TX JM-467 April 4, 1986

Must a Texas city put a polling place inside every city council district and appoint district residents as election judges?

Short answer: Not exactly. JM-467 said a municipal polling place had to be within the election precinct, which was not necessarily the same as a council district, and an election judge generally had to be a qualified voter of that precinct unless the emergency-appointment rule applied.

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Currency note: this opinion is from 1986
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. The opinion dates from 1986; verify current statutes and case law before relying on it.
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Texas AG Opinion JM-467: City Polling Places and Election Judges

Plain-English summary

Alvin was moving from at-large city council elections to a system with five district seats and two at-large seats under a federal court order. The city had appointed some election judges who did not live in the districts they were assigned to serve, and it had not placed a polling location in every district electing a council member. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

JM-467 said the Election Code used the election precinct, not the city council district, as the geographic unit for polling places. It stated that a single polling place was to be located within each precinct and that the city council chose the location within that precinct. The opinion could not decide whether Alvin's particular arrangements complied with the law because the answer depended on facts and on the federal court order. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

For election judges, the opinion quoted section 32.051: "to be eligible to serve as a judge of an election precinct, a person must be a qualified voter of the precinct." It also recognized an emergency exception when neither the presiding judge nor the alternate could serve and the vacancy arose too late for the normal appointment process. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did every city council district need its own polling place?

JM-467 did not state that rule. It said the precinct was the relevant unit and that "a single polling place is to be located within each precinct." Whether Alvin's precinct and district boundaries produced a lawful arrangement depended on facts the opinion could not resolve. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Who had authority to redraw county election precincts to match city districts?

The county commissioners court, not the city council. The opinion said the Election Code authorized the commissioners court to change county precinct boundaries to conform to city election districts, subject to statutory timing rules and federal requirements. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Did an election judge have to live in the council district being elected?

The opinion framed the ordinary requirement by precinct, not by council district. Section 32.051 required the judge to be a qualified voter of the election precinct, while the city charter could add eligibility requirements for city election officers. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Could the city appoint a judge from outside the precinct in an emergency?

Yes, under the emergency provision discussed in the opinion. If neither the presiding judge nor the alternate could serve and the vacancy was discovered too late for the normal process, the appointing authority could name a replacement subject to the remaining eligibility rules. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Background and statutory framework

The commissioners court divided the county into compact and contiguous election precincts. Section 42.005 restricted a county precinct from containing territory from more than one city ward, and the statute defined a ward as a territorial unit whose voters alone elected a member of the city's governing body. Sections 42.031 through 42.035 addressed changes to county precinct boundaries. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

JM-467 also treated the federal Voting Rights Act and the governing federal court order as possible limits on the ordinary state-law analysis. It noted that changes to precinct boundaries and polling-place locations were then subject to federal preclearance and expressly declined to decide how the federal order affected Alvin's April 1986 election. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Citations and references

  • Election Code sections 11.003, 32.007, 32.051 through 32.056, 42.001, 42.005, 42.031 through 42.035, 42.061, 43.001, and 43.004
  • 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. and 1973c
  • Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 380-83 (1971)
  • County Council of Sumter County, South Carolina v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983)
  • Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739, 740 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
  • Harrison v. Jay, 271 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. 1954)
  • Thomas v. Groebl, 212 S.W.2d 625, 630-31 (Tex. 1948)
  • Stotler v. Fetzer, 630 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd)
  • Branaum v. Patrick, 643 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1982, no writ)
  • Greater Beauxart Garden Municipal Utility District v. Cormier, 596 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1980, no writ)
  • Zuniga v. Almaraz, 514 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1974, no writ)
  • Ex parte White, 28 S.W. 542, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894)
  • Anderson v. Crow, 260 S.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1986/jm0467.pdf

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF via OCR. Minor errors may remain; the linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General

April 4, 1986

Honorable Clint Hackney
Chairman
Committee on Elections
Texas House of Representatives
P.O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78769

Opinion No. JM-467

Re: Location of polling places and residency requirements for election judges in city council election

Dear Representative Hackney:

You ask two questions about an election for members of the Alvin City Council scheduled for April 5, 1986. The city is under a federal court order to cease at-large election of city council members and adopt a plan that includes the election of five city council members by district and two at large. The city is phasing in the new plan. You inform us that the city council has named election judges who do not reside in the district to which they are assigned. Moreover, the city has not established a polling place in each district which will elect a city councilman.

You request an opinion on the following questions:

  1. In a municipal election, does the election of a council member from a district require that the polling place be located within the district?

  2. In a municipal election, does the law require that the election judge be a registered voter living within the boundaries of the district?

We cannot provide an exhaustive answer to your first question. Whether the polling places were designated for the April 5 election in compliance with the Election Code depends in part upon the facts. Some facts have been submitted to us, but an Attorney General Opinion may not make the additional fact findings necessary to a complete answer to this question. Moreover, the requirements of the Federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, et seq., are also relevant to your inquiry. The requirements of this act may in some cases prevail over the provisions of state law. We lack sufficient information about court orders issued under the Voting Rights Law that would modify the application of Election Code provisions to this election. See, e.g., Attorney General Opinion MW-350 (1981). However, the court order to which the city is subject will control its duty with respect to this particular election. We will discuss the relevant provisions of law to provide some guidance to you.

With this caveat, we turn to your first question. Under the Election Code, the precinct, and not the city election district, is the geographical unit within which a polling place is established. A single polling place is to be located within each precinct. Elec. Code § 43.001. The city council has authority to determine where the polling place will be located within the precinct. Elec. Code § 43.004; see Elec. Code § 1.005(13) (defining "political subdivision" to include city).

The city council also has some authority to establish election precincts for city council elections, but the city's election precincts "may not divide a county election precinct except as necessary to follow the city's boundary." Elec. Code § 42.061(c). Thus, the city's election precincts are virtually determined by the county's election precincts established pursuant to the Election Code. See Attorney General Opinion H-232 (1974).

The commissioners court is to divide the county into "compact and contiguous" election precincts. Elec. Code § 42.001. Section 42.005 of the code establishes the relationship between county election precincts and single member districts for the election of city councilmen:

(a) A county election precinct may not contain territory from more than one of each of the following types of territorial units:

(1) a commissioners precinct;

(2) a justice precinct;

(3) a congressional district;

(4) a state representative district;

(5) a state senatorial district;

(6) a ward in a city with a population of 10,000 or more; or

(7) a State Board of Education district.

. . . .

(c) In this section, 'ward' means a territorial unit of a city, regardless of its designation under other law, from which a member of the city's governing body is elected by only the voters residing in the territorial unit. (Emphasis added).

Elec. Code § 42.005.

The Election Code authorizes the commissioners court to change the boundaries of county election districts to make them conform to city election districts. See Elec. Code §§ 42.031-42.035. You have not informed us whether the county has attempted to change election precinct boundaries to accommodate the new city election districts, or whether there was sufficient time between the issuance of the court order and the April 5 election date to fulfill the statutory requirements for changing a boundary. See Elec. Code § 42.003(b).

Moreover, the Federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq., might prevent the commissioners court from complying with Election Code deadlines in changing an election precinct boundary to conform to a new city election district. Changes in election precinct boundaries and in the locations of polling places are subject to preclearance by the Attorney General of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 380-83 (1971); County Council of Sumter County, South Carolina v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983); Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739, 740 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see Attorney General Opinion MW-350 (1981). See also Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 340, at 2589 (county election precincts are not required to conform to city election districts if compliance is impracticable because of a federal court order).

To summarize, authority rests with the county commissioners court, and not the city council, to redraw election precinct lines to conform with city wards or election districts. See Attorney General Opinion H-282 (1974). We cannot determine whether the statutes discussed prevent or excuse the county from redrawing the precinct lines in time for the April 5 election; the application of those statutes to a specific case requires the investigation and resolution of fact questions.

The city council is required to locate the polling place within the established election precinct, and voters are required to vote within the precinct in which they reside. Elec. Code § 11.003; Harrison v. Jay, 271 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. 1954). Election laws, however, are construed as directory in absence of fraud or a mandatory provision which requires voiding a ballot for failure to comply with a statute. Thomas v. Groebl, 212 S.W.2d 625, 630-31 (Tex. 1948); Stotler v. Fetzer, 630 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd). Election law provisions which relate to voters are more readily construed as directory than those relating to candidates. Branaum v. Patrick, 643 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1982, no writ).

The courts have in most cases strictly construed the section 11.003 requirement that all voters vote in the precinct in which they reside. Harrison v. Jay, 271 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. 1954); Greater Beauxart Garden Municipal Utility District v. Cormier, 596 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1980, no writ); Zuniga v. Almaraz, 514 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1974, no writ). There are, however, exceptions to the strict construction of this provision. Ex parte White, 28 S.W. 542, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894); Anderson v. Crow, 260 S.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion O-1303 (1939).

You next ask whether the law requires that the election judge in a municipal election be a registered voter living within the boundaries of the district. Chapter 32 of the Election Code deals with the appointment and qualifications of election judges. The provisions of a home rule city charter supersede or supplement some of the code provisions. See Elec. Code §§ 32.011, 32.035, 32.056. Alvin is a home rule city and its charter provisions on elections will have to be read together with the Election Code.

Sections 32.051 through 32.056 of the Election Code govern eligibility requirements for election judges. These provisions constitute subchapter C of chapter 32 of the Election Code. Section 32.051 provides as follows:

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), to be eligible to serve as a judge of an election precinct, a person must be a qualified voter of the precinct.

(b) If the authority making an emergency appointment of a presiding judge cannot find an eligible qualified voter of the precinct who is willing to accept the appointment, the eligibility requirement for a clerk prescribed by Subsection (c) applies.

(c) To be eligible to serve as a clerk of an election precinct, a person must be a qualified voter:

. . . .

(3) of the political subdivision, in an election ordered by an authority of a political subdivision other than a county. (Emphasis added).

A home rule city charter may prescribe eligibility requirements or grounds of ineligibility in addition to those prescribed in subchapter C for election officers serving in elections ordered by an authority of the city. Elec. Code § 32.056; see §§ 32.052 (public officer ineligible); 32.053 (candidate for public office ineligible); 32.054 (relative or employees of candidate ineligible). Under section 32.051, the person appointed as a city election judge must be a qualified voter of the precinct, unless he is appointed under the emergency provision. Section 32.007 of the Election Code defines an "emergency appointment" under chapter 32:

(a) If neither the presiding judge nor the alternate presiding judge can serve in an election and their inability to serve is discovered so late that it is impracticable to fill the vacancy in the normal manner, the presiding officer of the appointing authority or the authority if a single officer shall appoint a replacement judge to preside at the election. If the appointing authority is unavailable, the authority responsible for distributing the supplies for the election shall appoint the replacement judge.

Elec. Code § 32.007. Under the circumstances described here, the city may appoint a qualified voter as election judge, subject to other eligibility provisions in the city charter applicable to an emergency appointee. Whether an order under the federal Voting Rights Act affects the operation of these provisions at the April 5 election in Alvin is a question beyond the scope of this opinion.

SUMMARY

Section 43.004 of the Election Code provides that a polling place for a municipal election should be located within the election precinct. Section 32.051 of the Election Code requires that the election judge be a registered voter of the election precinct he serves as judge. Section 32.051 of the Election Code also provides for appointment of a registered voter in an emergency as defined by section 32.007 of the Election Code. The provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act may in some cases prevail over the provisions of the Texas Election Code.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT GRAY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General

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