Can a Texas student keep a car phone in their car parked at school?

Texas AG Opinion JM-1225: Is a Car Telephone a Banned "Paging Device" at School?

Plain-English summary

The chair of the Texas House Public Education Committee asked whether a car telephone counts as a "paging device" under section 21.309 of the Education Code. That statute barred a public school student from possessing a paging device on school property or at school activities (with narrow exceptions for volunteer firefighters and emergency medical volunteers), and defined a paging device as a telecommunications device that emits an audible signal, vibrates, displays a message, or otherwise summons or delivers a communication to the possessor.

The Attorney General acknowledged that a car telephone is a telecommunications device and could, read literally, fall within that definition, since a student parked on school property could be summoned by the phone on arrival and departure. But the opinion looked to the legislative history and concluded the legislature did not intend the ban to reach that far. The bill analysis showed the concern was pagers being activated in class (disrupting the educational process) and used to facilitate drug dealing. A car telephone locked in a parked car, which a student cannot hear during class, would not be disruptive, and if access is limited to arrival and departure it does no more to facilitate drug deals than any other nearby telephone.

So the bottom line was that section 21.309 does not prohibit a car telephone in a car parked on school property. The opinion added that if a particular district finds car telephones are in fact disruptive, the district has authority to adopt its own reasonable rules about them.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1990. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule mentioned here.

Who this opinion affected (as of 1990)

School districts: The opinion confirmed that the statewide paging-device ban did not, by itself, prohibit car telephones in parked cars, but that a district could still adopt its own reasonable disciplinary rules regulating car telephones on school property if it found them disruptive.

Students and parents: For students at the time, the opinion meant that simply having a car telephone in a car parked at school was not a violation of the state paging-device statute, though local district rules could still apply.

School administrators and peace officers: The opinion narrowed how the state paging-device prohibition applied, so that the confiscation-and-forfeiture procedure in section 21.309 was not triggered merely by a car telephone in a parked car.

Common questions

Did Texas law ban students from having car phones at school in 1990?
Not in a parked car, according to this opinion. The Attorney General concluded that section 21.309's ban on student "paging devices" did not reach a car telephone sitting in a car parked on school property.

Wasn't a car telephone technically a "paging device" under the statute?
The opinion agreed a car telephone is a telecommunications device that could fall within the literal wording, but concluded the legislature did not intend the ban to be applied that broadly, based on the bill's stated concerns about classroom disruption and drug dealing.

Could a school district still ban car telephones?
Yes. The opinion said a district that finds car telephones disruptive has authority to adopt its own reasonable rules regulating them on school property.

Background and statutory framework

Section 21.309 of the Education Code prohibited a public school student from possessing a paging device on school property or at a school-sponsored or school-related activity, unless the student was serving as an active member of a volunteer firefighting or volunteer emergency medical services organization. It required each district to include the prohibition in its written standards of student conduct, made a violating student subject to discipline, and directed that a paging device found in violation be confiscated and forfeited to the district. The statute defined "paging device" as a telecommunications device that emits an audible signal, vibrates, displays a message, or otherwise summons or delivers a communication to the possessor.

The opinion parsed the definition into two elements, a telecommunications device that summons or delivers a communication to the possessor, and reasoned that the device must actually reach its possessor, not merely have the capacity to. It relied on the bill analysis for Senate Bill 424 of the 71st Legislature (1989), which described the problem as paging devices disrupting class and being used to facilitate drug dealing, to conclude the legislature did not intend to reach a car telephone in a parked car. A footnote noted that reading the definition absolutely literally would even bar car radios, which are also telecommunications devices that emit a signal and deliver a message. On the districts' authority to regulate, the opinion cited Texarkana Indep. School Dist. v. Lewis and Education Code sections 23.26 and 21.301.

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Educ. Code § 21.309 (student possession of paging devices)
• Tex. Educ. Code § 21.301 (school district rulemaking authority)
• Tex. Educ. Code § 23.26 (school district powers)

Cases:

• Texarkana Indep. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1971, no writ)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1225
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1990/jm1225.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

September 18, 1990

Honorable Ernestine V. Glossbrenner
Chairperson
House Public Education Committee
P.O. Box 2910
Capitol Bldg., Room 302D
Austin, Texas 78768-2910

Opinion No. JM-1225

Re: Use of a "paging device" on school property or at a school function (RQ-1942)

Dear Representative Glossbrenner:

You ask whether a car telephone is a "paging device" for purposes of section 21.309 of the Education Code, which provides as follows:

(a) A student in a public school may not possess a paging device while on school property or while attending a school-sponsored or school-related activity on or off school property, unless the student is in attendance in the capacity of an active member of a volunteer firefighting organization or a volunteer emergency medical services organization.

(b) The board of trustees of each school district shall include the prohibition in Subsection (a) of this section in the district's written standards of student conduct. A student who violates the prohibition is subject to discipline as provided by board policy, consistent with this subchapter.

(c) A person who discovers a student in possession of a paging device in violation of this section shall report the violation to the appropriate school administrator, determined by school policy, who shall order a peace officer or appropriate school employee to confiscate the device, which is forfeited to the school district.

(d) In this section, 'paging device' means a telecommunications device that emits an audible signal, vibrates, displays a message, or otherwise summons or delivers a communication to the possessor.

The components of the definition of "paging device" are (1) that it be a telecommunications device and (2) that it, by some means, summon or deliver a communication to the possessor. A car telephone is a telecommunications device. See Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1984) (defining "telecommunication" as "communication at a distance as by telephone or television"). The remaining question is whether a car telephone summons or delivers a communication "to the possessor."

We note that the requirement is that the device actually summon or deliver a communication to its possessor, not merely that it have the capacity to do so. A car telephone would be able to summon its possessor only if its possessor were able to hear or otherwise perceive its signal. Consequently, a student who parked on school property would be on school property and subject to the summons of a car phone upon arrival at and departure from school or a school activity.¹ Although that would be sufficient to bring the student within the literal language of the prohibition set out in section 21.309, the legislative history indicates that the legislature did not intend that the prohibition be applied so broadly.²

The bill analysis prepared in regard to section 21.309 of the Education Code sets out the following background information:

The presence of paging devices on the campuses of the large, urban districts is increasing. Teachers and administrators report that this presence is disruptive to the educational process when these devices are activated in an educational setting. In addition, there is concern that these devices are being used to facilitate the dealing of illegal drugs.

Bill Analysis, S.B. 424, 71st Leg. (1989). Unless students attending classes or school activities could perceive the signal emitted by a car telephone, it seems unlikely that a car telephone would be disruptive to the educational process. Also, if access to car telephones is limited to time of arrival and time of departure, car phones would do no more to facilitate drug transactions than any other telephone in the vicinity of the school.

If a particular school district finds that car telephones are in fact disruptive, it has the authority to adopt reasonable rules regulating their presence on school property. See Texarkana Indep. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1971, no writ); Educ. Code §§ 23.26, 21.301.

SUMMARY

Section 21.309 of the Education Code does not prohibit the presence of car telephones in cars parked on school property. Individual school districts have authority to adopt disciplinary rules regarding car telephones.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General