In Orange County, Texas, who has the final say over how much the child support office staff get paid: the juvenile board that runs the office, or the county commissioners court that controls the county budget?

Texas AG Opinion JM-1150: Who Sets Child Support Office Salaries in Orange County

Plain-English summary

The Orange County Attorney asked whether the county's juvenile board or its commissioners court had the authority to set salaries for personnel in the county's child support office. The dispute came up because the juvenile board submitted a budget with a nine percent raise for child support office employees, and the commissioners court rejected it, saying a six percent increase was what it found acceptable.

The Human Resources Code provisions governing Orange County's child support office direct the juvenile board to establish the office, appoint a collector, and administer the fees collected to meet the office's expenses, "including postage, equipment, stationery, office supplies, subpoenas, salaries, and other expenses authorized by the board," with the general county fund required to supplement that budget as necessary. Unlike some other statutes the Attorney General had previously reviewed, where the legislature explicitly conditioned an agency's or board's budget on commissioners court approval, nothing in the child support office statute makes the juvenile board's salary decisions subject to the commissioners court's approval.

Drawing on prior Texas cases and opinions addressing similar disputes between commissioners courts and other county bodies (probation departments, a county auditor, a hospital district), the Attorney General concluded that the Orange County Juvenile Board has the authority to set the salaries of its child support office personnel, and the commissioners court's role is limited to ministerially approving the board's budget for that office unless the county can show the board abused its discretion. A commissioners court cannot simply reject the board's chosen raise and substitute its own number.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1990. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Can an Orange County commissioners court cut the raise a juvenile board approved for child support office staff?
Only if it can show the juvenile board abused its discretion. The opinion held the commissioners court's role is to ministerially approve the board's budget for that office, not to substitute its own judgment about the right raise percentage.

Why didn't the general rule that commissioners courts set county employee salaries apply here?
Because the specific statute governing the child support office, Human Resources Code section 152.1872(g), gives the juvenile board authority over "salaries...authorized by the board" for that office and does not condition those salaries on commissioners court approval, unlike some other statutes the opinion reviewed.

Does the county still have to help pay for the raises the juvenile board approves?
The opinion read section 152.1872(g)'s requirement that the child support fund "be supplemented from the general fund or other available funds of the county as necessary" to mean the county must supplement the fund to the extent needed to cover expenses the juvenile board authorizes, including budgeted salaries.

Background and statutory framework

Human Resources Code section 152.1872 required the Orange County Juvenile Board to establish a child support office and appoint a collector to handle court-ordered child and spousal support payments, funded in part by a collection fee under subsection (b) and a $5 filing fee on divorce petitions under section 152.1873, both deposited into a "Child Support Fund." Subsection (g) directs the juvenile board to administer those fees to meet the office's expenses, "including postage, equipment, stationery, office supplies, subpoenas, salaries, and other expenses authorized by the board," with the fund "supplemented from the general fund or other available funds of the county as necessary." Local Government Code section 152.012 generally directs the commissioners court to set salaries of county employees.

The opinion distinguished this arrangement from other statutes it had previously construed. In Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, a Texas court of appeals upheld district judges' authority to fix probation officer salaries with only the commissioners court's ministerial "consent," because the former probation statute (article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, before 1978 amendments) placed responsibility for probation administration with the judges. In Commissioners Court of Harris County v. Fullerton, a court similarly limited the commissioners court's power to reject a county auditor's equipment budget to instances of excessive or unreasonable specific costs, since a separate statute expressly authorized the auditor to obtain necessary equipment. By contrast, prior Attorney General opinions JM-79 (1983) and MW-15 (1979) had found commissioners court approval required for a hospital district's budget and for probation officer compensation under article 5142b, because those statutes expressly conditioned the relevant budgets on the commissioners court's approval. Because the Orange County child support office statute contains no comparable approval condition, and instead directs the county to supplement the fund "as necessary," the opinion concluded the juvenile board, not the commissioners court, controls the salary decisions, subject only to an abuse-of-discretion challenge.

Citations

Statutory provisions:

• TEX. HUM. RES. CODE §§ 152.1872, 152.1872(a), 152.1872(b), 152.1872(f), 152.1872(g), 152.1873
• TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 152.012
• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 42.12, 42.121

Cases:

• Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
• Commissioners Court of Harris County v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Prior Attorney General opinions cited: JM-79 (1983); MW-15 (1979); H-908 (1976).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/jim-mattox/jm-1150
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1990/jm1150.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

March 22, 1990

Honorable Stephen C. Howard
Orange County Attorney
Orange County Courthouse
Orange, Texas 77630

Opinion No. JM-1150

Re: Authority to set the salaries of the Orange County Child Support Office (RQ-1892)

Dear Mr. Howard:

You ask whether it is the function of the juvenile board or the commissioners court to set the salaries of child support office personnel in Orange County.

Subsection (a) of section 152.1872 of the Human Resources Code provides that the Orange County Juvenile Board shall establish a child support office and appoint a child support collector to collect and disburse child support payments as ordered by a court. Subsection (b) authorizes the collection of not less than one dollar per month from the payor of the support for collecting and disbursing child or spousal support payments made to the office. Section 152.1873 provides for the payment of a five dollar fee by each person who files for a divorce in Orange County to be used to assist in maintaining the child support office. Subsection (f) of section 152.1872 states that these fees shall be deposited in a separate fund known as the "Child Support Fund" by the county treasurer.

Subsection (g) of section 152.1872 concerns the administration of the fees in this account and the funding of the child support office.

