Could the Sweeny Hospital District buy or lease real property outside its district boundaries for regular hospital operations?

Texas AG Opinion JM-257: Property Outside a Hospital District

Plain-English summary

The request asked whether the Sweeny Hospital District could acquire, "by lease or purchase in fee simple," real property outside its boundaries when officials considered the property necessary for efficient operations. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

JM-257 concluded that the district lacked authority to acquire outside-boundary real estate for its regular medical and hospital services. Its summary said the legislature "did not intend the district to have the authority to acquire property located outside of its boundaries." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

The opinion began from the rule that special-purpose districts "have only the authority which is clearly granted by the legislature." It therefore asked whether the legislature had clearly granted the power, not merely whether outside acquisitions had been prohibited. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

The enabling law authorized property acquisition for a hospital system, but its express eminent-domain provision covered property "within the boundaries of the said district." JM-257 treated that limit, the absence of an express outside-acquisition grant, and the district's local-service purpose as evidence against an implied power. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

The opinion drew a narrow distinction for urgent care. It said the district could pay to send a needy inhabitant to an outside facility "because of a temporary or emergency lack of sufficient medical or hospital facilities," even though it could not acquire outside property for regular care. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could Sweeny Hospital District purchase land outside its boundaries?

No. JM-257 concluded that the enabling law did not clearly grant that authority and that the legislature "did not intend the district to have the implied power to acquire property located outside of its boundaries." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Did the same conclusion cover leasing outside property?

Yes. The request asked about acquisition "by lease or purchase in fee simple," and the summary broadly denied authority "to acquire property located outside of its boundaries." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Was the absence of an express prohibition enough to allow the acquisition?

No. JM-257 said the question was whether the legislature "has clearly granted" the authority, "not merely whether the legislature has not prohibited such action." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Could a special district ever operate or own property outside its boundaries?

The opinion recognized that the legislature could authorize such operations. It said cases permitting outside acquisitions "usually deal with a specific legislative grant of authority to acquire property within or without the district." Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Could the district pay for a resident's treatment outside the district?

Yes, in the situation JM-257 described. It said the district could pay for a needy inhabitant's outside medical expenses when a "temporary or emergency lack" of local facilities required it. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Background and statutory framework

The Sweeny Hospital District's enabling act required a hospital system furnishing care "to persons residing in said hospital district" and assigned full responsibility for needy inhabitants. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Section 9 gave the district eminent-domain power over property "within the boundaries of the said district" when necessary or convenient to its statutory powers. JM-257 reasoned that the purpose behind this express geographic restriction also applied to purchases and leases. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

The opinion acknowledged that an outside facility might be near enough to serve residents and might cost less. It nevertheless said the district's local service purpose, combined with the statutory text, weighed against an implied acquisition power; boundary expansion was the legislative solution the opinion identified for a continuing geographic problem. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Citations and references

• Moore v. Edna Hospital District, 449 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeared in the discussion of hospital-district powers. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf
• Tri-City Fresh Water Supply District No. 2 of Harris County v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940), and Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, 274 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.), supported the clear-grant rule for special districts. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf
• San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District v. Sellers, 184 S.W.2d 920, 923-24 (Tex. 1945), and State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ), addressed authorized operations beyond district boundaries. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf
• Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S.W.2d 40, 47 (Tex. 1964), stated that courts could sometimes add words needed to carry out clearly disclosed legislative intent. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf
• Stamford Hospital District v. Vinson, 517 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Carter v. Hamlin Hospital District, 538 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), concerned legislative authority to expand hospital-district boundaries. Source: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-0257
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1984/jm0257.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain. The linked PDF is authoritative.

The Attorney General of Texas

December 21, 1984

Honorable Jim Mapel
Criminal District Attorney
Brazoria County Courthouse
Angleton, Texas 77515

Opinion No. JM-257

Re: Whether a hospital district may acquire by lease or purchase real property outside its boundaries

Dear Mr. Mapel:

You ask whether the Sweeny Hospital District may acquire, by lease or purchase in fee simple, real property located outside its boundaries when such property is deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the hospital district. We conclude that the Sweeny Hospital District lacks the authority to purchase real property located outside its boundaries to fulfill the district's purpose of providing regular medical and hospital care for its inhabitants.

Grants of power to hospital districts and limitations on the exercise of that power depend upon the constitution and upon each hospital district's enabling statute. Attorney General Opinion M-171 (1967); see Moore v. Edna Hospital District, 449 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Special purpose districts have only the authority which is clearly granted by the legislature. Tri-City Fresh Water Supply District No. 2 of Harris County v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940); Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, 274 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Moore v. Edna Hospital District, supra.

The Fifty-eighth Legislature authorized creation of the Sweeny Hospital District in accordance with article IX, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 135 (V.T.C.S. art. 4494q-13). The enabling statute provides, in part, as follows:

Sec. 2. The hospital district herein authorized to be created, shall provide for the establishment of a hospital system to furnish medical and hospital care to persons residing in said hospital district by the purchase, construction, acquisition, repair, or renovation of buildings and improvements; and the equipping of same and the administration thereof for hospital purposes. Such district shall assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care for its needy inhabitants.

. . . .

Sec. 9. A hospital district organized in pursuance of this Act shall have the right and power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring by condemnation any and all property of any kind or character, real, personal or mixed, or any interest therein, including outright ownership of such property in fee simple absolute, within the boundaries of the said district, necessary or convenient to the exercise of the rights, powers, privileges and functions conferred upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by General Law with respect to condemnation. . . . (Emphasis added).

Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 135 at 361. The only express reference to acquiring real property limits the district's power of condemnation to property "within the boundaries of the said district." Nevertheless, the purpose for the restriction also logically applies to non-condemnation acquisitions of property.

Thus, neither the enabling statute nor the constitutional provision upon which it is based expressly prohibits acquisitions of real property located outside the district. However, because special purpose districts have only the authority clearly granted by the legislature, the determinative question is whether the legislature has clearly granted the Sweeny Hospital District the authority to acquire real property outside of its boundaries, not merely whether the legislature has not prohibited such action. See Attorney General Opinion WW-914 (1960). In the Sweeny Hospital District's enabling statute, the legislature granted authority to acquire real property but did not clearly indicate the scope of the power.

Because the constitution does not require that the boundaries of a special purpose political subdivision include all areas in which the subdivision has operations, the legislature may authorize operations outside a district's boundaries. San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District v. Sellers, 184 S.W.2d 920, 923-24 (Tex. 1945); State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Harris County Water Control and Improvement District No. 58 v. City of Houston, 357 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, supra. However, the cases allowing acquisitions of real property outside the boundaries of a special district usually deal with a specific legislative grant of authority to acquire property within or without the district. See, e.g., San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District v. Sellers, supra; Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, supra.

The court in State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, supra, upheld inclusion of a portion of Grimes County within the Texas Municipal Power Agency's operating area that was not within its boundaries although the enabling statute did not expressly authorize acquisitions of property outside of the TMPA's boundaries. See V.T.C.S. art. 1435a, §4(2). However, the court emphasized that it was undisputed that from the inception of planning to establish the TMPA, it was contemplated that certain areas outside its boundaries were to be acquired as sources of lignite coal to carry out the purpose of the TMPA of producing electricity. Further, even when a statute does authorize acquisitions outside district boundaries, the acquisitions must further the purpose for creation of the district. Harris County Water Control and Improvement District No. 58 v. City of Houston, supra; Attorney General Opinion WW-914 (1960). Therefore, determination of the legislative intent for creation of the Sweeny Hospital District is necessary.

The legislature is not required to set forth in detail all the provisions governing the authority of a political subdivision in carrying out its legislative purpose, State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, supra at 273, and the courts will occasionally add words or phrases to a statute when necessary to give effect to legislative intent when the intent is clearly disclosed by the remainder of the statute. Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S.W.2d 40, 47 (Tex. 1964). However, we conclude that the lack of an express grant to the Sweeny Hospital District of authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, and the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to within its boundaries indicate that the legislature did not intend the district to have the implied power to acquire property located outside of its boundaries.

Further, the fundamental purpose for the hospital district militates against implied authorization for the acquisition of facilities outside the boundaries of the district. The sole purpose of the Sweeny Hospital District is to provide medical and hospital care to persons residing in the hospital district. Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 135, §2. Conceivably, a medical facility located outside the district's boundaries may be near enough to the district to serve its inhabitants efficiently. Although purchasing an existing facility outside the district could be less expensive than purchasing one inside the district and less expensive than constructing a new facility, the inhabitants of a hospital district will usually best be served through medical facilities located within their district. A hospital district's difficulty in serving its inhabitants within its boundaries may indicate a need for a change in district boundaries rather than a need for acquisitions of facilities outside its boundaries. The legislature may provide a solution to this problem by authorizing expansion of the boundaries of a hospital district even when it is already in creation and subject to bonded indebtedness. See Stamford Hospital District v. Vinson, 517 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Carter v. Hamlin Hospital District, 538 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

However, we note that in fulfilling its constitutional duty to assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care for its needy inhabitants, the hospital district has the authority to pay for the medical expense of sending a needy inhabitant to a medical facility outside the district because of a temporary or emergency lack of sufficient medical or hospital facilities. Attorney General Opinion M-171 (1967); see also Attorney General Opinion M-870 (1971). We conclude only that the Sweeny Hospital District may not acquire real property located outside the district to fulfill its purpose of providing regular medical and hospital care for inhabitants of the district.

SUMMARY

The Sweeny Hospital District has only the authority which is clearly granted by the legislature. The lack of an express grant to the district of authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to within its boundaries, and the fundamental purpose for the hospital district of providing medical and hospital care to its inhabitants indicate that the legislature did not intend the district to have the authority to acquire property located outside of its boundaries.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE

Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Jim Moellinger
Jennifer Riggs
Nancy Sutton