Can a Texas school district operate a campus outside its own geographic boundaries?

Plain-English summary

The Commissioner of Education asked whether the Boles Independent School District, in Hunt County, could operate a school outside its own geographic boundaries. Boles wanted to run a formerly private school, the Phoenix Campus, as a satellite, but that campus was physically located inside the boundaries of the Greenville Independent School District. The Texas Education Agency had taken the position that nothing in Texas law prevented a district from running a program outside its territory so long as the board found a public purpose for spending the money.

The opinion disagreed. It started from the settled rule that an independent school district has only the powers expressly given to it by law or those necessarily implied from the powers granted. There is no express statute letting a district run a public school beyond its own boundaries. The Education Code gives trustees "exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools of the district," but the operative phrase is "of the district," and the opinion read "district" to mean a defined geographic area.

To support that reading, the opinion pointed to courts in other states that have treated "district" as a single, bounded territory, and to a Texas statute showing the legislature knows how to authorize out-of-area facilities when it wants to: junior college districts were once allowed to operate branch campuses "without regard to the geographical bounds" of the district, but since 1999 that authority is limited to the district's service area. Because the legislature has granted out-of-boundary authority expressly in some contexts and not for independent school districts, the opinion concluded Boles ISD could not operate the Phoenix Campus.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later Attorney General opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

Independent school districts (what the opinion held for them): The opinion held that a district's authority is limited to schools within its geographic boundaries, because trustees' powers run to "the public schools of the district" and a district means a bounded geographic area.

The Texas Education Agency (what the opinion held for them): The opinion rejected TEA's view that the absence of a prohibition supplied authority, holding that the mere lack of a statutory ban does not furnish power to act, and that the "reserved" educational functions language in sections 11.151 and 7.003 did not supply it either.

Boles ISD and the Phoenix Campus (what the opinion held for them): The opinion held that Boles ISD could not operate the Phoenix Campus as a satellite school because that campus lay within the Greenville ISD's boundaries.

Common questions

Can a Texas school district run a campus in another district's territory?
No. The opinion concluded an independent school district may not operate a school outside its own geographic boundaries.

Does it matter that no statute forbids it?
No. The opinion held that the absence of a prohibition does not by itself create authority; a district acts only where a statute expressly or impliedly grants the power.

Where did the opinion find the boundary limit in the statute?
In the phrase "public schools of the district" in section 11.151(b), which the opinion read together with out-of-state case law treating "district" as a defined geographic area.

Has the legislature ever allowed out-of-boundary campuses?
Yes, for junior college districts before 1999, which the opinion used as proof that the legislature grants such authority expressly when it intends to, and had not done so for independent school districts.

Background and statutory framework

Section 11.151(b) of the Education Code vests in a district's trustees "the exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools of the district" and reserves to them all powers not specifically delegated to the agency or the State Board of Education. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.151(b) (Vernon 1996). Section 7.003 reserves to school districts any educational function not specifically delegated to the agency or board. The long-standing rule, drawn from cases like Harlingen Independent School District v. C.H. Page & Bro., is that a district holds only powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied. The opinion also relied on section 130.086, which since 1999 limits a junior college district's branch campuses to its service area (and grandfathers pre-1999 campuses under subsection (g)), as evidence that the legislature authorizes out-of-area facilities only when it says so expressly. See id. § 130.086(a), (g) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

Citations

Statutory provisions:

• Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 7.003, 11.151(b), 12.011, 130.006, 130.086(a), (g)

Cases:

• Harlingen Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C.H. Page & Bro., 48 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgm't adopted)
• Mesquite Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gross, 67 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)
• Texas Roofing Co. v. Whiteside, 385 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
• Royse Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Reinhardt, 159 S.W. 1010 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ ref'd)
• City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984)
• Jones v. Falcey, 222 A.2d 101 (N.J. 1966)
• Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E.2d 227 (Ohio C.P. 1953)
• Hemmingson v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 89 F. Supp. 502 (D. Alaska 1950)
• Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1993)
• Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1968)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/john-cornyn/jc-0332
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2001/jc0332.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official scanned PDF. Minor character-level errors from the source OCR have been corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - STATE OF TEXAS

JOHN CORNYN

January 22, 2001

Mr. Jim Nelson
Commissioner of Education
Texas Education Agency
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, Texas 78701-1494

Opinion No. JC-0332

Re: Whether a school district may operate a school outside the district's geographic boundaries (RQ-0273-JC)

Dear Commissioner Nelson:

You have requested our opinion as to whether the Boles Independent School District may operate a school outside the district's geographic boundaries.[1] For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that it may not do so.

You indicate that the Boles Independent School District, a school district located in Hunt County, wishes to operate a formerly private school, the Phoenix Campus, as a satellite campus.[2] The Phoenix Campus is located within the geographic boundaries of the Greenville Independent School District. See Exhibit "C", note 2, at 1; Request Letter, note 1, at 1. You state that the Texas Education Agency ("TEA") "has concluded that nothing in Texas law precludes a school district from operating an educational program outside of its geographic boundaries, provided that the school board has concluded that a public purpose is served that warrants the expenditure of its funds." Request Letter, note 1, at 1-2. Furthermore, "[t]he agency has advised school districts that have inquired that it is permissible to operate educational programs outside of the geographic boundaries of the district, and is aware of several instances in which that has happened." Id. at 2.

Section 11.151(b) of the Education Code places the exclusive control of the public schools in the school districts of the state:

(b) The trustees as a body corporate have the exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools of the district. All powers and duties not specifically delegated by statute to the agency or to the State Board of Education are reserved for the trustees, and the agency may not substitute its judgment for the lawful exercise of those powers and duties by the trustees.

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(b) (Vernon 1996). In addition, section 7.003 provides:

An educational function not specifically delegated to the agency or the board under this code is reserved to and shall be performed by school districts or open-enrollment charter schools.

Id. § 7.003. You apparently suggest that such "reserved" powers authorize the district, in the situation you pose, to operate the Phoenix Campus outside the limits of its geographic boundaries.

It is well established that an independent school district, such as the Boles Independent School District, "only possesses the powers expressly conferred on it by law or necessarily implied from the powers so conferred." Harlingen Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C.H. Page & Bro., 48 S.W.2d 983, 986 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgm't adopted); see also, Mesquite Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gross, 67 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. 1934); Texas Roofing Co. v. Whiteside, 385 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Royse Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Reinhardt, 159 S.W. 1010, 1011 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ ref'd). Clearly, a district has no express authority to operate a school outside the district's geographic boundaries. Although subsection (b) of section 11.151 grants to the trustees of an independent school district "the exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools of the district," the ultimate question is whether a school beyond a district's geographic boundaries may be said to constitute a public school "of the district." See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(b) (Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).

Courts of other jurisdictions have consistently construed the term "district" to mean a specific geographic area. In City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984), for example, the Supreme Court of Colorado said that the "term 'district,' as used in article II, section 16 [of the Colorado State Constitution], and as applicable to a municipal court prosecution for an ordinance violation in a multi-county municipality, should be interpreted to mean the area served by the municipal court or, in other words, the territorial boundaries of the city." Aurora, 689 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added). In Jones v. Falcey, 222 A.2d 101 (N.J. 1966), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "the very concept of a 'district' . . . is, that it must embrace an area with a single set of boundaries rather than be a collection of geographically isolated oases." Falcey, 222 A.2d at 106. See also Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (District "describes a special geographical area over which specific authority, executive, legislative or judicial is exercised by properly constituted officers."); Hemmingson v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 89 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Alaska 1950) (district means "'division' in a geographical sense"). Furthermore, section 12.011 of the Education Code, which authorizes a school district to adopt a "home-rule school district charter," specifically provides that the adoption of such a charter "does not affect . . . the district's boundaries." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.011 (Vernon 1996). These authorities lend credence to the principle that, unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise, a public school "of the district" should be construed to mean a public school within a school district's geographic boundaries.

This view is buttressed by an example in which the legislature has made specific provision for unusual arrangements involving public education. Since 1999, for instance, the board of trustees of a junior college district has been authorized to operate "branch campuses, centers, or extension facilities" only "within the junior college district's service area." Id. § 130.086(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Prior to 1999, however, a junior college district could operate such facilities "without regard to the geographical bounds of the junior college district."[3] Junior college districts that operated branch campuses prior to September 1, 1999, apparently may continue to do so by virtue of subsection (g) of section 130.086. See id. § 130.086(g). The point is that the legislature, when it wishes to authorize a district to operate a school facility outside its geographical area, knows how to do so, and has done so in the past. The fact that it has not done so with respect to independent school districts indicates, we believe, that such entities may not operate branch campuses outside their geographic boundaries. See also id. § 130.006 (Vernon 1991) (independent school district and community college district may enter into contract to hold college courses in school district's facilities).

We must also consider the conclusion of the TEA that "nothing in Texas law precludes a school district from operating an educational program outside its geographic boundaries." See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. It is of course settled law that the construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict a statute's plain language. See Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. 1993); Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. 1968). As we have indicated, however, a school district does not have untrammeled powers. Its authority derives from express or implied statutory language. The TEA has not explained the basis for its conclusion, nor any statute from which the authority to do so might be implied. The mere absence in Texas law of a prohibition on doing some act does not in itself furnish authority to perform that act. Nor, in our opinion, does the amorphous reference to "reserved" educational functions found in both section 11.151 and section 7.003 provide such authority. We therefore conclude that TEA's interpretation of Texas law in this instance, that the Boles Independent School District may operate a school outside its geographic boundaries, does not meet the Texas Supreme Court's test of reasonableness formulated in Moore and elsewhere.

In summary, it is our opinion that the Boles Independent School District may not operate the Phoenix Campus, a school outside the district's geographic boundaries. In view of our answer to your first question, we need not address your second question.

[1] See Letter from Jim Nelson, Commissioner of Education, to Honorable John Cornyn, Texas Attorney General (Aug. 22, 2000) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request Letter].

[2] See Exhibit "C" attached to Request Letter (Letter from Sara Hardner Leon, Powell & Leon, L.L.P., to Jim Nelson, Commissioner of Education (Aug. 16, 2000)) [hereinafter Exhibit "C"].

[3] Act of May 31, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 689, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2109, amended by Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1424, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4863.

SUMMARY

The Boles Independent School District may not operate the Phoenix Campus, a school outside the district's geographic boundaries.

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas

ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General

CLARK KENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel

SUSAN D. GUSKY
Chair, Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee