Could a Texas school-district police department serve as the law-enforcement agency for Family Code child-abuse investigations?

Plain-English summary

Harris County's district attorney asked whether a newly added definition of "law enforcement agency" applied only to one professional-reporting provision or throughout Texas Family Code Chapter 261, and whether school-district police could serve as the appropriate agency for child-abuse investigations.

Attorney General Ken Paxton concluded that the definition in Family Code § 261.001(3-a) applied throughout Chapter 261 because the Legislature expressly made the section's definitions applicable "in this chapter." Legislative history could not narrow that unambiguous text.

The statutory list included the Department of Public Safety, municipal police departments, county sheriffs, and county constables. It did not include a school-district police department. School-district police therefore could not be the "appropriate law enforcement agency" receiving referrals or conducting the investigations assigned by §§ 261.105 and 261.301.

The opinion did not remove other responsibilities. School-district police and officers still had duties to report suspected abuse, cooperate in investigations, and assist an appropriate law-enforcement agency.

What this means for you

School-district police departments

The opinion excluded district police from the defined agency role under §§ 261.105 and 261.301. District officers could still report, cooperate, and assist, but could not replace the listed state, municipal, or county agency for these statutory functions.

School administrators and employees

The definition did not change Chapter 261's reporting duties. Professionals with reasonable cause to believe abuse or neglect occurred remained subject to the statutory reporting deadline described in the opinion.

DFPS staff

Required notifications, referrals, and joint investigations had to involve an agency within § 261.001(3-a). A school-district police department did not satisfy that definition.

District attorneys and child-abuse investigators

The opinion applied the definition chapter-wide, not only to § 261.101(b). The statutory text controlled over narrower statements offered from the legislative process.

Common questions

Q: Does the Family Code definition apply only to professional abuse reports? A: No. The AG concluded that it applied throughout Chapter 261.

Q: Is a school-district police department an appropriate agency under § 261.105? A: No. It is not one of the agencies listed in § 261.001(3-a).

Q: Can school police lead an investigation under § 261.301? A: Not in the statutory role assigned to the appropriate law-enforcement agency under that section.

Q: Are school police relieved from reporting suspected abuse? A: No. The opinion expressly preserved reporting duties and the obligation to cooperate.

Q: Can a school-district officer assist another agency's investigation? A: Yes. The opinion said the new definition did not prohibit assistance to an appropriate law-enforcement agency.

Background and statutory framework

Family Code § 261.101 governed reporting suspected child abuse or neglect. Section 261.105 addressed DFPS notification and referral to the appropriate law-enforcement agency. Section 261.301 allocated investigation duties and joint work.

Senate Bill 571 added § 261.001(3-a), defining law-enforcement agency. The opinion used Youngkin v. Hines and In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC to apply the chapter-wide text and Molinet v. Kimbrell to reject reliance on individual legislative statements. Connally v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. supported the limits on an individual school officer's investigatory authority.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001(3-a)
• TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.105
• TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.301
• TEX. EDUC. CODE § 37.081(a)(4)
• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2A.057

Cases:

• Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018)
• In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158–59 (Tex. 2021)
• Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)
• Connally v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 506 S.W.3d 767, 780

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0528
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2026/kp-0528.pdf

Original opinion text

KEN PAXTON
ATTORNE Y GENERAL OF TEXAS

September 16, 2026

The Honorable Sean Teare
Harris County District Attorney
1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Opinion No. KP-0528
Re: Scope of “law enforcement agency” definition under Senate Bill 571 (RQ-0614-KP) Dear Mr. Teare: Your request pertains to reporting and investigating child abuse and neglect. 1 You first ask whether the definition of “law enforcement agency” in Texas Family Code section 261.001 applies “only to the specific abuse and neglect reporting requirements under Texas Family Code
[sub]section 261.101(b), or to the entirety of Family Code Chapter 261.” Request Letter at 1. You then ask “[w]hether school district police departments remain qualified to serve as the ‘appropriate law enforcement agency’ . . . for child abuse and neglect investigations occurring within their territorial jurisdiction” under “Family Code sections 261.105 and 261.301.” Id. at 3. Family Code Chapter 261 addresses reporting suspected child abuse or neglect. For context, we begin by reviewing several provisions of Chapter 261 of the Family Code that address the duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 261.101. Subsection 261.101(a) requires any person to “immediately” report a belief based on reasonable cause “that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person.” Id. § 261.101(a); see Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. 1998) (confirming the same). Subsection 261.101(b) establishes a reporting requirement for a “professional,” defined as “an individual who is licensed or certified by the state or who is an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state and who, in the normal course of official duties or duties for which a license or certification is required, has direct contact with children,” such as teachers. TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.101(b). A professional with “reasonable cause to believe that a child has been” or may be abused or neglected or is the victim of certain offenses, shall make a report within twenty-four hours. Id. A person or professional shall also make a report if they have “reasonable cause to believe that an adult was a victim of abuse or neglect as a child” See Letter from Hon. Sean Teare, Harris Cnty. Dist. Att’y, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1 (Sept. 15, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2025/RQ0614KP.pdf (“Request Letter”). 1

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and they determine in good faith that the disclosure of this information is necessary to protect the health and safety of another child, an elderly person, or a person with a disability, as defined by section 48.002 of the Human Resources Code. Id. § 261.101(b-1). Chapter 261 also addresses to what entity a report shall be made. With certain exceptions, “a report that alleged or suspected abuse or neglect of a child has occurred or may occur” “shall be made to” one of the following entities—“a law enforcement agency,” the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”), or “the state agency that operates, licenses, certifies, or registers
[a] facility in which the alleged abuse or neglect occurred.” Id. §§ 261.103(a), .001(2) (defining “[d]epartment”), .001(6) (defining “[r]eport”). As you note, the Legislature recently amended Chapter 261 to add a definition for the term “law enforcement agency.” Request Letter at 2; see Act of May 31, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 1138, § 1.29, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 2788, 2809 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001(3-a)) (“Senate Bill 571”). Section 261.001 defines the term to mean “the Department of Public Safety,” “the police department of a municipality,” “the sheriff’s office of a county,” or “a constable’s office of a county.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001(3-a). The definition of “law enforcement agency” applies throughout Chapter 261. We first consider whether the definition of “law enforcement agency” applies only to the reporting requirement for professionals in subsection 261.101(b) or throughout Chapter 261. Request Letter at 1. “In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018) (quoting City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003)). “The ‘truest manifestation’ of legislative intent is the ‘literal text’ of the statute.” Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006)). “Moreover, legislative intent derives from an act as a whole rather than from isolated portions of it.” Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 680. Importantly, section 261.001 states that the definitions provided therein apply “[i]n this chapter,” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001, which certainly includes subsection 261.101(b), id.
§ 261.101. But had the Legislature intended to limit the definition of “law enforcement agency” only to the professional reporting requirement under subsection 261.101(b), we presume it would have so provided, as it did with other terms in Chapter 261. Compare id. § 261.001, with, e.g., id.
§§ 261.3018(e) (defining “professional” “in this section”), .405(a) (providing definitions for this particular section, “[n]otwithstanding [s]ection 261.001”). See In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158–59 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that courts presume “the Legislature chose the statute’s language with care, purposefully choosing each word, while purposefully omitting words not chosen” (quoting In re Commitment of Bluitt, 605 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. 2020))). Here, the plain language of section 261.001 reveals the scope of the definition of “law enforcement agency,” and we must adhere to that definition throughout the chapter given that the Legislature did not indicate an intent to otherwise limit the applicability of the definition. See Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 680 (“Courts must adhere to legislative definitions of terms when they are supplied.”). You contend this conclusion is in tension with Senate Bill 571’s legislative history, which you assert “suggests a narrow intent to address” only the reporting requirement applicable to

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professionals. Request Letter at 2–3. “Statements made during the legislative process by individual legislators or even a unanimous legislative chamber are not evidence of the collective intent of the majorities of both legislative chambers that enacted a statute.” Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011). We are thus forbidden from “rely[ing] on such extrinsic aids to construe unambiguous statutory language” because, again, the text “is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent.” Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 135–36 (Tex. 2018) (citations omitted). A school district police department is not an “appropriate law enforcement agency” under Family Code section 261.105 or 261.301. With the definition of “law enforcement agency” in mind, we next consider “[w]hether school district police departments remain qualified to serve as the ‘appropriate law enforcement agency’ . . . for child abuse and neglect investigations” under “Family Code sections 261.105 and 261.301.” Request Letter at 3. We understand your reference to a “school district police department” to mean a department consisting of peace officers commissioned by a school district board of trustees to carry out Education Code, Chapter 37, subchapter C. See id. at 1–2; TEX. EDUC. CODE § 37.081(a)(4) (authorizing a school district board of trustees to “commission peace officers to carry out this subchapter”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2A.001(8) (listing persons commissioned under section 37.081 as a “peace officer”). We assign the same meaning to the term. Section 261.105 is titled “Referral of Report by Department or Law Enforcement.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.105. It provides that DFPS “shall immediately notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of any report it receives[] . . . that concerns the suspected abuse or neglect of a child or death of a child from abuse or neglect.” Id. § 261.105(b). If DFPS investigates “and determines that the abuse or neglect does not involve a person responsible for the child’s care, custody, or welfare,” the report shall be referred to “the appropriate law enforcement agency for further investigation.” Id. § 261.105(d); see also id. § 261.001(5) (defining “[p]erson responsible for a child’s care, custody, or welfare”). Section 261.301 is titled “Investigation of Report” and contemplates a law enforcement agency’s investigation of a report in various instances. Id. § 261.301. First, it provides that “[w]ith assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agency . . . the [DFPS] shall make a prompt and thorough investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect allegedly committed by a person responsible for a child’s care, custody, or welfare.” Id. § 261.301(a). Second, it provides that “[t]he appropriate law enforcement agency shall investigate” “a report that alleges child abuse, neglect, or exploitation by a person other than a person responsible for a child’s care, custody, or welfare” “if th[at] agency determines an investigation should be conducted.” Id. § 261.301(c). Third, it requires a joint investigation by the DFPS and a peace officer “from the appropriate local law enforcement agency” be conducted if a report to the DFPS “alleges that a child has been or may be the victim of conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that poses an immediate risk of physical or sexual abuse of a child that could result in the death of or serious harm to the child.” Id.
§ 261.301(f). Fourth, it commands that the DFPS “and the appropriate local law enforcement agency shall conduct an investigation[] . . . as provided by . . . section [261.301] and [a]rticle

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2A.057, Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 if” a report “alleges that a child has been or may be the victim of conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that poses an immediate risk of physical or sexual abuse of a child that could result in the death of or serious harm to the child.” Id.
§ 261.301(h) (footnote added).
Nothing in either section 261.105 or 261.301 suggests that the definition of “law enforcement agency” is different than that set out in subsection 261.001(3-a). See id. §§ 261.105,
.301. And a school district police department is not included in that definition—i.e., it is not the Department of Public Safety, a municipal police department, or a county sheriff’s or constable’s office. See id. § 261.001(3-a). Giving effect to the unambiguous language of the statute, a school district police department is not an “appropriate law enforcement agency” for the purposes of sections 261.105 and 261.301. 3 See Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 680 (“Courts must adhere to legislative definitions of terms when they are supplied.”). You argue this conclusion cannot be reconciled with the powers school district peace officers “retain . . . under state law, including the authority and duty to investigate crimes within their territorial jurisdiction.” Request Letter at 3. But there is no law “that would give an individual police officer who is commissioned through a police agency, the unfettered authority to conduct an investigation . . . without the permission or authority from the” entity that employs him. Connally v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 506 S.W.3d 767, 780 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). For school district police department officers, this is best exemplified by the fact that the board of trustees of a school district determines an officer’s “jurisdiction” and “law enforcement duties” for the school district. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 37.081(a-1), (d)–(e). The board of trustees must, of course, act within the bounds of state law when making those determinations. Cf., e.g., White Deer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 596 S.W.3d 855, 858, 869–70 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, pet. denied). In sum, the definition of “law enforcement agency” in Family Code subsection 261.001(3a) applies throughout Family Code Chapter 261. Accordingly, a school district police department is not an “appropriate law enforcement agency” under either section 261.105 or 261.301.

2
Article 2A.057 requires a peace officer from an appropriate law enforcement agency to accompany the DFPS investigator “[a]s soon as possible, but not later than [twenty-four] hours, after being notified” of a report that is assigned the highest priority in accordance with certain DFPS rules and that “alleges an immediate risk of physical or sexual abuse of a child that could result in the death of or serious harm to the child by a person responsible for the care, custody, or welfare of the child.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2A.057(a)–(c).

That a school district police department is not an appropriate law enforcement agency under those sections does not relieve the department and its officers from carrying out other duties, such as the duty to report, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.101; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0106 (2003) at 5, and to cooperate in the investigation of reports of child abuse or neglect, see, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE § 38.004(a). Nor does it prohibit a school district peace officer from providing assistance to an appropriate law enforcement agency. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 37.081(c). 3

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S U M M A R Y
The definition of “law enforcement agency” in Family Code
subsection 261.001(3-a) applies throughout Chapter 261.
Accordingly, a school district police department is not an
“appropriate law enforcement agency” under either section 261.105 or 261.301.

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Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
MICHAEL C. COTTON
Chair, Opinion Committee
CHRISTY DRAKE-ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee