TX JM-890 April 11, 1988

Did a Texas county have to competitively procure a private company's microfilming and indexing services for the county clerk?

Short answer: Yes. The Attorney General concluded that the company contract was neither a personal service, because the commissioners court had not selected specific individuals to perform it, nor a professional service. Microfilm work therefore remained subject to the County Purchasing Act's competitive bidding or competitive proposal procedures.

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1988. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1988
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Statutes can be amended; verify current law before relying on anything here. Consult a licensed attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Texas AG Opinion JM-890: Microfilm Services Required Competitive Procurement

Plain-English summary

Brazos County asked whether its contract with a private company to microfilm and index county-clerk records had to follow the County Purchasing Act. The company supplied and maintained the camera, developed the clerk's daily film, kept an archival print, returned the original microfilm, and produced bound indices. The annual cost exceeded $100,000.

The Attorney General concluded that the contract was not exempt as a personal service. A personal-service contract required the commissioners court to choose a particular person who would perform the work. This contract instead called for a company to supply services through personnel who were largely unknown to the court.

It was not a professional service either. Older cases protected contracts for work such as legal, medical, teaching, engineering, or architectural services, where selection solely by low bid would ignore advanced learning and professional judgment. Microfilming and indexing did not fit that category merely because the work involved equipment and technical skill.

The County Purchasing Act also expressly treated high-technology items as subject to competitive bidding or the alternative competitive-proposal procedure. If listed technologies such as electronic control and microwave systems were not exempt professional services, the lower level of technology described in the microfilm contract was not exempt.

The county therefore had to use the competitive bidding or competitive proposal procedures in the act.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1988. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Was the microfilm contract a personal service?

No. The commissioners court did not select particular individuals to perform the work; the company supplied its own personnel.

Was it a professional service because it required technical skill?

No. Technical work did not automatically become a professional service within the statutory exception.

What kinds of services did the older cases treat as professional?

The opinion discussed law, medicine, teaching, civil engineering, and architecture as examples requiring education, judgment, and professional skill that could not sensibly be selected by lowest bid alone.

Did the contract have to use sealed competitive bidding?

It had to comply with competitive procurement. Depending on the statutory category, the act allowed competitive bidding or the alternative competitive-proposal procedure.

Why did the high-technology provisions matter?

They showed that the Legislature expected technically sophisticated items to remain inside the competitive procurement system rather than fall automatically within the professional-services exception.

Background and statutory framework

Section 262.023 required competitive bidding or competitive proposals for county purchases above the statutory threshold. Section 262.024(a)(4) allowed the commissioners court, by order, to exempt a personal or professional service.

Hunter et al. v. Whiteaker & Washington et al., 230 S.W. 1096, 1097-98 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, writ ref'd), rejected low-bid selection for civil engineers and explained why professional judgment mattered. Gulf Bitulithic Co. v. Nueces County, 11 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgment adopted), treated skilled construction supervision as a professional service.

For personal services, Attorney General Opinion JM-486 (1986) had applied Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1962). Work performed by a specifically selected individual could qualify; a corporation's agreement merely to provide workers did not.

The code defined high-technology items, including information-processing equipment and related services, and allowed competitive proposals for those items. The opinion read those provisions as evidence that the professional-services exception did not swallow technology contracts.

Citations

Statutory authority:

  • Local Government Code sections 262.021 through 262.024
  • Local Government Code sections 262.022(3) and 262.030
  • V.T.C.S. articles 2368, 2368a, and 2368a.5

Cases:

  • Hunter et al. v. Whiteaker & Washington et al., 230 S.W. 1096, 1097-98 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, writ ref'd)
  • Gulf Bitulithic Co. v. Nueces County, 11 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgment adopted)
  • Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1962)

Prior Attorney General materials referenced: MW-344 (1981) and JM-486 (1986).

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Obvious character-level OCR errors have been corrected, but minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS

                  April 11, 1988

Honorable Bill Turner Opinion No. JM-890
Brazos County Courthouse
300 E. 26th Street, Suite 310 Re: Whether a contract for
Bryan, Texas 77803 microfilming of records of
county clerks office is
subject to competitive
bidding (RQ-1280)

Dear Mr. Turner:

 You ask:

   [Wlhether the use of a private company to
   microfilm records  for the County Clerk's
   Office of Brazos County must comply with the
   competitive bidding requirements   of Local
   Government   Code, Sec. 262.021 et seq.,
   County Purchasing Act, or whether said item
   is a personal or professional service under
   Sec. 262.024(4), supra, and thus need not be
   competitively purchased.

 You describe such services as follows:

      The County Clerk has contracted with a
   company in    Dallas to    microfilm    legal
   instruments  filed in the county clerk's
   office. The company furnishes the county
   clerk with a camera,    film, and provides
   maintenance for the camera. Every day the
   county clerk microfilms    the    instruments
   filed in his office. At the end of each day
   he splices the film and sends it to the
   company in Dallas where it is developed.
   The company makes an archival print of the
   film which it keeps and returns the original
   microfilm back to the county clerk's office.
   The company also makes     indices of     the
   clerk's records, binds the indices and sends
   it to the county clerk's office. The annual




                       p. 4356

Honorable Bill Turner - Page 2 JM-890)

   cost for this service is slightly more        than
   $100,000.
                                                               -,

Section 262.023(a) of the Local Government Code provides
that, for county contract purchases requiring expenditures
over $5,000, the commissioners court "must comply with the
competitive~ bidding or competitive proposal procedures
prescribed by this subchapter."

 Section 262.024 of the Local Government       Code provides

in pertinent part:

      (a) A contract for the purchase of any of
   the following    items is exempt     from the
   requirement established   by section   262.023
   if the commissioners   court by order grants
   the exemption:

      .   .   .   .

      (4) a personal or professional       service.

 The "personal or professional     service"  exception

currently codified as section 262.024(a)(4) remains --,
substantially unchanged from that in the section's
predecessor provisions, article 2368a.5, section 4(a)(4),
V.T.C.S. (Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 641, §1, at 2377) and
article 2368a, section 2, V.T.C.S. (Acts 1931, 42nd Leg.,
ch. 163, at 270-71).

 Prior to the codification     of the "personal

professional service" exception in 1931, the competitizz
bidding statute provided the sole statutory exception to
its operation for "work done under the direct supervision
of the county commissioners and paid for by the day."
V.T.C.S. art. 2368 (Acts 1923, 38th Leg., ch. 127, at 262,
repealed by Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., at 269); and V.T.C.S
art. 2368a (Acts 1917, 35th Leg., ch. 141, §1, at 349,
repealed in part by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 149, §49(1),
at 2545). Hunter et al v. Whiteaker & Washington et al,
230 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, writ
ref'd) considered the latter statute as applied to
engineering services:

      There is but one question of law in this
   case, and that is whether a commissioners'
   court has the legal power and authority   to
   enter into a contract with engineers     for
   their technical and professional services in
   connection   with   the   construction   and




                      p. 4357


Honorable Bill Turner - Page 3 JM-890)




       maintenance of public highways and roads in
       their county, without advertising for compe-
       titive bids' for such services.

          .   .   .   .

          To hold that the act would require that
       the services of a man belonging       to   a
       profession such as that of the law, of
       medicine, of teaching, civil engineering, or
       architecture should be obtained by a county
       only through competitive bidding would give
       a ridiculous meaning to the act, and require
       an absurdity.

          .   .   .   .

          Such a construction   would require the
       selection of attorneys, physicians,   school
       teachers, and civil engineers by competitive
       bids, the only test being the lowest bid for
       the services of such men. Such a test would
       probably be the best that could be conceived
       for obtaining the services of the least
       competent man, and would be most disastrous
       to the material interest of a county.

          Civil engineering    is   a    profession,
       requiring years of education and service to
       obtain perfection in it, and calling, in its
       application, for a high order of intelli-
       gence and extraordinary skill and learning,
       and it was never contemplated by the Legis-
       lature that the money of the citizens of a
       county, raised for road purposes, should be
       expended upon the advice of a civil engineer
       who had obtained his employment by underbid-
       ding his competitors, and without regard to
       his ability to fill the position.

Id. at 1097-98.

     Gulf Bitulithic Co. v. Nueces County, 11 S.W.2d    305
(Tex. Comm’n  App. 1928, judgm't adopted) ruled on the

P applicability of the competitive bidding requirements
imposed by article 2368a, to the services of a company
engaged by the county to supervise the construction of
county roads. Stressing that the county itself directly
paid the cost of labor and material for the projects, and
P that "[t]he company was not employed as contractor or

                          p.   4358

Honorable Bill Turner - Page 4 (JM-890)

materialman but as agent" the court, in holding such
services within the "personal or professional services"
exception, reasoned as follows:

      To   hold   that    contracts for    the
   supervision of work done directly by the
   county must be let to the lowest bidder
   would result in the county obtaining the
   least competent     supervision, as   those
   possessing the necessary skill, experience,
   and business judgment to supervise a large
   construction program in the most efficient
   and economical manner could not hope to
   successfully compete with those of lesser
   skill, experience, or business judgment.
   (Emphasis added.)

Id. at 309.

  McCall v. Commissioners' Court of Madison County, 281 S.W. 593 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 15 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1929), considered a county

contract with a company for various services such as
making abstracts of property upon which taxes were
delinquent, making a map and plat system or block map of
all land in the county, surveying where necessary br
agreed, and making reports of such to the commissioners
court, and held that:

      Some of the things embraced in the con-
   tract in this case would perhaps require
   technical knowledge and some would not, and
   those that do not would be controlled by
   [the competitive bidding requirements   of]
   said statute.

Id. at 595.

 Attorney General Opinion MW-344    (1981) pointed  out

that the pre-1931 cases established an exception for
services involving "special skills," but that the language
of the exception adopted in 1931 for "personal or
professional services" does not on its face appear to be a
mere codification of that prior court-created exception.

 "Personal services" in its ordinary meaning,     for    -

example, would include other sorts of services than only
those involving "special skills." Recently, Attorney
General Opinion JM-486 (1986), in seeking to elucidate the
scope of the personal service exception, referred to a ?

                     p. 4359


  Honorable Bill Turner - Page 5     (JM-890)




  definition of personal services developed by Van Zandt v.
  Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1962) which had
  • considered the applicability of a statute providing for
    recovery of attorneys fees by persons "having a valid
    claim . . . for personal services rendered." Attorney
    General Opinion JM-486 concluded with respect to the
    question of the applicability of the competitive bidding
    statute to janitorial services:
            Someone who claims to have        rendered
         'personal services' must have performed   the
         services himself. The claimant's employees,
         in contrast, may have rendered    'services.'
         If the contract you ask about requires      a
         specific person    to   perform    janitorial
         services, it is a contract      for personal
         services.  If the contract merely requires a
         person or corporation to provide persons who
         will perform janitorial services, it is not
         a contract for personal services.
    
       It is our opinion that the microfilm services which
    

    are the subject of your request are not "personal
    .c, services" within the scope of section 262.024(a)(4) of the
    Local Government Code, because from your description of
    such services they are not to be rendered by a person or
    persons chosen specifically by the commissioners court,
    but rather by personnel of the service company, many or
    most of whom are unknown to the commissioners.

       The next question is:      Are the microfilm    services
    

    "professional services?" Webster's definitions of "pro-
    fessional" range from "of relating to, or characteristics
    of a profession" to "engaged in one of the learned
    professions" and "characterized by or conforming to the
    technical or ethical standards of a profession." The
    definition of profession includes "a calling requiring
    specialized knowledge and often long and intensive
    academic preparation" as well as "a principal calling,
    vocation, or employment." See Webster's Ninth New
    Collegiate Dictionary (1985).

       Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979)     contains   the
    

    following entry under "profession":

            A vocation   or   occupation  requiring
         special, usually advanced, education   and
         skill: e.g. law or medical professions.
    

    r Also refers to whole body of such profes-
    sion.

                           p. 4360
    

Honorable Bill Turner - Page 6 (JM-890)

      The labor and       skill involved  in     a
   profession   is   predominantly   mental     or
   intellectual,   rather    than  physical     or
   manual.

      The term originally    contemplated  only
   theology,   law,  and   medicine,   but
   applications of science and learning a::
   extended to other departments   of affairs,
   other vocations also receive the name, which
   implies professed   attainments   in special
   knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.

