Can the surviving spouse of a Texas officer killed in the line of duty buy health insurance if they had not enrolled before the death?

Plain-English summary

When a Texas law enforcement officer, firefighter, or similar public servant is killed in the line of duty, Chapter 615 of the Government Code gives certain survivors benefits. One of those is the right of an eligible surviving spouse to "purchase continued health insurance benefits" from the officer's former employer. A state senator asked the Attorney General to settle a real-world problem: some employers had been reading "continued" strictly and refusing coverage to a surviving spouse who was eligible for the plan before the officer's death but had not actually signed up yet. Could that survivor still buy in after the death?

The Attorney General did not answer. The opinion explained that the word "continued" is not defined in Chapter 615 and carries two reasonable meanings. One common meaning points back in time, so "continued" coverage would be coverage that was already in force before the death and simply keeps going. Another common meaning is just "lasting" or "enduring," which would not require any earlier coverage and would let the benefit start at the death. Because both readings are plausible, the opinion concluded the statute could admit more than one meaning.

Faced with that ambiguity, and given what the opinion called the special nature of the class the provision protects, the Attorney General declined to guess which reading a court would adopt. The opinion noted that courts will not rewrite a statute by adding words, and that rendering legal advice does not include the power to legislate. It said the Legislature remains free to clarify section 615.073. Because the senator's second question (about reapplying under the version amended by Senate Bill 872) depended on a yes to the first, the opinion did not reach it.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later Attorney General opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

Surviving spouses and children of officers killed in the line of duty (what the opinion did and did not decide): The opinion did not decide whether a survivor who was eligible but not yet enrolled before the death could buy coverage afterward. It identified two plausible readings of "continued" and declined to choose between them.

Senator Lucio and the Legislature (what the opinion pointed to): The opinion told the requestor that, absent a court ruling, the Legislature is free to clarify what section 615.073 means by "continued health insurance benefits."

Public employers administering Chapter 615 plans (what the opinion described): The opinion described that some employers had denied coverage based on a strict reading of "continued," but it did not resolve whether that strict reading was correct. It left the meaning and scope of section 615.073 unsettled.

Common questions

Did the Attorney General decide whether the survivor could get coverage?
No. The opinion expressly declined to interpret section 615.073, finding the word "continued" ambiguous.

Why wouldn't the Attorney General just answer?
The opinion explained that "continued" has two reasonable common meanings, that courts avoid adding words to a statute under the guise of construction, and that the office's duty to give legal advice does not include the power to legislate. Given the ambiguity and the special class involved, it would not speculate on a court's reading.

What did the two meanings of "continued" turn on?
The opinion contrasted a meaning that looks back in time (coverage already in place that persists) with a meaning of simply "lasting" or "enduring" (coverage that lasts from the death forward, with no earlier coverage required).

What about the second question on reapplying after Senate Bill 872?
The opinion did not address it, because it depended on an affirmative answer to the first question, which the opinion did not give.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 615 of the Government Code provides benefits to eligible survivors of specified law enforcement officers, firefighters, and others employed by the state, its political subdivisions, and other entities. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 615.001-.123 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). Within subchapter D, section 615.073 entitles an eligible surviving spouse of a deceased individual identified in section 615.071 to "purchase continued health insurance benefits" from the deceased officer's employer. Id. § 615.073(a) (West Supp. 2010); id. § 615.073(b); id. § 615.071 (West 2004). The senator reported that some surviving spouses had been denied coverage based on a strict construction of "continued coverage" and asked the office to advise on the meaning and scope of section 615.073, including under the version amended by Senate Bill 872.

The opinion set out the usual rules of construction: the goal is to effectuate the Legislature's intent, beginning with the plain language, and undefined words take their plain and common meaning. Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009); Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010); City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2005). Where text is unambiguous, courts adopt the plain-language construction unless context shows a contrary intent or the result would be absurd, and a statute is unambiguous only where it admits of no more than one meaning. City of Waco, 309 S.W.3d at 542; State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Because Chapter 615 does not define "continued," the opinion found two competing common meanings and concluded section 615.073 could admit of more than one. Citing its own precedent that courts avoid amending a statute by adding words and that the office cannot legislate, it declined to speculate on the construction a court would give. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0446 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0279 (2004). It left the question to a court or to legislative clarification, and did not reach the contingent second question.

Citations

Statutes and bills:

• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 615.001-.123 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)
• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 615.073(a) (West Supp. 2010)
• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 615.073(b)
• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 615.071 (West 2004)
• Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2005)
• Senate Bill 872

Cases and opinions:

• Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009)
• Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010)
• City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010)
• State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0446 (2006)
• Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0279 (2004)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0822
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2010/ga0822.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from the official PDF. Minor extraction artifacts were corrected; the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

November 19, 2010

The Honorable Eddie Lucio Jr. Opinion No. GA-0822
Chair, Committee on International Relations
and Trade Re: Eligibility for health insurance of survivors of
Texas State Senate a public servant killed in the line of duty
Post Office Box 12068 (RQ-0886-GA)
Austin, Texas 78711-2068

Dear Senator Lucio:

You ask about continued health insurance benefits of a surviving spouse of a public servant killed in the line of duty.[1] Specifically, you inquire whether

a surviving spouse or child of a public servant killed in the line of duty that was eligible for coverage under the public employer's health insurance plan before the death but had not yet elected to be covered, [is] entitled to apply for coverage after the death of the public servant under the provisions of Chapter 615, Government Code[.] And if so, were the survivors who were not covered at the time of death entitled to reapply for coverage under the provisions of Chapter 615, Government Code, as amended by Senate Bill 872?

Request Letter at 1, 4.

Generally, chapter 615, Government Code, provides for certain benefits to eligible survivors of specified law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and others who are employed by the state, its political subdivisions and other entities. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 615.001-.123 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). Within subchapter D, chapter 615, section 615.073 provides that an eligible surviving spouse of a deceased individual included in section 615.071 is "entitled to purchase continued health insurance benefits" from the deceased officer's employer. Id. § 615.073(a) (West Supp. 2010) (relating to deceased law enforcement officer employed by the state), 615.073(b) (relating to deceased law enforcement officer employed by a political subdivision of the state); see also id. § 615.071 (West 2004) (identifying law enforcement officers of which person must be surviving spouse to be eligible for subchapter D benefits). You inform us that surviving spouses of officers killed in the line of duty have been denied health insurance coverage by the officer's employer due to a strict construction of the phrase "continued coverage." Request Letter at 2. Thus you ask us to advise you on the meaning and scope of section 615.073.

The primary goal in construing statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent. See Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009). Courts begin with the statute's plain language as the surest guide to that intent. See Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010). Courts construe a statute's undefined words according to their plain and common meaning. City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2005) ("Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage."). Where the text is unambiguous, courts adopt a construction supported by the statute's plain language unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context or the construction would lead to an absurd result. City of Waco, 309 S.W.3d at 542; see State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (recognizing that "a statute is unambiguous where it 'admits of no more than one meaning'" (citation omitted)).

On its face, section 615.073 entitles a surviving spouse to "purchase continued health insurance benefits." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 615.073(a) (West Supp. 2010). Chapter 615 does not define the word "continued." See generally id. §§ 615.001-.123 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). A generally understood common meaning of "continued" is to "persist in an activity or process." NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 371-72 (2001). Under this meaning the term "continued" would seem to include reference to a point prior in time, which in this context would mean a time prior to the death of the individual. A court could construe the word "continued" in section 615.073 to mean the health insurance benefits that persist from a time prior to the individual's death. However, the term "continued" is also commonly defined to mean "to be permanent or durable; to endure; to last." WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 577 (1947). This definition connotes lasting effect and does not necessarily include an implicit reference to a prior point in time. A court construing the phrase in section 615.073 according to this definition could read it to mean the lasting "health insurance benefits," or health insurance benefits that endure. With such a construction, there is no point prior from which the health insurance benefits must persist, but rather they last or endure from the individual's death. With these two definitions of the term "continued," section 615.073 could admit of more than one meaning.

Given the latent ambiguity in the statute as well as the special nature of the class on which this provision operates, we will not speculate on the construction a court would give to section 615.073. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0446 (2006) at 6 ("Texas courts avoid 'under the guise of statutory construction, amend[ing] a statute by adding words to it, no matter how desirable such additions might seem.'" (citations omitted)); GA-0279 (2004) at 4-5 (recognizing that the Attorney General's constitutional duty to render legal advice does not include the authority to legislate). Thus, we cannot advise you on the meaning and scope of section 615.073. Of course in the absence of a judicial construction, the Legislature is free to clarify the meaning of 615.073.

Because your second question is contingent upon an affirmative answer to your first question, we do not address it.

SUMMARY

Given the latent ambiguity in section 615.073, Government Code, as well as the nature of the circumstances by which a surviving spouse becomes eligible for benefits under chapter 615, we will not speculate on the construction a court would give to the phrase "continued health insurance benefits."

Very truly yours,

DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General

DAVID J. SCHENCK
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Charlotte M. Harper
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

[1] Request Letter at 1 (available at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov).