Can a Texas prosecutor drop charges if the defendant donates money to charity?

Texas AG Opinion JC-0042: Deferring Prosecution in Exchange for a Donation

Plain-English summary

The Hopkins County Auditor described a practice in the county attorney's office. Before charges were filed, the prosecutor would offer to drop a misdemeanor, such as driving while intoxicated, if the arrested person donated money to an organization the prosecutor picked. The recipient might be the county or the county law library, or a private nonprofit like Crime Stoppers, D.A.R.E., or the Sheriff's Posse. The auditor asked whether the county attorney could legally do this, and whether the county could then receive and allocate the money.

The Attorney General answered no on the first question, which made the others moot. A prosecutor does have broad discretion to decide not to prosecute a case, and may even use pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution where the law allows it. But the opinion drew a line between declining to prosecute and selling a decision not to prosecute. No Texas statute let a prosecutor demand a donation as the price of dropping a charge. The opinion pointed out that the Legislature had expressly authorized and carefully limited the diversion programs that do exist (the El Paso pretrial diversion program, juvenile deferrals, community-supervision intervention programs), which showed that this kind of arrangement is something the Legislature regulates, not something a prosecutor can invent. Given the potential for abuse, the opinion was unwilling to imply the authority from common law.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the opinion say prosecutors can't use their discretion to drop charges?
No. It recognized that a county or district attorney has broad discretion to refrain from prosecuting when, in good faith, the prosecutor thinks a prosecution would not serve the State's best interests. The problem was specifically the quid pro quo: dropping the charge in exchange for a payment.

What's the difference between this and a normal pretrial diversion program?
The opinion stressed that real diversion programs are authorized and constrained by statute. It cited the El Paso County pretrial diversion program, juvenile deferral provisions in the Family Code, and intervention programs run by community-supervision departments. Each comes with legislative limits on which offenses qualify and what conditions can be imposed. The donation practice had no such statutory basis.

Why did the opinion bring up what judges can do?
To show how tightly the Legislature controls payments to outside organizations even in court. A judge's authority to order a defendant to pay a charitable or governmental organization is strictly limited by Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, section 11(b). If a judge cannot freely route money to chosen charities, the opinion saw no basis for a prosecutor to do it informally.

Could the Legislature allow this practice?
The opinion said that was the right forum. It noted that other states which authorize deferred prosecution do so by statute and impose limits, like restricting eligible offenses, requiring written agreements, or requiring court approval. The opinion left the policy choice to the Legislature rather than reading the authority into the common law.

Background and statutory framework

A Texas county or district attorney's duty to prosecute criminal cases carries broad discretion not to prosecute. The opinion grounded that discretion in the constitutional and statutory duties of prosecutors (Tex. Const. art. V, § 21; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2.01, 2.02) and in cases like Meshell v. State and State v. Gray recognizing prosecution as the prosecutor's primary function. It also cited treatise authority that the duty to prosecute requires only the exercise of sound discretion.

Against that backdrop, the opinion catalogued the diversion mechanisms the Legislature has expressly created and bounded: the El Paso County pretrial diversion program (Gov't Code § 54.745(a)); deferral of prosecution for children with conditions like self-responsibility classes or property restoration (Fam. Code § 53.03(e), (g) and § 59.005(a)(1)); and pretrial intervention programs run by community-supervision and corrections departments (Gov't Code § 76.011(a)). It distinguished a court's deferred adjudication and community supervision under article 42.12, noting Busby v. State and the limits section 11(b) places on ordering payments to charities.

The opinion concluded as a matter of law that a prosecutor may not agree to refrain from filing a complaint or information in exchange for an offender's contribution to a designated organization, citing the absence of any authorizing statute and the potential for abuse. It surveyed several other states' deferred-prosecution statutes to underscore that where the practice is allowed, it is allowed and limited by legislation.

Citations

Texas authorities:

• TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21
• TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1999)
• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 2.01, 2.02 (Vernon Supp. 1999)
• TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 5(a), 11(a), 11(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999)
• TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.745(a) (Vernon 1998)
• TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 76.011(a) (Vernon 1998)
• TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.03(e), (g), 59.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1999)
• Tex. S.B. 1368, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999)

Cases:

• Busby v. State, 984 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)
• Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)
• State v. Gray, 801 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ)
• United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
• Wood v. United States, 622 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1993)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/john-cornyn/jc-0042
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1999/jc0042.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

May 4, 1999

Ms. Suzanne N. Bauer
Hopkins County Auditor
P.O. Box 288
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75483

Opinion No. JC-0042

Re: Whether a prosecutor may defer prosecution of a violation of the law contingent upon the offender's donation of money to a governmental or nonprofit organization, and related questions (RQ-1056)

Dear Ms. Bauer:

You ask whether a prosecutor, specifically the Hopkins County Attorney, may agree with an individual arrested on a misdemeanor charge to refrain from prosecuting a violation of the law if the offender contributes money to the county or county law library, or to private organizations such as Crime Stoppers, Drug Abuse Resistance Education ("D.A.R.E."), or the Sheriff's Posse. Although a prosecutor has broad discretion to refrain from prosecuting a violation of the law that occurs within his or her jurisdiction, a prosecutor may not require an offender to contribute money to a public or private entity in consideration of the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute. You also ask whether the county attorney may receive and allocate the sum received in accordance with the agreement, or whether the county treasurer may receive the sum and credit it to the recipient designated in the contract. Because we conclude a prosecutor lacks authority to enter this type of agreement, we do not answer these questions.

You explain that, before a prosecution is filed, the county attorney may decline to prosecute a violation of the law against an individual who has been arrested while committing a misdemeanor, such as driving while intoxicated, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1999). The prosecutor requires, as a quid pro quo, the offender to contribute to an organization selected by the prosecutor, which may be governmental, e.g., the county or the county law library, or private, nonprofit, e.g., the Sheriff's Posse, Crime Stoppers, or D.A.R.E.

The practice you describe is unlike arrangements that are explicitly permitted by statute. A county or district attorney of El Paso County, for example, may operate a pretrial diversion program. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.745(a) (Vernon 1998). In addition, any prosecutor may defer prosecuting a child and may, in certain circumstances, request the child to attend classes in self-responsibility and empathy for a victim or request the child to restore property the child damaged. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.03(e), (g) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1999) (added by Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 593, § 6, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2072, 2075); see also id. § 53.03(g) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (added by Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1013, § 16, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3686, 3692) (prosecution may not be deferred in certain circumstances); id. § 59.005(a)(1) (permitting a prosecutor to defer prosecution for a child at sanction level two for not less than three nor more than six months). A community supervision and corrections department established under chapter 76 of the Government Code may operate a pretrial intervention program. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 76.011(a) (Vernon 1998). Lastly, the practice you describe is distinguishable from a court's deferral of adjudication and imposition of community supervision in accordance with article 42.12, section 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Busby v. State, 984 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc). Notably, a judge's authority to order a defendant to make payments to a charitable or governmental organization of the judge's choosing is strictly limited. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (forbidding judge to require defendant to make payments as condition of community supervision except as authorized by law); Busby, 984 S.W.2d at 629-30 (stating that section 11(b) limits conditions authorized by section 11(a)); see also Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 241 (1999), reprinted at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/241-250.htm (stating that Code of Judicial Conduct restricts judge's freedom to force litigants to provide gifts or services to specified charities or organizations).

A county attorney's constitutional and statutory duty to prosecute criminal cases in his or her county traditionally provides the prosecutor broad discretion to determine not to prosecute an offense. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21 (requiring prosecutor to represent state in criminal cases within prosecutor's jurisdiction); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 2.01, .02 (Vernon Supp. 1999) (prescribing district and county attorneys' duties); Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (recognizing "primary function" of district and county attorneys is to prosecute the state's pleas in criminal cases); State v. Gray, 801 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (stating that responsibility for criminal prosecutions in Texas is vested in the district and county attorneys). "[T]he duty to prosecute . . . requir[es] the prosecuting attorney only to exercise a sound discretion, which permits refraining from prosecuting whenever the prosecutor in good faith thinks that a prosecution would not serve the best interests of the state . . . ." 63C AM. JUR. 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys § 21, at 133-34 (1997); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a), at 160 (1984); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 150, 152-53 (1st ed. 1977).

But you do not ask about a prosecutor's authority to refrain from prosecuting a violation of the law. See United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (and sources cited therein) (describing pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution as technique prosecutors have long used, whereby prosecutor keeps defendant out of criminal justice system but requires defendant to rehabilitate self); 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 13.1(d), at 158-59 (1984) (describing pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution as alternative between formal adjudication and outright dismissal of charge). Rather, you ask about a prosecutor's authority to refrain from prosecuting a violation of the law contingent upon the offender's contribution to a governmental or nonprofit organization.

We conclude as a matter of law that a prosecutor may not agree with an offender to refrain from filing a complaint or information in exchange for the offender's contribution to a designated organization. We are not aware of any statute that generally permits a prosecutor to exact a donation from an offender, and you do not cite to any. Moreover, because of the potential for abusing such a practice, we are reluctant to imply authority in the absence of legislation expressly approving the practice.

Rather than this office divining prosecutorial discretion to engage in the practice you describe from the common law, the legislature should have the opportunity to consider whether to allow the practice and, if so, what restrictions to place on the practice. But see Wood v. United States, 622 A.2d 67, 70 (D.C. 1993) (discussing prosecutor's common-law authority to defer prosecution). Those states that explicitly authorize a prosecutor to divert an offender to a deferred prosecution program constrain the prosecutor's discretion. For example, some of the states that authorize a prosecutor to defer prosecution restrict the offenses for which deferred prosecution is an option. See IND. CODE ANN. § 33-14-1-7(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130(3) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(i) (1997 & Supp. 1998). Some require that the agreement be in writing and may require that the offender waive his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130(1)(b), (c) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 305.2 (West 1991 & Supps. 1996 & 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(A), (a)(3) (1997 & Supp. 1998). Several limit the conditions to which an offender may be subject. See IND. CODE ANN. § 33-14-1-7(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.24, subd. 3(1)-(8) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130(1)(a) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(a)(2) (1997 & Supp. 1998). Two require that a pretrial diversion agreement be approved by a court. See IND. CODE ANN. § 33-14-1-7(c) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130(2) (1997). For other state statutes regulating the use of pretrial diversion agreements, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(6) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998) (requiring prosecutor to consult victim on perpetrator's entry into pretrial diversion program); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3603 (1995) ("Pretrial diversion plan; requirements"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 305.1-.6 (West 1991 & Supps. 1996 & 1997) ("Proceedings After Commitment: Deferred Prosecution").

SUMMARY

A prosecutor, such as the Hopkins County Attorney, may not enter into an agreement with an offender whereby the prosecutor will "defer" prosecution in exchange for the offender's agreement to contribute money to an organization of the prosecutor's choice.

Very truly yours,

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas

ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General

CLARK KENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel

ELIZABETH ROBINSON
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Kymberly K. Oltrogge
Assistant Attorney General

Footnotes

1. The legislature has before it a bill proposing to reletter subsection (g), added by Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 593, § 6, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2072, 2075, as subsection (h). See Tex. S.B. 1368, art. 19, § 19.01(17), 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).