TX JM-469 April 7, 1986

Were airport crash and fire rescue workers covered as firefighters under Texas public-employee relations law?

Short answer: Yes. JM-469 concluded that airport crash and fire rescue personnel employed by a city, town, or other political subdivision were firefighters under article 5154c-1.

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This page answers the general question as of 1986. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1986
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. The opinion dates from 1986; verify current statutes and case law before relying on it.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
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Texas AG Opinion JM-469: Airport Fire Rescue Personnel

Plain-English summary

The question was whether airport crash and fire rescue personnel counted as "firefighters" under article 5154c-1, the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act. The opinion limited its analysis to airports operated by cities, towns, or other political subdivisions because the act applied to those public employers. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

JM-469 concluded that covered airport rescue personnel were firefighters under the act. It reasoned that "The nature of the job they perform rather than a job label of 'firefighter' should control." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

The opinion relied on the act's public-safety purpose and its direction that the law be liberally construed. Airport crash and fire rescue workers provided the same kind of protection for public health, safety, and welfare even if they were not administratively placed in the regular fire department. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the worker's job title determine coverage?

No. JM-469 focused on the nature of the employee's work rather than the administrative label attached to the position. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Did the opinion cover rescue personnel at every airport?

No. The analysis assumed an airport operated by a city, town, or other political subdivision because article 5154c-1 applied to those public entities. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Why did the deputy-sheriff case matter?

The cited court had interpreted the act's definition of "policeman" in light of the statute's overall purpose rather than a narrow departmental label. JM-469 applied similar reasoning to airport rescue personnel. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Background and statutory framework

Article 5154c-1 sought comparable compensation and employment conditions for public firefighters and police while prohibiting strikes that could threaten public health, safety, and welfare. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Section 3(1) defined a firefighter as each permanent paid employee in the fire department of a city, town, or other political subdivision, except the department chief, and excluded volunteers. The opinion read that language liberally in light of the act's purpose. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Citations and references

  • article 5154c-1, V.T.C.S.
  • article 5154c-1, sections 2(a), 2(b)(1), 3(1), and 3(2), V.T.C.S.
  • Commissioners' Court of El Paso County v. El Paso County Sheriff's Deputies Association, 620 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
  • Kierstead v. City of San Antonio, 636 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1982), modified, 643 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1982)
  • City of San Antonio v. Aguilar, 696 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1985, no writ)

Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0469.pdf

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF via OCR. Minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General

April 7, 1986

Honorable Lloyd Criss
Chairman
Committee on Labor and Employment Relations
Texas House of Representatives
P. O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78769

Opinion No. JM-469

Re: Whether airport crash and fire rescue personnel are within the provisions of article 5154c-1, V.T.C.S.

Dear Representative Criss:

You ask whether airport crash and fire rescue personnel are covered as "firefighters" under article 5154c-1, V.T.C.S., the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act.

This act provides, in part, that

[i]t is declared to be the policy of the State of Texas that cities, towns, and other political subdivisions within the state having police and/or fire departments shall provide the firefighters and policemen, in said departments, with compensation and other conditions of employment that are substantially the same as compensation and conditions prevailing in comparable private sector employment. (Emphasis added).

Sec. 2(a). Thus, the act applies only to "cities, towns, and other political subdivisions." See also §3(3); Commissioners' Court of El Paso County v. El Paso County Sheriff's Deputies Association, 620 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accordingly, we assume that you ask about rescue personnel of airports operated by cities, towns, and other political subdivisions.

Section 3(1) of article 5154c-1 defines "firefighter" as follows:

The term 'firefighter' means each permanent paid employee in the fire department of any city, town, or other political subdivision within the state, with the sole exception of the chief of the department. Nothing herein shall apply to volunteer firefighters.

The reasoning followed in Commissioners' Court of El Paso County, 620 S.W.2d 900, is instructive in determining the scope of section 3(1). The court addressed whether the term "policeman," as defined in section 3(2) of the act, includes deputy sheriffs employed by counties. Section 3(2) provides:

The term 'policeman' means each sworn certified full-time paid employee, whether male or female, who regularly serves in a professional law enforcement capacity in the police department of any city, town, or other political subdivision within the state, with the sole exception of the chief of the department.

Ascertaining legislative intent was the court's primary objective. See 620 S.W.2d at 901. The court looked "to the entire Act and not its isolated provisions, keeping in mind at all times 'the old law, the evil and the remedy.'" Id. Public health, safety, and welfare conditions demand a prohibition on strikes by firefighters and police. Art. 5154c-1, §2(b)(1). Without a right to strike, however, firefighters and policemen need a method to bargain with and to settle disputes with their public employers in order to maintain morale. Id.; 620 S.W.2d at 902. With these considerations, the court reasoned that "[t]he existing evil and the remedy provided apply to deputy sheriffs as well as other 'policemen.'" Accordingly, the court ruled that deputy sheriffs fall within section 3(2) of article 5154c-1. 620 S.W.2d at 902.

Similar considerations apply to the instant case. Although airport rescue personnel may not always be administratively designated as part of the regular fire department of a political subdivision, like the regular department, they serve as vital protection for the public health, safety, and welfare. The nature of the job they perform rather than a job label of "firefighter" should control. See generally Attorney General Opinion H-76 (1973). Consequently, we believe that they are the type of public employee that the legislature intended to protect as "firefighters" in article 5154c-1.

Moreover, the courts have followed the legislature's directive that "this Act should be liberally construed." For example, in Kierstead v. City of San Antonio, 636 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1982), modified, 643 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1982), the court applied article 5154c-1 to Emergency Medical Technicians of the San Antonio Fire Department. Cf. City of San Antonio v. Aguilar, 696 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1985, no writ). These public employees were personnel of the fire department, but they were not employed in a fire-fighting capacity. Although the scope of the term "firefighter" was not directly in issue, the case evidences a tacit acceptance of a liberal construction of the coverage of the term. For these reasons, we conclude that the crash and fire rescue personnel of an airport operated by cities, towns, and other political subdivisions are covered by article 5154c-1.

SUMMARY

The crash and fire rescue personnel of an airport operated by cities, towns, and other political subdivisions are covered by article 5154c-1, V.T.C.S.

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT GRAY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorney General

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