TX JM-393 December 19, 1985

Does a state budget grandfather clause for probation-department car allowances cover paid trainees, not just probation officers?

Short answer: Assuming the rider was valid, the Attorney General read the grandfather clause to protect anyone employed by a local probation department on May 31, 1985, not just probation officers. Because anyone who works for compensation is an employee, paid trainees who later became officers were covered too.

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1985. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Texas law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1985
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Texas Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Texas courts but are not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. The opinion dates from 1985; verify current statutes and case law before relying on it.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Texas AG Opinion JM-393: Probation Rider Grandfather Clause

Plain-English summary

The Sixty-ninth Legislature attached a rider to the money it appropriated for the Texas Adult Probation Commission. Rider No. 7 told the Commission to claw back state aid from local probation departments that were paying mileage or monthly car allowances above the state reimbursement rate. But it carved out an exception: when the Commission looked at those allowances, it was not to count car allowances "provided to individuals employed by probation departments as of May 31, 1985." That carve-out is a grandfather clause, protecting allowances that were already in place. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

State Senator Oscar Mauzy asked the Attorney General how wide that grandfather clause reached. Some local departments were reading it narrowly, as covering only people who were already full probation officers on May 31, 1985, and not trainees who were still in training that day but later became regular officers. The senator wanted to know whether the trainees were left out. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

The Attorney General read the clause broadly. Assuming the rider was valid (the opinion did not decide that), the clause applied to anyone who was an employee of a local probation department on May 31, 1985, not just to people who held the title of probation officer. The reasoning was simple: anyone who works for a probation department for compensation is an employee. So if trainees were being paid by their local departments, they were employees on that date and the grandfather clause covered them too. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1985 and interpreted a rider in that year's General Appropriations Act, which expired with that budget cycle. The Texas Adult Probation Commission has since been reorganized, and adult probation is now administered through the Community Justice Assistance Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice.

Common questions

Did the grandfather clause protect only probation officers?

No. The Attorney General concluded it protected anyone who was an employee of a local probation department on May 31, 1985, regardless of job title. The word "employed" in the rider was not limited to people who were already probation officers. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Were paid trainees covered even though they were not yet full officers?

Yes, if they were being paid. The AG reasoned that anyone who works for a probation department for compensation is an employee, so a compensated trainee on May 31, 1985 was an employee that day and fell within the grandfather clause. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Did the opinion decide whether the rider itself was legal?

No. The Attorney General expressly assumed the rider was valid and answered only the interpretation question. It did not rule on whether the rider was a proper use of an appropriations act. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Background and statutory framework

The rider appeared in the General Appropriations Act, Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 980, at 7452. Its stated intent was that the Adult Probation Commission would reduce per capita state aid to local probation departments by the amount their mileage or monthly car allowances exceeded what the state mileage reimbursement rate would justify, once the Commission determined the actual payments were over that rate. The final sentence added the grandfather clause: in reviewing and adjusting per capita aid, the Commission "shall not consider mileage or car allowances provided to individuals employed by probation departments as of May 31, 1985." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

To decide who counted as "employed," the Attorney General leaned on the ordinary meaning of employment. Anyone who works for a probation department for compensation is an employee (Northwestern National Life Insurance Company v. Black, 383 S.W.2d 806, 809, 810 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ackley v. State, 592 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). Applying that, a paid trainee on May 31, 1985 was an employee and the grandfather clause reached the trainee just as it reached a titled probation officer. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Citations and references

  • General Appropriations Act, Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 980, at 7452
  • Northwestern National Life Insurance Company v. Black, 383 S.W.2d 806, 809, 810 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
  • Ackley v. State, 592 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)

Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1985/jm0393.pdf

Source

Original opinion text

Transcribed from the scanned PDF by OCR. Character-level scanning errors have been cleaned; the wording, citations, and substance are reproduced as issued.

The Attorney General of Texas

December 19, 1985

Honorable Oscar H. Mauzy
Chairman
Committee on Jurisprudence
Texas State Senate
P. O. Box 12068, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711

Opinion No. JM-393

Re: Interpretation of Rider No. 7 to the appropriation for the Texas Adult Probation Commission in the General Appropriations Act passed by the Sixty-ninth Legislature

Dear Senator Mauzy:

You have asked a question about language in a rider to the General Appropriations Act passed by the Sixty-ninth Legislature. Rider No. 7 to the appropriation for the Texas Adult Probation Commission provides:

It is the intent of the Legislature that the Adult Probation Commission shall reduce per capita state aid payments to local probation departments by a sum equal to the amount by which the local probation departments' actual payments for mileage or monthly car allowances exceed the payments which would be justified using the state mileage reimbursement rate upon a determination by the Adult Probation Commission that the actual payments did exceed the state mileage reimbursement rate. In viewing the mileage or car allowances paid by local probation departments and in making related adjustments in per capita aid, the Adult Probation Commission shall not consider mileage or car allowances provided to individuals employed by probation departments as of May 31, 1985. (Emphasis added).

General Appropriations Act, Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 980, at 7452.

The underlined language is, in effect, a grandfather clause. You state that some local probation departments are interpreting that clause as not applying to probation officers who were trainees on May 31, 1985, and who have now become regular probation officers.

Assuming this rider is valid, the clause in question applies to persons who were employees on May 31, 1985. It is not limited to persons who were probation officers on that date. Anyone who works for a probation department for compensation is an employee. See Northwestern National Life Insurance Company v. Black, 383 S.W.2d 806, 809, 810 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ackley v. State, 592 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Thus, if trainees receive compensation from local probation departments, they are employees of such departments. The grandfather clause in the rider set out above applies to anyone who was an employee of a local probation department on May 31, 1985.

SUMMARY

If the rider is valid, the grandfather clause in Rider No. 7 to the appropriation for the Texas Adult Probation Commission in the General Appropriations Act enacted by the Sixty-ninth Legislature applies to anyone who was an employee of a local probation department on May 31, 1985.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General

MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT GRAY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General

Get today's answer for your situation

You just read a 1985 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Texas statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.