Can an arrested person in Texas waive being read their rights by a magistrate?

Plain-English summary

The chair of the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence (the request came from his predecessor) asked the Attorney General two questions about article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires an arrested person to be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours and to be told ("admonished") of the accusation and of certain rights, including the right to counsel and the right to an examining trial. First, is the magistrate's duty to give those admonishments mandatory regardless of the arrested person's wishes? Second, may an arrested person waive the right to be taken before a magistrate and admonished? The request grew out of an informal practice, "waiving magistration," in which defense counsel offers to waive the step to speed up a client's release during busy booking periods. The opinion assumed that the only thing being waived was the magistrate's oral recitation of the rights and warnings, and it expressed no opinion on waiving any other part of the article 15.17 procedure.

On the first question, the opinion concluded the magistrate's duty is mandatory. Article 15.17(a) says the magistrate "shall" inform the arrested person, and the office had previously read "shall" in this statute to make the admonishment duty mandatory, a view the opinion saw no reason to change.

On the second question, the opinion concluded the arrestee may waive the oral recitation. A mandatory duty does not necessarily mean the benefit cannot be waived; the office had earlier concluded that a person intended to benefit from a statutory requirement could waive it. The arrestee is clearly the person the admonishment is meant to benefit, and article 1.14(a) lets a defendant in a noncapital case generally "waive any rights secured him by law," which the Court of Criminal Appeals has read broadly to allow waiver of most rights and procedural matters. Because the admonishment gives the arrestee information he has a right to receive, he may waive that right under article 1.14(a). But the opinion added a crucial limit: a person is not deemed to have waived a right unless he says so plainly, freely, and intelligently, so an arrestee may waive the oral recitation only on those terms, and whether any particular waiver is effective is for the magistrate to decide case by case. The opinion also addressed the predecessor's argument that article 1.14(a) did not apply because the article 15.17 hearing is pretrial, explaining that the hearing marks the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings and so is part of a "criminal prosecution" within the waiver provision.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later Attorney General opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

Magistrates (as the opinion described it): The opinion described the duty to give the article 15.17 admonishments as mandatory, while concluding that an arrestee may waive the oral recitation, and it left the validity of any particular waiver (whether it was made plainly, freely, and intelligently) for the magistrate to decide in each case.

Arrested people and defense counsel (as the opinion described it): The opinion described the arrestee as the person the admonishment is meant to benefit, with the ability under article 1.14(a) to waive the oral recitation of rights and warnings, but only if the waiver is plain, free, and intelligent.

Prosecutors and jail staff (as the opinion described it): The opinion limited its holding to the oral recitation and expressly did not opine on whether any other aspect of the article 15.17 procedure (such as bail determinations or other required steps) may be waived.

Common questions

Is a Texas magistrate required to read an arrested person their rights under article 15.17?
Yes. The opinion concluded that because article 15.17(a) uses "shall," the magistrate's duty to give the admonishments is mandatory.

Can an arrested person waive hearing those admonishments?
The opinion concluded yes, the arrestee may waive the magistrate's oral recitation of the rights and warnings, because the arrestee is the person the admonishment is meant to benefit and article 1.14(a) lets a defendant waive rights secured by law.

What makes a waiver valid?
Under the opinion, the waiver is effective only if the arrestee makes it plainly, freely, and intelligently, and whether any particular waiver meets that standard is for the magistrate to decide.

Does waiving magistration skip the magistrate's other duties?
The opinion assumed only the oral recitation was being waived and expressed no opinion on waiving other parts of article 15.17. Briefing it cited indicated the magistrate and sheriff still perform their other required duties.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion construed article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that an arrested person be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours and that the magistrate inform the person of the accusation and of certain rights (subsection (a)), along with other duties such as bail determinations and notifications in fresh-pursuit cases (subsections (b), (d), (g), with references to articles 14.051 and 51.13). For the mandatory-duty question, it relied on the plain-language rule in R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water and on a prior opinion, GA-0426 (2006), reading "shall" as mandatory.

For waiver, the opinion drew on a prior opinion, JC-0044 (1999) (a person intended to benefit from a requirement may waive it), and on article 1.14(a)'s broad authority for a defendant to "waive any rights secured him by law," reinforced by Ex parte Smith (most rights and procedural matters may be waived, citing Lackey v. State) and article 1.05 (the accused's right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation). It applied Sanchez v. State for the standard that a waiver must be plain, free, and intelligent, and Pecina v. State for the conclusion that an article 15.17 hearing marks the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings and is part of a criminal prosecution under article 1.14(a).

Citations

Cases:

• R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex. 2011)
• Ex parte Smith, 650 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
• Lackey v. State, 574 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
• Sanchez v. State, 120 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
• Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

Statutes:

• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2012); art. 15.17(b); art. 15.17(d); art. 15.17(g); art. 14.051; art. 51.13
• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(a) (West 2005); art. 1.05 (West 2005)

Other authority:

• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0426 (2006)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0044 (1999)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0993
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2013/ga0993.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official PDF. Minor extraction artifacts were corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

March 15, 2013

The Honorable Abel Herrero Opinion No. GA-0993
Chair, Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence
Texas House of Representatives Re: Whether an arrested person may waive the
Post Office Box 2910 requirement that he or she be taken before a
Austin, Texas 78768-2910 magistrate and admonished in accordance with
article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(RQ-1085-GA)

Dear Representative Herrero:

Your predecessor asked about a magistrate judge's duty to admonish an arrested person under article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, he asked the following:

1. Whether a magistrate judge has a mandatory duty to admonish an arrested person as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure irrespective of the arrested person's wishes?

2. Whether an arrested person may lawfully waive his right to be taken before a neutral magistrate and be admonished in accordance with Article 15.17?[1]

Article 15.17 provides that an arrested person must be brought before a magistrate judge within 48 hours. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2012). Among other things, article 15.17(a) further states that the magistrate "shall inform" the person of the accusation against him and of his rights, including the right to counsel, certain rights available during official custodial interrogation, and the right to have an examining trial. Id. (emphasis added). In addition to the required oral admonishment, article 15.17 mandates a number of other procedures related to the processing of an arrested person.[2]

The request letter provides that "an informal practice has emerged which involves defense counsel . . . offering to waive the necessity of taking their client before a neutral magistrate under Article 15.17, commonly referred to as 'waiving magistration,'" in order to expedite the client's release during busy periods at a county jail's booking facility. Request Letter at 1. Your predecessor expressed concerns about this practice, suggesting that "foregoing the Article 15.17 hearing" could affect other duties placed on the magistrate under article 15.17. Id. at 2, 5-6. Briefing submitted to this office, however, indicates that the only aspect of article 15.17 affected by the waivers at issue is the personal recitation by the magistrate to the arrestee of the rights and warnings listed in article 15.17(a).[3] In answering these questions, we assume that only the waiver of this oral recitation of rights and warnings is at issue. We express no opinion on whether any other aspects of the article 15.17 procedure may be waived.

The first question is whether article 15.17(a)'s oral admonishment requirement imposes a "mandatory duty" on the magistrate. Request Letter at 2. The Supreme Court "ordinarily construe[s] a statute so as to give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in its plain language." R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex. 2011). Article 15.17(a) uses the word "shall" in requiring the magistrate to admonish the arrested person. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2012). This office has previously concluded that the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in article 15.17 makes the duty of the magistrate to provide the required admonishments mandatory, a view which we see no reason to change. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0426 (2006) at 3 (determining that all officers who are magistrates have an equal mandatory duty to provide the admonishments of article 15.17). Thus, in answer to the first question, the duty of a magistrate to admonish an arrestee under article 15.17 is mandatory in nature.

The second question is whether the oral recitation of rights and warnings by the magistrate may be waived by the arrestee. Request Letter at 2. We first note that the mandatory nature of the magistrate's duty to admonish does not necessarily mean the admonishment cannot be waived. For instance, this office has previously concluded that a prosecutor could waive his right to receive service by certified mail from a district clerk who had a mandatory duty by statute to provide service in that manner because the prosecutor was "the person intended to benefit from the service requirement." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0044 (1999) at 2-3. Here, the only occurrence being waived is the oral recitation of the admonishments listed in article 15.17. The arrestee is clearly the person intended to benefit from the magistrate's admonishment. Under article 1.14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,[4] a defendant in a noncapital case may generally "waive any rights secured him by law." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). The statute applies very broadly by its plain terms. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals has acknowledged that "most rights and procedural matters may be waived." Ex parte Smith, 650 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (citing Lackey v. State, 574 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). Generally speaking, an accused in a criminal prosecution "shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05 (West 2005) (emphasis added). When a magistrate admonishes an arrestee, he informs the arrestee "of the accusation against him" and of his rights. Id. art. 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2012). This procedure is designed to benefit the arrestee, who has a "right" to receive the information from a magistrate and, by extension, the ability to waive that right pursuant to article 1.14(a) (West 2005).

While an arrestee has the ability under the Code of Criminal Procedure to waive the right secured to him by the requirement of oral admonishment, whether a valid waiver has occurred is a separate question. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a person is not deemed to have waived a right "unless he says so plainly, freely, and intelligently." Sanchez v. State, 120 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Thus, in answer to the second question, we conclude that an arrestee may waive his right to have a magistrate personally recite the admonishments of article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only if he does so plainly, freely, and intelligently. Whether any particular waiver is effective is a matter for the magistrate to decide in each individual case.

SUMMARY

The duty of a magistrate to admonish an arrested person as required by article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a mandatory duty. An arrestee may waive his right to have a magistrate orally recite the admonishments of article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only if the waiver is made plainly, freely, and intelligently.

Very truly yours,

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES D. BLACKLOCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JASON BOATRIGHT
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Becky P. Casares
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

[1] See Letter from Honorable Pete P. Gallego, Chair, House Comm. on Crim. Jurisprudence, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 2 (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opin ("Request Letter").

[2] See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2012) (magistrate shall determine whether the person is currently on bail for a separate criminal offense and, if appropriate, set the bail amount); (d) (on warrantless arrest made pursuant to article 14.051 of the Code pertaining to out-of-state "fresh pursuit" on suspicion of felony, arrestee is considered a fugitive from justice and magistrate shall notify appropriate officials pursuant to article 51.13 of the Code); (b), (d), (g) (providing certain parameters for magistrate's release of the arrested person on personal bond or without bond, depending on the circumstances).

[3] See Letter briefing on RQ-1085-GA from the City of Austin at 6 (Dec. 7, 2012) (on file with the Op. Comm.) ("The only step in the process that does not happen when a defendant waives magistration is the defendant listening to the magistrate's recitation of rights. Regardless of the waiver, the magistrate always performs the other required duties. Just like the magistrate, the sheriff's duties are also not affected by the defendant's waiver. Before a defendant is released from jail the sheriffs run the same checks for warrants, detainers, and other pending matters that they would for a defendant who has not waived magistration. Lastly, if a represented defendant waives the admonishments, this does not change any of the party's duties under the Vienna Convention.").

[4] Your predecessor contended that the article 1.14(a) waiver provision is not dispositive because "the Article 15.17 hearing takes place pre-trial." Request Letter at 4. However, nothing in article 1.14(a) limits its application to rights existing at the time of trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(a) (West 2005). It expressly applies to a defendant "in a criminal prosecution." Id. An article 15.17 hearing "marks the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings," and as such it is a part of a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the article 1.14(a) waiver provision. Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).