 Marvland Casualtv Co. v. Crazv Water Co., 160 S.W.Zd

102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1942, no writ) interpreted
the meaning of "professionalV' services as found in an
insurance policy rider and found that the services of the
bath house operator policy holder were not "professional"
services, the labor and skill required for the latter
sorts of services being "predominantly mental or
intellectual, rather than physical or manual." Id. at

  1. Marvland Casualtv Co. was cited in Attorney General
    Opinion MW-344 (1981), which held that a contract for the
    services of a container terminal operator was not one for
    "professional services."

    A more recent indication by the legislature as to the
    present scope of the "professionall* service exception it
    created 57 years ago is found in two other sections of the
    County Purchasing Act:

    §262.022. Definitions

      In this subchapter:
    
      .   .   .   .
    
      (3) *High technology    item'       means  a
    

    service, equipment, or good of a highly
    technical nature, including:

          (A) data processing   equipment   and
      software and firmware used in conjunction
      with data processing equipment;
    
          (B) telecommunications,      radio,   and       ?
      microwave systems:
    
                                                          ?
    
                             p. 4361
    

,
Honorable Bill Turner - Page 7 (JM-890)

P


                     (C) electronic    distributed   control
                 systems,    including    building    energy
                 management systems: and

                    (D) technical   services    related   to
                 those items.

       Local Gov't Code §262.022.

              §262.030. Alternative Competitive Proposal
              Procedure for Insurance or High Technology
              Items

                  (a) The competitive   proposal procedure
              provided by this section may be used for the
              purchase of insurance or high technology
              items. Quotations must be solicited through
              a request for proposals.   Public notice   for
              the request for proposals must be made      in
              the same     manner   as provided     in   the
              competitive bidding procedure.   The request
              for proposals    must specify the relative
              importance of price and other evaluation
              factors. The award of the contract shall be
              made to the      responsible  offeror    whose
              proposal is determined    to be the lowest
              evaluated offer resulting from negotiation,
              taking   into   consideration  the    relative
              importance of price and other evaluation
              factors set forth      in the request      for
              proposals.

       Local Gov't Code §262.030.

            In providing for "high-technology items." a "competi-
       tive proposal"   procedure alternative   to the competitive
       bidding procedure   set out in the Act, section 262.030
       clearly contemplates that such high technology items are
       covered by the requirement of section 262.023 that certain
       items be purchased in compliance with the "competitive
       bidding  or    competitive   proposal    procedures."   The
       legislature therefore could not have considered such "high
       technology" items to be exempted      from the coverage   of
       section 262.023 by the provisions of section 262.024 which
       provide for the "personal or professional      service" and
,r-‘   other exceptions to the operation of section 262.023.

            It is our opinion that since the legislature intended
       such high technology items to be covered by the competi-
       tive bidding or competitive proposal requirements and not




                                 p. 4362

Honorable Bill Turner - Page 8 JM-890)

to fall within the section 262.024 exceptions, it would
not have considered the microfilm services in question
here as exempted from coverage. If services requiring
such high skills and technical expertise as "electronic
distributed control systems," "microwave systems," and the
other examples of high technology services listed in
§262.022(3) are nevertheless not "professional" services
within the meaning of §262.024(a)(4), then it is clear
that the microfilm services which, from your description,
involve a lower level of technology, are not "professional
services."

 We conclude therefore that the microfilm services you

described are subject to the competitive bidding or
competitive proposal requirements of the County Purchasing
Act, Local Gov't Code §262.021, et seq.

                   SUMMARY

      A contract   for microfilm services does
   not fall within the "personal or profession-
   al service" exception of Local Government
   Code section 262.024, and therefore must be
   let under     the competitive   bidding    or
   competitive proposal procedures set forth in
   the County Purchasing Act, Local Government
   Code section 262.021, et seq.

                                Very truly yours,
                                    I


                                JIM
                                     ““~
                               Lb+& hc  MATTOX            -
                                Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN ‘7

Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by William Walker
Assistant Attorney General

                     p. 4363

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read a 1988 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Texas statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.