Can the Texas Legislature let just one city charge extra court costs on municipal court convictions?

Texas AG Opinion JM-535: City-Specific Court Costs

Plain-English summary

The chairman of the Texas House Judiciary Committee asked the Attorney General a targeted question: could the Legislature pass a law letting one particular city charge an extra court cost on convictions in its municipal court, without running afoul of the state or federal constitution? The question assumed a bill written to apply to a single named city. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

The AG answered no. The controlling provision is article III, section 56 of the Texas Constitution, which says the Legislature shall not pass any "local or special law" regulating the affairs of cities, except as the constitution otherwise provides. The constitution does carve out an exception (in article V) for laws that create courts and set their jurisdiction and organization, and a 1946 decision (Tom Green County v. Proffitt) used that exception to uphold a court-reporter-salary law tied to a population bracket. But the AG concluded the proposed bill reached further than court structure: it would hand a specific city a specific power, the power to impose additional court costs. The AG pointed to In re Johnson, where a court struck down a statute letting court reporters set their own fees, because the fee ended up applying unequally to litigants; that showed section 56 can invalidate a law even when it concerns how the courts function. So the judiciary exceptions would not rescue this bill. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

The deeper problem was that the bill would apply to only one city. Section 56 does not forbid every law that treats cities differently. Texas courts have upheld population-bracket laws, and the real test is whether the classification is reasonably related to the differences that justify it and whether the law is written so other cities can come within it in the future (Morris v. City of San Antonio; Miller v. El Paso County). A statute so constructed that no other city in the state could ever be included is an unconstitutional local or special law (City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt). Because this proposal, by its terms, would apply to just one city, the AG concluded article III, section 56 barred it. The AG cautioned that the law might also raise equal protection issues under the Fourteenth Amendment, took no position on whether the charge was really a "court cost" or a fine, and noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure already governs costs and fines in justice and corporation courts. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. The constitutional local-or-special-law analysis it applies remains the general framework, but later court decisions and constitutional amendments may refine it, and the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions on municipal court costs and fines have been amended and recodified since. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule or citation mentioned here.

Common questions

Why can't the Legislature just pass a law for one city that needs the extra revenue?

Because the Texas Constitution forbids it. The AG explained that article III, section 56 bars local or special laws regulating the affairs of cities, and a bill that by its terms applies to a single city, which no other city can ever join, is exactly the kind of local or special law that provision prohibits. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Doesn't the constitution let the Legislature pass laws about courts?

Yes, but within limits. The AG acknowledged the constitution's exception (article V) for creating courts and setting their jurisdiction and organization, but concluded that granting one city the power to impose additional court costs goes beyond court structure. It cited In re Johnson, where a statute touching how courts functioned was still struck down under section 56, to show the exception would not save this bill. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Are all laws that treat cities differently unconstitutional?

No. The AG noted that Texas courts have upheld population-bracket laws, and that the key test is whether the classification is reasonably related to the differences that justify it and whether the law is written so other cities can later come within it. A one-city law that no other city can ever join fails that test. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Did the AG decide whether the charge was a court cost or a fine?

No. The AG expressly made no comment on whether the charge was correctly characterized as a court cost rather than a fine, and it pointed out that the Code of Criminal Procedure already contains provisions governing the fixing and collection of costs and fines in justice and corporation courts. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Background and statutory framework

Article III, section 56 of the Texas Constitution lists subjects on which the Legislature may not pass a local or special law, including "regulating the affairs of . . . cities." The provision is meant to keep the Legislature from singling out one locality for special treatment that others in the same situation cannot get. The constitution qualifies it with exceptions elsewhere, and article V (sections 1, 7, and 22) allows laws creating courts and prescribing their jurisdiction and organization. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

The AG worked through the case law on both sides of the line. Tom Green County v. Proffitt upheld a court-reporter-salary act that exempted courts in a population bracket, treating it as a law affecting the organization of the courts under article V, section 1. But In re Johnson struck down a statute letting court reporters set their own fees, because the fees applied unequally to litigants, showing that a law touching court functions can still violate section 56. On classifications generally, Jones v. Alexander shows population-bracket laws can be valid, while Morris v. City of San Antonio (quoting Miller v. El Paso County) requires that a classification be broad enough to include a substantial class and that the law apply uniformly to municipalities that later fall within the classification. City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt held a statute invalid where it was so constructed that no other city could ever come within its terms. Measured against these, a bill applying to one city alone was an impermissible local or special law. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Citations and references

The opinion cited the following authorities. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Constitutional and statutory provisions:

• Tex. Const. art. III, § 56 (local or special laws)
• Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 7, 22 (judicial department)
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV (equal protection)
• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 45.01 - 45.54 (justice and corporation court costs and fines)

Cases:

• Tom Green County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1946, no writ)
• In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e., writ dism'd, 569 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1978)
• Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933)
• Morris v. City of San Antonio, 572 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1978, no writ)
• Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000 (1941)
• City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 470 (1931)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-0535
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0535.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF text layer. Minor OCR errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

August 20, 1986

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General

Honorable Bob Bush
Chairman
Committee on Judiciary
Texas House of Representatives
P. O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78769

Opinion No. JM-535

Re: Whether the legislature may authorize a particular municipality to impose additional court costs on convictions

Dear Representative Bush:

As chairman of the House of Representatives' Committee on Judiciary you ask:

May the legislature, without violating the state or federal constitution, authorize a particular city to impose an additional court cost on a conviction in municipal court?

We assume that you refer to legislation which would apply to one particular municipality. You do not indicate which provisions of the state or federal constitution concern you.

Your question implicates one provision of the Texas Constitution in particular. Article III, section 56, of the Texas Constitution states that "[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law" on certain enumerated subjects. These subjects include "[r]egulating the affairs of . . . cities. . . ." Accordingly, we must determine whether the proposed act is a "local or special law" and whether it falls within a constitutional exception from section 56.

The proposed legislation relates not just to the affairs of a particular city but to the city's municipal courts. The Texas Constitution contains an exception to section 56 for the creation of certain courts and for the prescription of their jurisdiction and organization. See Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 7, 22; Tom Green County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1946, no writ). The court in Tom Green County upheld an act which dealt with salaries for official court reporters but which exempted the courts in counties falling within a certain population bracket. The court held that the act was not controlled by article III, section 56, because the act fell within article V, section 1, as a law affecting the organization of the courts. 195 S.W.2d at 847.

Nevertheless, we believe that the instant case extends beyond the creation, jurisdiction, and organization of the courts. You ask whether the legislature may grant a certain power to a particular city -- the power to impose additional court costs on municipal court convictions. The court in In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1977), per curiam, case 1 writ ref'd n.r.e.; case 2 writ dism'd per curiam, 569 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1978), applied article III, section 56, to a statute which authorized court reporters to set their own fees, subject to the approval of the court. Although this statute applied to an aspect of the functioning of the courts, the court struck down the provision under article III, section 56:

Since the article is subject to unequal application to litigants due to the fact that the fee charged is subject to each individual court reporter's fee scale and the individual determination by each trial judge of what is a reasonable amount, the article is in violation of Art. III, §56 of the Texas Constitution.

554 S.W.2d at 785. Accordingly, we do not believe that the constitutional judiciary exceptions would save the proposed legislation.

Moreover, the proposed legislation would apply to only one city. Article III, section 56, does not prohibit all classifications which treat cities differently. For example, Texas courts have upheld a number of population bracket laws. See, e.g., Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933). The vital test is whether the classification is reasonably related to the differences in circumstances that necessitate the classification. Applying article III, section 56, the court in Morris v. City of San Antonio, 572 S.W.2d 831, 833-34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1978, no writ) stated:

Not only must a classification be broad enough to include a substantial class based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing that class from others, but the legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all municipalities that may in the future come within the classification designated. Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000 (1941). In a case decided ten years earlier than Miller the Supreme Court held a statute invalid as a local or special law and said, '. . . the act is so constructed that it is absolutely impossible for any other city in the state to ever be included within the terms or under the provisions of the act.' City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1931).

Your question involves a law which would, by its terms, apply to only one city.

Consequently, we conclude that article III, section 56, prohibits the Texas Legislature from enacting legislation which grants a particular city the authority to impose additional "court costs" on convictions in municipal courts. We make no comment on whether such a cost is correctly characterized as a court cost rather than as a fine. We note that this type of legislation may also implicate equal protection issues under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Further, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains various provisions which govern generally the fixing and collection of costs and fines in justice and corporation courts. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 45.01 - 45.54.

SUMMARY

Article III, section 56, of the Texas Constitution prohibits the Texas Legislature from enacting legislation granting a particular city the authority to impose additional "court costs" on convictions in municipal courts.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorney General