If I was let off probation when my term ended but never paid my court fines, do I still owe them in Texas?

TX AG Opinion GA-0413: Do unpaid probation fines survive after the term ends?

Plain-English summary

The Administrative Director of the Office of Court Administration explained a practical problem from courts across the state. Judges often do not sign discharge orders. Instead, local supervision officers "administratively release" defendants when the community supervision (probation) period runs out, whether or not the defendant fulfilled the conditions, and the defendant stops reporting. Collections officials wanted to know: if such a defendant never paid the fines, fees, and court costs that were ordered as conditions of supervision, are they still on the hook? County attorneys were advising that they were not, because the defendants were no longer on supervision.

The opinion framed the issue as whether community supervision ends automatically when the period expires, or only when the judge enters a formal discharge order. It read article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to draw a "clear line" at the end of the supervision period. During the period, the court has broad power to set, alter, and enforce conditions, and to issue arrest warrants for violations. After the period expires, the court's jurisdiction is very limited: it continues only if, before the term ended, the prosecutor filed the right motion (to revoke for regular supervision, or to adjudicate for deferred adjudication) and a capias issued for the defendant's arrest.

Because the statute makes post-expiration jurisdiction depend on those specific steps, the opinion concluded supervision ends automatically on the expiration date. A line of Court of Criminal Appeals and court of appeals decisions backed this up, holding that the expiration of the period divests the court of jurisdiction even without a discharge order. The opinion also pointed to its own earlier opinions reaching the same result. The bottom line: a defendant administratively released at the end of the term, with none of the jurisdiction-preserving procedures used, is no longer subject to the conditions, including paying the ordered fines, fees, and court costs. The opinion was careful to add that judicial discharge still does real work, because it lifts the legal disabilities (voting, office-holding, jury service, and similar penalties) that remain in place until the judge signs the order.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was later reorganized and recodified, and the community supervision statutes have been amended repeatedly since 2006. The section numbers and procedures described here may no longer match current law. Anyone dealing with a probation collections question today should check the current statutes rather than rely on this opinion.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2006)

County and city collections officials: The opinion told them they could not collect ordered fines, fees, and court costs from a probationer once the supervision period had expired and the defendant was administratively released, unless the court's jurisdiction had been preserved by a timely motion and capias.

Judges and prosecutors: It underscored that to keep the court's power to collect or enforce after the term, the right motion (to revoke or to adjudicate) had to be filed and a capias issued before the period expired.

Probation defendants: It meant a defendant released at the end of the term, without those procedures, was free of the conditions, including unpaid fines and fees, but still needed a formal judicial discharge to clear the lingering legal disabilities of the conviction.

Common questions

Does community supervision end automatically when the term is up?
According to the opinion, yes. For both regular and deferred adjudication supervision, the period ends automatically on the expiration date, even if the judge never signs a discharge order.

Can the court still collect unpaid fines after the term ends?
Only if it preserved jurisdiction. The opinion explained that the court keeps jurisdiction past expiration only when a motion to revoke or adjudicate was filed and a capias issued before the period ran out.

If I was administratively released, do I still owe the fines and court costs?
The opinion concluded that a defendant administratively released at expiration, with no jurisdiction-preserving steps taken, is no longer subject to the conditions of supervision, including paying those fines, fees, and court costs.

Then why does a discharge order matter at all?
The opinion explained that the judge's dismissal and discharge removes legal disabilities tied to the conviction, like limits on voting, holding public office, and serving on a jury. Those disabilities remain until the judge enters the order, even after the defendant is free of the supervision conditions.

Background and statutory framework

Community supervision is governed by article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and means the placement of a defendant under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court "for a specified period" (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005)). The article provides for regular community supervision, where the defendant is convicted and sentenced but the sentence is probated (id. § 2(2)(B); §§ 3, 4), and deferred adjudication, where guilt is not adjudicated (id. § 2(2)(A); § 5; Rodriguez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.)). During supervision the court may set and, "during the period of community supervision," alter conditions, and only the trial court may grant, condition, revoke, or discharge (id. §§ 10(a), 11). At any time during the period the judge may issue a warrant for a violation (id. §§ 21(b), 5(b)). For deferred adjudication, when the period expires and the judge has not adjudicated guilt, the judge "shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge him," and that dismissal and discharge is generally not a conviction for disqualification purposes (id. § 5(c)). For regular supervision, section 20 lets the judge reduce or terminate supervision after part of the term and, on satisfactory completion, discharge the defendant and release him from penalties and disabilities (id. § 20(a)). A court retains jurisdiction after expiration only if, before the period ends, the appropriate motion is filed and a capias issued (id. §§ 5(h), 21(e)).

Construing the statute by its plain language (Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999)), the opinion concluded supervision terminates automatically when the period expires. It read section 20 to apply to regular and shock supervision and section 5(c) to deferred adjudication (State v. Juvrud, 96 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. granted); and noted the interchangeable use of "probation," Prevato v. State, 77 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). A Court of Criminal Appeals decision illustrated the "clear line": a probation that began November 3, 1976 could not be revoked for conduct after November 3, 1977 (Pedraza v. State, 562 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), citing Nicklas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) and Ex parte Miller, 552 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). Other decisions agree that expiration, even without a discharge order, divests the court of jurisdiction (Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Nesbit v. State, 175 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Shahan v. State, 792 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Howard v. State, 495 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Arrieta v. State, 719 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd)). Prior opinions of the office agreed (Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-165 (1984); Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-98-069), the latter concerning Family Code section 53.03 deferred prosecution probation.

The opinion stressed its reading does not make the discharge language of sections 5(c) and 20(a) meaningless, because those provisions remove the disqualifications, disabilities, and penalties imposed by law for a conviction, including limits on voting, holding office, and jury service (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(g); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 11.002(4)(B), 141.001(a)(4) (Vernon 2003); Payton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. MW-148 (1980)). Those disabilities persist until the judge formally dismisses and discharges (Wolf v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Davis v. State, 968 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). The opinion noted other states reach the same result (State v. Smith, 425 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)), and pointed to the Office of Court Administration's role in improving collections (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.0033(g)(2)).

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 2(2), (2)(A), (2)(B), 3, 4, 5, 5(b), (c), (h), 7, 10(a), 11, 11(a), 20, 20(a), 21, 21(a), (b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2005); arts. 42.13, 103.0033(g)(2), 44.01-.47 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 2005)
• Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(g); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 11.002(4)(B), 141.001(a)(4) (Vernon 2003); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.03

Cases:

• Rodriguez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.)
• Prevato v. State, 77 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)
• Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999)
• State v. Juvrud, 96 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. granted)
• Pedraza v. State, 562 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
• Nicklas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)
• Ex parte Miller, 552 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
• Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
• Nesbit v. State, 175 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.)
• Shahan v. State, 792 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
• Howard v. State, 495 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
• Arrieta v. State, 719 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd)
• Payton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
• Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
• Wolf v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
• Davis v. State, 968 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
• State v. Smith, 425 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0413
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2006/ga0413.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain - the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

March 13, 2006

Mr. Carl Reynolds
Administrative Director
Office of Court Administration
Post Office Box 12066
Austin, Texas 78711-2066

Opinion No. GA-0413

Re: Payment of uncollected fines, fees and court costs by defendants who have been administratively released from community supervision (RQ-0396-GA)

Dear Mr. Reynolds:

You inquire whether probation defendants who have been administratively released (but not judicially discharged) from community supervision and who have failed to pay the fines, fees and court costs they were ordered to pay as a condition of community supervision are still responsible for paying those fines, fees and court costs.[1]

In your letter you state that

clerks from across the State have informed [your office] that judges typically do not sign discharge orders. Usually, local supervision officers will administratively release defendants upon the expiration of the designated community supervision period, whether or not they have fulfilled the conditions of community supervision, and the defendants no longer report to a supervision officer.

Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. You inform us that many local collections officials are unable to continue efforts to collect the fines, fees and court costs from these defendants because county attorneys advise that because the defendants are no longer on community supervision they do not owe the funds. See id. You question whether defendants who have been administratively released are discharged from community supervision. See id. We believe the answer to your query depends on whether community supervision ends automatically at the expiration of the community supervision period or only upon formal order of the judge.

I. Legal Background

Community supervision, or probation,[2] is governed by article 42.12, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Community supervision "means the placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court for a specified period." See id. § 2(2). Article 42.12 primarily provides for two kinds of community supervision: regular community supervision and deferred adjudication community supervision. See id. Under regular community supervision, a defendant is convicted and sentenced but the sentence "is probated and the imposition of [the] sentence is suspended in whole or in part." Id. § 2(2)(B). Regular community supervision is imposed by the terms of sections 3 and 4 of article 42.12. See id. §§ 3 (judge ordered), 4 (jury recommended). Deferred adjudication community supervision differs from regular community supervision in that the defendant is not convicted and no sentence is imposed. Rather, the criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt. See id. § 2(2)(A). Section 5 sets forth the requirements for granting deferred adjudication probation. See id. § 5; see also Rodriguez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.) (distinguishing community supervision imposed with deferred adjudication under section 5 from regular community supervision imposed under section 3 or section 4).

During either type of community supervision, the defendant is subject to court-imposed conditions on behavior and activities. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Section 11 provides a non-exclusive list of possible conditions and authorizes the judge to determine what conditions to place on the community supervision. See id. It also provides that the judge may "at any time, during the period of community supervision alter or modify the conditions." Id. With certain exceptions, this authorization over the conditions of community supervision is vested only in the trial court. See id. § 10(a) ("Only the court in which the defendant was tried may grant community supervision, impose conditions, revoke the community supervision, or discharge the defendant . . . .").

For both regular and deferred adjudication community supervision, "[a]t any time during the period . . . the judge may issue a warrant for violation of any of the conditions of community supervision and cause the defendant to be arrested." Id. § 21(b); see also id. § 5(b) ("[o]n violation of a condition of community supervision . . . , the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 21"). In regular community supervision, after a hearing, the judge may "continue, extend, modify, or revoke the community supervision." Id. § 21(b). In deferred adjudication, the judge is limited to a determination of whether to proceed with "an adjudication of guilt on the original charge." Id. § 5(b).

When the deferred adjudication period has expired and "if the judge has not proceeded to adjudication of guilt, the judge shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge him." Id. § 5(c). The judge is given discretion to dismiss the proceedings and discharge the defendant prior to the expiration of the community supervision period "if in the judge's opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served." Id. Except in specified instances, under deferred adjudication community supervision, a "dismissal and discharge . . . may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense." Id. For regular community supervision,[3] section 20 provides that once a defendant has satisfactorily completed one-third of the original community supervision period or two years, whichever is less, "the period of community supervision may be reduced or terminated by the judge." Id. § 20(a). Under this provision, "[u]pon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of community supervision, and the expiration of the period of community supervision, the judge, by order duly entered, shall amend or modify the original sentence imposed, if necessary to conform to the community supervision period and shall discharge the defendant." Id. The discretionary authority given in section 20 permits the judge to "set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, and . . . dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against the defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted or to which he has pleaded guilty [with certain exceptions]." Id.

In regular and deferred adjudication community supervision, a court has jurisdiction even after the expiration of the community supervision period to revoke, continue, or modify the community supervision. See id. §§ 21(e) (regular community supervision), 5(h) (deferred adjudication community supervision). However, this continuing jurisdiction is limited and exists only if, before the period expires, both a motion to revoke, continue or modify (regular community supervision) or a motion to adjudicate (deferred adjudication) is filed and a capias issued for the arrest of the defendant. See id.

II. Analysis

The plain language of article 42.12 speaks to our question. See Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. 1999) (stating that a court construes a statute by looking to the plain meaning of the statute's language). Section 2 defines the term "community supervision" and expressly states that conditions are "imposed by the court for a specified period." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). Section 11 authorizes a court to alter or modify the conditions of community supervision, but only "during the period of community supervision." Id. § 11(a) (emphasis added). Section 21 provides for the issuance of an arrest warrant of a probation defendant who has violated the conditions of probation, but only during the period. See id. § 21(a), (b); see also id. § 5(b) (referring to section 21). Sections 5 and 21 grant a court limited jurisdiction that continues even after the expiration of the community supervision period but only if "before the expiration" of the period, the respective motion to revoke or adjudicate has been filed and a capias issued. Id. §§ 5(h) (deferred adjudication), 21(e) (regular) (emphasis added). We believe article 42.12 draws a clear line at the expiration of the period of community supervision. During the period of community supervision, courts have broad jurisdiction and discretion with regard to conditions of community supervision. At the expiration of the period, courts have very limited continuing jurisdiction conferred only by the timely filing of an appropriate motion and issuance of a capias. We believe that by drawing this clear line upon expiration of a community supervision period, whether for regular or deferred adjudication community supervision, supervision terminates automatically on the date the period expires.

A Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case illustrates the "clear line" to which we refer. In Pedraza v. State, the trial judge placed the defendant on misdemeanor probation for a period of two years in a case where the maximum length of probation, under the version of the statute in effect at the time, was one year. See Pedraza v. State, 562 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (citing Nicklas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) and Ex parte Miller, 552 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). The defendant's probation period commenced on November 3, 1976. See id. at 259. On June 27, 1977, a motion to revoke was filed based on an offense that had occurred on April 9, 1977. See id. at 259-60. On June 29, 1977, in a hearing on the motion to revoke, the court determined that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation and revoked the probation. See id. The defendant appealed the revocation on the grounds that the original order placing him on probation was void because it attempted to impose a two year probation period, a period in excess of that allowed by law. See id. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals decided that the original order placing the defendant on probation was void only to the extent it imposed a longer probation period than was authorized by law. See id. at 260. The court stated that "[h]ere, probation was granted on November 3, 1976, and consequently, any violation of its terms and conditions after November 3, 1977, could not support a revocation order." Id. Ultimately the court decided that the motion to revoke had been filed within a valid probation period, see id., but under its reasoning if the motion to revoke had been filed on or after November 4, 1977, the motion would not have been effective. See id. Implicit in the court's conclusion as to the attempted imposition of the second year of probation is the principle that at the expiration of the period, the community supervision ends automatically.

Other courts considering the timeliness of motions to revoke or motions to adjudicate under sections 21 and 5 have consistently recognized that the expiration of the community supervision period, even without a judicial order discharging the probation defendant, divests the court of jurisdiction.[4] See, e.g., Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam) (six year probation period beginning on May 10, 1993, ended May 10, 1999). One recent court of appeals case likened a term of community supervision to a prison sentence and determined that the period of community supervision expires the day prior to the anniversary date the community supervision was imposed. See Nesbit v. State, 175 S.W.3d 565, 567-68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding that defendant's "ten-year period of community supervision that began on April 29, 1994, ended on April 28, 2004"). These cases recognize that, absent the timely filing of a motion to revoke or adjudicate and the issuance of a capias, the expiration of the community supervision period divests the court of jurisdiction over the probation defendant and the conditions of community supervision.[5]

In addition, article 42.12 provides a means by which a court may retain jurisdiction over a defendant serving a term of community supervision even after the community supervision period expires, but only if before the period expires, both a motion to revoke (regular community supervision) or a motion to adjudicate (deferred adjudication community supervision) is filed and a capias issued for the arrest of the defendant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 5(h) (deferred adjudication), 21(e) (regular) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The presence of this express provision further suggests that a court's jurisdiction over a defendant serving community supervision ends at the expiration of the period.

Moreover, this office has previously recognized that the expiration of community supervision ends the jurisdiction of the court. In Opinion JM-165 this office considered language identical to that in article 42.12, section 5(c) and concluded that a defendant whose adjudication was deferred under article 42.13 (misdemeanor community supervision) could not be compelled to pay a fine after the period of probation had expired. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-165 (1984) at 2 (former article 42.13 is now incorporated into article 42.12, section 7). In 1998, this office concluded that "[d]eferred prosecution probation pursuant to section 53.03 of the Family Code may not be revoked on account of an offense or offenses committed after the expiration of the probationary period." Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-98-069, at 2.

Our conclusion does not render meaningless the language of section 5(c) and 20(a) that requires the judge to dismiss the proceedings and discharge the defendant. Both sections act, upon the judge's dismissal and discharge, to remove the disqualifications, penalties and disabilities that are imposed by law for a conviction of an offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 5(c) ("Except as provided by Section 12.42(g), Penal Code, a dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense."), 20(a) ("who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities [that result] from the offense or crime of which [the defendant] has been convicted or to which [the defendant] has pleaded guilty") (Vernon Supp. 2005). Such disqualifications, disabilities, and penalties include punishment for the commission of a criminal offense, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "penalty" as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer, esp. in the form of imprisonment or fine"), as well as limitations on the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to serve on a jury. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 11.002(4)(B), 141.001(a)(4) (Vernon 2003); Payton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. MW-148 (1980) at 2 (construing phrase "penalties and disabilities" in community supervision context and opining it operated "merely to restore the civil rights of a convicted defendant, rather than to remove all evidence of the conviction"). We believe that though the defendant is free of the conditions of community supervision, including the condition of payment of fines, fees and court costs, on the expiration of the community supervision period, the defendant does not yet have the benefit of having the disqualifications, disabilities and penalties removed until the judge has formally dismissed the proceedings and discharged the defendant. See Wolf v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("The plain language of article [42].12,[6] § 20(a) clearly contemplates the entry of an order before releasing a defendant from legal disabilities resulting from [a] conviction . . . . the legislature may have wished to formulate a method of removing legal disabilities that would be easy to verify."); see also Davis v. State, 968 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ("A defendant who has been discharged from deferred adjudication community supervision is immediately eligible to serve on a jury, [or] to vote[.]").

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we believe that absent any action by the court to revoke community supervision or determine guilt prior to the expiration of the community supervision period, the period of deferred adjudication community supervision or regular community supervision ends automatically on expiration. We therefore conclude that a probation defendant is not subject to the conditions of community supervision as of the date the period of community supervision expires. Thus, probation defendants who have been administratively released at the expiration of the community supervision period but who have failed to pay the fines, fees and court costs ordered as a condition of community supervision are no longer responsible for those fines, fees and court costs. Article 42.12 provides specific procedures that, if followed, would continue the court's jurisdiction and allow for the collection of owed fines, fees and court costs even after the community supervision period has expired. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 5(h) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (deferred adjudication), 21(e) (regular); see also id. art. 103.0033(g)(2) (the Office of Court Administration shall assist counties and cities to improve the collection of court costs, fees and fines imposed in criminal cases by providing training and consultation).

SUMMARY

Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides specific procedures that, if followed, would continue the court's jurisdiction and allow for the collection of owed fines, fees and court costs even after the community supervision period has expired. If, however, those procedures are not followed, then a probation defendant is not subject to the conditions of community supervision, including the payment of fines, fees and court costs, after the date the period of community supervision expires.

Very truly yours,

GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas

BARRY R. MCBEE
First Assistant Attorney General

ELLEN L. WITT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Charlotte M. Harper
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

Footnotes

1. See Letter from Carl Reynolds, Administrative Director, Office of Court Administration, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas (Sept. 12, 2005) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

2. "The terms 'community supervision' and 'probation' share the same meaning and are generally used interchangeably." Prevato v. State, 77 S.W.3d 317, 317 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

3. See State v. Juvrud, 96 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. granted) ("[w]e conclude that section 20 applies only to regular and shock community supervision, and section 5(c) governs early termination of deferred adjudication").

4. See also Shahan v. State, 792 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (six months probation beginning on December 17, 1986, ended June 17, 1987); Nicklas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (two year probation beginning on June 3, 1971, ended June 3, 1973); Howard v. State, 495 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (two year probation beginning on March 14, 1969, ended March 14, 1971); Arrieta v. State, 719 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd) (two year probation beginning on October 27, 1981, ended October 27, 1983).

5. Other states that have considered the question have reached the same conclusion. See State v. Smith, 425 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Once a probation term has expired, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation."); Utah Att'y Gen. Informal Op. No. 83-34 (1983) at 1 ("Under the laws of Utah, the probationary term expires automatically and unlawful conduct occurring after its expiration can never be used as grounds to revoke probation.").

6. In context, it is apparent the court's reference to section 44.12 in this statement is a typographical error. See Wolfe, 917 S.W.2d at 277 (discussing article 42.12, section 20 in the immediately preceding paragraph). Chapter 44, Code of Criminal Procedure, concerns appeals. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 44.01-.47 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 2005) (Chapter 44, "Appeal and Writ of Error").