Could a Virginia town with a police department provide police services to a town with no police force and receive that town's fines to pay the officer?

Plain-English summary

Virginia Attorney General Robert F. McDonnell concluded in 2008 that § 15.2-1726 did not authorize a town with a police force to enter the proposed police-services agreement with a municipality that had neither a police force nor authority to establish one. The statute authorized "reciprocal" agreements, and the AG found no mutual or bilateral police arrangement when only one municipality could supply a police department.

The opinion also concluded that, without a valid agreement, a local officer's authority outside the officer's jurisdiction remained limited by § 19.2-250 and other specifically granted exceptions. It further found no authority for fines assessed in one jurisdiction to be transferred to the other municipality to pay the officer's salary.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Charlotte County Sheriff Thomas D. Jones asked whether a municipality with a police charter and police force could contract with another municipality that had no police charter or force. He also asked whether the first municipality's officer could enforce laws in the second and whether fines from summonses there could be sent back to pay the officer.

Section 15.2-1726 authorized localities to make reciprocal agreements for cooperation in furnishing police services or for consolidating police departments. Under the opinion's stated facts, the second municipality could not contribute a police force or reciprocate, so the proposed arrangement did not fit the statute.

The AG read § 15.2-1726 alongside § 15.2-1730.1, which specifically allowed a sheriff in a county without a police department to enter certain law-enforcement assistance agreements. That express grant supported the conclusion that the General Assembly had not granted the broader municipal authority proposed in the request.

What the AG concluded

The proposed arrangement was not a reciprocal police agreement. With no police force or authority to establish one, the second municipality supplied no mutual or bilateral police service under § 15.2-1726.

The officer did not gain general authority in the second municipality. In the absence of a valid agreement, the opinion said the officer's authority outside the home jurisdiction was limited by § 19.2-250. It separately noted narrow statutory exceptions for close pursuit and specified emergencies.

The fines could not be transferred on the stated facts. Applying Virginia's Dillon Rule, the AG found no authorization to move fines from the second municipality to the first to fund the officer's salary.

A valid reciprocal agreement presented a different issue. The opinion expressly declined to address a financial arrangement connected to a valid reciprocal agreement because that question was not presented.

Common questions

Why was the agreement not considered reciprocal?
The opinion used the ordinary meaning of "reciprocal" as mutual or bilateral. Because the second municipality had no police force and no authority to create one, it could not contribute police services to the arrangement described.

Could the visiting officer make arrests anywhere in the second municipality? Not under the proposed agreement. The AG said the officer's authority remained confined to the territorial rules in § 19.2-250 and any separate, limited statutory exceptions that actually applied.

Did the opinion eliminate all cross-jurisdiction police assistance? No. It discussed statutes allowing close pursuit and assistance in certain emergencies. Its conclusion concerned the particular agreement proposed under § 15.2-1726.

Could one municipality keep fines collected from summonses issued in the other? The opinion found no authority for that transfer under the stated facts. It did not decide what financial terms might be lawful under a valid reciprocal agreement.

Citations

• Va. Code Ann. §§ 15.2-1726, 15.2-1730.1 (law-enforcement agreements)
• Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-250(A) (territorial criminal jurisdiction)
• Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-77, 15.2-1724 (limited outside-jurisdiction authority)
• Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 261 S.E.2d 532 (1980)
• Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982)
• Commonwealth v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.oag.state.va.us/annual-reports-opinions/official-opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2008/08-028-Jones.pdf

Original opinion text

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Robert F. McDonnell

900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
7-1-1

Attorney General

July 28, 2008

The Honorable Thomas D. Jones
Sheriff, Charlotte County
222 Law Lane
Charlotte County Courthouse, Virginia 23923
Dear Sheriff Jones:
I am responding to your request for an official advisory opinion in accordance with § 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia. Issues Presented You inquire concerning § 15.2-1726, which governs consolidation of police departments. Specifically, you ask whether a municipality that has a police charter and police force may enter into an 1 agreement with another municipality that has no police charter or police force. Further, you ask whether pursuant to such an agreement, an officer from one jurisdiction may enforce laws in the other jurisdiction. Finally, you ask whether fines for a summons issued in the second jurisdiction may be transferred back to the first jurisdiction to pay for the officer’s salary in the second jurisdiction. Response It is my opinion that § 15.2-1726 does not authorize a municipality that has a police charter and police force to enter into an agreement with another municipality that does not have such a charter or force. Absent such an agreement, authority for an officer to operate outside his jurisdiction is limited by
§ 19.2-250. Finally, it is my opinion that in the situation you present, fines assessed in one jurisdiction are not transferrable to another. Applicable Law and Discussion Section 15.2-1726 authorizes localities to enter into reciprocal agreements concerning consolidation of police departments or for cooperation in furnishing police services. In relevant part,
§ 15.2-1726 provides that:
Any locality may, in its discretion, enter into a reciprocal agreement with any other locality, any agency of the federal government exercising police powers, police of any state-supported institution of higher learning appointed pursuant to § 23-233, Division of Capitol Police, or with any combination of the foregoing, for such periods and under such conditions as the contracting parties deem advisable, for cooperation in the furnishing of 1

For purposes of this opinion, a municipality with “no police charter” means a municipality that has not enacted an ordinance authorizing a police force pursuant to § 15.2-1701 or one that does not have a charter providing for the establishment of a police force.

The Honorable Thomas D. Jones
July 28, 2008
Page 2
police services. Such localities also may enter into an agreement for the cooperation in the furnishing of police services with the Department of State Police. The governing body of any locality also may, in its discretion, enter into a reciprocal agreement with any other locality, or combination thereof, for the consolidation of police departments or divisions or departments thereof. Subject to the conditions of the agreement, all police officers, officers, agents and other employees of such consolidated or cooperating police departments shall have the same powers, rights, benefits, privileges and immunities in every jurisdiction subscribing to such agreement, including the authority to make arrests in every such jurisdiction subscribing to the agreement; however, no police officer of any locality shall have authority to enforce federal laws unless specifically empowered to do so by statute, and no federal law-enforcement officer shall have authority to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth unless specifically empowered to do so by statute.
[Emphasis added.]
The term “reciprocal agreement” is not defined by statute. Absent a statutory definition, words 2 are given their ordinary meaning. Consequently, unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest, words used in an act must be given their common, ordinary, and accepted meanings in use at the time of the 3 4 statute. “Reciprocal” means “[d]irected by each toward the other or others; MUTUAL.” It also means 5 “BILATERAL.” “Reciprocity” means “[m]utual or bilateral action” or “[t]he mutual concession of 6 advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations.” The proposed agreement you describe is deficient because it does not contemplate a “reciprocal agreement.” There is no mutual or bilateral action. The second municipality does not have a police force with which to cooperate or consolidate, and it has no authority to establish a police force. Thus, the second municipality fails to contribute to, or reciprocate in, the proposed agreement. A 1986 opinion of the Attorney General (“1986 Opinion”) concluded that § 15.1-131.3, the predecessor statute to § 15.2-1726, did not authorize two towns to contract with a county to have the county sheriff serve as chief of police for the towns and to provide law-enforcement services for the three 7 localities. A crucial detail was the fact that the county did not have a police force at the time of the 8 proposed contract. “[C]learly, [§ 15.1-131.3] does not authorize the arrangement requested because
[9]
Grayson County has no police department, and this portion of the statute is uniquely applicable to the 10 consolidation of police departments.” The fact pattern discussed in the 1986 Opinion is consistent with your question. 2

1987-1988 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 513, 514.
See Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980) (noting that in absence of statutory definition, statutory term is given its ordinary meaning, given context in which it is used); 1987-1988 Op. Va. Att’y Gen., supra note 2, at 514. 4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004). 5 Id. 6 Id. at 1298. 7 1986-1987 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 130. 8 Id. at 132 n.1. 9 See id. (interpreting portion of § 15.1-131.3 providing for “consolidation of police departments”). 10 Id. (emphasis in original). 3

The Honorable Thomas D. Jones
July 28, 2008
Page 3

“[A] fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of 11 legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’” “In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire 12 statutory enactment.” A reading of § 15.2-1730.1 in conjunction with § 15.2-1726 further bolsters my opinion that the situation that you present is not statutorily permitted. Section 15.2-1730.1 provides that: In counties where no police department has been established and the sheriff is the chief law-enforcement officer, the sheriff may enter into agreements with any other governmental entity providing law-enforcement services in the Commonwealth, and may furnish and receive interjurisdictional law-enforcement assistance for all law-enforcement purposes, including those described in this chapter, and for purposes of Chapter 3.2 (§ 44-146.13 et. seq.) of Title 44. Under accepted rules of statutory construction, the mention of one thing in a statute implies the 13 exclusion of another. Moreover, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists 14 only to the extent specifically granted in the statute. By enacting § 15.2-1730.1, the General Assembly clearly has authorized sheriffs to enter into agreements with counties to provide law-enforcement services in certain situations. Section 15.2-1730.1 does not authorize any other individual or entity to contract with counties for the provision of law-enforcement services. Because § 15.2-1726 does not authorize agreements between municipalities when both do not have operational police departments, or at least the authority to establish a police force, it is my opinion that there is no authority for a police officer to operate outside the jurisdictional confines of § 19.2-250. Section 19.2-250(A) limits the jurisdiction of corporate authorities in adjoining jurisdictions. Further,
§ 19.2-250(A) provides that “the jurisdiction of the corporate authorities of each town or city, in criminal cases involving offenses against the Commonwealth, shall extend within the Commonwealth one mile 15 beyond the corporate limits of such town or city.” Section 19.2-250 does not confer law-enforcement authority to local police departments outside of the corporate limits of the localities that they serve. 11

Va. Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va. App. 152, 157, 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (citation omitted). Id. 13 See Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 364, 297 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1982) (explaining maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). 14 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (7th ed. 2007); Op. Va. Att’y Gen.: 1992 at 145, 146; 1989 at 252, 253; 1980-1981 at 209, 209-10. 15 Notwithstanding § 19.2-250, §§ 19.2-77 and 15.2-1724 provide law-enforcement officers with expanded lawenforcement powers in limited situations. Section 19.2-77 provides that, “[w]henever a person in the custody of an officer shall escape or whenever a person shall flee from an officer attempting to arrest him, such officer … may pursue such person anywhere in the Commonwealth and, when actually in close pursuit, may arrest him wherever he is found.” Section 15.2-1724 authorizes police officers to “lawfully go or be sent beyond the territorial limits of such locality … to assist in meeting such emergency or need” in four limited situations: (1) enforcement of laws related to use or sale of controlled drugs; (2) law-enforcement emergencies involved threats to life or public safety; (3) execution of orders related to temporary detention or emergency custody regarding mental health evaluations; and (4) emergencies related to state of war or public disasters. I note that none of these situations appear to be applicable to the questions you present. 12

The Honorable Thomas D. Jones
July 28, 2008
Page 4
Additionally, in the situation you present, you ask whether fines collected for a summons issued in one jurisdiction may be transferred to a second jurisdiction to pay for an officer’s salary in the second jurisdiction. I find no authorization for such a transfer of funds between municipalities. Virginia adheres 16 to the Dillon Rule of strict construction regarding powers of local governing bodies. Further, I find no authority for municipalities to agree to transfer fees collected in one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction 17 absent a valid reciprocal agreement. Conclusion Accordingly, it is my opinion that § 15.2-1726 does not authorize a municipality that has a police charter and police force to enter into an agreement with another municipality that does not have such a charter or force. Absent such an agreement, authority for an officer to operate outside his jurisdiction is limited by § 19.2-250. Finally, it is my opinion that in the situation you present, fines assessed in one jurisdiction are not transferrable to another. Thank you for letting me be of service to you. Sincerely,

Robert F. McDonnell
3:1351; 1:875/1:941/08-028

16

Commonwealth v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 573, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977). I do not opine regarding a financial arrangement in connection with a valid reciprocal agreement as that issue is not presented. 17