(g) The juvenile board shall administer the fees collected under this section and Section 152.1873 to meet the expenses of the office, including postage, equipment, stationery, office supplies, subpoenas, salaries, and other expenses authorized by the board. The fund shall be supplemented from the general fund or other available funds of the county as necessary.

You advise that your question is prompted by the juvenile board's submission of a budget to the commissioners court that included a nine percent raise for employees in the child support office. The commissioners court rejected that raise, stating "the court feels a 6 percent salary increase is acceptable." See Local Gov't Code § 152.012 (commissioners court shall set salaries of county employees).

Prior to the enactment of article 42.121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 343, at 910 (eff. Sept. 1, 1978), article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that the district judges of the county would hire and fix the salaries of probation officers "with the advice and consent of the commissioners court." The salaries were funded by the counties except for the portion defrayed by probation fees.

In Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court rejected the position of the commissioners court that the [then] provision in article 42.12 permitting district judges to appoint and fix salaries for probation officers was unconstitutional. In upholding the action of the judges in fixing the salaries of probation officers, the court found that it was the intent of the legislature to place on the judges the authority to provide for and supervise the administration of probation departments. The court reasoned that it was a subject not only peculiarly within the knowledge of the judges, but one specifically entrusted to them. The court stated that the commissioners' approval of the salaries, under the provision of article 42.12 requiring their "consent," was a ministerial duty in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.

While Commissioners Court of Harris County v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), involved purchase of office equipment by the auditor, rather than salaries, the court upheld the county auditor's budget that included equipment the commissioners court refused to approve. The court found that statutes expressly authorizing the auditor to prescribe the system of accounting for the county and provide himself with equipment did not deny the commissioners court its right to exercise budgetary authority. The court concluded, however, that the commissioners court had authority to review or reject the auditor's budget "only to the extent that the specific cost of an enumerated item is excessive or unreasonable in its monetary demands upon county funds, available or to become available, subject to any abuse of discretion."

Attorney General Opinion JM-79 (1983) concerned the authority of the Harris County Commissioners Court to refuse to approve the budget of the Harris County Hospital District. Section 8 of article 4494n, V.T.C.S., authorized the administrator, under the direction of the board of managers, to prepare an annual budget to be presented to the commissioners court for final approval. Attorney General Opinion JM-79 concluded that while the statute authorized the administrator and board of managers of the hospital district to submit a suggested budget, "it accords to the commissioners court the right of 'final approval.'"

The same conclusion was reached in Attorney General Opinion MW-15 (1979) under article 5142b, V.T.C.S., regarding the budget submitted by a juvenile board. Article 5142b provided that the compensation of all probation officers shall be fixed by the board "subject to the approval of the County Commissioners Court."

A like result was reached in Attorney General Opinion H-908 (1976) under article 332a, V.T.C.S., now section 41.106 of the Government Code, which authorized the prosecuting attorney to hire personnel and set salaries conditioned on the approval of the commissioners court.

Martin was discussed and distinguished in Attorney General Opinions JM-79 and MW-15. In Attorney General Opinion MW-15 it was stated:

The language relating to the commissioners court's duty in [Martin] was ambiguous, and . . . the courts relied on the rest of the act to ascertain the legislative intent. The statute specifically indicated that this purpose was to place responsibility for probation supervision wholly within the state courts. There is neither a similar ambiguity in article 5142b nor similar language which would broaden the responsibility of the juvenile board.

Attorney General Opinion JM-79, in considering Fullerton, stated:

The court held that, once the auditor makes a determination that a particular item of equipment is necessary for the proper functioning of his office, the commissioners must ministerially take the proper legal steps to provide that equipment "unless it finds that the county auditor abused his discretion." [Fullerton] at 576. The decision was based, however, on article 1650, V.T.C.S., which authorizes a county auditor "to provide himself with all necessary ledgers, books, records, blanks, stationary, equipment, telephones and postage at the county's expense."

Under the court's reasoning in Fullerton, the commissioners court would be obliged to ministerially approve only those items in the hospital district's budget which article 4494n, or some other statute, specifically authorized. Since no statute specifically authorizes a hospital district to make the expenditures about which you inquire, we must conclude, on the authority of Attorney General Opinions MW-15 and H-908, that the commissioners court is the body ultimately responsible for the financial affairs of the county, and that, as such, it is empowered to reject any budget submitted by the hospital district.

The legislature authorized the Orange County Juvenile Board to establish a child support office, appoint a child support collector, and administer the fees collected for the child support fund to meet, among other expenses, salaries "authorized by the board." Subsection (g) of section 152.1872 further provides "the fund shall be supplemented from the general fund or other available funds of the county as necessary." We construe this provision to reflect an intent on the part of the legislature that the county supplement the child support fund to the extent that it is necessary to meet the expenses authorized by section 152.1872, including salaries budgeted by the juvenile board. Unlike the expenses under the statutes considered in Attorney General Opinions JM-79, MW-15, and H-908, the expenses budgeted by the juvenile board are not statutorily conditioned on the approval of the commissioners court. As with the statutes considered in Martin and Fullerton, it appears that it was the intent of the legislature that the juvenile board create and supervise the child support office, appoint its collector, and provide for the expenses of the office. We conclude that it is the commissioners court's function to ministerially approve the budget for child support office personnel submitted by the juvenile board, subject to a showing that the juvenile board abused its discretion.

SUMMARY

The Juvenile Board of Orange County is authorized to set the salaries of the child support office personnel. The authority of the commissioners court of Orange County to reject the salaries budgeted by the board is limited to a showing that the board abused its discretion.

Very truly yours,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General

RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Tom G. Davis
Assistant Attorney General