Could a Texas school attendance officer also work as a juvenile court coordinator in the justice court handling the district's truancy cases?

Plain-English summary

The Texas Attorney General concluded in 2012 that no statute prohibited an interlocal agreement under which school-district attendance officers also served as juvenile court coordinators in the justice courts where the district filed truancy cases. Education Code section 25.089 said an attendance officer “may” be a probation officer or juvenile-court officer, but that permissive wording did not limit the position to those two categories.

The opinion did not approve the arrangement under judicial ethics rules. Because the coordinators filed cases for the district while also assisting the justice of the peace, the relationship could raise judicial-conduct or recusal questions. The AG said the State Commission on Judicial Conduct had primary responsibility for applying judicial canons to specific conduct, and the answer would also require factual findings outside the opinion process.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did Texas law bar a school attendance officer from also serving as a juvenile court coordinator?
A: The opinion found no statute that prohibited the dual role under the described county-school district agreement.

Q: Did section 25.089 require an attendance officer to be a probation officer or juvenile-court officer?
A: No. The AG read “may” as permissive, so the statute allowed those roles without making them exclusive.

Q: Did the AG decide whether the arrangement violated judicial ethics rules?
A: No. It directed questions about the arrangement's propriety to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

Q: Did the opinion resolve whether the justice of the peace had to recuse?
A: No. Recusal depended on a case-specific factual inquiry, which the attorney general opinion process did not undertake.

Background and statutory framework

The Laredo Independent School District and Webb County entered an interlocal agreement under which district-employed attendance officers would file truancy cases for the district and assist the justices of the peace handling those cases. The district and county shared the compensation, but the coordinators remained district employees.

The opinion interpreted Education Code section 25.089 and Government Code section 311.016. It separately discussed the Code of Judicial Conduct and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b but stopped short of applying them to the particular working relationship.

Citations and references

• Tex. Educ. Code § 25.089
• Tex. Gov't Code § 311.016
• Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b
• Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2005)
• Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref'd)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0637 (2008), GA-0651 (2008)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0912
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2012/ga0912.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

February 27, 2012

The Honorable Richard Peña Raymond
Opinion No. GA-0912
Chair, Committee on Human Services
Texas House of Representatives
Re: Whether a justice of the peace may adjudicate
Post Office Box 2910
truancy cases where an interlocal agreement
Austin, Texas 78768-2910
between the county and the school district provides
that a school attendance officer will serve as juvenile court coordinator (RQ-0994-GA)

Dear Representative Raymond:

You ask whether a justice of the peace may adjudicate truancy cases where there exists an interlocal agreement between the county and the school district that provides that a school attendance officer will serve as a juvenile court coordinator.¹

You indicate that the Laredo Independent School District (the “District”) has entered into an interlocal agreement with Webb County (the “County”) whereby school attendance officers employed by the District would simultaneously serve as “juvenile court coordinators” in the justice of the peace courts in which the District files its truancy cases. Request Letter at 1. According to the interlocal agreement, signed by the County Judge and the District superintendent, the juvenile court coordinators will file truancy cases on behalf of the District and will also assist the justice of the peace with truancy cases. Id. at 2. The agreement further states that the juvenile court coordinators will be employees of the District, not employees of the County, and that their compensation will be shared equally by the District and the County. Id.

You first ask whether a juvenile court coordinator is an “officer of the juvenile court of the county.” This question is apparently prompted by a provision of the Education Code that declares:

(a) An attendance officer may be compensated from the funds of the county, independent school district, or open-enrollment charter school, as applicable.

(b) An attendance officer may be the probation officer or an officer of the juvenile court of the county.

¹ Letter from Honorable Richard Peña Raymond, Chair, House Committee on Human Services, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas (Sept. 15, 2011), https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opin/index_rq.shtml (“Request Letter”).

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.089 (West 2006) (emphasis added). We have found no authority that indicates the meaning of the term “officer of the juvenile court.” However, we need not address that question. Subsection (b) of section 25.089 does not require that an attendance officer must be either a probation officer or an officer of the juvenile court. The word “‘may’ creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.016 (West 2005); see also Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. 2005) (the word “may” should be given its permissive meaning). Thus, subsection 25.089(b) does not preclude persons other than those named therein from serving as an attendance officer.

You also suggest that the relationship between the justice of the peace and the attendance officer, in which the attendance officer serves as a “coordinator” for the court, might implicate the Code of Judicial Conduct. Because the “State Commission on Judicial Conduct is responsible in the first instance for applying the judicial canons to specific judicial conduct,” this office does not address such questions. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0651 (2008) at 6.² Moreover, an evaluation of this relationship will necessarily involve a factual inquiry, which this office will not undertake.

We conclude that, although no statute prohibits an interlocal agreement between a school district and a county whereby attendance officers employed by the district would simultaneously serve as juvenile court coordinators in the justice of the peace courts, questions about the propriety of such an arrangement should be addressed by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

² A brief suggests that the relationship between the justice of the peace and the school attendance officer is prohibited by Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Brief from Lisa Graybill, ACLU of Texas (Oct. 24, 2011) at 3-4. That rule requires a judge to “recuse himself in any proceeding in which,” inter alia, “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b. It is well established that, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, an appellate court presumes that a trial court is neutral and detached. “The determination of whether recusal is necessary must be made on a case-by-case fact-intensive basis.” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d). This office does not resolve questions of fact. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0637 (2008) at 5 (stating that the investigation and resolution of facts are outside the scope of the opinion process).

SUMMARY

No statute prohibits an interlocal agreement between a school district and a county whereby attendance officers employed by the district would simultaneously serve as juvenile court coordinators in the justice of the peace courts. Questions about the propriety of such an arrangement should be addressed to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

Very truly yours,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID J. SCHENCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JASON BOATRIGHT
Chair, Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee