasure of the council. Id.
at 164.
2

Mr. Daniel M. Siegel
October 9, 2008
Page 2
provide law-enforcement assistance to Charlotte Court House for a total of fourteen hours per week at the
rate of $28.00 per hour.
You conclude that because the charters for the towns of Drakes Branch and Charlotte Court
House authorize the towns to appoint a police force, both towns have the authority under § 15.2-1726 to
enter into a reciprocal agreement for cooperation in the furnishing of police services upon the terms that
3
the parties deem advisable.
Applicable Law and Discussion
Under the Dillon Rule of strict construction, municipal corporations possess and may exercise
only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from
4
such express powers, and those powers that are essential and indispensable. Section 15.2-1102 confers
general police powers on cities and towns which are not:
expressly prohibited by the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth, and
which are necessary or desirable to secure and promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the municipality and the safety, health, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, morals, trade, commerce and industry of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof[.]
[5]

Section 15.2-1701 requires that, “[w]hen a locality provides for a police department, the chief
of police shall be the chief law enforcement officer of that locality. However, in towns, the chief lawenforcement officer may be called the town sergeant.”
6

Statutes using the word “may” are permissive rather than mandatory. The Charter authorizes,
7
but does not require, the Council to appoint “a town sergeant, who shall be the conservator of the peace.”
8
The town sergeant would be the chief law-enforcement officer of Charlotte Court House. The applicable
rule of statutory construction requires that words be given their ordinary meaning, given the context in
9
which they are used. The plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used in the Charter clearly
authorizes the Council to appoint a town sergeant when the Council deems such an appointment to be
necessary and proper.

3

Section 2.2-505(B) requires that an opinion request from a town attorney “shall itself be in the form of an
opinion embodying a precise statement of all facts together with such attorney’s legal conclusions.”
4
Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 408 n.3, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (2004); Arlington Co. v. White,
259 Va. 708, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2000); Bd. of Supvrs. v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d
610, 613 (1999); County of Fairfax v. S. Iron Works, Inc., 242 Va. 435, 448, 410 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1991).
5
The term “locality,” as used in Title 15.2, “shall be construed to mean a county, city, or town as the context may
require.” VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-102 (2008).
6
See Op. Va. Att’y Gen.: 1992 at 133, 135; 1991 at 225, 226.
7
1989 Va. Acts, supra note 1, at 163-64 (using permissive “Council may appoint”).
8
See § 15.2-1701 (2008) (providing that chief law-enforcement officer of town may be called town sergeant).
9
Va. Beach v. Bd. of Supvrs., 246 Va. 233, 236, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993).

Mr. Daniel M. Siegel
October 9, 2008
Page 3
Section 15.2-1726 authorizes localities to enter into reciprocal agreements concerning
consolidation of police departments or for cooperation in furnishing police services and provides that:
Any locality may, in its discretion, enter into a reciprocal agreement with any other
locality, …, for such periods and under such conditions as the contracting parties deem
advisable, for cooperation in the furnishing of police services.… The governing body of
any locality also may, in its discretion, enter into a reciprocal agreement with any other
locality, or combination thereof, for the consolidation of police departments or divisions
or departments thereof. Subject to the conditions of the agreement, all police officers,
officers, agents and other employees of such consolidated or cooperating police
departments shall have the same powers, rights, benefits, privileges and immunities in
every jurisdiction subscribing to such agreement, including the authority to make arrests
in every such jurisdiction subscribing to the agreement …. [Emphasis added.]
10

In interpreting a specific inquiry related to § 15.2-1726, a 2008 opinion (the “2008 Opinion”)
concluded that a municipality that does not have a police charter or a police force may not enter into a
reciprocal agreement with another municipality that has a police charter and police force. For purposes of
the 2008 Opinion only, “a municipality with ‘no police charter’ means a municipality that has not enacted
an ordinance authorizing a police force pursuant to § 15.2-1701 or one that does not have a charter
11
providing for the establishment of a police force.” Furthermore, the 2008 Opinion relied upon a 1986
opinion (the “1986 Opinion”) interpreting portions of § 15.1-131.3, predecessor to § 15.2-1726, as being
12
“‘uniquely applicable to the consolidation of police departments.’” Because the requesting county did
not have a police force at the time of the proposed reciprocal agreement, the predecessor statute to
§ 15.2-1726 did not authorize two towns to contract with that county to have the county sheriff serve as
chief of police for the towns and to provide law-enforcement services for the three localities.
The General Assembly has not substantially amended or changed the portion of § 15.2-1726
providing for “consolidation of police departments” considered by the Attorney General in the 1986
Opinion. While an opinion of the Attorney General is not binding on the courts of the Commonwealth, it
13
is entitled to due consideration. “‘The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney
General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative
14
acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.’” Therefore, § 15.2-1726 does not permit localities to
contract for the consolidation of the police departments of separate localities when one of the contracting
localities does not have a police department.

10

2008 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 08-028, available at http://www.vaag.com/OPINIONS/2008opns/08-028Jones.pdf.
11
Id. at n.1.
12
Id. (quoting 1986-1987 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 130, 132 n.1) (emphasis in original).
13
See Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1998) (quoting Va. Beach v. Va.
Rest. Ass’n, 231 Va. 130, 135, 341 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1986)).
14
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983) (quoting Richard L.
Deal & Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622, 299 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1983)).

Mr. Daniel M. Siegel
October 9, 2008
Page 4
Section 15.2-1726 also permits localities to enter into reciprocal agreements “for cooperation in
15
16
the furnishing of police services.” Based upon the definitions of “reciprocal” and “reciprocity,” the
17
2008 Opinion concluded that there must be mutual or bilateral action. Consequently, all contracting
localities must have a police department before they may enter into reciprocal agreements “for
18
cooperation in the furnishing of police services.”
You advise that Charlotte Court House has contracted with Drakes Branch to use the Drakes
Branch town sergeant to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within Charlotte Court House. You also
advise that the town charters of both Drakes Branch and Charlotte Court House have provisions
19
authorizing the appointment of a town sergeant. Therefore, I conclude that Charlotte Court House is
authorized to enter into a reciprocal agreement with Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Town of Charlotte Court House is authorized to appoint a
town sergeant and any other necessary officers to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth within the
Town. It further is my opinion that Charlotte Court House is authorized to enter into a reciprocal
agreement with the Town of Drakes Branch pursuant to § 15.2-1726.
Thank you for letting me be of service to you.
Sincerely,

Robert F. McDonnell
1:213; 1:941/08-076

15

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “reciprocal” to mean “[d]irected by each toward
the other or others; MUTUAL” or “BILATERAL”).
16
See id. at 1298 (defining “reciprocity” to mean “[t]he mutual concession of advantages or privileges for
purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations”).
17
See 2008 Op. Va. Att’y Gen., supra note 10.
18
Section 15.2-1726 (2008).
19
See 1989 Va. Acts supra note 1, § 4.1, at 263-64 (authorizing town sergeant for Charlotte Court House); see
also 1998 Va. Acts ch. 275, at 405, 405 (amending § 3 of Drakes Branch charter to remove mandatory office of
sergeant and providing that town officers include mayor, six council members, “and such other officers as the
council may deem proper and necessary”) (emphasis in original).