Can a pardoned person collect wrongful-imprisonment compensation if they served a concurrent sentence for another crime?

TX AG Opinion GA-0531: Wrongful-imprisonment pay when a concurrent sentence overlapped

Plain-English summary

This opinion came out of the Tulia drug cases. In July 1999, 46 people, nearly all of them African American, were arrested in Tulia by a local drug task force and charged with selling small amounts of cocaine. Most were convicted in Swisher County or took plea bargains. After investigations discredited the arrests and the undercover agent behind them, the Governor pardoned 35 of those convicted in August 2003. One of the pardoned defendants then filed a claim for wrongful-imprisonment compensation under chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which compensates people who were wrongfully imprisoned and later pardoned on the basis of innocence.

The wrinkle was a separate, unrelated felony. Before the Tulia case, this defendant had a Potter County drug conviction for which he was on probation, not in prison. His Tulia arrest caused that probation to be revoked, so he ended up serving the Potter County sentence in prison at the same time as the Tulia sentence. Section 103.001(b) says a person cannot be compensated "for any part of a sentence in prison during which the person was also serving a concurrent sentence for another crime to which Subsection (a) does not apply." The Comptroller asked whether that provision blocked the claim when the only reason for the concurrency was the wrongful conviction itself.

The Attorney General said it did not block the claim. The key word in section 103.001(a) is "for," which the opinion read as meaning "because of." The concurrent Potter County prison sentence was served because of that unrelated crime, but it was equally served because of the Tulia crime, since the probation revocation that put the defendant behind bars happened only because of the Tulia arrest. The pardon, though directed at the Tulia conviction alone, was therefore applicable to both prison sentences. Put plainly: but for the wrongful Tulia conviction, the defendant would never have served the concurrent prison sentence, so subsection (a) reached that sentence too and subsection (b) did not strip away his right to compensation. The opinion added one limit in a footnote: this "but-for" logic would not cover a crime that the defendant committed while in prison (for example, an assault behind bars), because that sentence is not served because of the pardoned conviction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, including the compensation criteria and the claim procedures, has been amended by the Legislature since 2007. Anyone evaluating a wrongful-imprisonment claim today should work from the current statute, not this opinion's description of the 2005 version.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2007)

The Comptroller of Public Accounts: The opinion told the Comptroller she could approve a chapter 103 claim where the wrongful-imprisonment sentence overlapped a sentence for an unrelated offense, so long as that concurrent prison term was served solely because of the wrongful conviction.

Pardoned Tulia defendants and others in the same position: The opinion meant that a prior, unrelated conviction did not automatically disqualify a claimant from compensation if the only reason they served that other sentence in prison was the wrongful conviction (here, a probation revocation triggered by the Tulia arrest).

People with a sentence for a crime committed in prison: The opinion's footnote signaled the opposite result for them. A sentence for a crime committed while incarcerated (the example given was an in-prison assault) is not served "because of" the pardoned conviction, so the but-for reasoning would not extend compensation to that time.

Common questions

Does a separate criminal conviction automatically bar wrongful-imprisonment compensation?
Not under this opinion. The Attorney General read section 103.001(b) to allow compensation even with a concurrent sentence for an unrelated crime, provided the claimant served that concurrent sentence in prison solely because of the wrongful conviction.

What made the difference for the Tulia defendant?
His earlier Potter County drug offense had put him on probation, not in prison. The Tulia arrest is what caused that probation to be revoked, so but for the wrongful Tulia conviction he would not have been imprisoned on the other charge at the same time.

Did the pardon have to mention both crimes?
No. The opinion said the pardon, although directed only at the Tulia conviction, was nonetheless applicable to both prison sentences because the defendant was serving both only because of the Tulia conviction.

Is there any concurrent sentence this reasoning would not cover?
Yes. The opinion noted that a sentence for a crime committed while in prison for the pardoned offense would not qualify, because that sentence is not served because of the pardoned conviction.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code compensates persons who were wrongfully imprisoned, with claims filed in the Comptroller's judiciary section (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 103, § 103.051(a) (Vernon 2005)). Section 103.001(a) sets the entitlement criteria: the person served, in whole or in part, a prison sentence under state law and received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2005)). Section 103.001(b) restricts that entitlement, denying compensation for any part of a sentence served concurrently with a sentence for another crime to which subsection (a) does not apply (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103.001(b) (Vernon 2005)).

The opinion applied ordinary rules of statutory construction, beginning with the plain and common meaning of the statute's words and interpreting unambiguous language according to its terms (Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004); McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003); State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002)). Reading "for" to mean "because of," the opinion concluded that subsection (a)(2)(A) reached the concurrent sentence and subsection (b) did not eliminate the entitlement, subject to the footnoted limit excluding crimes committed in prison (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103.001(a)(2) (Vernon 2005)).

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 103 (Vernon 2005)
• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 103.001(a), 103.001(a)(2), 103.001(b), 103.051(a) (Vernon 2005)

Cases:

• Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004)
• McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003)
• State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0531
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2007/ga0531.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain - the linked PDF is authoritative.

GREG ABBOTT

March 19, 2007

The Honorable Susan Combs
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
Post Office Box 13528
Austin, Texas 78711-3528

Opinion No. GA-0531

Re: Application of section 103.001(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to a claim filed by one of the Tulia defendants (RQ-0523-GA)

Dear Comptroller Combs:

Your predecessor in office requested an opinion on the interpretation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, section 103.001(b). Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides for compensation to persons who have been wrongfully imprisoned. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 103 (Vernon 2005). Claims for compensation are filed with the Comptroller's judiciary section. See id. § 103.051(a). Section 103.001(a) states the criteria for entitlement to compensation for wrongful imprisonment while section 103.001(b) provides the following restriction on entitlement to compensation under section 103.001(a):

(b) A person is not entitled to compensation under Subsection (a) for any part of a sentence in prison during which the person was also serving a concurrent sentence for another crime to which Subsection (a) does not apply.

Id. § 103.001.

The question about section 103.001(b) arose in connection with a wrongful imprisonment compensation claim filed by a Tulia defendant. The request letter recited the well-publicized facts of the Tulia prosecutions:

In July 1999, 46 individuals, nearly all African Americans, were arrested in Tulia by a local drug task force and charged with the sale of small amounts of cocaine. Most of those charged were either convicted in the 242nd District Court of Swisher County or entered into plea bargains to avoid the risk of a certain conviction. . . .

Following a state investigation and an investigation of the undercover agent involved in the arrests, the arrests and convictions were discredited. In August 2003, the Governor pardoned 35 of the individuals who had been convicted.

Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

The Comptroller received a claim for compensation under chapter 103 from a Tulia defendant who was among those pardoned by the Governor. See id. At the time of the Tulia prosecutions, this individual had a previous conviction for an unrelated felony offense in Potter County involving possession of a controlled substance. See id. at 2. The individual had been granted probation for the Potter County offense and thus was not serving a sentence in prison prior to the Tulia prosecutions. Solely because of the Tulia arrest and conviction, his probation for the Potter County offense was revoked. Id. As a result, this individual served time in prison for the unrelated drug offense in Potter County concurrently with the time served in prison for the Tulia conviction. Id. The request letter pointed out that these facts raise an issue under section 103.001(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides that a person is not entitled to compensation "for any part of a sentence in prison during which the person was also serving a concurrent sentence for another crime to which Subsection (a) does not apply." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(b) (Vernon 2005). Your predecessor also stated that claims of similarly situated Tulia defendants would soon be filed, and asked whether she might approve a claim for compensation under chapter 103, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "where there is a complete concurrency between the sentence for the wrongful imprisonment and for an unrelated offense if the concurrency occurred solely because of the wrongful imprisonment." Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2.

The task before us is to determine the meaning of section 103.001(b). The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004); McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003). In discerning the Legislature's intent, the courts begin with the "plain and common meaning of the statute's words." State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). If the statutory language is unambiguous, we must interpret it according to its terms. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. We follow these rules of statutory construction in addressing the meaning of section 103.001.

Section 103.001(a) provides that a person is entitled to compensation if:

(1) the person has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state; and

(2) the person:

(A) has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced . . . .

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2005). There appears to be no dispute that section 103.001(a) by itself applies to the Tulia defendant at issue: he "served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state" and "received a full pardon on the basis of innocence" for the Tulia conviction. See id.; Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. However, under section 103.001(b), a defendant who serves a concurrent sentence in prison for an unrelated crime is not entitled to compensation if section 103.001(a) does not also apply to that concurrent sentence. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(b) (Vernon 2005). Because the Tulia defendant served "a sentence in prison" for the unrelated crime, the determinative issue is whether the full pardon was for "the crime for which" the defendant served the concurrent sentence. See id. § 103.001(a) (emphasis added).

The plain and common meaning of the word "for" in this context is "because of." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 488 (11th ed. 2003). While it is true that the concurrent sentence in prison was served because of the unrelated crime, it is equally true that such sentence was served because of the Tulia crime. And even though the pardon was applicable directly to, and only to, the Tulia crime, it was applicable to both prison sentences. Thus, in accordance with section 103.001(a), the defendant "received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which" both prison sentences were served. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2005). In sum, but for the wrongful Tulia conviction the defendant would not have served the concurrent prison sentence, and thus subsection (a)(2)(A) applies to the concurrent sentence, and thus subsection (b) does not eliminate the defendant's entitlement to compensation for the Tulia sentence.

Accordingly, the Comptroller may approve a claim for compensation under chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code where there is a concurrency between the prison sentences for the wrongful imprisonment and for an unrelated offense if the concurrent sentence was served solely because of the wrongful conviction.

SUMMARY

Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the Comptroller of Public Accounts to approve a claim for compensation for wrongful imprisonment where the sentence for the wrongful imprisonment was served concurrently with a sentence for an unrelated offense that was served in prison solely because of the wrongful conviction.

Very truly yours,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

KENT C. SULLIVAN
First Assistant Attorney General

ELLEN L. WITT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

Footnotes

[1] Letter from Honorable Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Accounts, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (Aug. 15, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

[2] Note that any such "but-for" analysis would not include a crime that would not have been committed but for the conviction (e.g., assault committed by the defendant while in prison for the pardoned crime). A sentence for such a crime is not served "because of" the pardoned conviction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2) (Vernon 2005).